psihologia socială - Observator international in stiinte sociale

PSIHOLOGIA SOCIALĂ
Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iaşi
Nr. 30 (II)/2012
POLIROM
2012
Editura POLIROM, B‑dul Carol I nr. 4;
P.O. BOX 266, 700506, Ia[i, ROMÂNIA
Bucure[ti, Splaiul Unirii nr. 6, bl. B3A, sc. 1,
et. 1, sector 4, 040031, O.P. 53, C.P. 15‑728
Copyright © 2012 by Editura POLIROM
ISSN: 1454‑5667
Printed in ROMANIA
Sumar
In memoriam Adrian Neculau......................................................................5
I. STUDII
Adrian Neculau
Histoires oubliées – les drames des psychologues roumains sous la dictature:
gens emprisonnés, enquêtés, surveillés...................................................... 11
Frederico Guilherme, Isabel R. Pinto, José M. Marques
The Effects of Social Identity Threat on Reactions to Normative
and Deviant Group Members: A Subjective Group Dynamics Approach............. 19
Mihai Curelaru, Beatrice Abălaşei
Violenţa în mediul şcolar: un studiu al fenomenului la elevii de liceu............... 33
Valérie Fointiat
La rationalisation en acte à l’épreuve du paradigme du choix:
Lorsque la dissonance consécutive à un choix
est réduite par voie comportementale....................................................... 47
Luminiţa Samson‑Secrieru
L’influence de la dimension culturelle individualisme‑collectivisme
sur la soumission sans pression.............................................................. 55
Cristian Tileagă
Public Apologia, Moral Transgression and Degradation Ceremonies................. 67
Inès Skandrani‑Marzouki
Effet de la valence positive vs négative de l’étiquetage fonctionnel vs
social sur le travail universitaire collectif.................................................. 79
Camelia Soponaru, Andreea‑Oana Petriciac
Existential Meaning and Religious Orientation in Adulthood........................... 89
II. SINTEZE
Dorin Nastas
Redefining Culture from a Psychological Perspective................................... 107
Andreea Ernst‑Vintilă
L’implication personnelle, variable explicative majeure de la pensée sociale.
Quelques rappels du modèle tridimensionnel proposé par M.‑L. Rouquette........ 121
III. NOTE
Adrian Neculau
Porto: Colocviul, oraşul şi o capitală europeană a culturii (Guimarães)...........129
Gabrielle Poeschl, José M. Marques
Tendances actuelles de la recherche en psychologie sociale de langue
française. Retour sur le 9 e Colloque International de l’ADRIPS
tenu à Porto en juillet 2012.................................................................. 135
Joaquim Pires Valentim
Un compte rendu sur la 11e Conférence Internationale
sur les Représentations Sociales............................................................139
IV. EVOCARE
Serge Moscovici
Jean‑Claude Abric – Une évocation........................................................145
Adrian Neculau , Mihai Curelaru
In memoriam Jean‑Claude Abric............................................................147
V. RECENZII
Adrian Neculau
Serge Moscovici, Raison et cultures....................................................... 151
Adrian Neculau
Psihologi‑scriitori
Genoveva Logan, Puterea celor lipsiţi de putere/Il potere dei senzapotere..........153
Luminiţa Mihaela Iacob
Dana Gavreliuc, Alin Gavreliuc,
Şcoală şi schimbare socială. Axiome sociale, autonomie personală
şi integrarea schimbării în mediul educaţional românesc..............................157
In memoriam Adrian Neculau
(30 august 1938 – 20 decembrie 2012)
Astăzi, 20 decembrie 2012, a plecat dintre noi profesorul Adrian Neculau, figură
emblematică a psihologiei sociale din România, întemeietor de şcoală, fondator de instituţii
şi deschizător de drumuri în cercetarea psihologică.
S‑a născut la 30 august 1938, în comuna Ungureni, judeţul Botoşani. Studiile liceale
le‑a absolvit la Liceul „A.T. Laurian”, apoi şi‑a continuat educaţia la Universitatea din
Iaşi, unde a obţinut, în anul 1974, şi doctoratul în psihologie. A urmat, după un scurt stagiu
6
IN MEMORIAM ADRIAN NECULAU
într‑un laborator de psihologie auto, o carieră didactică în învăţământul superior, devenind
în 1990 profesor. S‑a dedicat imediat, în acei ani ai reconstrucţiei, relansării ştiinţifice şi
instituţionale a psihologiei. L‑a cucerit cea socială, pe care a slujit‑o cu ochi de fin observator,
sensibilitate şi talent de scriitor. I se datorează, în 1997, statutul de facultate de sine
stătătoare pentru domeniile Psihologie şi Ştiinţe ale Educaţiei la Universitatea din Iaşi.
Prin profesorul Serge Moscovici, pe care l‑a cunoscut imediat după 1989, a stabilit
contacte cu personalităţi de marcă ale psihologiei europene. Începând cu 1991, a obţinut
stagii de cercetare la Maison des Sciences des Hommes din Paris şi la universităţi din Lille,
Liège, Chambéry, Napoli, Nanterre, Paris, Roma etc. S‑a conectat la echipe de cercetare
din Vest, atât ca membru invitat, cât şi în calitate de coordonator. A făcut parte, între altele,
din echipa doctoratului european în psihologie socială de la Universitatea Sapienza, European
PhD on Social Representations and Communication and So.Re.Com. THEmatic NETwork.
De altfel, în lucrarea sa Un secol de cercetări psihosociologice, profesorul Septimiu Chelcea
observă cu justeţe că de numele profesorului Adrian Neculau se leagă relansarea internaţională
a psihologiei sociale din România.
După modelul şcolilor din Vest a fondat la Iaşi, în cadrul Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan
Cuza”, un laborator de psihologie socială, intitulat Psihologia Câmpului Social, cu o echipă
tânără, productivă ştiinţific. A susţinut, în ultimele două decenii, o intensă activitate de
cercetare, publicare şi traducere, organizare de colocvii şi conferinţe sub semnul recuperării
anilor în care psihologia a fost interzisă în România.
În ştiinţă, s‑a dovedit un cercetător de mare deschidere, acoperind arii vaste ale
domeniului, cu un spirit critic şi inovator. Din 1977 şi până în prezent, profesorul Adrian
Neculau a dăruit publicului interesat de psihologia socială nu mai puţin de zece cărţi de
autor. Amintim doar câteva dintre ele: Liderii în dinamica grupurilor (1977), A fi elev
(1983), Memoria pierdută (1999), Educaţia adulţilor (2004), Dinamica grupului şi a echipei
(2007). În aceste lucrări, a arătat o consecvenţă deosebită în urmărirea unor teme ştiinţifice
de interes, ancorate nu numai în literatura de specialitate şi în laboratoarele de psihologie,
ci şi în spaţiul cetăţii, al şcolii şi al familiei.
În calitate de coordonator al echipei laboratorului de psihologie socială a dat tiparului
peste 20 de volume editate sub îngrijirea sa. S‑au explorat, în aceste lucrări, arii diverse,
cum ar fi dinamica de grup, schimbarea socială de după 1989, integrarea europeană,
fenomenul sărăciei, intervenţia psihosocială, psihologia minorităţilor, psihologia dictaturii
comuniste etc. În 2008, a apărut în Franţa una dintre lucrările reprezentative în cadrul
preocupărilor sale de cercetare, La vie quotidienne en Roumanie sous le communisme.
Didactic, se remarcă Manualul de psihologie socială, apărut în 2003 şi 2004 la Editura
Polirom. Sunt lucrări fundamentale în domeniu, la care au contribuit autori reprezentativi
atât din ţară, cât şi din spaţiul vest‑european. Ştia să anime în jurul unei idei, să opereze
ca nimeni altul cu alternativele, să găsească soluţii, resurse şi energii chiar şi acolo unde
nu părea să existe vreuna.
A scris peste 200 de articole ştiinţifice şi capitole de carte în domeniul psihologiei sociale.
Dintre acestea, multe au fost publicate în reviste occidentale sau în lucrări colective editate
de nume prestigioase din Franţa, Elveţia şi Canada. S‑a remarcat în domeniul reprezentărilor
sociale, unde are contribuţii ştiinţifice recunoscute în cercetarea contextului social, a
practicilor şi a gândirii sociale. S‑a aplecat, de asemenea, asupra cercetării mecanis­melor
psihologice ale dictaturii comuniste dinainte de 1989, focalizându‑şi atenţia asupra analizei
mijloacelor utilizate de propaganda regimului din acea vreme pentru crearea „omului nou”.
A fost fondatorul revistei Psihologia Socială, cu un consiliu ştiinţific european şi al
cărei director onorific este profesorul Serge Moscovici. Publicaţia a apărut, din 1998 şi
IN MEMORIAM ADRIAN NECULAU
7
până în prezent, în 30 de numere, fără întrerupere. Paginile ei au găzduit texte reprezentative
pentru cercetarea europeană, studii empirice, sinteze teoretice, precum şi interviuri cu mari
personalităţi ale psihologiei. În toată această muncă, profesorul Neculau a fost sufletul
revistei, iniţiatorul şi susţinătorul neobosit al activităţii din redacţie.
Prin eseurile şi editorialele publicate în diverse reviste şi ziare, s‑a dovedit a fi un om
prezent în spaţiul media, fin observator al vieţii sociale şi politice româneşti. Profesorul
Neculau are marele merit de a fi tratat psihologia socială drept ceva mai mult decât o ştiinţă
de laborator – o ştiinţă a relaţiilor umane, a comunităţii, a străzii. Nu a fost un analist
distant al vieţii cetăţii, ci o persoană implicată prin scrisul său, alegând să ia atitudine,
poziţie, fiind printre puţinii care au făcut acest lucru. A scris implicat, atitudinal, fără să
se menajeze. Nu şi‑a autoprotejat trăirile prin neutralitatea subiectelor abordate. Fiind o
persoană sensibilă la disonanţele cognitive sau sociale, la inedit sau atipic, s‑a simţit obligat
să le analizeze, să le înţeleagă, să ni le restituie prin grila sa de lectură, afectivă şi acidă
în acelaşi timp. Fără tableta sa de fiecare sâmbătă, Ziarul de Iaşi va fi mai puţin incitant
şi rafinat, iar revista Cronica mai puţin ancorată în memoria spaţiului academic ieşean.
Nostalgicii îl vor putea regăsi ca publicist în volumul Un psiholog în Agora (Polirom, 2007).
În faţa colegilor săi, s‑a arătat, în numeroase situaţii, un om de caracter, un exemplu
de verticalitate, o persoană cu respect pentru adevăr, cu pasiune pentru psihologie şi
seriozitate în muncă. Îi plăcea să‑şi dovedească între colegi omenia, după expresia lui
Nicolae Mărgineanu, căruia i‑a îngrijit cu multă dăruire memoria. De asemenea, pentru
cei mai tineri, doctoranzi şi asistenţi, a fost un mentor autentic, ghidând şi susţinând,
ştiinţific şi afectiv, eforturile lor de construire a începuturilor carierei.
Deşi plecat dintre noi, mutat la cer prea devreme şi fără a fi dat vreun semn mai înainte,
profesorul Adrian Neculau rămâne viu în memoria celor care l‑au cunoscut. Va rămâne o
prezenţă şi pentru cei care nu l‑au cunoscut, deoarece şi‑a multiplicat anii vieţii prin cei ai
cărţilor sale.
Dumnezeu să‑l odihnească în pace!
Colegii din Departamentul de Psihologie
Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iaşi
I. STUDII
Adrian Neculau1
Histoires oubliées – les drames des psychologues roumains
sous la dictature: gens emprisonnés, enquêtés, surveillés2
Résumé: Cette étude propose un modèle explicatif du drame des psychologues roumains soumis
au traitement répressif. En rappelant la pression à la conformité exercée sur eux par le contexte
idéologique et institutionnel, ainsi que les stratégies de survie et de résistance professionnelle et
morale de ces psychologues, cette recherche met en évidence et illustre des théories et paradigmes bien
connus en psychologie sociale: la pression exercée par le contexte et la manipulation de ses représen­
tations sociales. Elle permet de comprendre ainsi comment la société totalitaire a affecté le quotidien,
le travail et l’œuvre de ces importants psychologues. La vie privée et institutionnelle de la plupart
d’entre eux était un calvaire; ils étaient surveillés, enquêtés, soumis à toutes sortes de pressions.
Au moins dix parmi eux ont connu l’emprisonnement politique, malgré leurs options démocratiques,
parfois même de gauche. Par conséquent, lorsqu’il s’agit d’évaluer le travail qu’ils ont réalisé dans
ces conditions, cela demande d’adopter une approche complexe, contextualisée et empathique.
Mots‑clés: psychologues roumains, surveillés, enquêtés, emprisonnés
Tableau synoptique du contexte social et de la situation
psychologique de l’époque
Certaines sciences, et les professionnels qui les exercent, se voient parfois soudainement
non‑agréées à l’intérieur de systèmes fermés (totalitaires). C’est ce qui est arrivé à la
psychologie et à la génétique en URSS pendant l’entre‑deux‑guerres. Cela a été aussi le
cas de la psychologie en Roumanie après l’instauration du régime totalitaire prosoviétique,
dans l’après‑guerre (les années ’50‑’60) et lors de la dernière décennie du régime de
Ceauşescu, jusqu’en 1989.
