1600742

Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the
Nineteenth Century
Author(s): Metin Heper
Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique
, 1980, Vol. 1, No. 1, Studies in Systems Transformation (1980), pp. 81-105
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1600742
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CENTER AND PERIPHERY
IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
With Special Reference to
the Nineteenth Century
METIN HEPER
The article takes issue with two hypotheses often claimed in the literature-that the
Ottoman centuries extending from the sixteenth to the nineteenth evince a progressive
development from a centralized to a quasi-feudal polity, and that during the course of
the nineteenth century progress had been made toward a constitutional government. It
is noted that throughout the period in question, in fact, two types of relationship existed
between the center and the periphery: power politics and a degenerated form of patron-
client relationship. The change that took place has been no more than a segregative change.
Change in the periphery itself was not evolutionary, let alone revolutionary. At times it
showed signs of involution; any weakening of the central control led to maximum legal
irresponsibility.
The Ottoman centuries, extending from the second half of the
sixteenth to the early decades of the nineteenth century, are often
depicted as a progressive development from a centralized to a
quasi-feudal polity. The proponents of this view have in mind the
gradual weakening of the center and the growing "autonomy"
that the periphery acquired during this period. ' Another observa-
tion frequently made is that, during the course of the nineteenth
century, progress was made toward a constitutional government
in the Ottoman polity. The Sened-i ittifak (Deed of Alliance)
of 1808, the Guilhane Hatt-i Humayunu (Imperial Rescript of
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to the Social Science Research Council, New York, and
the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, for support and encourage-
ment that made this study possible. I should also mention here the perceptive criticisms
of Engin Akarh, Carl Brown, Carter Findley, Serif Mardin, and Howard Reed on an
earlier version of this paper. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for the mistakes that
remain.
International Political Science Review, Vol. I No. 1, 1980 81-105
? 1980 International Political Science Association
81
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82 STUDIES IN SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION
Guilhane) of 1839, the islahat Fermani (Reform Edict) of 1856,
the creation of central and provincial "representative" assemblies
and councils throughout the Tanzimat (Regulations) period of
1839-1876, and the convening of the first Ottoman parliament in
1877 following the proclamation in the previous year of a consti-
tution are taken as milestones in this development.
Neither of these views, it is true, is advanced without qualifi-
cations. The fact is not denied that, after its final consolidation
during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-1481),2 the
political power of the center never dwindled completely. Simi-
larly, the nineteenth century is not taken as the triumphant period
of pluralism, let alone liberalism. Frequently, reference is made
to sultanic and/or bureaucratic absolutism during this century.
Still, one is often left with the impression that from the sixteenth
century on, there took place a resurgence of the local notables
in the Ottoman polity who commanded significant political
influence, and that this group maintained and even strengthened
its position during the nineteenth century (see inter alia Aricanli,
1976; Sadat, 1972; Szyliowicz, 1977).
CENTER AND PERIPHERY:
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Ottomans, in fact, succeeded to a legacy of feudalism.3
Maliksah of the Sejuks had compensated his mamluk officers
with estates where they had built their autonomous powers
(Weber, 1968: 1015-1016; Shaw, 1976: 7). Osman, the first sultan
of the Ottomans (1299-1324), was recognized by the Seljuk sultan
as a bey, as a person wielding political authority (Inalcik, 1976:
15). Even at this time, however, the social structure in Anatolia
was not genuinely feudal because the peasants were far from
being serfs. In the lands conquered by the Ottomans, they were
usually left in the status of a kind of a tenant (Karpat, 1973: 30).
This heritage is significant in that the class power of the feudal
lords in the West was directly at stake with the gradual disap-
pearance of serfdom (Anderson, 1974: 19).
