himself trained Ottoman artillery for the Russian War of 1548-50, and established naval operations
against Spain in 1551-5
; French embassies offered aid in the 17th century, and the Embassy of
Mehmed Efendi to France in 1720-21 included military manoeuvres as well as the study of
fortification models
; and the series of military reverses the Ottoman Empire suffered in the 18th
century occasioned new efforts at military reform and modernisation, such as Russian, prussian and
British military missions in 1834 - too late, since her defeats triggered the Eastern Question,
namely the long agony fo the dismemberment of the Empire which concluded with the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923
.
The setting for this paper is therefore an Empire in gradual decline faced by increasingly
industrialised European powers seeking markets for their products, and willing to use their armies
and navies as an arm of commerce. In what was a Mediterranean (and, indeed, Europe-wide) game
of chess, with ever-moving alliances, the French Ministry of War attempted to keep up-to-date on
Ottoman military and navalcapabilities by studying the strengths and weaknesses of the Ottoman
Empire, by mapping possible invasion routes, and by recording the reports on defences and
weapons composed by officers lent to the Turks. In 1783 and 1784, for example, engineers,
artillery officers and sappers arrived in Turkey, to train officers, found cannon, and build
fortifications, within a School of Military Engineering
. Many such officers were well-educated,
and intensely interested in the antiquities they came across, not only because of a classical
education, but also because such antiquities (roads, forts, cisterns, aqueducts) might well be needed
in the event of invasion, as proved to be the case when they invaded Algeria in 1830
. Since their
reports often write at great length on such matters, the Ministry was clearly of the same mind. We
shall examine below some examples of the reports generated during this mission.
Such reconnaissance reports are valuable today because they are often the only record of many
antiquities since destroyed, or of the more pristine states of monuments since become dilapidated.
Through them we can gain a much fuller picture both of the “antique landscape” of the Ottoman
Empire than is available from most 18thC or 19thC travel writers or (later) archaeologists, and of
how the Ottomans continued in many instances to use a “military landscape” bequeathed to them
by Rome and Byzantium. To take as an introductory example the most basic of all, namely roads:
Western Europe was giving great attention to transport questions in the 18th century, even to the
extent of investigating building roads on the Roman model. That such Roman-style construction
was an unattainable ideal because too expensive, is reflected partly in the recourse to canal-
building. But in the Ottoman Empire, roads were especially important, nothing equivalent having
replaced what the Romans had built well over a millennium beforehand. To locate and use such
surviving roads was therefore essential for any army. Their lack was a cause for lament, as in an
1807 Itinerary from Spalato to Constantinople
: Du reste les chemins sont tel, qu'on pouvoit dire
qu'il n'y en a point et qu'il y en a partout…
D. M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: a pattern of alliances 1350-1700, Liverpool 1951, pp. 124, 127.
F. M. Gocek, East encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century, New York 1987, pp.58, 86.
R. Mantran, "Les debuts de la Question d'Orient (1774-1839)", in R. Mantran editor, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman,
Paris 1989, pp.421-458.
L. Pingaud, Choiseul-Gouffier, la France en Orient sous Louis XVI, Paris 1877, pp. 95ff; cited in Masson, Histoire
du commerce francais dans le Levant au XVIIIe siecle, p.275;
M. Greenhalgh, "The new centurions: French reliance on the Roman past during the conquest of Algeria", War &
Society 16.1, May 1998, pp.1-28.
Genie, Article 14: Turquie, Carton II, 1786-1838.