Pendant l’entre‑deux‑guerres, la psychologie avait été en Roumanie une science en plein
essor au sein des sciences humaines et sociales. Son développement a été tout particulièrement
marqué par la vigueur de ses domaines appliqués et par son orientation expérimentale. Mais
soudainement, à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, elle s’est trouvée isolée, mise entre
parenthèses, ou au moins en sourdine. Une part importante des psychologues sont devenus
indésirables, étant réduits au silence par des méthodes administratives; ils ont été licenciés,
enquêtés, enfermés dans des prisons, surveillés par la police politique, jetés à la périphérie
1. Université «Alexandru Ioan Cuza», Iaşi, Roumanie; [email protected].
2. Communication orale présenté au 9ème Colloque International de Psychologie Sociale en Langue
Française, organisé par l’ADRIPS, Porto, 1er au 4 juillet, 2012.
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ADRIAN NECULAU
de la famille des sciences et de la société: il ne s’agit pas de cas isolés, car plus d’une
dizaine de psychologues réputés ont subi ce traitement, sur une communauté relativement
restreinte (25‑30 membres au maximum).
Nous présenterons en ce qui suit la manière dont la communauté des psychologues a
été réduite au silence par des moyens coercitifs. A l’issue de périodes dramatiques (prison
politique, enquêtes et intimidation, surveillance stricte), certains ont recouvré le droit de
travailler. Mais «on» leur a distribué une nouvelle «partition», étrangère à leurs intérêts et
méthodologies de recherche authentiques, on leur a demandé de changer leur idéologie et
de se soumettre aux nouvelles orientations sociales.
Serge Moscovici, qui a connu parfaitement ce phénomène, en a décrit aussi les moyens:
la diffusion des nouvelles idées, leur propagation et la propagande. La psychologie au
service de la propagande politique! Dans les années ’50 et ’60 du XXe siècle, la psychologie
se développait donc en Roumanie dans la direction attendue par le nouveau régime: elle
était devenue une annexe utile de l’idéologie dominante. Seuls certains des thèmes de
recherche étaient autorisés, ceux censés refléter le nouveau modèle de société et d’idéal
social; la voie recommandée était celle qu’avait tracée la psychologie en URSS. C’était un
contexte contraignant, déformé et strictement contrôlé. Pour survivre, les gens récupérés
par le nouveau régime n’avaient qu’une seule solution: se rallier, se replier. De nouveaux
noms ont surgi, parfois inventés, pour servir la nouvelle orientation et devenir plus tard ses
noms de référence, ses dépositaires dans le champ scientifique.
Cette décennie de compromis et idéologisation forcée a été suivie d’une nouvelle étape
où le professionnalisme a été comme redécouvert. Cette nouvelle étape a été marquée par
la fondation de l’Institut de Psychologie de l’Académie et l’accord pour la parution de la
Revue de Psychologie. En cette nouvelle étape la recherche psychologique semblait ainsi
redécouvrir sa dignité.
Mais en réalité tout était bien entendu contrôlé: les thèmes de recherche, comme la vie
professionnelle et privée des chercheurs. En guise d’exemple, le premier numéro de la
Revue de Psychologie (1955) débutait ex abrupto par la traduction d’un texte publié par la
revue soviétique Voprosi filosofii [Questions de philosophie], intitulé «Sur les problèmes
philosophiques de la psychologie»: c’était un texte destiné à «orienter» la recherche, lui
montrer la voie juste, un texte censé mettre en lumière les modalités par lesquelles la
psychologie pouvait se rapprocher du matérialisme dialectique (l’idéologie du régime
totalitaire prosoviétique) et contribuer à éliminer le retard entraîné par la persistance des
«conceptions bourgeoises et autres influences nuisibles», en anéantissant ces dernières.
En 1964, un texte émanant des leaders roumains avait fait renaître les espoirs. La
Déclaration d’avril promettait au pays une certaine indépendance politique tout en offrant
à ses citoyens l’espoir d’une identité nationale et individuelle autre que celle de satellite de
l’URSS. Dans ce contexte, la publication un an plus tard de l’ouvrage de Vasile Pavelcu, Drama
psihologiei [Le drame de la psychologie, Editions Scientifiques, 1965], a créé l’événement
dès sa parution. Cet ouvrage annonçait une nouvelle perspective d’approche et suggérait
une évaluation critique des «conquêtes» obtenues par la psychologie inféodée à l’idéologie
de l’époque. L’ouvrage est paru à un moment où la science psychologique en Roumanie
était encore envahie par la littérature soviétique, tandis que les publications scientifiques
autochtones étaient idéologisées par la domination de la littérature marxiste‑léniniste. Cet
ouvrage a été perçu comme une tentative de surmonter le ralliement idéologique et la langue
de bois en vigueur, puisqu’il apparaissait comme une alternative ouvrant de nouvelles
perspectives. C’est sûr que l’ouvrage a été lu au second degré, comme une invitation adressée
à la pensée libre, non dogmatique et non soumise à la pression de l’idéologie dominante
HISTOIRES OUBLIÉES – LES DRAMES DES PSYCHOLOGUES ROUMAINS...
13
du temps. En la personne de Vasile Pavelcu, les jeunes chercheurs de l’époque découvraient
un véritable «personnage» de la science psychologique. Derrière cette biographie, le personnage
réel de Vasile Pavelcu vivait son propre drame: déraciné, en quête identitaire, en lutte pour
survivre dignement. Parmi ceux qui le connaissaient, nous étions un certain nombre à
soupçonner que son drame était aussi celui d’autres psychologues, dont nous savions qu’ils
avaient connu l’horreur des prisons communistes.
Au début des années ’80, après une quinzaine d’années d’accalmie relative, un nouveau
coup dur a frappé la psychologie. Un montage de la Securitate (la police politique) a ainsi
eu pour but de réduire au silence la psychologie: c’était l’affaire dite de la «Méditation
Transcendantale». Il s’agissait en fait d’une simple expérimentation de cette technique de
relaxation menée à l’Institut de Psychologie de l’Académie – une expérimentation qui
s’inscrivait dans un thème de recherche commandé par le Conseil National de la Recherche
Scientifique (organisme dirigé par Elena Ceauşescu, épouse du dictateur). L’expérimentation
a été prise pour prétexte pour accuser la psychologie d’être une science obscurantiste, une
secte militant pour la paix mondiale (voyez l’infamie!) et par là‑même menaçant l’identité
nationale. En conséquence, l’Institut a été fermé, la formation universitaire en psychologie
a été interdite, les chercheurs ont été renvoyés pour rééducation au champ du travail (câmpul
muncii, syntagme désignant le vrai travail, celui qui était physique, à l’exclusion donc du
travail intellectuel). Renvoyée, la directrice de la section de Psychologie sociale de l’Institut
de Psychologie de l’Académie s’est ainsi retrouvée femme de ménage dans une pharmacie;
le Dr. Aurora Liiceanu, auteure prolifique et très appréciée de nos jours, a été renvoyée
comme ouvrière dans une fabrique, puis femme de ménage dans une maternelle; un autre
membre de l’institut, Dr. Grigore Nicola, a dû gagner sa vie comme plombier dans une
fabrique; Ion Mânzat, docteur en psychologie lui aussi, a été intégré comme éboueur à la
salubrité publique; et les exemples peuvent continuer.
Psychologues emprisonnés
La stratégie mobilisée par le totalitarisme stalinien des années ’50 pour vaincre la pensée
indépendante a consisté à induire la peur généralisée, capable de paralyser toute tentative
d’opposition. La méthode a été simple: enfermer les résistants à la pression idéologique,
et inoculer la peur à leurs familles. Dans les prisons politiques la rééducation passait par
la pédagogie de la soumission par la faim, le froid, et la torture – appliquée à tous les sujets
de l’expérience de changement cognitif planifié. Les témoignages de Nicolae Mărgineanu
(psychologue), Constantin Giurescu (historien), et Nicolae Balotă (écrivain) montrent des
situations impensables de recours à la violence dans le but de changer les repères du sujet
victime, sa conviction du respect des normes, sa confiance dans les valeurs, ses sentiments
humains. On retrouve dans ces témoignages tous les moyens par lesquels un individu peut
être infailliblement et définitivement vaincu: l’humiliation, la dévalorisation de la condition
humaine jusqu’à la perte de l’estime de soi, la provocation de la douleur atroce qui annihile
la raison, l’enlèvement de la dignité humaine.
Le nombre des psychologues visibles des trois centres universitaires de Roumanie et de
chercheurs dans la Roumanie de l’après‑guerre était relativement réduit, comptant quelques
dizaines au maximum. Parmi ceux‑ci, une dizaine au moins ont été arrêtés, enquêtés,
condamnés à plusieurs années de réclusion. Des psychologues des trois centres universitaires
ont été arrêtés. A Bucarest, George Bontilă, maître de conférences à la Chaire de Psychologie;
Traian Herseni, maître de conférences en sociologie, puis psychosociologue; C.I. Botez,
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ADRIAN NECULAU
ancien maître assistant à Iaşi, puis responsable de section à l’Institut de Psychologie de
l’Académie; C.I. Zahirnic et Marian Bejat. A Cluj – le professeur Fl. Ştefănescu‑Goangă
et le maître de conférences Nicolae Mărgineanu. A Iaşi – le maître de conférences Petre
Botezatu, qui enseignait la psychologie de l’enfant; Al. Claudian, professeur de sociologie
et de psychologie, Ion Alexandrescu – ancien doctorant de Vasile Pavelcu, connu comme
auteur d’un ouvrage sur la personnalité. Quelques uns parmi eux n’ont pas été emprisonnés,
mais poursuivis, enquêtés, renvoyés de leurs postes universitaires et de recherche. Au
Conseil National pour l’Etude des Archives de la Securitate, nous avons étudié les dossiers
de poursuite, enquête et condamnation de tous ceux qui sont ici mentionnés, et de quelques
autres, qui ont été seulement surveillés: Vasile Pavelcu, mon ancien Professeur, auquel on
a ouvert un dossier de poursuite à l’âge de 86 ans; Ştefan Bârsănescu, professeur de
pédagogie; I.M. Nestor, ancien maître de conférences en psychologie à Bucarest; Ernest
Stere, ancien maître de conférences en psychologie à Iaşi. Avec eux, Mihail Ralea: bien
que proche du régime, il n’en avait pas la confiance. Au contraire, il était poursuivi par
tous les moyens: enregistrement de ses conversations téléphoniques, surveillance de sa vie
privée, de sa maison; rapports réguliers rédigés par plusieurs informateurs infiltrés dans
son entourage; dans les dossiers on a trouvé même des photos, des instantanés pris dans
la rue. Sa mort survenue subitement a mis fin au dossier qui augmentait à vue d’œil.
Quatre études de cas
Florian Ştefănescu‑Goangă (1881‑1958) a soutenu un doctorat réalisé sous la direction de
W. Wundt. Il est considéré comme le fondateur de la psychologie expérimentale en Roumanie.
Il a créé à Cluj un institut de psychologie, une maison d’édition, une revue, et une école
réputée; il a également été un intellectuel démocrate et Recteur (Président d’université) de
vocation, fondateur d’école et initiateur de directions dans l’enseignement.
Florian Ştefănescu‑Goangă a été la victime d’un attentat commis par les étudiants
nationalistes légionnaires (trois balles ont percé son corps), avec des conséquences impor­
tantes pour sa santé (il a toutefois eu la chance de s’en remettre après quatre mois). Après
l’installation du régime totalitaire prosoviétique en 1944, il n’avait pas adhéré au nouveau
pouvoir: au contraire, il a demandé que la politique s’arrête aux portes de son université.
Le régime totalitaire l’a donc qualifié de réactionnaire, ennemi à craindre, opposant de la
démocratie, «épave fasciste».
Plus tard, exclu de l’université, Fl. Ştefănescu‑Goangă a été arrêté à 69 ans et emprisonné
sans aucun procès à Sighet, la terrible prison destinée aux élites intellectuelles roumaines
de 1950 à 1955. On lui a confisqué son appartement de Bucarest, il a été dépossédé de
tous ses biens, on lui a brûlé tous les livres, les manuscrits, la correspondance. Sa maison
de Cluj ne lui a jamais été restituée. Le professeur est mort pauvre, malade, isolé. C’est
le fondateur de la psychologie expérimentale en Roumanie.
Nicolae Mărgineanu (1905‑1980), né dans une famille de paysans, avait impressionné,
comme étudiant, son professeur Florian Ştefănescu‑Goangă. A la suite de sa soutenance
de thèse de doctorat, il a été recommandé pour des études et spécialisation en Allemagne,
où il a visité les laboratoires de psychologie les plus connus:
– à Leipzig il s’est imprégné de l’esprit de Wundt et de celui de ses continuateurs, Krueger,
Külpe et autres;
– à Hambourg il a rencontré Stern, auprès duquel s’était formé G.W. Allport;
HISTOIRES OUBLIÉES – LES DRAMES DES PSYCHOLOGUES ROUMAINS...
