Goethe's phenomenological way of thinking and Urphänomen

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Goethe’s Phenomenological Way of Thinking and the Urphänomen
Article in Goethe Yearbook · January 2015
DOI: 10.1353/gyr.2015.0036
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IRIS HENNIGFELD
Goethe’s Phenomenological Way of Thinking
and the Urphänomen
Das Höchste wäre, zu begreifen, daß alles Factische schon Theorie ist. Die Bläue
des Himmels offenbart uns das Grundgesetz der Chromatik. Man suche nur
nichts hinter den Phänomenen; sie selbst sind die Lehre. (FA 1.13:49)
[The ultimate goal would be: to grasp that everything in the realm of fact is
already theory. The blue of the sky reveals to us the basic law of chromatics.
Let us not seek for something behind the phenomena—they themselves are
the theory.1]
Der Mensch kennt nur sich selbst, insofern er die Welt kennt, die er nur in
sich und sich nur in ihr gewahr wird. Jeder neue Gegenstand, wohl beschaut,
schließt ein neues Organ in uns auf. (FA 1.24:596)
[The human being knows himself only insofar as he knows the world; he perceives the world only in himself, and himself only in the world. Every new
object, well contemplated and clearly seen, opens up a new organ within us.
(39)]
T
HESE TWO MAXIMS SUGGEST that Goethe’s thinking about and intuition of
the world are phenomenologically grounded. They can be read as programmatic statements for his specific kind of phenomenological thinking,
evident in his poetry and his natural science and philosophical writings. I
suggest reading the first aphorism in the light of the phenomenological shibboleth “Back to the things themselves”2 (Zurück zu den Sachen selbst), pronounced by Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement. Similarly, the second aphorism reflects the phenomenological intertwinement of subject and object; it shows how each new experience might
widen the faculties of perception, cognition, and intuition and thus suggests
that the observer undergoes perpetual metamorphosis in response to each
new object of perception and cognition.
As I will show, reading Goethe’s method—his way of perceiving, experiencing, and reflecting—as grounded in and guided by what Husserl calls the
“principle of all principles,” that is, pure and “original intuition,”3 allows new
insights into Goethe’s works. Hence, I propose a phenomenological reading
of Goethe, especially of his philosophical and scientific writings.4 Husserl’s
philosophical language and phenomenological method, oriented toward
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Iris Hennigfeld
clarity and truth, help to illuminate Goethe’s phenomenological thinking
and to transform implicit into explicit philosophical concepts. The relation
between Goethe’s and Husserl’s phenomenology can be viewed from two
perspectives: from the historical point of view, Goethe can be seen as a forerunner of phenomenological insights; from the philosophical angle, Goethe
and Husserl share similar philosophical ideas. I want to show how Goethe’s
thinking sheds new light on central questions in phenomenological philosophy, in particular regarding Husserl and his followers. If we regard Goethe
as a spiritual predecessor of the phenomenological movement in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, his analyses can provide new insights into the
problems that also drove Husserl’s work.
In the following, I examine some key ideas in Goethe’s thinking, including his notion of the Urphänomen from a phenomenological perspective. My
aim is to show that the Urphänomen can be understood as an example of a
phenomenological science of nature that explores the limits of intuition and
cognition. Furthermore, Goethe’s phenomenological way of thinking, exemplified by his notion of the Urphänomen, invites radical openness especially
toward phenomena that, like the Urphänomen, elude the standards of modern science and its mathematization of nature and exceed the limits of mere
objectification and representation.
This article is divided into five parts. Section 1 focuses on the phenomenological method in its relation to different kinds of givenness in the phenomenal world. Section 2 analyzes the relation between art and science in
Goethe’s thinking and explains, from a phenomenological point of view,
why Goethe used imagination as a tool of cognition. Section 3 explains how
Goethe’s phenomenological method—particularly, his enhanced notion of
experience and his showing (Aufweisen or Ausweisen) or illumination of
the manifold conditions of appearances—led him to the “discovery” of the
Urphänomen. Section 4 parses the relation between world and consciousness, phenomena and thinking, in phenomenological philosophy. I link the
phenomenological correlation of Self and world with Goethe’s attempt to
develop and enhance the organs of perception. In this last section, I turn
toward Martin Heidegger’s adoption of Goethe’s Urphänomen and its inherent potential for the “task of thinking”5 in the future.
Intertwining Method and Content
in Phenomenological Thinking
Phenomenological thinking describes and analyzes manifold ways of phenomenal givenness and shows how different phenomena (or ontological
regions of phenomena) correlate with particular kinds of experiences. The
late Husserl programmatically describes this correlation in his Cartesian
Meditations: “Zu jedem Gegenstandstypus gehört seine typische Art möglicher Erfahrung” (Hua 1:24; Each type of object correlates to its own specific
type of possible experience). The founder of phenomenology did not first
develop a method and then apply it to different fields of phenomena; rather,
he conceived of different phenomenological methods—the “static,”“genetic,” and “generative” approaches—through phenomenological investigation,
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145
through describing and analyzing different fields of the phenomenal world
and of consciousness.6 Therefore, phenomenology is not a philosophical discipline in the same way as, for example, metaphysics, ontology, and
ethics; nor is it a technique, which, once developed and adopted, can be
applied in a uniform manner to different fields of phenomena. Rather, in
phenomenological thinking each specific type of givenness determines its
correlative methodological approach; so, as new fields of research appear,
new methods must develop.7 Consequently, in phenomenological thinking
there is a certain supremacy of the process of thinking over the result of
research.
Different phenomenologists have developed their original styles of phenomenology, which differ, sometimes to a very considerable extent, from
Husserlian phenomenology. But at the same time they all share essential
communalities that mark them as exponents of phenomenological thinking. Because they have much in common, it is justified to turn to other phenomenologists to support particular arguments, all the more so since these
thinkers developed their own approaches in response to questions raised
by Husserl. Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s most famous student, for example,
emphasized in the context of his methodological considerations in §7 of Sein
und Zeit (Being and Time, 1927) that the term “phenomenology” signifies neither a “standpoint” nor a “direction” but primarily a method; phenomenological thinking, as Heidegger continues, focuses not on “the what of the objects”
of research but rather on “the how of that research.”8 Similarly, the French
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who attended Husserl’s lectures in
1929 in Paris, theorized the intertwinement of content, the object of thought,
and method in phenomenological thinking. Merleau-Ponty points out that
this correspondence is not limited to any specific field of research but characterizes phenomenology itself. In the preface to his Phenomenology of
Perception (1945), he radicalizes this correlation, stating that “[p]henomenology is accessible only through a phenomenological method.”9
In Goethe’s thought, the uniqueness of different phenomena or fields of
research calls for a variety of different methods. There is no one abstract
theoretical approach that could do justice to different kinds of phenomena.
