Take it or leave it: Cognitive rules and satisfying choices.
Wahida Chowdhury (wahida_chowdhury@carleton.ca)
Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, K1S 5B6, Canada
Warren Thorngate (warren_thorngate@carleton.ca)
Department of Psychology, Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, K1S 5B6, Canada
Abstract
We frequently face decision situations (selecting a mate,
accepting a job offer, etc.) presenting only one alternative
at a time and requiring us to "take it or leave it" (TIOLI).
These situations force us to adopt some kind of satisfying
rule setting minimum standards and accepting the first
alternative that meets or exceeds them. One such rule sets
initial standards and does not change them as alternatives
are sampled. Another kind of rule modifies the standards in
light of sampled alternatives. The present simulation
examined how level of initial standards, quality of
alternatives, and rule modification speed influenced search
length and the quality of choice outcomes. Results show
that search length grows exponentially when standards
remain fixed and declines drastically even when
modifications are slow. Results also support the
speculation that people adopting lower standards are far
more likely to choose alternatives exceeding their
expectations than are people adopting higher standards.
Implications for the shift from idealism to realism are
discussed.
Keywords: decision-making, satisficing rules, search
length, take it or leave it
Decision-Making Situations
The hardest thing to learn in life is which bridge to cross
and which to burn. David Russell
Most research in human decision-making examines
situations where a chooser must select one of two or more
alternatives presented simultaneously (e.g., Botti & Hsee
2010; Schwartz 2005). This allows the chooser to
compare the alternatives before making a choice.
However, many decision-situations present only one
alternative at a time, and a chooser is constrained to either
take it or leave it (TIOLI). If she/he takes it, no more
alternatives are presented; if she/he leaves it, the rejected
alternative is not presented again. For example, most of us
cannot ask prospective mates to wait for a few years while
we search for someone better, or ask a prospective
employer to hold a job open for a few months while we
look for a better one. Also, we are rarely guaranteed
alternatives in the future. We might, for example, reject
prospective mates until we are too old to marry, or decline
job offers until our skills are no longer required. The
present study presents a computer model of TIOLI
situations, and investigates the consequences of possible
cognitive rules people might use to make choices in these
situations.
Cognitive rules to make decisions can range from
sophisticated evaluations of each alternative, to seeking
advice, to flipping a coin. The rules we employ depend
not only on our personal characteristics (such as,
temperament, cognitive ability, practice, and habit), but
also on the decision situations we face (Simon 1956).
Psychologists and economists have studied the
consequences of varying cognitive rules used in decision-
situations with simultaneous alternatives (e.g., Fasolo,
McClelland, & Todd 2007; Gourville, & Soman 2005;
Thorngate, 1980). However, the literature for cognitive
rules used in TIOLI decision-situations is scarce.
Simon (1956) argued that, when choosing an
alternative, people tend to satisfice (set a minimum
standard of satisfaction and take the first alternative that
meets this standard) rather than optimize: (take the best
alternative after evaluating all). TIOLI situations force
decision makers to use some form of satisficing cognitive
rule. We might begin our search by setting a fixed
minimum standard: to be acceptable, for example, an
alternative must have at least seven out of ten desired
features. We might then take the first alternative that
meets or exceeds our standard, or we might lower our
standard if we examine several alternatives and none meet
the standard we set.
There are several variations of satisficing rules,
prompting a few simple questions: How do variations of
the rules compare in the choice outcomes they generate?
How simple can cognitive rules be and yet make
satisfying choices? We attempt to answer such questions
by running a computer model of TIOLI situations, with
variations of cognitive rules.
The TIOLI Computer Model
Drawing on Thorngate's (2000) original simulation, we
wrote a program in "R" that (1) created TIOLI situations
and (2) applied variations of satisficing rules for making
choices in these situations, and (3) examined how the
variations affected the number of alternatives examined
and expected outcome. Each TIOLI situation was
represented in a matrix of 10 rows and 50,000 columns;
its cells filled randomly with 0s and 1s in varying
proportions. Each column in the TIOLI matrix