15
– à Berlin s’est formé aux plus récentes recherches dans le domaine de Gestaltpsychologie
et il s’est familiarisé avec les idées de Koehler;
– les professeurs Rupp et Moede ont publié le compte‑rendu de sa thèse de doctorat dans
des revues allemandes; de retour en Roumanie, il a écrit un ample rapport sur cette
visite, qui donnera plus tard un livre consistant, Psihologia germană contemporană [La
psychologie allemande contemporaine] (1930);
– en France il a connu ceux plus tard qui ont marqué l’évolution de la psychologie française,
Pierre Janet et Henri Piéron. Il a obtenu par la suite une bourse de la Fondation
Rockefeller et commencé une nouvelle étape de formation;
– à Harvard il s’est lié d’amitié avec le professeur Allport et rencontré aussi Cantril,
Murray, Boring («le représentant le plus célèbre de la psychologie expérimentale aux
Etats Unis») et Roback, l’auteur du célèbre traité sur la Psychologie du caractère. Avec
Allport il a maintenu des liens serrés, celui‑ci lisant devant ses étudiants les lettres de
Mărgineanu, pour lequel il avait une haute considération;
– à Yale il a travaillé avec Hartshorne et May, qui accordaient une attention significative
au milieu et à la «situation», et il fréquente Sapir, qui était quant à lui intéressé par
l’influence de la culture sur la personnalité humaine;
– à Chicago il a connu Thurstone, avec lequel il a eu des longues discussions; à Wisconsin –
Young; à Stanford – Terman; à Los Angeles – Bogardus; à l’Université Duke il a rencontré
William McDougall; à Columbia – Murphy et Symonds; sans oublier Thorndike.
Au bout de huit mois, il a réalisé une synthèse sur la psychologie de la personne, qui a
été le point de départ d’un ample ouvrage. En moins de deux ans est devenu un nom très
connu parmi les psychologues importants des Etats Unis. Il a été souvent consulté en tant
que très bon connaisseur de la psychologie européenne, invité à donner des cours et
conférences, en devenant un partenaire diligent de ses collègues américains.
Le tableau des «rencontres» de Nicolae Mărgineanu est impressionnant. Il s’est formé
dans la proximité spirituelle et a coopéré avec les représentants les plus importants de la
psychologie allemande, française et américaine.
Il a été arrêté suite à une délation «collégiale», accusé de «complot contre l’ordre social»,
impliqué dans un lot de «saboteurs» et «enquêté», c’est‑à‑dire humilié, violenté, violemment
battu, soumis à la faim, à des pressions de toutes sortes, pour qu’il «témoigne» ou pour qu’il
s’implique dans des actions de «dévoilement». Il a été condamné à 25 ans de prison. Il a résisté
avec une impensable dignité au régime carcéral et en sorti très malade, après 16 ans, tout en
réussissant à survivre encore 16, à travailler et à publier encore nombre d’études et de travaux.
Dans son livre de mémoires, tenu loin des yeux de la famille, et publié après le
changement de régime de 1989, on trouve des témoignages très importants sur les enquêtes
menées à sa rencontre pendant sa détention. Il avait continué à observer, comparer, évaluer,
jauger, interpréter des attitudes, des comportements, des styles.
La compétence d’observateur participant du psychologue Mărgineanu ressort de l’objectivité
d’une description qu’il donne, alors même qu’il est victime et sujet de «l’expérience». A ce
sujet, il raconte:
Deux bourreaux m’ont lié mains et jambes, ils m’ont fait introduire mes genoux entre les mains
et, entre les genoux et les mains, ils ont introduit un bâton. Ils m’ont surélevé au dessus du sol
en posant les extrémités du bâton sur deux piliers. Ainsi le corps était en l’air, ma tête en bas
et les jambes en haut. Le chef de l’arrestation a commencé à me frapper le dos avec un bâton
de caoutchouc à l’intérieur duquel il y avait un fil de fer tressé. Dans l’état d’émotion dans
lequel je me trouvais, je n’ai pas senti une douleur très grande.
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ADRIAN NECULAU
Cette description nous apparaît comme réalisée par quelqu’un d’autre, comme s’il en
avait été l’observateur et non le sujet.
Dans ses écrits ultérieurs, au sortir de prison, il a vivement maintenu ses convictions
humanistes, en s’appuyant sur des valeurs auxquelles il croyait et sur des gens qui les
incarnaient. Dans Sub semnul omeniei [Sous le signe de l’humanité], publié à peine cinq
ans après le calvaire carcéral, il a témoigné sa confiance dans la culture et la civilisation,
dans le sens de la mesure, le style national et le sentiment de l’harmonie, dans les coutumes
(dans le sens de coutume morale) et dans la communauté, la confiance dans la loi des
ancêtres, fondée sur l’humanisme et le bon sens. Il croyait fortement à une institution de
la valeur morale, aux lois, normes et devoirs, aux actions correctes et aux bonnes pratiques,
tout cela étant pour lui des qualités de la personnalité civilisatrice.
Son œuvre scientifique d’avant et d’après la détention/la prison est impressionnante.
Petre Botezatu (1911‑1981) est connu en Roumanie comme un remarquable auteur de
textes philosophiques, qui s’est affirmé dans la seconde partie de sa vie dans des domaines
comme la logique, l’exégèse philosophique, la sémiotique et l’herméneutique. Il a créé une
«école philosophique», étant repéré comme l’auteur d’une «logique naturelle», originale.
Le mérite lui revient aussi d’avoir situé l’univers de la logique en pleine modernité, car il
est fondateur d’un système; c’est une personnalité créative, doublée d’un esprit éthique et
démocratique d’exception.
Petre Botezatu a débuté professionnellement en tant que psychologue, évoluant jusqu’au
niveau académique de Maître de conférences dans le domaine de la psychologie de l’enfant.
Nous avons pu reconstituer cette étape de sa vie; il était particulièrement consciencieux et
penché sur le détail, discutait avec ses étudiants et tirait au clair les questions les plus
difficiles; pendant ses heures de séminaire tout devait être éclairé, systématisé, organisé,
complété. Ce professeur était très apprécié.
Comme de nombreux universitaires d’Iaşi, Petre Botezatu était, depuis son jeune âge,
un homme de gauche, démocrate authentique, militant actif pour ses idées et celles de son
groupe. Refusant de suivre ceux de ses collègues qui sont allés vers le Parti Communiste
après l’installation du régime totalitaire, il est resté fidèle au Parti Social Démocrate dont
il était membre. Le groupe dont il faisait partie de jeunes intellectuels de gauche, socio‑démo­
crates et bohèmes, regroupés autour du professeur de sociologie Alexandru Claudian, leur
leader à Iaşi, a été éliminé de l’université, puis arrêté, sous l’accusation de «trahison de
la démocratie populaire». Petre Botezatu a été condamné à cinq ans de prison, mais il a
été libéré au bout de deux ans, ainsi que certains de ses collègues, suite à l’intervention du
Parti Travailliste Anglais auprès des autorités roumaines.
Il a travaillé après en tant que psychologue dans un office de recrutement du personnel
auprès de la Compagnie Roumaine des Chemins de Fer. Petre Botezatu a fait de nombreux
travaux de recherche, monographies professionnelles et études théoriques de psychologie
sociale (dont l’article souvent cité, intitulé «L’acte interpersonnel»). Il a pu revenir au sein
de l’Université à l’âge de 47 ans, mais en tant qu’enseignant de logique et non plus de
psychologie. Tout au long de cette période il a été poursuivi continuellement par des agents
de la Securitate (la police politique), à travers des indics recrutés parmi ses propres
collègues, il a fait objet d’écoutes téléphoniques, son courrier a été intercepté. Son dossier,
récemment mis à la disposition des chercheurs, contient des renseignements qui prouvent
sans conteste le fait qu’il était au courant de sa surveillance et poursuite; pour lui cette
période a été un vrai calvaire. Le dossier de poursuite n’a été fermé, comme on l’a déjà
dit, qu’après sa mort. Son portrait trouve actuellement sa place dans la Salle du Sénat de
HISTOIRES OUBLIÉES – LES DRAMES DES PSYCHOLOGUES ROUMAINS...
17
l’Université «Alexandru Ioan Cuza», intégrant la galerie des éminents professeurs de cette
réputée institution.
Vasile Pavelcu (1900‑1991) a suivi des études de psychologie à Iaşi, et fait ensuite une
spécialisation de deux ans à Paris. J’étais à Paris, lors de ma première «sortie» à l’Ouest
(1991): en rendant visite à Didier Anzieu, je lui ai parlé de Vasile Pavelcu qui avait été
mon maître à penser, et qui avait été lui‑même le disciple de H. Delacroix et de Lalande
(1925‑1927); fréquenté les cours de Henri Wallon en Sorbonne, et ceux de Pierre Janet,
Henri Piéron et d’Emile Gley au Collège de France; à l’hôpital psychiatrique Sainte Anne
il a travaillé sous la direction du professeur Georges Dumas. «C’est ça, pour nous, mon
cher collègue, l’histoire de la psychologie; personne aujourd’hui ne sait plus rien sur nos
devanciers, notez donc, pour ne rien oublier, tout ce que le Maître vous a dit», m’a conseillé
Didier Anzieu. A mon retour à Iaşi, le Professeur n’était plus. Un amphithéâtre de la
Faculté de Psychologie porte actuellement, pour mémoire, son nom.
Le Professeur Pavelcu a publié en 1964 un livre qui a éveillé les consciences des jeunes
gens, intitulé Drama psihologiei [Le drame de la psychologie]. Nous savions à l’époque
que ce livre devait être lu au premier degré tout comme au second, quoique cela ne puisse
pas être affirmé explicitement: il faisait ainsi référence à la fois au drame de la science
qu’à celui des psychologues.
Vasile Pavelcu n’a pas connu la prison, il venait de la province roumaine annexée à
l’URSS, la Bessarabie, et il parlait la langue russe. C’est cela qui l’a sauvé. Pendant un
temps, il a ainsi enseigné la littérature russe; c’est lui qui m’a ouvert le goût pour les
écrivains «psychologues» Tolstoï, Tourgueniev et Tchekhov.
Mais il a été poursuivi par la Securitate toute sa vie. On vérifiait sa correspondance,
son téléphone était écouté; deux «sources» sont confirmées: «Ştefan» et «Filatelistul» (le
Philatéliste), délateurs autorisés à le fréquenter pour rapporter les visites qu’ils lui rendaient,
le contenu de ses conversations, quelles étaient ses pensées, ses convictions. Un nouveau
dossier a été ouvert à son nom en 1985. On met en place un moment spécial: un tel lui
rend visite, le provoque à parler, tout en ayant sur lui, bien caché, un appareil à enregistrer.
Tous ces renseignements sont à trouver dans son dossier de poursuite.
Pavelcu était membre de l’Académie de la République Socialiste de Roumanie. Un tel
academicien recevait, en reconnaissance de sa qualité, un repas gratuit à la cantine de la
communauté juive de la ville. Ce repas, il le complétait par ce que ses anciens jeunes
collègues lui apportaient, lorsqu’ils venaient le visiter. L’«objectif» du dossier de poursuite
était un vieil homme isolé, âgé de 85 ans.
Conclusions
Le totalitarisme stalinien instauré en Roumanie dans l’après‑guerre, tout comme les répressions
et la terreur ont été orientés envers des catégories sociales et professionnelles précises,
comme les politiciens, les officiers, les représentants du clergé, les magistrats, les écrivains, les
guides d’opinion, etc. Les psychologues constituaient à l’époque une catégorie professionnelle
peu nombreuse et socialement non saillante. Ils avaient pour la plupart des convictions
gauchistes. Comment pourrait‑on expliquer la violence de la répression envers eux? Je ne
dispose que d’une seule explication: leur refus de collaborer avec les nouvelles autorités.
Leur conscience critique.
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Forgotten (Hi)Stories of Detention, Surveillance, and Interrogation:
The Drama of Romanian Psychologists under Communism
Abstract: The study seeks to provide a model for explaining the pressure of a repressive ideological
and institutional context on the personal and professional lives of psychologists in Romania after
the installation of the pro‑Soviet regime in the aftermath of World War II. It examines the strategies
used by Romanian psychologists to escape or resist this pressure. Special attention is devoted to the
surveillance, interrogation, and detention of important Romanian psychologists under Communism.
The paper appeals to familiar theories and paradigms of social psychology such as the pressure of
the context and the manipulation of its social representations in order to understand how totalitarian
society affects private life and scientific work.
Key words: Romanian psychologists, surveillance, interrogation, detention
Istorii uitate – dramele psihologilor români sub dictatură:
întemniţaţi, anchetaţi, supravegheaţi
Rezumat: Acest studiu propune un model explicativ al dramei psihologilor români supuşi unui
tratament represiv. Se reconstituie presiunea pentru conformitate, exercitată asupra lor de către
contextul ideologic şi instituţional, ca şi strategiile de supravieţuire şi de rezistenţă profesională şi
morală a acestor psihologi. Cercetarea pune în evidenţă şi ilustrează teorii şi paradigme bine
cunoscute în psihologia socială: presiunea exercitată asupra contextului şi manipularea reprezentărilor
sociale. Prezenta abordare ne permite să înţelegem modul în care societatea totalitară a afectat
cotidianul, munca şi opera acestor importanţi psihologi. Viaţa privată şi instituţională a celor mai
mulţi era un calvar: supravegheaţi, anchetaţi, supuşi presiunilor. Cel puţin zece dintre aceştia au
făcut închisoare politică, deşi aveau opţiuni democratice, adesea de stânga. În consecinţă, dacă
vrem să evaluăm munca lor, realizările lor profesionale în aceste condiţii, trebuie să adoptăm o
abordare complexă, contextualizată şi empatică.
Références:
Anisescu, C. (2006). Nicolae Mărgineanu. Un psiholog în temniţele comuniste (Un psychologue
roumain dans les prisons communistes), «Préface» d’Adrian Neculau, Iaşi: Polirom.
Neculau, A. (ed.) (2008). La vie quotidienne en Roumanie sous le communisme, «Préface» de Serge
Moscovici. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Neculau, A. (2010). Psihologi români în închisorile comuniste (Les psychologues roumains dans
les prisons communistes). Psihologia socială, 26, 115‑130.
Sirota, A., Neculau, A., Soponaru, C. (2010). Le système totalitaire: du dehors au‑dedans.