Especially after his encounter with the Kantian Schiller, Goethe reflected on
his own method of research, and as a result, his studies on comparative anatomy and botany after the 1790s emphasized methodological considerations
over new scientific experiences and results.10 More than twenty years later,
in his next phase of scientific research, Goethe’s notebooks Zur Morphologie
(FA 1.24:399–642; Morphological Notebooks) and Zur Naturwissenschaft
(Scientific Notebooks) pair—under the title “Erfahrung, Betrachtung,
Folgerung, durch Lebensereignisse verbunden” (Experience, Reflection,
Conclusion, Linked by Life Events)—new essays with older attempts without revising the latter. Thus, Goethe does not merely explicate his results
or a complete and closed system but rather gives insight into his process of
research, that is, how he approaches nature.11 In so doing, Goethe enables
the reader to participate actively in the process and historical development
of his research. By reenacting Goethe’s way of thinking, readers gain a deeper and more detailed understanding of the morphological method, which
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enables them to apply it to their own fields of research. Thus, in a letter to
Hegel from 1820, accompanying his treatise on entoptische Farben (entoptic colors), included in his Zur Morphologie, Goethe confesses that it is “die
Rede nicht von einer durchzusetzenden Meinung, sondern von einer mitzuteilenden Methode, deren sich ein jeder als eines Werkzeugs nach seiner
Art bedienen möge” (FA 2.36:115; we are speaking not of an opinion that
is to triumph by all means but rather of a method to be suggested that anyone may use as a tool in his own way). This correlation of method and field
of study called for different methods depending on whether one dealt with
organic or physical nature. According to Gernot Böhme, Goethe considers
the phenomenological method particularly adequate to the field of organic
nature, and here particularly morphology.12
For Goethe a phenomenon of living nature has no objective, external
purpose but rather is constituted as an organism with its own telos. Kant
provided the philosophical foundation for this position in §§76 and 77
of his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Pure Reason).13 In his essay on
Kant entitled “Einwirkung der neueren Philosophie” (FA 1.24:442–46; The
Influence of Modern Philosophy), Goethe points to a similarity between
his thought and Kant’s concept of the faculty of judgment: both regard
“das innere Leben der Kunst so wie der Natur” (the inner life of nature and
art) as well as “ihr beiderseitiges Wirken von innen heraus” (FA 1.24:444;
their respective effects as they work from within, 29). In §75 of Kritik der
Urteilskraft Kant argues that physical-mechanical laws cannot fully explain
phenomena of organic nature and urges us to consult teleological explanations.14 Whereas for Kant these teleological laws are subjective principles
(regulative ideas) that derive from the conditions of our faculty of cognition,15 for Goethe they are an integral part of the constitution of the phenomena themselves; that is, they are objective. Thus, for Goethe, discursive
rationality or mathematical standards cannot fully explain and exhaust a
phenomenon of living nature (see Förster [1] 171). Rather, the observer
must be flexible in his approach and cultivate an attitude of living participation: “wir haben uns, wenn wir einigermaßen zum lebendigen Anschaun
der Natur gelangen wollen, selbst so beweglich und bildsam zu erhalten,
nach dem Beispiele mit dem sie uns vorgeht” (FA 1.24:392; we ourselves
must remain as quick and flexible as nature and follow the example she
gives, 64). According to Goethe, the flexibility of the observer’s cognitive
faculties is the only adequate response to the manifold ways in which phenomena of organic or living nature are constituted. Additionally, I argue
that, besides phenomena of organic nature more generally, the infinite horizon of possible perception and experience within the phenomenal world
as such demands a methodological adaptability. Each phenomenon opens
up a new horizon and demands infinite openness and research toward the
things themselves. Therefore, phenomenological thinking is necessarily
preliminary and open. This, however, is not a lack but a consequence of
the horizon “bestimmbarer Unbestimmtheit” (Hua 11:6; determinable indeterminacy), as Husserl puts it. From a phenomenological point of view, we
can do justice to the unique achievements of Goethe’s contribution to the
field of a science of nature only if we acknowledge the predominance of
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method and process over results and use value. Consequently, the particular value of Goethe’s way of thinking lies not in positive results (as “matters
of facts”) but rather in his specific method of phenomenological thinking
and experiencing.
The Arts and Science in Goethe’s Thinking
The Arts and Science as “Leading Clues”
Goethe often expressed his philosophical and scientific ideas in a poetic, aphoristic, or even paradoxical style. The reason for this is not a subjective preference for poetic language over philosophical concepts. Rather, it
is a consequence of his insight into the correspondence of the subjective
approach to phenomena and their objective nature. Since in phenomenological philosophy there is a necessary correlation between the original intuition
and the respective intuitive or descriptive term (see Hua 3/1:190; 91), Goethe
relied on poetry when the paradoxical nature of a phenomenon demanded a
similarly paradoxical language.
In his influential study of the phenomenological movement, Herbert
Spiegelberg subsumes Goethe, together with Isaac Newton, Ernst Mach, and
Albert Einstein (among others), under the rubric “Pseudo-Phenomenologies”
or “Extra-Philosophical Phenomenologies.”16 Although Spiegelberg allows
(in a footnote) a protophenomenological interpretation of Goethe’s thinking, he sees his actual focus “merely” on a science of nature “different from
Newton’s”:
Goethe, although he never uses the term “phenomenology,” has often been presented as a proto-phenomenologist, chiefly on the basis of his anti-Newtonian
doctrine of the phenomena of color. . . . Certain parallels between his approach
and Husserl’s phenomenology, and even more that of others, are unmistakable.
. . . Nevertheless Goethe’s concern was not philosophy, but merely a natural
science of the color different from Newton’s. (Spiegelberg 8; italics are mine)17
Spiegelberg’s assessment of Goethe’s contribution to the phenomenological
tradition is symptomatic of a common prejudice: it mistakes Goethe’s actual field of research—the phenomena of organic and inorganic nature—for
the original questions and problems that led Goethe to both natural science
and the arts or poetry. Goethe did not simply intend to challenge Newtonian
science, just as Husserl did not simply aim to disprove skepticism or refute
Galilean science in the radical critique of the modern sciences in his late
work Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, 1936).18 Rather, both thinkers encountered scientists like
Galileo and Newton while developing their own scientific or philosophical
thinking and phenomenology, which was toto coelo different from Galileo’s
and Newton’s approach. For both Goethe and Husserl, Galileo and Newton
exemplify a type of thinking that mistakes the quest for theory for the quest
for a truth of the things themselves.19
For Husserl, the phenomena themselves as they occur in direct experience must be subjected to description and analysis, prior to all prescientific
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or scientific prejudgments or causal, psychological, cognitive, or affective
explanations.20 In this manner, the phenomenological style of thinking uses
one phenomenon, which is accessible to observation and description, as an
example for another, hidden but more basic, phenomenon. For Heidegger, as
he explains in the introductory motto and first paragraphs of Sein und Zeit,
the analysis of Dasein and time not only offers new insights but serves as a
unique “leading clue” (Leitfaden) for investigating the “question of the meaning of Being” (Sein und Zeit, 1).21 Similarly, for the late Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
nature leads to being and, thus, represents “the expression of an ontology.”22
In Goethe’s research in the field of natural science, on the other hand, sensible phenomena of nature allow insights into archetypal phenomena and
thus facilitate a deeper knowledge of the relation between the real and the
ideal, the sensuous and supersensuous world, matter and spirit. In his morphological studies, for example, Goethe focuses not on the outer shape but
on the “innere Identität der verschiedenen Pflanzenteile, welche uns bisher
in so mannigfaltigen Gestalten erschienen sind” (FA 1.24:128–29; inner identity of different plant parts that have presented themselves to us in a variety
of forms). In his treatise Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären
(FA 1.24:109–51; The Metamorphosis of Plants), Goethe gives an account
of his approach to the field of organic nature. He describes in detail how,
prior to any scientific theory or hypothesis, he observes the dynamic, continuous transitions between each step of development from the seed to the
flower. This essential identity gradually reveals the nature of organic development as such, its underlying idea, unity, or Gestalt (see FA 1.24:131). We
arrive at this “innere Identität” by successively observing each step of the
plant’s becoming, until the moment at which a higher, more basic phenomenon, which precedes and underlies all parts, comes to light (see Förster, Die
25 Jahre der Philosophie, 262). Through the process of reenacting and reproducing these transitions in the mind, the plant’s underlying idea, its unity, can
be revealed.23
As Goethe explains in his methodological treatise Der Versuch als
Vermittler zwischen Objekt und Subjekt (The Experiment as Mediator
between Object and Subject, 1792, published 1823), he is acutely aware
that in living nature “geschieht nichts, was nicht in einer Verbindung mit
dem Ganzen steht” (FA 1.25:33; nothing occurs that is not connected to the
whole), and his scientific method seeks to do justice to this essential insight
into the connectedness of all phenomena. Moreover, just as there is an essential nexus between all phenomena in nature, there is also an analogy between
the arts and science. Thus, referring to ancient works of art, Goethe writes in
his diary in Italy (September 6, 1787):
Diese hohen Kunstwerke sind zugleich als die höchsten Naturwerke
von Menschen nach wahren und natürlichen Gesetzen hervorgebracht
worden. Alles Willkürliche, Eingebildete fällt zusammen, da ist Notwendigkeit,
da ist Gott. (FA 1.15/1:424)
[These sublime works of art are, as the highest works of nature, brought forth
by human beings according to true and natural laws. Everything arbitrary or
fictional collapses. There is necessity, there is God.]
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Goethe’s concept of nature must be understood in its widest sense. “Nature”
designates being as such as it reveals itself through conscious participation
in the phenomena of nature. For Goethe, art and nature are analogical: they
reveal the same lawfulness of being and they spring forth from the same
source, and conversely, they can both serve as Ariadne’s thread to the same
original unity.24 As Goethe writes in Versuch einer Witterungslehre (Toward
a Theory of Weather, 1825), this unity can be perceived and conceived in
a symbol or in a “mirror” (Abglanz) that reflects “truth” or the “divine,”25
for which Goethe, depending on the particular context or period of his
work, uses different names, including God, Godhead, Nature, and Spirit,
and which itself is “unerforschlich” (inexplorable) or “unaussprechlich”
(inexpressible).26
Imagination and “Intuitive Understanding” as
Phenomenological Tools of Cognition
In Goethe’s way of encountering the world, particularly the phenomena of
nature, there is another cognitive faculty at work in sensible experience. This
faculty opens up sensory experience and physical nature for its underlying
idea and mediates between the “real” and the “ideal.” For this organ of cognition, Goethe coined the phrase “exakte sinnliche Phantasie” (FA 1.24:615;
exact sensory imagination, 46), which should not be misread as a paradoxical,
poetical expression. Rather “exakte sinnliche Phantasie” signifies a precise,
phenomenologically grounded method of encountering, seeing, and experiencing phenomena in their sensuous and supersensuous nature. In order to
elucidate how “Phantasie,” or imagination, can serve as a tool of knowledge, I
first focus briefly on the devaluation of the imagination in the philosophical
tradition and then turn to the value of imagination for phenomenological
thinking.