The Ottomans from the very beginning set forth to establish
a centralized polity.4 During Bayezit I's reign (1389-1403) and
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Heper/CENTER AND PERIPHERY 83
immediately thereafter almost all the tools and the structures of
a centralized administration were adopted: periodic surveys of
population and land, a central treasury, a bureaucracy which
sought from the capital to regulate affairs of state throughout
the provinces, and a system of control through the sultan's own
slaves (Inalcik, 1976: 28; Szyliowicz, 1977: 105).
Whereas the absolute monarchs in the West had usually drawn
their servants from among the small rural nobility (Beloff, 1962:
101; Rosenberg, 1958: 67), the Ottomans, like the Indian sultans
(Thorner, 1965: 218), opted for a royal household full of loyal
slaves. By successful deployment of the members of this group
to all the critical posts both at the center and the localities, the old
Turkish aristocracy was gradually removed from its position of
a ruling class. Although they were retained as an influential group
so that the sultan could play them off against his slave group
(Shaw, 1976: 58), their status could now be determined by the
center, a fact which shows the beginning of the dependency
relationships
The Ottoman land regime, too, manifested patrimonial char-
acteristics. The whole country was a single oikos; the political
realm was identical with a huge sultanic manor (Weber, 1968:
1013).6 When the Ottoman administration was first established
in Anatolia, all agricultural land passed to the ownership of the
state. All local feudal rights which limited the state's control over
the land and the peasants were abolished. In 1475, a large part
of the land held by vakifs (religious foundations) and private
individuals was confiscated by the state and assigned as timars
(fiefs) to cavalrymen who, among other things, collected taxes in
the localities on behalf of the state (Inalcik, 1976: 34-35, 49).
Under the Ottoman fief (timar) system, the granting of benefice
in return for service to the sultan did not bring with it extensive
political-territorial rights. Furthermore, there was an element
of compulsion in this relationship. One component of the fief was
no more than a dirlik, or revenue granted as a "living." Each
timar holder was given a relatively small land, ifitlik, for his
personal use. He extracted his "salary" from this land as long as
he remained in that area. When he was assigned to another area,
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84 STUDIES IN SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION
he returned his qiftlik to the state. On other lands he had only
supervisory powers. He had to see to it that the peasants kept their
assigned lands under cultivation, and paid their taxes. The fief-
holder could not himself cultivate lands other than his own small
qiftlik, nor could he transfer them to other peasants as long as
the present tenants fulfilled their obligations deriving from the
centrally specified rules. The administrative and legal matters
were largely the responsibility of the other centrally appointed
governors, kadis (district judges), and the janissary units. Before
the law, the peasants were equals with the fief-holders; they could
make complaints about the fief-holders who never possessed
autonomous political powers (Szyliowicz, 1977: 108).
Autonomous political power implies among other things the
authority to make laws and regulations. This authority is exer-
cised independently; it is not based on delegated powers. That
in the Ottoman Empire autonomous powers were not granted to
the localities is evident in the fact that, in the polity, one comes
across legal codes covering all aspects of government and society
in a manner that previous Muslim rulers had never attempted
(Shaw, 1976: 62-83, 101).7 The Ottomans for their part revived
the late Roman-Byzantine principles of ius publicum. They
adopted from the Persians what the Austrian nobility in the 1860s
had dubbed as "the dangerous procedure of personal decree ...
and the dubious principle that it can bestow and take away rights"
(Anderson and Anderson, 1967: 69). Drawing upon their drf-i
sultani, or sovereign prerogatives, the Ottoman sultans could
issue laws and regulations which could do away with precedents
(Mardin, 1962: 102; Shaw, 1976: 135); their edicts, therefore,
could be very different from the medieval practice that only
interpreted tradition (Weber, 1968: 1012).8 Through the granting
or withdrawing of berats (imperial certificates), the sultans could
also decide whether a person belonged to a tax-free or a tax-
paying group (Mardin, 1969: 272).
Thus, the existence of extensive rules and regulations was
devised for regulating the society from the center rather than for
granting rights. Further, the state's supremacy in the Ottoman
polity was propped up by the fact that Islam was never an autono-
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