Connexions, 2 (94), 95‑112.
Frederico Guilherme, Isabel R. Pinto, José M. Marques
The Effects of Social Identity Threat on Reactions
to Normative and Deviant Group Members:
A Subjective Group Dynamics Approach1
Abstract: The present research draws from the postulates of subjective group dynamics theory
(SGDT) (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001; Marques & Paez, 2008) and previous research on
the black sheep effect (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). We found
support to the SGDT hypothesis that the extreme differentiation between normative and deviant
in‑group members is determined by the motivation to guarantee the in‑group’s positive distinctiveness.
In our study, participants derogated deviant in‑group members and upgraded normative in‑group
members in comparison to respectively similar out‑group members, when the in‑group’s positive
distinctiveness was undermined by an unfavorable inter‑group comparison. In contrast, when
participants were ensured about the in‑group’s positive distinctiveness, they favored both in‑group
members in comparison to the out‑group targets. These results are consistent with SGDT, and are
at odds with an explanation of extreme intra‑group differentiation as a result of the violation of
positive in‑group expectancies (cf. Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999).
Key words: black sheep effect, deviance, social identity, social influence, subjective group dynamics
Guy Fawkes was an English Catholic involved in the failed attempt to assassinate King
James I in 1605. Marshall Henri Philippe Pétain was the Head of State of France who
collaborated with the Nazi regime during World War II. Mordechai Vanunu is a former
Israeli nuclear technician who in 1986 publicly revealed details of his country’s nuclear
weapons program. These are illustrations of famous persons who were convicted for high
treason. They were vilified and despised in their countries. They were also sentenced to
severe penalties, including life imprisonment and death.
In order to understand why individuals despise and antagonize in‑group traitors, we
must understand the reasons why they reject in‑group deviant members in general. By
“deviant” we mean a member of a social group who behaves against the group’s valued
norms (Marques, Abrams, Paez, Hogg, 2001; Marques & Paez, 2008). Treason is a
particular case of deviance as it goes against a general norm of loyalty to the group. In
1. This research is part of Frederico Guilherme’s PhD project supervised by José M. Marques and
supported by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, Grant: SFRH/BD/46518/2008.
José Marques is also an Associate Researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of
Lisbon. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Frederico Guilherme,
Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade do Porto, Rua Alfredo Allen,
4200‑135 Porto, Portugal, e‑mail: frederico‑[email protected].
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FREDERICO GUILHERME, ISABEL R. PINTO, JOSÉ M. MARQUES
contrast, normative group members are those who behave accordingly with the group’s
norms and, as such, they generally stand out less than the deviants.
According to subjective group dynamics theory (Marques, 2010; Marques, Abrams,
Paez, et al., 2001; Marques & Paez, 2008), hostility toward deviant in‑group members is
illustrated by the evaluative differentiation process coined the black sheep effect, by which
individuals upgrade normative in‑group members and downgrade deviant in‑group members
as compared to similar out‑group members (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, 2010;
Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). SGDT accounts for the
black sheep effect as an outcome of people’s motivation to ensure that fellow in‑group
members are consonant with the prescriptive standards that legitimate their beliefs on the
in‑group’s positive distinctiveness (Marques, 2010; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001;
Marques & Paez, 2008).
Indeed, previous research on subjective group dynamics has showed that group members
are generally favorable toward normative in‑group members, while being more hostile
towards deviant in‑group members than deviant out‑group members, when it is necessary
to achieve or to restore the in‑group’s positive distinctiveness (e.g., Marques, Abrams, &
Serodio, 2001). Our goal with the present study is to follow up that research in support of
the idea that individuals favor normative in‑group members and derogate deviant in‑group
members, more than similar out‑group members, when the in‑group’s positive distinctiveness
is undermined. We suggest this is a way to achieve and sustain a positive social identity. In
addition, we analyze how the motivation for a positive social identity can determine the
advocacy of strategies of social influence, either socializing or punitive, toward in‑group
deviants (cf. Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010).
Subjective group dynamics and the black sheep effect
Subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT) draws from the general postulates of the social
identification approach, including social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner,
1986) and self‑categorization theory (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987) to which it adds a perspective about the role of deviance in structuring social relations
(cf. Marques, Abrams, Paez, et al., 2001; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Marques
& Paez, 2008). According to the social identification approach, individuals strive to achieve
and to sustain a positive social identity by achieving and maintaining a positive differentiation
as compared to relevant out‑groups in specific social situations (Tajfel, 1978). Namely,
individuals assimilate themselves to an in‑group prototype and, as a result, develop in‑group
favoring attitudes, which materialize in terms of biased judgments and discriminatory
behavior regarding out‑groups and their members (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, et al., 1987).
SGDT, on its side, aims to extend the social identity approach to the analysis of
intra‑group differentiation processes that occur in inter‑group contexts. Based on research
on the black sheep effect, SGDT sustains that intra‑group differentiation may allow individ­
uals to subjectively validate the in‑group, namely by reinforcing their commitment to the
norms that legitimate their beliefs on the in‑group’s positive value as compared to an
out‑group (e.g., Marques, 2010; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Marques & Paez,
2008; Pinto, et al., 2010).
Since the initial work by Marques and colleagues (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques,
et al., 1988), the black sheep effect was found in a wide variety of social contexts, under
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THREAT...
21
a range of different experimental conditions (e.g., Biernat, et al., 1999; Branscombe,
Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Breakwell, Vignoles, & Robertson, 2003; Eidelman &
Biernat, 2003; Hichy, Mari, & Capozza, 2008; Jetten, Summerville, Hornsey, & Mewse,
2005; Khan & Lambert, 1998; Lewis & Sherman, 2010; Nesdale & Brown, 2004). In
this line of research, some authors proposed alternative accounts for the occurrence of the
black sheep effect. In particular, Biernat, Vescio, and Billings (1999) relate the downgrading
of in‑group deviant members to the aversive emotions triggered by the violation of higher
positive expectancies toward the in‑group than the out‑group by deviant in‑group members.
Below, we focus on the SGDT’s account on the black sheep effect. In a follow‑up section,
we analyze Biernat, Vescio, and Billings’ (1999) research and alternative explanation.
Descriptive focus and prescriptive focus
in judgments of in‑group members
SGDT suggests that judgments of in‑group members ensue from the articulation of a
descriptive and a prescriptive focus on the perception of individuals’ behavior (Marques,
2010; Marques, Abrams, Paez, et al., 2001; Marques & Paez, 2008). Descriptive focus
emerges when perception is driven by the accentuation of inter‑category differences and
intra‑category similarities. In such cognitive contexts, individuals simultaneously concentrate
on perceived similarities between instances of the same category and on perceived differences
between instances of contrasting categories (Haslam & Turner, 1992; Oakes, Haslam, &
Turner, 1994; Turner, et al., 1987). Social groups thus become cognitively construed in
terms of those attributes that, in each particular social context, best represent group
prototypes (Turner, et al., 1987), and individuals (including the self) come to be perceived
as in‑group or out‑group members (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998).
According to the social identification approach, group prototypes correspond to the
groups’ contrasted positions along dimensions that SGDT defines as descriptive norms.
Examples of descriptive norms may include skin color when ethnic differentiation between
groups is relevant, or particular chants voiced by soccer fans in support for their respective
teams during a match (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Marques, et al., 1998; Pinto,
et al., 2010). The position occupied by any individual on a descriptive dimension defines
that individual’s membership to one of the salient groups in those particular contexts.
However, there can be situations in which, after inter‑group distinctiveness is cognitively
established through descriptive focus, individuals’ attention is directed at group members’
behavior on dimensions that are not relevant for inter‑group differentiation and category
inclusion, but that define the value ascribed to the groups and their members. Examples of
such dimensions, which SGDT designates as prescriptive norms, include “honesty”, “fair‑play”,
“solidarity”. Prescriptive norms stand for moral conventions (cf. Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren,
1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993) that are common to every social group and thus
do not allow for inter‑group differentiation. However, they help define the value assigned
to the group and hence the perceived legitimacy, or subjective validity (Pinto, et al., 2010),
of group members’ beliefs on the positive value they ascribe to their group.
SGDT suggests that deviant behavior triggers a prescriptive focus on the part of the
observers, who will devote their attention to the extent to which the actor contributes
positively or negatively to the overall value assigned to their group. When the actor is an
in‑group member, deviant behavior jeopardizes belief on the relative superiority of the
in‑group. As a result, this member should be strongly derogated, as a means to legitimize
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FREDERICO GUILHERME, ISABEL R. PINTO, JOSÉ M. MARQUES
the in‑group’s positive identity in comparison to the out‑group. This process leads to extreme
evaluative appraisals of deviant and normative in‑group members, who are respectively
threatening and supportive to the in‑group’s positive distinctiveness, in comparison to
out‑group similar targets, i.e. the black sheep effect.
Identity threat and the black sheep effect
In line with the above reasoning, some research suggests that the black sheep effect is more
likely to occur when the in‑group’s image is undermined and it seems necessary to restore
its positive stand (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001). For
example, Marques, Abrams, and Serodio (2001, Experiment 3) categorized participants in
two groups based on a bogus imagination test. Some participants were then informed that their
in‑group type of imagination was undoubtedly superior to the other (a secure positive identity
scenario), whereas other participants were told that it was not sure which type of imagination
was superior, and that the purpose of the study was to clarify this issue (an insecure positive
identity scenario). All participants were then presented with four group members who
adopted a normative ethical opinion and one member who adopted a deviant opinion.
Results showed that only in the insecure positive identity scenario, participants judged
the normative in‑group member more favorably than the normative out‑group member and
derogated the deviant in‑group member in comparison to the deviant out‑group member.
In the secure positive identity scenario, participants favored both in‑group members in
comparison to the out‑group members. These results thus illustrate the idea that group
members are more inclined to reject deviant in‑group members and uphold normative
in‑group members when their identity’s positive value is undermined than when it is secure
by comparison with a relevant out‑group.
Expectancy violation and the black sheep effect
Biernat, Vescio and Billings (1999) proposed an account of the black sheep effect based on
a theoretical rationale alternative to subjective group dynamics theory. According to these
authors, the derogation of in‑group deviants ensues from a state of negative mood arising
from a perceived violation of positive in‑group expectancies. To test this hypothesis, Biernat,
Vescio and Billings (1999) had White female university students playing a team game with
a White or Black female confederate. Participants were told that the better their team result
was, the more chances they had in winning a prize. Confederates delivered a high or low
quality performance. After the game, participants were asked to judge their partner’s
performance, competence and warmth and whether their partner’s performance had violated
their expectancies. Before and after the game, participants were also asked to indicate the
extent to which they were experiencing each of a series of positive and negative emotions.
According to the results, low‑performing White partners elicited more expectancy violation
and more negative mood change, in comparison to both the low‑performing Black and the
high‑performing White partners. Furthermore, mediation analysis confirmed that perceived
expectancy violation led to negative mood, which in turn led to more negative evaluations.
In our view, it seems difficult to support the expectancy violation hypothesis relying on
the Biernat, Vescio and Billings’ (1999) study. Because this study included only White
participants, there is a possibility that the significant correlation between expectancy
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THREAT...
23
violation and negative mood was not related to social identity concerns per se, but to
race‑based stereotypes. Participants might expect the White confederate to be a competent
partner, not because she was a team member, but because she was White (cf. Whitehead,
Smith, & Eichhorn, 1982). Thus, a study including also Black participants would be advised
to account for this alternative possibility. Also, and perhaps more importantly, the expectancy
violation measure was collected after participants interacted with the partner and after
having answered to the mood and attitudinal scales. Thus, the question of causality remains
open. Biernat, Vescio and Billings (1999) propose that the perception of expectancy violation
leads to more negative moods and more negative evaluations of in‑group deviant members.
However, according to the temporal ordering of the variables in their study, it is possible
that the opposite causal order may be right.
The expectancy violation hypothesis is a compelling explanation for the black sheep
effect and can account for some instances of social discrimination, perhaps not necessarily
against in‑group deviants, but toward any in‑group or out‑group members who fall short of
group expectations. Thus, we believe this hypothesis deserves further scrutiny and should
be studied as an alternative explanation to the in‑group’s positive distinctiveness hypothesis
supported by subjective group dynamics theory and research (cf. also Pinto, et al., 2010).
Advocated strategies toward in‑group deviant members
More recent research on SGDT has showed that, in association with evaluations of normative
and deviant in‑group members, individuals advocate harsher social control strategies toward
deviant in‑group members, and that this is associated with their motivation to defend the
in‑group’s identity. For example, Pinto, et al. (2010, Study 3) informed students from two
courses that they would organize a debate between students issuing from both courses.
Participants were presented with in‑group or out‑group course normative and deviant targets
as potential debaters. Based on Levine and Moreland’s (e.g., 1994) group socialization
model, these targets were presented either as new to their course (new members), or as
well‑established students (full members), or as students who wished to leave their course
(marginal members). Participants were asked to evaluate a target who advocated a normative
opinion and a target with a deviant opinion about the topic for the debate, and to advocate
a series of socializing and punishing strategies as to deal with the target whom they agreed
the least (all participants chose the deviant).