Imagination as a tool of knowledge and source of images was banned in
the philosophical tradition for three reasons. First, the concept of dualism
locates the origin of all images in the lower sensuous order, not in the higher
power of the intellect; second, the theory of representationalism, which is
related to the image theory of consciousness, sees images as mental copies
of sensual perceptions; that is, the image is a simulacrum of a real object;
third, images are devalued because of their reification as quasi-material things
(in the mind, in consciousness), a position related to the image theory of
consciousness, especially the Cartesian tradition.27
In contrast, in phenomenological thinking, images are considered acts of
living consciousness. Husserl treated the imagination as a specific tool of
cognition. From 1898 until the mid-1920s, he devoted his research to the
field of image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein), imagining, imagination, and
fantasy. He sought to develop phenomenological criteria that clearly define
and differentiate image consciousness, perception, fantasy appearance or fantasy presentation, memory, and imagination from mere semblance, illusions,
dream appearances, and hallucinations, and so on.28 Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination does not reduce consciousness to its reflective (as in the
Cartesian tradition) or reproductive capacities or to its rational-discursive or
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mathematizing function (as in the Galilean or Newtonian tradition). Instead,
he gives a full account of possible modes of consciousness, including different kinds of rational and prereflective relations between the subject and
the world. Regarding different modes of consciousness Husserl writes in the
volume on image consciousness and imagination that “‘Bewusstsein’ besteht
durch und durch aus Bewusstsein, und schon Empfindung so wie Phantasie
ist ‘Bewusstsein’” (Hua 23:265; “consciousness” encompasses consciousness through and through, and even sensation, as well as fantasy, is already
“consciousness”).
Husserl grants fantasy, imagination, or “freie[r] Fiktion” (Hua 3/1:16; free
fiction) a high value within the phenomenological method and its goal of
eidetic intuition, or Wesensschau (see Hua 3/1:48). In a “free fiction” of an
object—for example, the geometrician who imagines a triangle, the idea of
a triangle, not any individual existent triangle—we can examine an object
independently from its real existence and freely vary the individual, contingent, or accidental features of this specific object (see Hua 3/1:147–48). The
variation of its attributes is possible as long as we do not lose its identity
as this specific object. The invariable features constitute the essential structures, or the eidos, the idea (Wesen), of an object.29 Thus, imagination is a
crucial tool for the intuition of essences. Husserl summarizes the specific
value of the imagination or fiction for the phenomenological goal of eidetic
intuition as follows:
So kann man denn wirklich, wenn man paradoxe Reden liebt, sagen und,
wenn man den vieldeutigen Sinn wohl versteht, in strikter Wahrheit sagen, daß
die “Fiktion” das Lebenselement der Phänomenologie, wie aller eidetischen
Wissenschaft, ausmacht, daß Fiktion die Quelle ist, aus der die Erkenntnis der
“ewigen Wahrheiten” ihre Nahrung zieht. (Hua 3/1:148)
[One can really say, if one loves a paradox and will allow for the ambiguity, and
say it with strict truth, that the element that makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetic science is “fiction,” that fiction is the source from which the
knowledge of “eternal truths” draws its sustenance.]
Similarly, for Goethe the power of “Phantasie” (fantasy) or “Einbildungskraft”
(FA 1.24:449; imagination) does not merely produce “fictions” or “illusions,”
as opposed to reality. Rather, Goethe’s notion of “Phantasie” stands in the
tradition of German Idealism and its concept of “intellectual intuition” or
“intuitive understanding” (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), both of which are productive, not receptive, organs of cognition. But it also anticipates Husserl’s
phenomenological idea of the imagination as a tool of eidetic intuition. As
Eckart Förster has shown, Goethe perfected the method of “intuitive understanding” through his morphological investigations and by observing a complete sequence of a plant’s developmental steps; but once the whole (or the
plant’s Gestalt) is intuited, all individual parts can be developed out of this
whole (see Förster [2] 324–25, 334–36).30 In a move comparable to the hermeneutic circle, all parts of a plant receive their meaning from the whole
even though the intuition of the organic unity of the plant itself results from
studying a complete series of forms. By observing the metamorphosis of
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plants, Goethe intuits that it is one and the same organ that unfolds, stepby-step, in the process of metamorphosis. He calls this primordial organ
“Blatt” (FA 1.15/1:402; leaf),31 a term that should be understood not literally but as a symbolic expression for the inner “telos” of the plant’s development. Although intuitive understanding is characterized by a living process
of inner participation and, correlating with the subject’s dynamism, by fluid
and flexible concepts, it is precise, not vague or inexact.
Goethe’s poetical thinking exemplifies how he integrated not only reason but also imagination as a distinguished mode of consciousness into
the process of cognition. For example, motivated by his study of Kantian
philosophy and its dualism of thinking and intuition, Goethe drew on poetical expression to bridge this gap. In his essay “Bedenken und Ergebung”
(Doubt and Resignation, 1820), he considers the “Schwierigkeit, Idee und
Erfahrung miteinander zu verbinden” (difficulty in uniting idea and experience), because “die Idee ist unabhängig von Raum und Zeit” (the idea is
independent of space and time), whereas natural science is based on an
experiential proceeding and is “in Raum und Zeit beschränkt” (FA 1.24:449;
bound by space and time, 33). Goethe further admits that “der Verstand
kann nicht vereinigt denken, was die Sinnlichkeit ihm gesondert überlieferte, und so bleibt der Widerstreit zwischen Aufgefaßtem und Ideiertem
immerfort unaufgelöst” (FA 1.24:449–50; our intellect cannot think of
something as united when the senses present it as separate, and thus the
conflict between what is grasped as experience and what is formed as idea
remains forever unresolved, 33). The philosophy of his time, in particular
Kant’s criticism, could not solve this epistemological problem. Instead, as
a way out of this impasse, Goethe proceeds to the next level of cognition,
the realm of poetry and “Einbildungskraft” (FA 1.24:449). He concludes his
essay in an ironic mode, quoting an “altes Liedchen” (FA 1.24:450; old song,
33):
So schauet mit bescheidnem Blick
Der ewigen Weberin Meisterstück,
Wie ein Tritt tausend Fäden regt,
Die Schifflein hinüber herüber schießen,
Die Fäden sich begegnend fließen,
Ein Schlag tausend Verbindungen schlägt. (FA 1.24:450)
[Thus view with unassuming eyes
The Weaver Woman’s masterpiece:
One pedal shifts a thousand strands,
The shuttles back and forward flying,
Each fluent strand with each complying. (33–34)]
In the opening lines of this poem, also published under the title“Antepirrhema”
(FA 1.3/1:100), the image of a weaving loom visualizes not only the infinite
references and manifold connections within the phenomenal world but also
the living entwinement of experience and idea. For Goethe, the power of
analytical reason together with the synthetic and unifying power of cognition fully intuits, conceives, and expresses this phenomenal and ideal
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nexus. Both faculties must work together in every investigation into nature
because nature itself proceeds both analytically and synthetically, as Goethe
writes in “Einwirkung der neueren Philosophie”:
Indessen fuhr ich fort der Bildung und Umbildung organischer Naturen ernstlich nachzuforschen, wobei mir die Methode womit ich die Planzen behandelt, zuverlässig als Wegweiser diente. Mir entging nicht, die Natur beobachte
stets analytisches Verfahren, eine Entwicklung aus einem lebendigen, geheimnisvollen Ganzen, und dann schien sie wieder synthetisch zu handeln, indem ja
völlig fremdscheinende Verhältnisse einander angenähert und sie zusammen in
Eins verknüpft wurden. (FA 1.24:444)
[In the meantime I was intent on continuing my studies of the formation and
transformation of organisms, and here the method I had applied to plants
proved to be a reliable guide. I could not help but notice that nature always follows an analytic course—development out of a living, mysterious whole—but
then seems to act synthetically in bringing together apparently alien circumstances and joining them into one. (29)]
In an aphorism, Goethe suggests a “Steigerung des geistigen Vermögens”
(FA 1.25:113; enhancement of our spiritual powers) in order to expand and
deepen the realm of possible experience and spiritual activity. In light of
the transition into poetry in “Bedenken und Ergebung,” such an enhancement of the organs of perception and cognition must include the aesthetic
dimension of reality and poetical creativity, which grants the desired synthesis of “Erfahrung” and “Idee,” the real and the ideal. For Goethe, “Phantasie”
or “Einbildungskraft” represents a precise tool of cognition correlating to a
widened and deepened notion of experience that is inextricably linked to
the idea. Thus, Goethe’s concept of cognition unifies idea and experience,
the individual and the general, for the sake of a deeper and richer knowledge of the phenomena themselves. Although the question of precisely how
imagination and intuitive understanding serve as extended tools of cognition
demands further study, in the following I focus on Goethe’s enhanced notion
of experience, which helps us understand how the phenomenological method led him to the Urphänomen.