Pinto and colleagues (2010) found that the normative in‑group full member was the most
favorably evaluated of all targets, and the deviant in‑group full member was the most
unfavorably evaluated of all targets. In addition, the more negatively participants evaluated
the deviant in‑group full member, the more they advocated a punishing reaction toward this
target, whereas the more negatively participants evaluated the deviant in‑group new member,
the more they advocated a socializing reaction toward this target. These findings suggest
that the appraisals of deviant in‑group targets can be related to more socializing or punitive
strategies, as a function of the level of threat the targets pose. More specifically, because
in‑group full members are held responsible for upholding the group’s values and image
(Levine & Moreland, 1994), any deviant behavior on their account poses a strong threat to
the in‑group’s image. Thus, the group should be highly motivated to punish in‑group full
members’ deviant behaviors. In contrast, deviant in‑group new members pose less of a
threat to the group’s image, and thus trigger less punishing and allow more socializing
reactions. In the present study, we follow this research by analyzing how punishing and
24
FREDERICO GUILHERME, ISABEL R. PINTO, JOSÉ M. MARQUES
socializing strategies of social influence toward in‑group deviants can lead to the validation
of a positive in‑group image.
Overview and hypotheses
We test reactions to group members in an inter‑group context which is either favorable or
unfavorable to the in‑group, namely a situation where participants are informed about the
in‑group’s positive value and a situation where they are informed of the in‑group’s negative
value to an out‑group. This methodology allows us to test the following competing hypothesis,
either (1) that the extreme reactions toward deviant and normative in‑group targets, which
are characteristic of the black sheep effect, are triggered in the presence of undermining
information to the in‑group’s image to a relevant out‑group (cf. Marques, Abrams, & Serodio,
2001), or (2) that the black sheep effect is triggered when in‑group deviant members contradict
the in‑group’s higher standards in comparison to an out‑group (cf. Biernat, et al., 1999).
We presented two inter‑group settings to students of Psychology and Educational Sciences
courses. In one setting, the in‑group (Psychology or Educational Sciences) course had more
deviant members in comparison to the other course (Threatening setting), whereas in the
other setting (Secure setting), the in‑group course had less deviant students. We asked
participants to judge a deviant and a normative target, who were either in‑group course, or
out‑group course students. In line with previous research (e.g., Marques, Abrams & Serodio,
2001), we expected the black sheep effect to emerge from the threatening, but not from the
secure setting, i.e. participants would derogate the in‑group deviant member as compared
to the out‑group deviant member, and would be more favorable to the in‑group normative
member than to the out‑group normative member.
In addition, we asked participants to indicate their degree of support for a socializing
and a punishing strategy aiming to reduce deviance in the in‑group. Previous research on
subjective group dynamics theory confirms that the support for socializing and punishing
strategies towards in‑group deviants is related to the implications of the deviant’s behavior
for positive group identity (Pinto, et al., 2010, Study 3). Individuals can give more support
toward a socializing reaction aimed at convincing in‑group deviants to change their views,
if the in‑group deviant members pose little threat to the in‑group’s image (e.g., because
they are new members); and adhere more to a punishing reaction, as to remind in‑group
deviants of the social costs of their deviance, if the in‑group deviant members pose a strong
threat to the in‑group’s image (e.g., because they are full‑time members). Either way, the
support for the influencing strategies toward in‑group deviants should help individuals to
assure a more positive view of the in‑group. In our study, we tested this hypothesis with
an exploratory analysis on how the support for socializing and punishing collective strategies
aiming to reduce in‑group deviance can lead to a more positive view of the in‑group.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 24 Psychology and 26 Educational Sciences students attending the Univer­
sity of Porto, Portugal (80% female, M = 22.12 years, DP = 6.88). A 2 (Inter‑­group Setting:
Threatening vs Secure) × 2 (Target’s Group: In‑group vs Out‑group) × 2 (Target’s Stance:
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THREAT...
25
Normative vs Deviant) mixed design was used. Group Comparison and Target’s Group were
between‑participants factors, and Target’s Stance was a within‑participants factor1.
Procedure
Participants were approached in public places in the Faculty building and asked to answer
a survey about prejudiced attitudes and discrimination among university students. Participants
were informed that a preliminary survey had measured Psychology and Educational Sciences
students’ opinions about several minority groups in Portugal. This survey had, supposedly,
highlighted the percentage of students in both courses who supported a discriminatory policy
against Gypsies, namely “exiling Gypsies who are condemned for criminal activities”.
Agreement with this policy had been previously shown to be infrequent and considered as
undesirable by a different sample of individuals from the same population2. According to
the Inter‑group Setting manipulation, participants either read that the in‑group course had
proportionally more, or less students, who supported the discriminatory policy than the
other course (18% vs 3%, or 18% vs 33%, respectively).
Before being presented with the information about the percentages of group members,
participants answered to a series of social identification questions. Next, they were asked
to evaluate two students who had given an opinion about the matter. The first target student
supported the discriminatory policy, and declared that Gypsies are “untrustworthy and prone
to engage in criminal behavior” (this statement was pre‑tested to be undesirable by another
sample of individuals from the same population3). The second target student opposed the
1. Participant’s course was similarly distributed across conditions χ2(3, N = 50) < 1. Participant’s sex
and age were unbalanced across conditions, χ2(3, N = 50) = 7.55, p = .056 and F(1, 46) = 4.020,
p = .051, respectively. Apart from the change in their respective magnitudes, the analysis involving
participants’ course, sex and age as covariates in the design of the experiment was similar to the analysis
reported in the results section. We thus disregarded Participant’s course, age and sex in the analysis.
2. We asked 16 Psychology and 12 Educational Sciences students about their opinion on five
anti‑Gypsies discriminatory policies, one of them being “exiling Gypsies who are condemned for
criminal activities”. We asked participants to estimate the percentage of students within their course and
Faculty that would support such a policy. Results indicated that students regarded the support for that
policy as infrequent within their own course (M = 18.14%, SD = 17.71) and Faculty (M = 26.50%,
SD = 21.57). Both results were significantly below a 50% threshold, t(27) = 9.52, p < .001 and
t(27) = 5.76, p < .001, respectively. Also, we asked participants about their personal support for the
policy on a 7‑point scale (1 = I totally disagree, 7 = I totally agree). Participants did not support
the discriminatory policy (M = 2.34%, SD = 1.28, significantly below the middle point of the scale,
t27 = 6.97, p < .001). There were no significant differences between Psychology and Educational
Sciences students for the estimation of the frequency of support within the Faculty and personal support,
t(26) always < 1.01, ns. But Educational Sciences students tended to regard support for the policy
as more infrequent within their course (M = 10.92%, SD = 11.76) in comparison to Psychology
students (M = 23.56%, SD = 19.76, t26 = 1.97, p = .060). Both these results were significantly
below 50%, t(15) = 5.35, p < .001 and t(11) = 11.51, p < .001, respectively.
3. We asked 11 Psychology and 13 Educational Sciences students about their opinion on four statements
of different university students whose courses were unidentified. They were asked to evaluate each
statement, on a scale between 1 = “negative” and 7 = “positive”. We retained two statements for the
main study: One statement that was evaluated favorably (M = 5.46%, SD = 1.02, significantly above
the middle of the scale, t23 = 7.00, p < .001) and another that was evaluated unfavorably (M = 2.29%,
SD = 1.04, significantly below the middle of the scale, t23 = 8.03, p < .001). We submitted these
scores to a Participant’s Course (Psychology and Educational Sciences) × Statement (Favorable and
Unfavorable) analysis of variance, with the latter measure as a within‑subject factor. Participants
favored one statement over the other, as shown by the significant Statement main effect, F(1, 22)
= 77.31, p < .001. Participant’s Course and Course × Statement yielded no significant effects,
both F(1, 22) < 1. A further t‑test conducted on the two scores, after reversing the items for the
26
FREDERICO GUILHERME, ISABEL R. PINTO, JOSÉ M. MARQUES
discriminatory policy, by noting that “any discriminatory judicial policies can only lead to
more marginality and exclusion” and stressing the values of a “multi‑cultural, democratic
and cohesive society” (pre‑tested as desirable). Both the deviant and the normative targets
were presented as attending either the same course as the participant (in‑group) or the other
course (out‑group). Participants were then asked whether they would support two civic
groups formed by students of the same course as theirs. Both groups aimed to reduce
prejudice among students of their course, but whereas one group advocated a persuasive
strategy, the other advocated a punishing strategy to be applied to prejudiced in‑group
students. In the end, participants answered to a second set of social identification questions.
Dependent Measures
Social identification. Participants indicated their degree of identification with their course
at two different times. First, after being informed of the goals of the study and before the
experimental manipulation, participants answered the following items: “Do you like the
students of your course?” (1 = I don’t like them at all; 7 = I like them a lot), “To be a
student of your course is an important part of your identity?”, “Do you trust the students
of your course?”, “Do you treasure the friendship of the students of your course?”, “Do
you believe students of your course are among the most qualified at the University of
Porto?”, “Do you think about yourself frequently as a student of your course?”, “Do you
believe students of your course are among the most altruists at the University of Porto?”
(1 = not at all; 7 = totally). Second, at the end of the survey: “Do you think you have
similar attitudes and values with the generality of the students of your course?”, “Do you
believe the students of your course have high levels of morality?”, “Is it important to you
to be seen as a student of your course?” (1 = not at all; 7= totally), and “What would
you feel if you heard someone badmouthing students of your course?” (1 = very well;
7 = very bad). We averaged the answers to these items to a pre‑Identification and a
post‑identification scores (Cronbach´s α = .72, and .67, respectively). This scores were
significantly correlated, r = .634, p < .001.
Evaluation of targets. Participants were asked to evaluate each of the two target­
‑students, on the following item: “What is your impression of this student?”
(1 = „negative”, 7 = „positive”).
Advocated strategies of social influence. This measure was inspired by the Political Action
Intentions Index (cf. Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). Participants were presented with
descriptions of two hypothetical civic groups composed by students of the same course as theirs,
each one advocating specific strategies aimed at reducing prejudice in their course. One group
advocated persuasive strategies (“informative measures, like conferences, debates, cultural
events”), whereas the other group advocated punishing policies (“disciplinary measures,
like sanctions, fines, punishments”) to be applied to prejudiced in‑group students. Participants
were asked to indicate their willingness to support each group in four ways, ranging from less
to more costly: “joining the group’s mailing list”, “signing the group’s manifesto”, “joining
the group”, and “recruiting other students to join the group” (1 = not at all; 7 = totally).
Thus, two sets of measures were averaged to respectively assess participants’ willingness to
participate in actions to support the persuasive group (four items, α = .88) and to support
the punishing group (four items, α = .96).
unfavorable score (1 = 7; 2 = 6; … 6 = 2, 7 = 1), was non‑significant (t23 = 1.10, ns), suggesting
that the favorable statement was as better evaluated as the unfavorable one was depreciated.
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THREAT...
27
Results
Pre‑identification
To check for participants’ identification with the in‑group course before experimental
manipulations, we ran an Inter‑group Setting (Threatening vs Secure) × 2 (Target’s Group:
In‑group vs Out‑group) analysis of variance on the pre‑identification score. There was a
significant difference in this measure between Targets’ Group conditions (In‑group: M = 4.69%,
SD = .68 vs Out‑group: M = 5.45%, SD = .39, F(1, 46) = 22.99, p < .001, η2 = .33).
This difference can only be attributed to chance, as the score was taken before participants
received any information related to the experimental manipulations.
Evaluations
We expected the black sheep effect to occur more strongly in the unfavorable inter‑group
comparison than in the favorable inter‑group comparison condition. To check for this
prediction, we conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) Inter‑group Setting × Targets’
Group × Target’s Stance on evaluation of normative and deviant members, while controlling
for the effects of pre‑identification.
The ANCOVA showed a significant Inter‑group Setting × Targets’ Group × Target’s Stance
interaction, which was consistent with our main hypothesis, F(1, 46) = 5.51, p = .023,
η2 = .111 (see Figure 1). We decomposed this interaction according to the Inter‑group Setting
condition. The Targets’ Group × Target’s Stance interaction was marginally significant in the
threatening setting and was not significant in the secure setting, F(1, 47) = 3.55, p = .066,
η2 = .07 and F(1, 47) = 2.20, ns, respectively.
Figure 1. Evaluations of normative and deviant targets as a function of inter‑group
comparison (unfavorable or favorable) and targets’ group (in‑group or out‑group).
1. Pre‑identification as a covariate had a reliable effect, β = .43, t = 2.65, p = .011.
28
FREDERICO GUILHERME, ISABEL R. PINTO, JOSÉ M. MARQUES
In the threatening setting, we found a pattern which was consistent with the black
sheep effect. Participants tended to evaluate more negatively the deviant in‑group member
(M = 1.33%; DP = .49) than the deviant out‑group member (M = 1.92%, DP = .86;
F1, 46 = 3.92, p = .094, η2 = .06) and evaluated more positively the normative in‑group
member (M = 5.42%; DP = 1.08) than the normative out‑group member (M = 4.85%,
DP = .90; F1, 46 = 4.62, p = .037, η2 = .09).
In the supportive setting, there was a Targets’ Group main effect, F(1, 46) = 6.56,
p = .014, η2 = .12. An exploratory analysis of the simple effects suggested that the Targets’
Group effect was mainly due to the deviant target’s evaluation, which was higher toward the
in‑group deviant (M = 2.50%, DP = 1.02) than toward the out‑group deviant (M = 1.64%,
DP = .81, F1, 46 = 3.92, p = .054, η2 = .08). There was no significant difference
between the evaluations of the normative in‑group (M = 5.50%, DP = 1.29) and normative
out‑group members (M = 5.55%, DP = 1.51, F1, 46 = 2.59, p = .11, η2 = .05).
Evaluative judgments, social control strategies, and identity motivations
We expected that the derogation of in‑group deviant members, the favorable evaluations of
in‑group normative members, and support for the social control strategies would be
significant predictors of social identification, but we were not sure about the relative
predictive power of each independent variable in each experimental condition. We thus ran
multiple regression analyses within each condition defined by Inter‑group Setting and Target’s
Group. Post‑identification was the dependent measure, and pre‑identification, evaluative
judgments toward each target, and support for the persuasive and punitive strategies were
predictors1. Due to the exploratory nature of this analysis, we ran forward selection stepwise
regressions (cf. Ho, 2006).
In the conditions in which participants evaluated out‑group members, the predictors did
not explain post‑identification (criterion: probability of‑F‑to‑enter ≤ .05). In the threatening
setting and evaluation of in‑group targets’ condition, post‑identification was predicted by
support for the persuasive strategy, β = .60, t = 2.57, p = .025. In this condition, the
more group members supported the persuasive civic group to deal with in‑group deviance,
the more they identified after with the in‑group. In the secure setting and evaluation of
in‑group targets’ condition, post‑identification was predicted by pre‑identification, β = .70,
t = 4.95, p = .001, followed by the evaluation of the normative in‑group member, β = .36,
t = 2.53, p = .032. The more favorably participants evaluated the normative in‑group
member, the more they identified after with the in‑group. In sum, these results are consistent
with our predictions. They show that evaluation of in‑group members and support for social
control strategies allow individuals to warrant the positive value of the in‑group.
Discussion
The present results indicate that participants favored a normative in‑group member and
derogated a deviant in‑group member in comparison to similar out‑group targets when the
in‑group’s positive distinctiveness was threatened. In contrast, when the in‑group’s positive
1. In contrast to previous research on SGDT, we analyzed social control over in‑group deviance in
general and not in particular group deviant members. Our present analysis is thus exploratory and
does not focus on means. The complete data is available from the first author upon request.
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THREAT...
29
distinctiveness was secure, the deviant in‑group member was less negatively evaluated than
the deviant out‑group target. The non‑emergence of the black sheep effect in the latter
condition seems at odds with Biernat, Vescio and Billings’ (1999) idea that derogation of
deviant in‑group members ensues from the violation of higher positive expectancies about
the in‑group than the out‑group.
Indeed, in light of this latter explanation, participants would derogate the in‑group
deviant more than the out‑group deviant members, especially in the secure setting. Following
the information that there are less instances of in‑group deviance than out‑group deviance,
expectations should be more positive toward the in‑group than the out‑group, and a particular
instance of in‑group deviance would be perceived as more unexpected than an instance of
out‑group deviance. According to the expectancy violation explanation, this setting would
thus be more fitting to a black sheep effect, than the threatening setting, where the in‑group
deviant member is more in accordance to group‑based expectations than the out‑group
deviant member.
In contrast, our results do not support the expected relationships between the evaluation
of group targets, social control over in‑group deviance, and social identification. It is
important to notice that previous research on subjective group dynamics measured the
relationships between evaluations and social control toward particular group deviant members
(Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Pinto, et al., 2010). However, our study analyzed
evaluations and social control toward different targets (in‑group or out‑group members, and
in‑group deviance as a whole, respectively). This may have made the resulting patterns
complex and non‑linear. Even so, two significant relationships emerged, which were in
accordance to our predictions. In the secure setting, the more participants favored the
in‑group normative member, the more they valued the in‑group afterwards. Also, in the
threatening setting, the more participants advocated the persuasive strategy to deal with
in‑group deviance, the more they assigned the in‑group a positive value afterwards. Perhaps
these exploratory results justify follow‑up studies on the social motivations behind the
punitive and socializing strategies over in‑group deviants. In addition, follow‑up studies
should include measures about the estimations of in‑group deviant behavior and its impact
on the in‑group’s image, which are important manipulation checks missing from our study.
Going back to our examples at the outset of this work, it is likely that the threats posed
by those historical characters to their nations’ identities are relevant components for a more
general explanation of the harshness of the social reactions they evoked. After all, Guy
Fawkes was tortured and sentenced to death, amidst a vibrant civil conflict for the religious
identity of England. Marshall Pétain was sentenced to death as part of France’s struggle to
exorcise its collaborationist past and to restore a heroic identity. Mordechai Vanunu was
sentenced to a 18 years imprisonment in a country whose national identity seems to be
permanently under threat. Thus, these narratives seem to illustrate SGDT’s postulate that
when social identity is threatened, group members can be strongly depreciative and hostile
toward in‑group deviants.
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Mihai Curelaru1, Beatrice Abălaşei2
Violenţa în mediul şcolar:
un studiu al fenomenului la elevii de liceu3
Rezumat: În studiul de faţă, prezentăm rezultatele unei anchete realizate în România, pe un eşantion
de 1.100 de elevi, aparţinând unui număr de 35 de licee din nord‑estul ţării. Prin intermediul unui
chestionar am explorat frecvenţa diferitelor forme ale violenţei şcolare, fizice, verbale şi nonverbale,
precum şi impactul unor variabile sociodemografice asupra lor, cum ar fi genul, vârsta şi tipul liceului.
Rezultatele acestei cercetări confirmă, în general, datele obţinute în alte ţări.
Cuvinte‑cheie: violenţă şcolară, violenţă, agresiune, şcoală, liceu
Consideraţii teoretice
Astăzi, în lume, sunt afectaţi de violenţa şcolară, în medie, între 15 şi 20% dintre elevi,
după cum arată majoritatea anchetelor realizate în şcoli, pe această temă. Acest fenomen
se referă la multiple forme de agresare fizică şi/sau psihologică a altor elevi, în mod repetat,
într‑o anumită perioadă de timp (Batsche şi Knoff, 1994).
Mai mulţi actori sociali implicaţi sunt interesaţi de explorarea manifestărilor şi cauzelor
violenţei şcolare, iar dintre aceştia cei mai preocupaţi sunt echipele manageriale ale şcolilor,
profesorii, psihologii şcolari, autorităţile poliţieneşti, precum şi elevii înşişi. Astfel, o
anchetă realizată în 1984 de către National Association of Secondary School Principals a
arătat că peste 25% dintre elevi consideră că una dintre cele mai importante îngrijorări
privind şcoala se referă la „frica de agresori” (Batsche şi Knoff, 1994).
În ceea ce priveşte studiul consecinţelor, în abordările mai vechi ale violenţei şcolare
se punea accentul exclusiv asupra victimelor şi climatului şcolar. Însă cercetările mai noi
arată că violenţa din şcoală are consecinţe psihologice nefavorabile atât asupra victimelor, cât
şi asupra agresorilor (Hazler, 1994). Mai mult decât atât, anumite cercetări asupra violenţei
şi hărţuirii sexuale de la locul de muncă arată că aceste comportamente îşi au originea în
practici din perioada şcolară (Rayner, 1997; O’Moore, Seigne, McGuire şi Smith, 1998).
Cercetările având ca obiect violenţa şcolară au debutat în deceniul opt al secolului trecut,
prin anchetele realizate de cercetătorul norvegian Dan Olweus. Publicarea primei sale lucrări
de amploare pe această temă, Aggression in the Schools: Bullies and Whipping Boys (1978),
1. Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iaşi.
2. Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iaşi.
3. Aceste rezultate au fost publicate sub forma unui scurt raport de cercetare şi în Proceedings of the 15th
European Conference on Developmental Psychology (2011).
34
MIHAI CURELARU, BEATRICE ABĂLAŞEI
atrage atenţia comunităţii ştiinţifice asupra violenţei şcolare, relativ neglijată până la acea
vreme. Însă abia în 1982 acest fenomen sensibilizează autorităţile, ca urmare a sinuciderii
a trei elevi, exasperaţi de hărţuirea la care fuseseră supuşi de către colegii lor. După acest
eveniment, Olweus conduce o anchetă extinsă asupra unei populaţii de 130.000 de elevi,
provenind din 715 şcoli din Norvegia (Olweus, 1991, 1993, 1994). Datele obţinute în acest
studiu arată că aproximativ 15% dintre elevii norvegieni cu vârste cuprinse între 7 şi 16 ani
au fost implicaţi în probleme de violenţă şcolară (fie ca agresori, fie ca victime, fie în
ambele ipostaze). Din totalul eşantionului investigat, cca 9% au fost victime, 7% agresori
şi 1,6%, atât agresori, cât şi victime (17% din totalul victimelor). De asemenea, 5% dintre
aceştia au fost implicaţi în probleme mai grave de violenţă şcolară, însemnând că au fost
agresaţi o dată pe săptămână sau chiar mai frecvent (Olweus, 1994).
În perioada următoare, cercetările asupra acestui fenomen s‑au extins şi în alte ţări,
cum ar fi Anglia şi Ţara Galilor (Stephenson şi Smith, 1987; Lane, 1989; Smith, 1991;
Boulton şi Underwood, 1992; Whitney şi Smith, 1993), Irlanda (O’Moore, Kirkham şi
Smith, 1997), Finlanda (Lagerspetz, Björkqvist, Berts şi King, 1982), Norvegia (Roland
şi Idsøe, 2001), Olanda (Junger‑Tas, 1999), Statele Unite (Perry, Kusel şi Perry, 1988;
Nansel, Overpeck, Pilla, Ruan, Simons‑Morton şi Scheidt, 2001), Japonia (Murakami,
1985; Morita, Soeda, Soeda şi Taki, 1999), Canada (Charach, Pepler şi Ziegler, 1995) şi
Australia (Rigby şi Slee, 1991; Slee, 1994; Rigby şi Slee, 1999).
În ceea ce priveşte procentajul persoanelor implicate direct (agresori şi victime),
rezultatele oscilează între 20 şi 40% din populaţia de elevi, cu variaţii depinzând în funcţie de
ţară, vârstă, gen etc. De exemplu, într‑o anchetă realizată în Anglia, Stephenson şi Smith (1987)
au arătat că, din totalul elevilor participanţi la studiu, 10% au fost identificaţi ca agresori,
7% s‑au declarat drept victime ale violenţei, iar 6% au obţinut atât caracteristici de victimă,
cât şi de agresor. În aceeaşi ţară, câţiva ani mai târziu, Smith (1991) a constatat că 20% dintre
elevi erau victime ale violenţei, iar 10% agresori. Mai recent, în SUA, într‑o anchetă efectuată
la nivel naţional ale cărei date au fost publicate în 2001, s‑a descoperit faptul că 29,9%
dintre elevii participanţi la studiu au fost implicaţi, fie ca agresor (13%), fie ca victimă
(10,6%) sau ca agresor‑victimă (6%), în probleme de violenţă şcolară (Nansel et al., 2001).
În general, în literatura de specialitate, violenţa şcolară (bullying, în limba engleză) este
definită drept act violent repetat care are loc între persoane având în general un statut egal,
ca, de exemplu, colegi de şcoală sau colegi de serviciu. Însă, încă din deceniul trecut, în
cadrul acestei arii de cercetare au fost luate în calcul şi diverse forme de agresiune cauzate
de către elevi profesorilor sau de către profesori elevilor (Smith, 2004). De exemplu,
rezultatele unei anchete realizate de Johnston, O’Malley şi Bencham (1993), citaţi de Batsche
şi Knoff (1994), au arătat că, în Statele Unite, 28% dintre profesorii din şcolile publice au
fost agresaţi verbal, 15% ameninţaţi în diverse forme şi 3% agresaţi fizic. Dar aceste ultime
raporturi de violenţă şcolară (elev‑profesor sau profesor‑elev) sunt rar luate în considerare
de către cercetători în definirea conceptului.
Olweus (1994, 1999) consideră că orice definiţie a violenţei şcolare trebuie să cuprindă trei
criterii: (1) faptul că este un comportament agresiv cu intenţia de a face rău cuiva, (2) faptul
că este realizat în mod repetat şi pentru o perioadă de timp anume şi (3) se întâmplă în
cadrul unei relaţii personale caracterizate printr‑un dezechilibru de putere (o relaţie asimetrică
de putere). În opinia sa, „un elev este victimizat atunci când este expus, în mod repetat şi
pentru o durată anume de timp, la acţiuni negative din partea unuia sau a mai multor elevi”
(1999, p. 31). De asemenea, Olweus (1993, 1994) consideră că, în esenţă, se poate face
distincţie între violenţa şcolară directă (cu atacuri relativ deschise asupra victimei) şi
violenţa şcolară indirectă (de exemplu, izolare socială sau excludere intenţionată din grup).
VIOLENŢA ÎN MEDIUL ŞCOLAR: UN STUDIU AL FENOMENULUI LA ELEVII DE LICEU
35
Ken Rigby deosebeşte între două accepţiuni conceptuale. Prima, mai extinsă, este cea
de abuz sistematic de putere (Rigby, 2002). Prin cealaltă, mai restrânsă, se înţelege actul
de oprimare repetată, fizică şi psihologică, a unei persoane cu mai puţină putere de către
una sau mai multe persoane cu putere mai mare” (Rigby, 2007, p. 15). Actul violent se
caracterizează, în opinia lui Rigby, prin următoarele elemente: (1) o intenţie iniţială de a
face rău, (2) dorinţa expresă de a trece la acţiune, (3) atingerea sau rănirea cuiva, (4) iniţierea
comportamentului de către un individ sau un grup mai puternic împotriva cuiva cu putere
mai mică, (5) lipsa justificării acţiunii, (6) repetarea actului şi (7) producerea unei plăceri
căutate (Rigby, 2007).
Elinoff, Chafouleas şi Sassu (2004) consideră, de asemenea, violenţa şcolară drept un
comportament agresiv, individual sau de grup, caracterizat prin ostilitate directă îndreptată
spre alţii, proactivă (iniţierea acţiunii fără provocare) sau reactivă (ca răspuns la acţiunea
iniţiată de altcineva), directă (de exemplu, atac deschis) sau indirectă (de exemplu, izolare
sau excludere).