Goethe’s Enhanced Notion of Experience
and the Urphänomen
As has been shown, phenomenological thinking is characterized by an
extended and enhanced notion of experience, which is conceived as a tool
of cognition. Goethe’s widened and deepened notion of experience served
as a precise, scientific tool in his investigations into the phenomena of color
and light. Similarly, Husserl’s lifelong investigations (and also those of his successors) into manifold phenomena show how phenomenological philosophy
offers a method to describe and reveal particular experiences in their specific character of truth or, phenomenologically speaking, “evidence,” which
Husserl defines, in turn, as “‘Erlebnis’ der Wahrheit” (Hua 19/2:652; “experience” of truth).
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From a phenomenological point of view, if we want to open the richness
of the phenomenal world to all possible life-world experiences and scientific
investigations, the notion of experience must be understood in its widest
sense, including and reflecting all kinds and levels of givenness, from phenomena of spatial-temporal presentation or perception to phenomena of the
religious, moral-emotional, or ecological spheres, as recent phenomenological research has shown.32
Anthony Steinbock characterizes phenomenological thinking as “a type
of reflective attentiveness attuned to givenness that occurs within experiencing itself” (Phenomenology and Mysticism, 3). This orientation toward
immanent givenness is one reason why a Kantian epistemology—based on
the assumption of a thing-in-itself not accessible to experience—would be,
from a Husserlian standpoint, “Unsinn” (Hua 36:32; nonsense). Rather, from
a phenomenological perspective, the nature of any being, its Wesen (eidos),
can be fully given in experience if we do not restrict or relegate experience
to a specific mode but evaluate “what is actually given in human experience,
thereby expanding our notion of evidence” (Steinbock, Phenomenology and
Mysticism, 1).
Husserl defines the phenomenological method of “Aufweisung” (showing)—in contrast to a scientific proof or argument—as uncovering “unerforscht gebliebene[r] Wesensstrukturen” (Hua 17:299; unexplored eidetic
structures), which may reveal what was formerly hidden or concealed. The
phenomenological method of “Aufweisen” or “Ausweisen” makes the invisible
visible; therefore, the phenomenologist Max Scheler aptly compares it with a
“Zeigestab[s], mit dem wir auf etwas hinzeigen, sehen machen, damit es der
andere besser sehe oder überhaupt sehe” (pointer that we use for showing
something so that others can see it better, or see it at all).33 Goethe suggests a gradual phenomenological demonstration and description of the phenomena by showing their interconnection and succession step-by-step and
from the bottom to the top.34 This procedure, as he writes in Versuch einer
Witterungslehre (1825), can prevent “die Gefahr. . . Ursache und Wirkung,
Krankheit und Symptom, Tat und Charakter zu verwechseln” (FA 1.25:274;
the danger of confusion between cause and effect, illness and symptom, deed
and character, 146). As I will show, Goethe’s method of observing and showing-up (Aufweisen) from the bottom to the top the manifold conditions of
appearances in the phenomenal world enabled his discovery and intuition
of the Urphänomen.
A study of Goethe’s thinking, particularly as it appears in his scientific
work, suggests that, from the very outset of his investigation into nature and
much like the phenomenologists, he brings into play a widened notion of
experience. This notion includes not only sensual or spatial-temporal experience but also “Erfahrungen der höheren Art” (FA 1.25:34–35; empirical
evidence. . . of a higher sort, 16) or “Erfahrungen von der höheren Gattung”
(empirical evidence of a higher nature, 36), as he puts it in his treatise on
the experiment, Der Versuch als Vermittler zwischen Objekt und Subjekt.35
Similarly, in his autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit (Poetry and Truth),
Goethe contrasts his idealism of nature to Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach’s materialistic interpretation of nature and confesses that he was always searching
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for “dasjenige, was höher als die Natur, oder als höhere Natur in der Natur
erscheint” (FA 1.14:536; that which appears higher than nature or as higher
nature within nature).
In Der Versuch als Vermittler, Goethe deals with the subjective and objective conditions in scientific research and reflects on the manifold relations
between the observer, the object of research, and the experiment or set of
experiments (cf. Kuhn 28). The inner depth and richness of each phenomenon require, as Goethe claims, either a “Reihe von Versuchen” (extensive
series of experiments, 14) and modification of the experimental arrangement on the part of the object, or a focus on “nur eine Erfahrung unter den
mannigfaltigsten Ansichten” (FA 1.25:34; a single piece of empirical evidence
explored in its manifold variations, 16) and varying perspectives on the
part of the subject.36 In his essay, Goethe grants experience a high methodological value, but he also formulates two difficulties: the first concerns
the proper use of experience as a scientific tool;37 the second concerns the
development of experiences of a higher order (see FA 1.25:30–36). The first
problem can be solved by building a community of researchers who focus
on the same object and then communicate their results.38 The second can
be addressed through a complete series of experiments related to one phenomenon all of which represent “nur Einen Versuch” (a single experiment) or
“nur Eine Erfahrung” (FA 1.25:34; a single piece of evidence, 16). Beholding
the sequence as a whole and simultaneously separating the steps from each
other would be one experience or an experience of a higher order. Aware
of each individual variation, Goethe then proceeds to a more general standpoint, until he finally intuits the coincidence of the individual phenomenon
and its universal lawfulness or a higher unity within each individual phenomenon. In an aphorism he expresses this correlation of the general and the
particular in a paradoxical style:
Was ist das Allgemeine?
Der einzelne Fall.
Was ist das Besondere?
Millionen Fälle. (FA 1.13:46)
[What is the universal?
The single case.
What is the particular?
Millions of cases.]
In Erfahrung und Wissenschaft (Empirical Observation and Science),
Goethe claims that a natural scientist must start his research with a series
of experiences and then continuously explore the manifold “Bedingungen
unter welchen die Phänomene erscheinen” (FA 1.25:126; conditions under
which the phenomena appear, 25). The goal of this serial proceeding is neither to accumulate mere empirical facts nor to reduce various phenomena to
their causal or foundational relation. These laws of nature, in Goethe’s view,
can neither be restricted to the principle of cause and effect nor misunderstood as logical, metaphysical, or epistemological and transcendental conditions (cf. Engelhardt 310). On the contrary, from a phenomenological point
Goethe Yearbook
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of view, the “Bedingungen” in Goethe’s thinking may be seen as references
both to the multiple and intertwined factors relating to the sphere of the
subject and to specific objective conditions that enable the appearance of
a particular phenomenon. In this context, Goethe refers to the Greeks: “Die
Griechen, wenn sie beschrieben oder erzählten sprachen weder von Ursache
noch von Resultat sondern trugen die äußere Erscheinung vor” (FA 1.13:266;
The Greeks spoke of neither cause nor effect in their descriptions and stories—instead, they presented the phenomenon as it was, 308).
Similar to Goethe, Husserl describes the process of phenomenological
perception and observation and shows how the phenomenologist, prior to
any analytical-reflective account, must integrate each appearance in a particular horizon of other phenomena, observe this appearance in various contexts,
and see it from manifold possible perspectives in order to gain full insight
into the phenomenon. Thus, in phenomenological thinking, as Eva-Maria
Simms puts it, all external perception must take “into account the unifying
halo of the plenum,”39 even if this halo is “empty” and refers to “non-actualized
appearances.”40 In perception the phenomenon in focus appears within a
horizon of other, unfocused phenomena, which are not perceived with the
same awareness. In Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl
describes the process of perception by letting the appearance speak:
There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze
run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on looking
me over again and again, turning me to all sides. You will get to know me like
this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner sensible qualities. (41)
Goethe’s use of the term “conditions” evokes Husserl’s idea of the phenomenal “horizon” as the particular horizon that surrounds each phenomenon. Different phenomena are associated with different circumstances
and manifold factors, which, although they can be separated, are all related to and necessary for the particular appearance and manifold conditions
of the phenomenon as the actual focus of awareness. Goethe describes
these multiple factors of the phenomena as their “konsequente Folge, ihr
ewiges Wiederkehren unter tausenderlei Umständen, ihre Einerleiheit und
Veränderlichkeit angeschaut und angenommen” (FA 1.25:126; their consistent sequence, their eternal return under thousands of circumstances, their
uniformity and mutability are perceived and predicted, 25).
Goethe’s Farbenlehre (Theory of Color) can be seen as a particular way
of phenomenological thinking. In §§136–77 of the “Didactic Part” of the
Farbenlehre, Goethe gives an account of his experiments with “turbid media”
(see FA 1.23/1:70–83). He describes his observations of different atmospheric conditions and the color phenomena of the sky from sunrise to sunset. He
explicates in depth in §§174–77 the method that led him to an intuition of
the Urphänomen and characterizes it in §175 as the full, dynamic interplay
and interaction between light, darkness, and turbidity, which generate a lively
variety of manifold colors.41 Goethe does not merely present his results; he
describes the process of his investigation into the phenomena of color by
proceeding, in a gradual manner, from the plurality of manifold, individual
phenomena to more general intuitions. He writes:
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Das, was wir in der Erfahrung gewahr werden, sind meistens nur Fälle,
welche sich mit einiger Aufmerksamkeit unter allgemeine empirische
Rubriken bringen lassen. Diese subordinieren sich abermals unter wissenschaftliche Rubriken, welche weiter hinaufdeuten, wobei uns gewisse
unerlässliche Bedingungen des Erscheinenden näher bekanntwerden. (FA
1.23/1:80–81)
[In general, events we become aware of through experience are simply those
we can categorize empirically after some observation. These empirical categories may be further subsumed under scientific categories leading to even
higher levels. In the process we become familiar with certain complex indispensable conditions for what is appearing itself. (194)]
This first stage of scientific investigation could be understood as a preliminary hypothesis that—unlike most modern or Newtonian science and its theories—is the result, not of a deductive or inductive method or a mental act
of construction, but rather of a phenomenological showing-up of the phenomena and gradual, step-by-step ascension from the bottom to the top with
mathematical carefulness and intuition. The scientist observes the manifold
and individual phenomena and proceeds gradually, continually guided by
originary intuitions, to the ultimate and basic intuition of the Urphänomen,
which symbolizes the unity of manifold correlating (scientific and prescientific) experiences. In Goethe’s words:
Von nun an fügt sich alles nach und nach unter höhere Regeln und Gesetze,
die sich aber nicht durch Worte und Hypothesen dem Verstande, sondern
gleichfalls durch Phänomene dem Anschauen offenbaren. Wir nennen sie
Urphänomene, weil nichts in der Erscheinung über ihnen liegt, sie aber dagegen völlig geeignet sind, daß man stufenweise, wie wir vorhin hinaufgestiegen,
von ihnen herab bis zu dem gemeinsten Falle der täglichen Erfahrung niedersteigen kann. (FA 23.1:80–81)
[From this point everything gradually falls into place under higher principles and laws revealed not to our reason through words and hypotheses, but
to our intuitive perception through phenomena. We call these phenomena
archetypal phenomena because nothing higher manifests itself in the world;
such phenomena, on the other hand, make it possible for us to descend, just
as we ascended, by going step by step from the archetypal phenomena to
the most mundane occurrence and manifestation in our daily experience.
(194–95)]
Like Husserl, who takes the eidetic method of the “geometrician” and the
“freedom” and “purity” (Hua 3/1:349) of his geometrical intuitions as examples for the phenomenologist, Goethe follows the rigor of a “geometrician”
and the stringency of mathematics in his science:
Diese Bedächtlichkeit nur das Nächste an’s Nächste zu reihen, oder vielmehr
das Nächste aus dem Nächsten zu folgern, haben wir von den Mathematikern zu
lernen, und selbst da, wo wir uns keiner Rechnung bedienen, müssen wir immer
so zu Werke gehen, als wenn wir dem strengsten Geometer Rechenschaft zu
geben schuldig wären. (FA 1.25:876)
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157
[From the mathematician we must learn the meticulous care required to connect things in unbroken succession, or rather, to derive things step by step.
Even where we do not venture to apply mathematics we must always work as
though we had to satisfy the strictness of geometricians. (16)]
Even though Goethe’s method does not adhere to a closed philosophical or
scientific system and his thinking is not restricted to mathematics, he nevertheless includes the precision of mathematical standards into scientific
thinking, as one faculty among others. Phenomenological “strictness” refers
to a radical orientation toward the phenomena themselves (Sachen selbst) in
order to avoid any premature and dogmatic misjudgments about the things.
Only if the scientist refrains from prejudgment can the “things themselves”
appear as they really are.
Goethe starts his research with “raw” empirical facts; he then purifies
these empirical phenomena in further research and separates them from everything contingent. At this point in the scientific investigation, the researcher
confronts a challenge: science may disconnect from the life-world and withdraw from the pregiven ground of life. However, if science becomes abstract,
it abandons any evident and real eidetic relations within nature and disregards the truth of the Sachen selbst. On the other hand, Goethe’s way of thinking essentially differs from most fields of modern science, which employs
result-oriented and utilitarian standards and strives to dominate nature. The
main achievement of Goethe’s way of thinking, unlike that of modern science, is that the most purified, scientific phenomenon, the “reine Phänomen”
(pure phenomenon) or the Urphänomen, conforms neither to the “raw” or
“hard” facts of empiricism nor to an abstract scientific theory; rather, as the
highest result of an intuitive method, it represents a unity between a single phenomenon and the eidetic, universal lawfulness of nature. Because
the Urphänomen is the result of a concurrence between “Augen des Leibes”
(eyes of the body) and “Geistesaugen” (FA 1.24:43) or “Augen des Geistes” (FA
1.24:248; eyes of the mind), it is not an abstract idea but rather corresponds
to an intuition. The phrase “Augen des Geistes” is not a metaphorical expression of Goethe, the poet, referencing some unspecific entity that is neither
sensuous perception nor reasoning-analytical thinking. Rather, “Augen des
Geistes” is related to Schelling’s and Fichte’s elaborate concept of the “eye
of the mind” as an intuitive organ of cognition.42 In Goethe’s thinking, the
particular unity perceived and intuited solely with the “Auge des Geistes” is
not a conceptual unity, which a rational and synthesizing act of consciousness bestows upon the objects, but, in fact, the original unity that is inherent
and grounded in the object (see Förster,“Goethe and the ‘Auge des Geistes,’”
90).43
In §177 of Farbenlehre, Goethe characterizes the Urphänomen as a limit-phenomenon grounded in itself, the ultimate “Grenze des Schauens” (FA
1.23/1:81; limit of intuition, 195).44 For Goethe, an invocation and recognition of this limit of seeing and perceiving is not, as a philosophical skeptic
might argue, motivated by subjective limits of the present state of human
knowledge or of the power of human consciousness, which further phenomenological research and investigation could possibly exceed. Rather, Goethe’s
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Urphänomen is located at the “Grenze des Schauens” because it designates an
ultimate limit of intuition, science, and philosophy. The Urphänomen shapes
the absolute limit that essentially and necessarily belongs to this particular phenomenon. The process by which Goethe arrived at the discovery of
the Urphänomen shows that phenomenological thinking gradually extends
subjective limits of perception and reflection, which are based on preconceptions, until it reaches essential and objective limits, as in the case of the
Urphänomen. The Urphänomen cannot be further explicated, nor does it
need a more refined and abstract theory.45 Rather, it must be expressed adequately if we are to recognize its meaning and elevate it to the “symbolic”
dimension. As a “symbol” it refers to manifold, individual phenomena all related to the Urphänomen. Thus, Goethe notes, concerning his study of magnetism: “Der Magnet ist ein Urphänomen, das man nur aussprechen darf, um es
erklärt zu haben. Dadurch wird es denn auch ein Symbol für alles Übrige,
wofür wir keine Worte noch Namen zu suchen brauchen” (FA 1.13:354;
The magnet is an Urphänomen that one only needs to mention in order to
explain it. Thus, it also comes to symbolize everything else for which we
need to seek neither words nor names).46 Conversely, further interpretation
of the Urphänomen increases the danger of scientific and philosophical misjudgment. Goethe’s notes on morphology characterize this particular threshold of cognition and describe the moment when the Urphänomene reveal
themselves to the senses and to the intuitive mind: “Vor den Urphänomenen,
wenn sie unseren Sinnen enthüllt erscheinen, fühlen wir eine Art von Scheu,
bis zur Angst” (FA 1.13:19; Whenever archetypal phenomena appear unveiled
to our senses, we feel a kind of awe, even bordering on anxiety).