În sfârşit, pentru Lines (2008, p. 19), comportamentul violent şcolar reprezintă „o
modalitate de intimidare continuă, fizică, verbală, psihologică, socială sau emoţională de
către un individ sau un grup. Violenţa şcolară implică orice acţiune, cum ar fi lovirea sau
poreclirea, care face pe cineva să se simtă furios, rănit sau supărat”.
Subiecţi
La cercetarea de faţă au participat 1.100 de elevi, din 35 de licee din zona de nord‑est a
României. Eşantionul aproximează distribuţia, pe variabile principale, a populaţiei de elevi
din această regiune şi cuprinde subiecţi cu media de vârstă de 17,46 ani, dintre care 587
între 15 şi 17 ani (53,4%) şi 513 între 18 şi 20 de ani (46,6%). Au participat 512 băieţi
(46,5%) şi 588 de fete (53,5%), 764 (69,5%) fiind născuţi în mediul urban şi 336 (30,5%)
în cel rural. De asemenea, 800 (72,7%) aparţin unor licee centrale şi 300 (27,3%) unor licee
periferice, 767 (69,7%) provin din licee de talie mare (număr mare de elevi) şi 333 (30,3%)
din licee de talie mică.
Instrumente
În cele mai multe studii, pentru măsurarea violenţei şcolare este utilizat The Revised Olweus
Bully/Victim Questionnaire, elaborat de Dan Olweus pentru nivelurile de învăţământ primar,
gimnazial şi liceal. Se foloseşte, de asemenea, frecvent şi Arora Life in Schools Questionnaire,
dar şi alte instrumente similare (Smith, 2004) sau forme modificate ale celor citate mai înainte
(vezi, de exemplu, Chapell et al., 2004). Pentru cercetarea de faţă, am elaborat un chestionar
propriu, cuprinzând şase întrebări. Pentru formularea lor, am organizat un focus‑grup cu elevii,
prin intermediul căruia am identificat cele mai frecvente forme de violenţă şcolară întâlnite
în şcoală. Apoi, pe baza clasificării propuse de Rigby (2007), am împărţit aceste comporta­
mente agresive în două categorii, care au stat la baza construcţiei chestionarului utilizat în
cercetare: (1) violenţa şcolară fizică şi (2) violenţa şcolară nonfizică (verbală şi nonverbală).
Pentru violenţa fizică am reţinut următoarele comportamente: lovire, pedeapsă corporală,
distru­gerea unor bunuri personale, farse şi şicane (la nivel fizic), atingere fizică cu tentă sexuală,
ameninţare cu arme (de exemplu, cuţit), furt, solicitare de bani şi exploatare fizică. Pentru a
doua categorie am selectat, de asemenea, comportamentele care au apărut cu cea mai mare
36
MIHAI CURELARU, BEATRICE ABĂLAŞEI
frecvenţă în discuţia de grup: dispreţ, lipsă de politeţe, jignire, intimidare, umilire, ameninţare,
înjurare, poreclire, şantaj, ironizare, gesturi obscene şi caricaturizarea comportamentelor.
Participanţii la studiu au fost întrebaţi la care dintre formele de violenţă verbală şi
nonverbală (întrebarea 1) sau fizică (întrebarea 3) au fost de faţă pe parcursul anului şcolar
precedent (situaţia‑martor) şi li s‑a cerut să bifeze într‑un tabel aceste comportamente, care
erau dispuse orizontal, pe rânduri. Pentru fiecare dintre formele de violenţă şcolară am
prevăzut trei variante, dispuse pe coloane: elev‑elev, profesor‑elev şi elev‑profesor. Prin
intermediul altor două întrebări, fiecare participant era întrebat dacă el însuşi a fost victima
unei forme de violenţă verbală şi nonverbală (întrebarea 2) sau fizică (întrebarea 4)
(situaţia‑ţintă), în mod repetat, pe parcursul anului şcolar precedent. Răspunsul era scris
pe un spaţiu liber, iar subiectul era invitat să aleagă unul sau mai multe comportamente din
lista folosită la întrebările anterioare. Nu au fost, desigur, excluse şi alte variante, în afara
celor incluse în tabelele din chestionar.
Prin următorul item (întrebarea 5), am explorat situaţiile în care un elev se comporta
autodistructiv. Astfel, fiecare participant la anchetă era întrebat dacă a fost de faţă la situaţii
în care „un coleg şi‑a făcut rău lui însuşi”, cu trei variante de răspuns: (1) distrugerea unui
bun propriu (haine, geantă, cărţi), (2) rănire demonstrativă şi (3) tentativă de sinucidere. În
sfârşit, prin ultimul item al chestionarului (întrebarea 6), am încercat să explorăm frecvenţa
evenimentelor perturbatoare ale orelor de clasă. Am elaborat în acest scop o listă de astfel
de evenimente, pornind de la analiza de conţinut a discuţiei de grup: sfidarea autorităţii
profesorului, tulburarea liniştii clasei, întârzierea elevilor la ore, absentarea elevilor de la
ore, întârzierea profesorilor la ore, absentarea profesorilor de la ore, trimiterea afară a unui
elev de la ore, copiatul temelor în pauze, fumatul profesorului în timpul orei, prezenţa
profesorului la ore după ce a consumat alcool şi distrugerea unor bunuri ale şcolii. Fiecare
respondent era solicitat să dea un răspuns pe o scală de la 1 la 4 (1 – niciodată, 2 – rareori,
3 – frecvent şi 4 – foarte frecvent), ataşat fiecărei situaţii. Deşi nu se referă în mod direct la
violenţa şcolară, am considerat utilă această explorare, deoarece descrie climatul general de
desfăşurare a cursurilor din liceele româneşti. La final, am cerut o serie de date sociodemo­
grafice, pe care ulterior le‑am folosit ca variabile în cercetare: (1) vârstă, (2) sex, (3) mediu
de origine şi (4) tip de liceu, cu două dimensiuni: (4.1) poziţionare şi (4.2) mărime.
Rezultate
În tabelul 1 sunt prezentate numărul şi distribuţia, pe forme de violenţă şcolară şi raporturi
între persoane, ale cazurilor pentru situaţia‑„martor”.
Remarcăm că, în relaţiile elev‑elev, poreclirea este forma cea mai frecventă de violenţă
şcolară (75,7%), urmată de înjurare (75,5%) şi jignire (74,0%). În relaţiile dintre profesor şi
elev, ironizarea este cel mai des întâlnită (40,4%), apoi jignirea (39,8%) şi intimidarea (36,6%).
La nivelul relaţiilor elev‑profesor, lipsa de politeţe este, de departe, cea mai frecventă, fiind
raportată de 58,2% dintre subiecţi. Următoarele două forme sunt poreclirea profesorului
(33,9%) şi dispreţuirea lui (31,0%). Unele rezultate sunt surprinzătoare, cum ar fi prezenţa
gesturilor obscene făcute de către profesori (3,9%) şi şantajul în relaţia elev‑profesor (6,1%).
Violenţa şcolară fizică în relaţia elev‑elev este reprezentată cu frecvenţa cea mai ridicată
de următoarele trei comportamente: lovire (67,3%), distrugerea unor bunuri personale
(46,1%) şi farsele şi şicanele (46,9%). Profesorilor li se reproşează lovirea elevilor (18,0%),
pedepsirea corporală (8,4%) şi solicitarea de bani sub formă de mită (8,1%). Elevii, la
rândul lor, practică mai frecvent, dintre comportamentele propuse evaluării, şicanarea
profesorilor (8,1%). Celelalte forme de la această categorie sunt reduse ca frecvenţă.
VIOLENŢA ÎN MEDIUL ŞCOLAR: UN STUDIU AL FENOMENULUI LA ELEVII DE LICEU
37
Tabelul 1. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă (situaţie‑martor)
elev‑elev
Dispreţ
Lipsă de politeţe
Jignire
Intimidare
Umilire
Violenţă
Ameninţare Înjurare
verbală
Poreclire
şi nonverbală Şantaj
Ironizare
Gesturi obscene
Caricaturizarea comportamentelor
Violenţă
fizică
Lovire
Pedeapsă corporală
Distrugerea unor bunuri personale
Farse, şicane (la nivel fizic)
Atingere fizică cu tentă sexuală
Ameninţare cu arme
Furt
Solicitare de bani
Exploatare fizică
profesor‑elev
elev‑profesor
651 (59,2%) 302 (27,5%) 341 (31,0%)
610 (55,5%) 234 (21,3%) 640 (58,2%)
814 (74,0%) 438 (39,8%) 234 (21,3%)
406 (36,9%) 403 (36,6%) 160 (14,5%)
552 (50,2%) 384 (34,9%) 111 (10,1%)
662 (60,2%) 250 (22,7%) 152 (13,8%)
830 (75,5%) 115 (10,5%) 207 (18,8%)
833 (75,7%) 300 (27,3%) 373 (33,9%)
333 (30,3%) 163 (14,8%) 67 (6,1%)
582 (52,9%) 444 (40,4%) 292 (26,5%)
558 (50,7%) 43 (3,9%)
143 (13,0%)
350 (31,8%) 104 (9,5%)
160 (14,5%)
740 (67,3%)
187 (17,0%)
507 (46,1%)
516 (46,9%)
329 (29,9%)
125 (11,4%)
371 (33,7%)
298 (27,1%)
108 (9,8%)
198 (18,0%)
92 (8,4%)
66 (6,0%)
52 (4,7%)
54 (4,9%)
7 (0,6%)
9 (0,8%)
89 (8,1%)
83 (7,5%)
11 (1,0%)
12 (1,1%)
29 (2,6%)
89 (8,1%)
19 (1,7%)
20 (1,8%)
16 (1,5%)
8 (0,7%)
–
Pentru violenţa şcolară nonfizică (situaţia‑ţintă), am sintetizat datele în tabelele urmă­
toare. Pe prima coloană am reprezentat numărul total al cazurilor pentru fiecare formă în
parte, iar pe celelalte, distribuţia lor pe cele trei variabile luate în analiză: gen (băieţi,
fete), vârstă (15‑17 ani şi 18‑20 ani) şi mediu de origine (urban şi rural).
Tabelul 2. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă nonfizică
(verbală şi nonverbală) în funcţie de variabila gen (situaţie‑ţintă)
N=1.100
Dispreţ
Lipsă de politeţe
Jignire
Intimidare
Umilire
Ameninţare
Înjurare
Poreclire
Şantaj
Ironizare
Gesturi obscene
Caricaturizarea comportamentelor
Altele
Total
Masculin
57 (5,2%)
26 (2,4%)
87 (7,9%)
46 (4,2%)
189 (17,2%) 80 (7,3%)
61 (5,5%)
26 (2,4%)
54 (4,9%)
21 (1,9%)
100 (9,1%)
49 (4,5%)
101 (9,2%)
62 (5,6%)
74 (6,7%)
45 (4,1%)
32 (2,9%)
15 (1,4%)
106 (9,6%)
40 (3,6%)
54 (4,9%)
32 (2,9%)
23 (2,1%) 8 (0,7%)
22 (2,0%) 9 (0,8%)
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Gen
Feminin
31 (2,8%)
41 (3,7%)
109 (9,9%)
35 (3,2%)
33 (3,0%)
51 (4,6%)
39 (3,5%)
29 (2,6%)
17 (1,5%)
66 (6,0%)
22 (2,0%)
15 (1,4%)
13 (1,2%)
χ2
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
9,84**
6,48*
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
38
MIHAI CURELARU, BEATRICE ABĂLAŞEI
Comparând datele obţinute în funcţie de variabila gen (tabelul 2), constatăm o serie de
diferenţe semnificative. Testul chi‑pătrat indică diferenţe semnificative între băieţi şi fete doar
la două comportamente dintre cele listate: înjurarea, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 9,84, p = 0,002 şi
poreclirea, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 6,48, p = 0,011. Conform acestor rezultate, se pare că cele
două forme de violenţă şcolară sunt mai degrabă asociate băieţilor decât fetelor.
Tabelul 3. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă nonfizică
(verbală şi nonverbală) în funcţie de variabila vârstă (situaţie‑ţintă)
N=1.100
Dispreţ
Lipsă de politeţe
Jignire
Intimidare
Umilire
Ameninţare
Înjurare
Poreclire
Şantaj
Ironizare
Gesturi obscene
Caricaturizarea comportamentelor
Altele
Total
57 (5,2%)
87 (7,9%)
189 (17,2%)
61 (5,5%)
54 (4,9%)
100 (9,1%)
101 (9,2%)
74 (6,7%)
32 (2,9%)
106 (9,6%)
54 (4,9%)
23 (2,1%)
22 (2,0%)
Vârstă
15‑17 ani
37 (3,4%)
44 (4,0%)
96 (8,7%)
34 (3,1%)
33 (3,0%)
42 (3,8%)
52 (4,7%)
34 (3,1%)
16 (1,5%)
52 (4,7%)
25 (2,3%)
25 (2,3%)
8 (0,7%)
18‑20 ani
20 (1,8%)
43 (3,9%)
93 (8,5%)
27 (2,5%)
21 (1,9%)
58 (5,3%)
49 (4,5%)
40 (3,6%)
16 (1,5%)
54 (4,9%)
29 (2,6%)
12 (1,1%)
14 (1,3%)
χ2
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
5,70*
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p< 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Din perspectiva vârstei (tabelul 3), ameninţarea este mai caracteristică vârstei de 18‑20 de
ani, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 5,70, p = 0,017, iar pentru variabila mediu de origine înregistrăm o
diferenţă semnificativă doar pentru ironizare, cei provenind din mediul urban fiind mai frecvent
expuşi acestui comportament în comparaţie cu cei de origine rurală, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 5,30,
p = 0,021 (tabelul 4).