Goethe’s methods in the field of optics have been vehemently criticized, but they have also been recognized by certain scientists as a fruitful and meaningful alternative to the one-sided mechanical and materialistic
standards of most scientific approaches in the Cartesian or Newtonian tradition. The quantum physicist Arthur Zajonc, for example, in his article on
Goethe’s Farbenlehre, explores why the phenomena of light and color are so
attractive, particularly for phenomenological thinking: “Are there, however,
objects, whose nature is so radically nonmechanical that they defy all honest
attempts to include them in the catalog of machines? I am convinced there
are many, but none is so unambiguously nonmechanical as light.”47
In Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie Husserl analyzed how positivistic natural science
since Galileo and the dawn of modernity has abstracted from the experience of the human life-world, which has resulted in a dangerous loss of
the meaning of science for human life.48 As Husserl aptly puts it: “Bloße
Tatsachenwissenschaften machen bloße Tatsachenmenschen” (Hua 6:4;
Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people, Crisis, 6). Both
Goethe’s and Husserl’s thinking critiques modern science and attempts a phenomenological renewal. The main target of Husserl’s critique is Galileo and
his transformation of natural science into a mathematical science; Goethe’s
antipode is Newton and his particle theory of light. Goethe’s Farbenlehre,
for example, and Husserl’s late work both show, albeit from different angles,
that a scientific inquiry that solely calculates or mathematizes sensible nature
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159
excludes an entire spectrum of phenomena and a full range of corresponding experiences because they cannot be grasped by standards previously set
by the sciences (cf. Simms 164). In his lecture course on Hölderlin’s hymn
“Andenken” (Remembrance), Heidegger offers a critical assessment of modern scientific thinking and metaphysical philosophy from the standpoint of
a postmetaphysical ontology.49 According to Heidegger, both are based on a
radical “forgetfulness” of “Being” (Seinsvergessenheit), that is, by “forgetting”
and neglecting the difference between Being and beings.50 For Heidegger,
scientific-technological thinking and the tradition of metaphysics, unlike
“meditative thinking” (GA 52:90),51 both follow the law of cause and effect
and calculate or measure the phenomena. Calculative thinking focuses on
quantitative, not qualitative, research and tends to measure and scale all phenomena. A scientist who applies these quantifying standards to phenomena
that, by their very nature, cannot be grasped merely by quantitative norms—
like phenomena of living nature, the human sciences, or philosophy—runs
the risk of sacrificing the phenomena’s innate telos, their phenomenological self-sufficiency, in favor of subordinating the phenomena to external
purposes.
Enhancement and Development of
the Organs of Perception
Every scientific and philosophical investigation must ask the following question: how can the Self and the world come together? How can the subject and
its object converge in the process of cognition in such a way that the truth
or “theory” about the phenomena truly reflects their nature, their Wesen? In
Husserl’s words:
Wie kann nun aber die Erkenntnis ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den erkannten
Objekten gewiß werden, wie kann sie über sich hinaus und ihre Objekte zuverlässig treffen? Die dem natürlichen Denken selbstverständliche Gegebenheit
der Erkenntnisobjekte in der Erkenntnis wird zum Rätsel. (Hua 2:20; see also
36)
[But how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the
object cognized? How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably? The unproblematic manner in which the object of cognition is given to
natural thought to be cognized now becomes an enigma.52]
To Husserl, these questions are the “sphinx”53 of knowledge. To solve them,
he focuses on the different modes in which transcendent objects are given
in the immanence of consciousness (see Hua 2:5). Also Goethe’s insight into
a mutual metamorphosis of subject and object, observer and phenomenon,
and his idea of the development of the organs of perception shed new light
on the riddle of knowledge. He explains: “Der Mensch kennt nur sich selbst,
insofern er die Welt kennt, die er nur in sich und sich nur in ihr gewahr
wird. Jeder neue Gegenstand wohl beschaut, schließt ein neues Organ in uns
auf” (FA 1.24:596; The human being knows himself only insofar as he knows
the world. Every new object, well contemplated and clearly seen, opens up
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a new organ within us, 55). This statement indicates that the phenomena
should not be adapted to the subject’s mind or to scientific theories nor
be reduced to any presupposed limits of human cognitive faculties. On the
contrary, if a phenomenon does not affirm or even contradicts a preliminary
theory and further research does not meet the expectations of the scientist,
the observer is “genötigt, neue Bedingungen zu suchen, unter denen ich die
widersprechenden Versuche reiner darstellen kann” (FA 1.25:125–26; forced
to find new conditions for conducting the contradictory experiments in a
purer way, 25). Consequently, the observer must either modify the theory
or abandon it altogether and choose a different standpoint. This procedure
continues until a theory can explain all actual and possible related phenomena. At this stage of scientific research the preliminary theory or hypothesis
has been transformed into an encounter with the most basic, primordial phenomenon, that is, the “reine Phänomen” (FA 1.25:125–26).
In Erfahrung und Wissenschaft Goethe demonstrates how to proceed
from the “empirische[n] Phänomen” (empirical phenomenon) of everyday
life to the “wissenschaftlichen Phänomen” (scientific phenomenon) in scientific research and finally to the “reine Phänomen” (pure phenomenon), which
represents the “Resultat aller Erfahrung und Versuche” (FA 1.25:126; result
of all our observations, 25). The “reine Phänomen” conforms, in the field of
natural science, to a universal law of nature and represents the ultimate stage
of scientific inquiry. This would be, following Goethe’s own method, at the
same time
derjenige Punkt, wo der menschliche Geist sich den Gegenständen in ihrer
Allgemeinheit am meisten nähern, sie zu sich heranbringen, sich mit ihnen (wie
wir es sonst in der gemeinen Empirie tun) auf eine rationelle Weise gleichsam
amalgamieren kann. (FA 1.25:126)
[the very point where the human mind can come closest to things in their general state, draw them near, and, so to speak, form an amalgam with them just as
it usually does in common empiricism, but now in a rational way. (25)]
This convergence or “amalgam” between the observer and his or her object
of contemplation corresponds to Goethe’s phrase “zarte Empirie” (FA
1.13:149; delicate empiricism, 307). “Zarte Empirie” reflects Goethe’s specific kind of phenomenological empiricism grounded in the experience of
a prior unity of subject and object, which in turn allows their specific difference or polarity on another level of experience. However, Goethe admits:
“Diese Steigerung des geistigen Vermögens aber gehört einer hochgebildeten
Zeit an” (FA 1.13:149; but this enhancement of our mental powers belongs
to a highly evolved age, 307). Although Goethe concedes that his idea of an
enhanced empiricism is difficult to achieve, one can infer that it still represents the necessary task both for a new encounter with the world and for
new scientific standards in the future.
Goethe’s insight into an inseparable relation between subject and object,
as he developed it in Der Versuch als Vermittler zwischen Objekt und
Subjekt, will later reappear in Husserl’s crucial discovery of the notion of
intentionality as a phenomenological “Haupthema” (principal theme) that
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161
characterizes consciousness “im prägnanten Sinne” (Hua 3/1:187; in the
pregnant sense54). The notion of intentionality in Husserlian phenomenology
implies that there is a necessary phenomenological, not psychological, correlation between consciousness and its corresponding object. This relation
implies that every act of consciousness is “consciousness-of-something.”55 If
the scientist does not aim to eliminate the subject pole from research but
rather deliberately includes it in his or her investigation, the observer can
focus on the specific structure of this mutual correspondence and thereby
unify or “amalgamate”56 with the object on a more general and enhanced
level. For Goethe the ultimate goal of scientific research is not a coherent
theory that explains the greatest possible number of phenomena without
contradiction, additionally supported by experiments and exemplified with
visual perceptions. Rather, it is the method of a meaningful, fruitful, and
truth-oriented science—Goethe’s “Was fruchtbar ist, allein ist wahr” (FA
1.2:686; What is fruitful alone is true)57—guided, step-by-step, by the phenomena themselves, up to the moment when the scientific consciousness
and phenomena “amalgamate” with each other or are both saturated with
each other. Thus, in phenomenological science and phenomenological philosophy, as the philosopher Jean-François Marquet pointed out with regard
to Husserl, the subject is in each moment the “pole” and the “flux,” whereby
the “pole” is to be understood simultaneously as a pole of convergence and
of divergence.58 Retrospectively, it can be said that Goethe’s idea of an “amalgam” between subject and object, consciousness and being, anticipated, from
an epistemological point of view, Husserl’s riddle of knowledge. For Goethe,
at the very moment when the subject and the object form an “amalgam,” the
phenomena can be seen as they are “themselves”; that is, they reveal their
true Wesen, their inner principles, their essential laws, and their individual,
innate telos. In this moment the scientist has the experience of absolute certainty and full “evidence” of the object.
In his lecture “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”
(The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, 1964), Heidegger explicitly
adopted Goethe’s idea of the Urphänomen (GA 14:67–90).59 Both irreducibility of the Urphänomen and the inducement of awe or fear play an important
role in Heidegger’s work. They are philosophical metaphors in his critique of
metaphysics and in the endeavor to think “Being” in nonmetaphysical terms.
Heidegger links Goethe’s Urphänomen to the “Lichtung” (GA 14:81; clearing),60 which enables all things to appear and makes them visible as phenomena for us. The “Ur-phänomen” of thinking, as Heidegger unfolds in his lecture,
is at the same time a “primal matter,” an “Ur-sache” (GA 14:81), which represents precisely the new task of thinking for the future. Heidegger recognizes,
in analogy to Goethe’s Urphänomen, the limit-character of the “clearing.” He
concludes that at this primordial threshold we might encounter a radical
new beginning, which does not lie behind us in the past but rather points to
an uncovering of the hidden possibilities of the past for the future. If the new
beginning represents a continuous possibility for the future, it still depends
on our willingness to be prepared for this new beginning. Therefore, it is
not surprising that Heidegger in his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions
to Philosophy)61 describes the “grounding attunement” (Grundstimmung)
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in the beginning of a new thinking, not as wonder or wondering—the traditional motivation for all philosophical beginnings since Plato—but, in a
striking parallel to Goethe’s attitude of “Scheu” and “Angst” in the face of the
Urphänomen, explicitly as “Schrecken” and “Scheu” (GA 6:396).
University of Freiburg
NOTES
1. Douglas Miller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Scientific Studies, ed. and trans.
Douglas Miller (New York: Suhrkamp, 1988) 307. If references to Goethe’s scientific
studies are taken from this volume, they are hereafter cited by page number only. All
other translations are my own.
2. Husserl pronounced his phenomenological program in different contexts. See
Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. 2, ed. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana
(hereafter cited as Hua) 19/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 10.
3. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Hua 3/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1976) 51.
4. Here, I align myself with David Seamon, who argues,“Only in the twentieth century, with the philosophical articulation of phenomenology, do we have a conceptual
language able to describe Goethe’s way of science accurately.” David Seamon,“Goethe,
Nature, and Phenomenology,” in Goethe’s Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature,
ed. David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc (Albany: State U of New York P, 1998) 1–6, here 1.
5. See Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (1962–1964), ed. FriedrichWilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe (hereafter cited as GA), vol. 14 (Frankfurt/
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007) 67–90.
6. See Anthony J. Steinbock, Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after
Husserl (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1995) 7. The difference between a “static,”
“genetic,” or “generative” method and the specific structure and scope of each methodological approach cannot be discussed in detail in the framework of this essay. For
further elaboration of this topic, especially with regard to the “generative” method in
phenomenological thinking, I recommend Steinbock’s innovative study.
7. In an article entitled “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” and first published in
the journal Logos (1910), Husserl programmatically writes: “Aber nicht von den
Philosophien, sondern von den Sachen und Problemen muß der Antrieb zur Forschung
ausgehen” (The motive to research must start not from philosophies but from issues
and problems). Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921), with complementary texts, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Hua 25 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1986) 61.
8. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967) 27.
9. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge
Classics, 2002) viii.
10. On the development of Goethe’s science of nature, see Dorothea Kuhn,
Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit: Studien über Goethes Kritik des französischen
Akademiestreites (Graz: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1967) 14–156, here 31–32.
11. Cf. Wolf von Engelhardt, Goethes Weltansichten: Auch eine Biographie (Weimar:
Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 2007) 317.
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12. See Gernot Böhme,“Die Paradigmen einer Phänomenologie der Natur: Aristoteles
und Goethe,” in Goethe und die Verzeitlichung der Natur, ed. Peter Matussek
(Munich: Beck, 1998) 434–60.
13. Cf. Eckart Förster,“Die Bedeutung von §§76, 77 der ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ für die
Entwicklung der nachkantischen Philosophie [Teil 1],” Zeitschrift für philosophische
Forschung 56, no. 2 (April–June 2002): 169–90, here 169–70; Eckart Förster, “Die
Bedeutung von §§76, 77 der ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ für die Entwicklung der nachkantischen Philosophie [Teil 2],” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 56, no. 3 (July–
September 2002): 131–345. Cf. also Eckart Förster, Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie: Eine
systematische Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011) 262;
Engelhardt 312.
14. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft B 338/A 334: “Es ist nämlich ganz gewiß, daß wir die
organisierten Wesen und deren innere Möglichkeit nach bloß mechanischen
Prinzipien der Natur nicht einmal zureichend kennen lernen, viel weniger uns erkären
können” (It is indeed quite certain that we cannot adequately cognize, much less
explain, organized beings and their internal possibility according to mere mechanical
principles of nature). For the English translation, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951) 248.
15. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft B 338/A 334–B 339/A 335: “[N]ur so viel ist sicher,
daß, wenn wir doch wenigstens nach dem, was einzusehen durch unsere eigene
Natur vergönnt ist . . . urteilen sollen, wird schlechterdings nichts anders als ein verständigs Wesen der Möglichkeit jener Naturzwecke zum Grunde legen können:
welches der Maxime unserer reflektierenden Urteiskraft, folglich einem subjektiven,
aber dem menschlichen Geschlecht unnachlaßlich anhängenden Grunde allein
gemäß ist” (So much only is sure, that if we are to judge according to what is permitted to us by our own proper nature [the conditions and limitations of our reason], we
can place at the basis of the possibility of these natural purposes nothing else than an
intelligent Being. This alone is conformity with the maxim of our reflective judgement and therefore with a ground which, though subjective, is inseparably attached
to the human race; Kant, Critique of Judgement, 248).
16. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical
Introduction, vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) 8.
17. David Seamon has pointed out that Spiegelberg misjudged Goethe’s natural science as being merely opposed to Newtonian science. Seamon, in contrast, recognizes
philosophical significance in Goethe’s achievements in the field of natural science,
especially in his Farbenlehre. See Seamon 13n36.
18. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie,
ed. Walter Biemel, Hua 6 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); Edmund Husserl, The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1969). Further references to the English translation
are henceforth cited as Husserl, Crisis and page number.
19. See Patrick A. Heelan,“Husserl’s Later Philosophy of Natural Science,” in Edmund
Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, vol. 2, The Cutting Edge:
Phenomenological Method, Philosophical Logic, Ontology and Philosophy of
Science, ed. Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, and Gina Zavota (London: Routledge, 2005)
334–57, here 334.
20. See John Brough’s foreword to Edmund Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness,
and Memory (1898–1925), trans. John B. Brough, in Collected Works, vol. 11
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005) 12–13.
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21. Heidegger sums up the specific correlation between the question of the meaning
of “Being” and “Dasein”: “Die ausdrückliche und durchsichtige Fragestellung nach
dem Sinn von Sein verlangt eine vorgängige angemessene Explikation eines Seienden
(Dasein) hinsichtlich seines Seins” (Sein und Zeit, 7; The explicit and transparent posing of the question of the meaning of Being first requires an adequate explication of
a being [Dasein] with regard to its Being).
22. Merleau-Ponty writes: “We will show how the concept of Nature is always the
expression of an ontology—and its privileged expression.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, ed. Dominique Séglard, trans.
Robert Vallier (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 2003) 204.
23. See also FA 1.24:131; Förster (2) 334.
24. Regarding the specific correspondence and unity between the arts and science
in Goethe’s thinking, see Rudolf Steiner, Einleitungen in Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften (Dornach: Rudolf Steiner-Nachlaßverwaltung, 1987) 134–40,
here 134.
25. “Das Wahre, mit dem Göttlichen identisch, läßt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen, wir schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, im Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten Erscheinungen; wir werden es gewahr als unbegreifliches Leben und können dem Wunsch nicht entsagen, es dennoch zu begreifen. Dieses gilt von allen
Phänomenen der faßlichen Welt” (FA 1.25:274; We can never directly see what is true,
i.e., identical with what is divine; we look at it only in reflection, in example, in the
symbol, in individual and related phenomena. We perceive it as a life beyond our
grasp, yet we cannot deny our need to grasp it, 145). Similarly, Faust in the second part
of the drama cannot recognize the light of the sun by looking directly into the center
of the sun; he can recognize it only if he looks through and in the reflected colors of
a rainbow.
26. Goethe claims in the first of two correlating aphorisms: “Je weiter man in der
Erfahrung fortrückt desto näher kommt man dem Unerforschlichen; je mehr man
die Erfahrung zu nutzen weiß desto mehr sieht man, daß das Unerforschliche
keinen praktischen Nutzen hat” (FA 1.13:240; The more we proceed in our
experience, the closer we come to the inexplorable; the more we know how to use
experience, the more we see that the inexplorable has no practical use). The second
thesis reads: “Das schönste Glück des denkenden Menschen ist das Erforschliche
erforscht zu haben und das Unerforschliche ruhig zu verehren” (FA 1.13:240; The
most beautiful joy of thinking human beings is to explore the explorable and calmly
to revere the inexplorable). Goethe writes in his essay on Laocoön: “Kunst- und
Naturwerke sind unaussprechlich” (FA 1.18:489; works of art and works of nature
are inexpressible).
27. Regarding the three reasons for devaluating imagination in the philosophical tradition that are presented in this paragraph, see Richard Kearny, Poetics of Imagining:
From Husserl to Lyotard (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991) 13.
28. See Edmund Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen; Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–
1925), ed. Eduard Marbach, Hua 23 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980).
29. Husserl (Hua 3/1:8) explains that he aims to substitute the traditional term “Idee”
(idea) with the “terminologisch unverbrauchte” (terminologically not depleted)
Greek expression “Eidos.”
30. Förster precisely elaborates the essential difference between Schelling’s and
Goethe’s or Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s “intuitive understanding” (see Critique of
Judgment, §77) (Förster [1] 184–85). See also Engelhardt 311.
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165
31. In Italy Goethe noted that he found the Urpflanze in “demjenigen Organ der
Pflanze, welches wir als Blatt gewöhnlich anzusprechen pflegen” (FA 1.15/1:402;
that organ of the plant which we commonly address as leaf); “Vorwärts und rückwärts ist die Pflanze immer nur Blatt” (FA 1.15/1:402; forward and backward the
plant is always only leaf).
32. See, e.g., Anthony Steinbock, Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the
Heart (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 2014); Anthony Steinbock, Phenomenology
and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (Bloomington: Indiana UP,
2007).
33. Max Scheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, ed. Maria Scheler, in Werke, vol. 5 (Bern:
Francke, 1954) 254.
34. Cf. also Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24), pt. 1, Kritische
Ideengeschichte, ed. Rudolf Boehm, Hua 7 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956) 197–98.
35. Goethe’s treatise on the experiment is a result of an intense study of Kantian philosophy, particularly Kant’s first critique. See Engelhardt 310.
36. Goethe also claims that in any scientific experiment we must “sorgfältig genug
untersuchen, was unmittelbar an ihn [den Versuch] grenzt, was zunächst auf ihn folgt”
(FA 1.25:33; be careful enough in studying what lies next to it or derives directly from
it, 16).
37. “Allein, wie diese Erfahrungen zu machen und wie sie zu nutzen, wie unsere
Kräfte auszubilden und zu brauchen, das kann weder so allgemein bekannt noch
anerkannt sein” (FA 1.25:28; But how to gather and use empirical evidence, how to
develop and apply our powers—this is not so generally recognized or appreciated,
12). See also Kuhn 28, 34.
38. “Es gilt also auch hier was bei so vielen andern menschlichen Unternehmungen
gilt, daß nur das Interesse Mehrerer auf Einen Punkt gerichtet etwas Vorzügliches
hervor zu bringen im Stande sei” (FA 1.25:28; Thus what applies in so many other
human enterprises is also true here: the interest of many focused on a single point can
produce excellent results, 12).
39. Eva-Maria Simms, “Goethe, Husserl, and the Crisis of European Sciences,” Janus
Head 8, no. 1 (2005): 160–72, here 168.
40. Edmund Husserl, Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on
Transcendental Logic, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic,
2001) 42.
41. Regarding the Urphänomen, see also Farbenlehre, §§247, 720, 741.
42. Regarding Goethe’s specific adaptation of the philosophical metaphor “Auge des
Geistes,” especially in the context of German Idealism, see Eckart Förster,“Goethe and
the ‘Auge des Geistes,’” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und
Geistesgeschichte 75, no. 1 (2001): 87–101, here 88.
43. Henri Bortoft describes the unity in Goethe’s thinking as follows: “But the unity
which Goethe perceived in the color phenomena is not a unity that is imposed by the
mind. What Goethe saw was not an intellectual unification but the wholeness of the
phenomenon itself.” Henri Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe’s Way of Science
(Edinburgh: Floris Books, 1996) 59.
44. Goethe describes the danger in any scientific research of not recognizing the
Urphänomen as follows: “Wäre denn auch ein solches Urphänomen gefunden, so
bleibt immer noch das Übel, daß man es nicht als ein solches anerkennen will, daß
wir hinter ihm und über ihm noch etwas Weiteres aufsuchen, da wir doch hier die
Grenze des Schauens eingestehen sollten” (FA 1.23/1:81; But even when we find such
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Iris Hennigfeld
an archetypal phenomenon, there still remains a further problem if we refuse to recognize it as such and if we seek something more above it despite the fact that at this
point we ought to acknowledge the limit of our intuition).
45. Goethe discerns contingent and preliminary limits of individual human knowledge, on the one hand, and the specific limit-character of certain phenomena like the
Urphänomen, on the other hand: “Wenn ich mich bei’m Urphänomen zuletzt
beruhige, so ist es doch auch nur Resignation; aber es bleibt ein großer Unterschied,
ob ich mich an den Grenzen der Menschheit resignire oder innerhalb einer hypothetischen Beschränktheit meines bornierten Individuums” (FA 1.13:49; If I finally acquiesce in view of the Urphänomen, this is, however, also nothing but resignation; yet it
makes a great difference if I resign at the limits of humanity or within a hypothetical
limitation of my narrow-minded individuality).
46. Regarding Goethe’s notion of the “symbol,” see, e.g., FA 1.13:33, 207.
47. Arthur Zajonc, “Light and Cognition,” in Goethe’s Way of Science, ed. Seamon and
Zajonc, 299–314, here 304.
48. Section 2 of Husserl’s Krisis is entitled “Die positivistische Reduktion der Idee der
Wissenschaft auf bloße Tatsachenwissenschaften: Die ‘Krisis’ der Wissenschaft als
Verlust ihrer Lebensbedeutsamkeit” (Hua 6:3; The Positivistic Reduction of the Idea of
Science to Mere Factual Science: The “Crisis” of Science as the Loss of Its Meaning for
Life; Husserl, Crisis, 5).
49. Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymne “Andenken” (Wintersemester 1941/42), ed.
Curd Ochwath, GA 52 (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982) 90; see also 93,
146.
50. “Die Seinsvergessenheit ist die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins zum
Seienden” (The forgetfulness of Being is the forgetfulness of the difference between
Being and beings). Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrman,
GA 5 (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977) 364.
51. In his lecture “Gelassenheit,” Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of thinking: “So gibt es denn zwei Arten von Denken. . . das rechnende Denken und das
besinnliche Nachdenken” (So, there are two kinds of thinking. . . calculative thinking
and contemplative thinking). “Gelassenheit,” in Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines
Lebensweges (1910–1976), ed. Hermann Heidegger, GA 16 (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 2000) 519–20.
52. Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William Alston and George
Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964) 15.
53. Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Hua Dokumente 3/1, Wissen
schaftskorrespondenz, vol. 7 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1994) 134.
54. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, vol. 1, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans.
Fred Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1998) 199.
55. Husserl characterizes the phenomenological structure of intentionality as “die
Eigenheit von Erlebnissen, ‘Bewusstsein von etwas zu sein’” (Hua 3/1:188; the peculiarity of experiences [of consciousness] to be the “consciousness of something”).
56. The verb “amalgamieren” (amalgamate) means “innig durchdringen” or “verschmelzen” (cf. FA 1.25:951). Another possible English translation might be “interpenetrate.” In this specific case, I prefer to stay close to the German word in my English
translation in order to keep the potential alchemical connotation.
57. Similarly, Goethe describes the relation between fruitful thinking and truth in a
letter to Friedrich Zelter (December 31, 1829): “Ich habe bemerkt, daß ich den
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167
Gedanken für wahr halte der für mich fruchtbar ist, sich an mein übriges Denken
anschließt und zugleich mich fördert” (FA 2.11:215; I have observed that I regard that
thought as true which is fruitful to myself, connects with the rest of my thinking, and
promotes me).
58. Jean-François Marquet, “Husserl: Le pôle et le flux,” in La gnose, une question
philosophique, ed. Natalie Depraz and Jean-François Marquet (Paris: Les Editions du
Cerf, 2000) 181–91, here 184. Correspondingly, in book 8 of his poetical autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe characterized his early worldview as an alternation between an inward-directed concentration and an outward-directed expansion
of the Self, for which he also coined the words “verselbsten” and “entselbstigen” (FA
1.14:385). Goethe’s poems “Prometheus” and “Ganymed” can be interpreted as another poetic expression for these centripetal and centrifugal movements of the Self. Cf.
David E. Wellbery, The Specular Moment: Goethe’s Early Lyric and the Beginning of
Romanticism (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996) 440–41.
59. See also Günter Figal’s commentary on Heidegger’s adoption of Goethe’s notion
of the Urphänomen. Günter Figal, Verstehensfragen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009)
198.
60. In Heidegger’s words: “Aber niemals schafft das Licht erst die Lichtung, sondern
jenes, das Licht, setzt diese, die Lichtung, voraus” (GA 14:81; But never creates light
first the clearing; rather, light presupposes the clearing). See also Günter Figal,
“Heidegger und die Phänomenologie,” in Das Spätwerk Heideggers: Ereignis-SageGeviert, ed. Damir Barbaric (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2007) 9–18,
esp. 16–18.
61. Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), 1936–38, ed.
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, GA 6 (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989).
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