Tabelul 4. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă nonfizică
(verbală şi nonverbală) în funcţie de variabila mediu de origine (situaţie‑ţintă)
N=1.100
Dispreţ
Lipsă de politeţe
Jignire
Intimidare
Umilire
Ameninţare
Înjurare
Poreclire
Şantaj
Ironizare
Total
57 (5,2%)
87 (7,9%)
189 (17,2%)
61 (5,5%)
54 (4,9%)
100 (9,1%)
101 (9,2%)
74 (6,7%)
32 (2,9%)
106 (9,6%)
Mediu de origine
Urban
Rural
42 (3,8%)
15 (1,4%)
66 (6,0%)
21 (1,9%)
138 (12,5%) 51 (4,6%)
48 (4,4%)
13 (1,2%)
37 (3,4%)
17 (1,5%)
73 (6,6%)
27 (2,5%)
70 (6,4%)
31 (2,8%)
51 (4,6%)
23 (2,1%)
23 (2,1%) 9 (0,8%)
84 (7,6%)
22 (2,0%)
χ2
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
5,30*
VIOLENŢA ÎN MEDIUL ŞCOLAR: UN STUDIU AL FENOMENULUI LA ELEVII DE LICEU
Gesturi obscene
Caricaturizarea comportamentelor
Altele
54 (4,9%)
23 (2,1%)
22 (2,0%)
40 (3,6%)
20 (1,8%)
15 (1,4%)
14 (1,3%)
3 (0,3%)
7 (0,6%)
39
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
În ceea ce priveşte violenţa şcolară fizică, se observă şi mai puţine diferenţe pe ansamblul
întregului eşantion. Prezentăm rezultatele în tabelele următoare.
Tabelul 5. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă fizică
în funcţie de variabila gen (situaţie‑ţintă)
Gen
N=1.100
Lovire
Pedeapsă corporală
Distrugerea unor bunuri personale
Farse, şicane
Atingere fizică cu tentă sexuală
Ameninţare cu arme
Furt
Solicitare de bani
Exploatare fizică
Altele
Total
83 (7,5%)
3 (0,3%)
25 (2,3%)
37 (3,4%)
11 (1,0%)
5 (0,5%)
35 (3,2%)
24 (2,2%)
35 (3,2%)
1 (0,1%)
Masculin
50 (4,5%)
2 (0,2%)
10 (0,9%)
20 (1,8%)
6 (0,5%)
1 (0,1%)
20 (1,8%)
13 (1,2%)
15 (1,4%)
1 (0,1%)
Feminin
33 (3,0%)
1 (0,1%)
15 (1,4%)
17 (1,5%)
5 (0,5%)
4 (0,4%)
15 (1,4%)
11 (1,0%)
20 (1,8%)
–
χ2
6,76**
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
–
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Se observă în tabelul 5 că băieţii practică lovirea într‑o proporţie mai mare decât fetele,
χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 6,76, p = 0,009.
Tabelul 6. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă fizică
în funcţie de variabila vârstă (situaţie‑ţintă)
Vârstă
N=1.100
Lovire
Pedeapsă corporală
Distrugerea unor bunuri personale
Farse, şicane
Atingere fizică cu tentă sexuală
Ameninţare cu arme
Furt
Solicitare de bani
Exploatare fizică
Altele
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Total
83 (7,5%)
3 (0,3%)
25 (2,3%)
37 (3,4%)
11 (1,0%)
5 (0,5%)
35 (3,2%)
24 (2,2%)
35 (3,2%)
1 (0,1%)
15‑17 ani
44 (4,0%)
2 (0,2%)
17 (1,5%)
22 (2,0%)
4 (0,4%)
4 (0,4%)
22 (2,0%)
5 (0,5%)
18 (1,6%)
1 (0,1%)
18‑20 ani
39 (3,5%)
1 (0,1%)
8 (0,7%)
15 (1,4%)
7 (0,6%)
1 (0,1%)
13 (1,2%)
19 (1,7%)
17 (1,5%)
–
χ2
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
–
40
MIHAI CURELARU, BEATRICE ABĂLAŞEI
La variabila vârstă nu sunt diferenţe semnificative (tabelul 6), iar pentru mediul de
origine, observăm că lovirea este asociată mai degrabă celor provenind din mediul urban
decât celor din mediul rural, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 4,28, p = 0,038. O situaţie similară am
găsit şi pentru furt, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 6,22, p = 0,013 (tabelul 7).
Tabelul 7. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de violenţă fizică
în funcţie de variabila mediu de origine (situaţie‑ţintă)
Mediu de origine
N=1.100
Lovire
Pedeapsă corporală
Total
83 (7,5%)
3 (0,3%)
Urban
66 (6,0%)
2 (0,2%)
Rural
17 (1,5%)
1 (0,1%)
χ2
4,28*
n.s.
Distrugerea unor bunuri personale
Farse, şicane
Atingere fizică cu tentă sexuală
Ameninţare cu arme
Furt
Solicitare de bani
Exploatare fizică
Altele
25 (2,3%)
37 (3,4%)
11 (1,0%)
5 (0,5%)
35 (3,2%)
24 (2,2%)
35 (3,2%)
1 (0,1%)
17 (1,5%)
23 (2,1%)
10 (0,9%)
2 (0,2%)
31 (2,8%)
14 (1,3%)
29 (2,6%)
1 (0,1%)
8 (0,7%)
14 (1,3%)
1 (0,1%)
3 (0,3%)
4 (0,4%0
10 (0,9%)
6 (0,5%)
–
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
6,22*
n.s.
n.s.
–
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Am analizat, de asemenea, frecvenţa evenimentelor negative şcolare, iar rezultatele
obţinute, reprezentând numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de perturbare a orelor, au
fost sintetizate în următoarele două tabele.
Tabelul 8. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de perturbare a orelor
(variabila tip liceu – centralitate)
N=1.100
Media
Sfidarea autorităţii profesorului
2,01
Tulburarea liniştii clasei
2,75
Întârzierea elevilor la ore
2,85
Absentarea elevilor de la ore
2,78
Întârzierea profesorilor la ore
2,17
Absentarea profesorilor de la ore
1,88
Trimiterea afară a unui elev de la ore 2,03
Copiatul temelor în pauze
2,90
Profesorul fumează în timpul orei
1,10
Profesorul a consumat alcool
1,33
Distrugerea unor bunuri ale şcolii
1,69
Tip liceu (centralitate)
SD Central SD
Periferic
0,73
2,04
0,76
1,94
0,86
2,81
0,85
2,60
0,80
2,87
0,80
2,80
0,81
2,81
0,82
2,68
0,64
2,19
0,65
2,10
0,57
1,92
0,57
1,75
0,75
2,07
0,75
1,93
1,01
2,87
1,04
2,97
0,38
1,11
0,41
1,07
0,60
1,35
0,62
1,27
0,71
1,72
0,72
1,60
SD
0,64
0,86
0,78
0,76
0,61
0,55
0,73
0,92
0,29
0,54
0,65
t
2,30*
3,52***
1,25
2,44*
2,27*
4,47***
2,78**
1,62
2,01*
2,05*
2,55*
Note: * p < 0,05 , ** p < 0,01,*** p < 0,001
În ceea ce priveşte poziţionarea liceului, toate diferenţele înregistrate arată o frecvenţă
mai mare a actelor de indisciplină la nivelul şcolilor centrale. Dintre acestea, se remarcă
cu valori mai ridicate tulburarea liniştii clasei, t(2, 1.098) = 3,52, p < 0,001, absentarea
VIOLENŢA ÎN MEDIUL ŞCOLAR: UN STUDIU AL FENOMENULUI LA ELEVII DE LICEU
41
profesorilor de la ore, t(1, 1.098) = 4,47, p < 0,001 şi trimiterea afară a unui elev de la ore,
t(1, 1.098) = 2,78, p = 0,006. În ceea ce priveşte variabila tip liceu după mărime,
diferenţele sunt, în marea lor majoritate, nesemnificative. Totuşi, se observă că elevii copiază
teme în pauze mai frecvent în liceele de talie mică prin comparaţie cu cele de talie mare,
t(1, 1.098) = 2,24, p = 0,025, şi profesorii din liceele mari absentează mai frecvent de
la ore decât cei din liceele mici, t(1, 1.098) = 2,05, p = 0,040.
Tabelul 9. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de perturbare a orelor
(variabila tip liceu – mărime)
Tip liceu (mărime)
N=1.100
Media SD Talie mare SD Talie mică
Sfidarea autorităţii profesorului
2,01 0,73
2,00
0,73
2,03
Tulburarea liniştii clasei
2,75 0,86
2,75
0,86
2,76
Întârzierea elevilor la ore
2,85 0,80
2,84
0,82
2,87
Absentarea elevilor de la ore
2,78 0,81
2,78
0,82
2,78
Întârzierea profesorilor la ore
2,17 0,64
2,18
0,64
2,13
Absentarea profesorilor de la ore
1,88 0,57
1,90
0,57
1,82
Trimiterea afară a unui elev de la ore 2,03 0,75
2,02
0,76
2,06
Copiatul temelor în pauze
2,90 1,01
2,85
1,04
3,00
Profesorul fumează în timpul orei
1,10 0,38
1,10
0,38
1,09
Profesorul a consumat alcool
1,33 0,60
1,33
0,61
1,31
Distrugerea unor bunuri ale şcolii
1,69 0,71
1,71
0,73
1,63
SD
0,73
0,86
0,76
0,77
0,63
0,57
0,72
0,94
0,38
0,57
0,65
t
0,64
0,18
0,59
0,00
1,07
2,05*
0,79
2,24*
0,41
0,66
1,81
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Rezultatele obţinute prin ultima întrebare a chestionarului sunt reprezentate sintetic în
tabelele următoare. Datele arată numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de autoagresiune
(situaţie‑martor), repartizat pe următoarele variabile: sex, vârstă, poziţionare liceu (central­
‑periferic) şi talie liceu (mărime mare – mărime mică).
Tabelul 10. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de autoagresiune
(variabilele gen şi vârstă) (situaţie‑martor)
Total
Distrugerea unui
430
bun propriu
(39,1%)
Rănire
87
demonstrativă
(7,9%)
Tentativă de
67
sinucidere
(6,1%)
Masculin
221
(20,1%)
51
(4,6%)
30
(2,7%)
Gen
Feminin
209
(19,0%)
36
(3,3%)
37
(3,4%)
χ2
6,67*
5,53*
n.s.
15‑17 ani
245
(22,3%)
52
(4,7%)
40
(3,6%)
Vârstă
18‑20 ani
185
(16,8%)
35
(3,2%)
27
(2,5%)
χ2
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001
Testul chi‑pătrat arată că două dintre cele trei comportamente, respectiv distrugerea unui
bun propriu, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 6,67, p = 0,010, şi rănirea demonstrativă, χ2(1, n = 1.100)
= 5,53, p = 0,019, sunt caracteristice mai degrabă băieţilor decât fetelor. Din perspectiva
poziţionării liceului, distrugerea unui bun propriu este mai mult asociată şcolilor centrale
42
MIHAI CURELARU, BEATRICE ABĂLAŞEI
decât celor periferice, χ2(1, n = 1.100) = 4,49, p = 0,034. La celelalte două variabile,
vârsta şi mărimea liceului, nu am obţinut diferenţe semnificative statistic.
Tabelul 11. Numărul elevilor care au raportat cazuri de autoagresiune
(variabila tip liceu) (situaţie‑martor)
Total
Distrugerea unui
430
bun propriu
(39,1%)
Rănire
87
demonstrativă
(7,9%)
Tentativă de
67
sinucidere
(6,1%)
Tip liceu (centralitate)
Central
Periferic
χ2
328
102
4,49*
(29,8%)
(9,3%)
71
16
0,032
(6,5%)
(1,5%)
48
19
n.s.
(4,4%)
(1,7%)
Tip liceu (mărime)
Talie mare
Talie mică
306
124
(27,8%)
(11,3%)
54
33
(4,9%)
(3,9%)
43
24
(3,9%)
(2,2%)
χ2
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p< 0,001
Discuţii
În relaţia elev‑elev, exceptând câteva comportamente din lista dată participanţilor, celelalte
sunt prezente în peste 50% dintre cazuri, iar în trei dintre acestea frecvenţa se situează la
aproximativ 75%. Apreciem aceste date ca indicând un nivel ridicat al violenţei şcolare.
Poreclirea colegilor este comportamentul cel mai frecvent întâlnit din lista itemilor nonfizici,
iar lovirea, din lista privind violenţa şcolară fizică.
În ansamblu, frecvenţa actelor de agresiune fizică este mai redusă decât cea verbală şi
nonverbală, însă depăşeşte cu mult ceea ce noi am presupus că vom găsi. Astfel, lovirea,
un act destul de grav, se găseşte în lista comună pe locul 4, înaintea unor comportamente
la care ne‑am fi aşteptat să colectăm frecvenţe mai mari, cum ar fi dispreţul sau lipsa de
politeţe. Cifre ridicate s‑au înregistrat, de asemenea, la distrugerea unor bunuri ale altora
(46,1%) şi la furt (33,7%).
Raportate la numărul actelor de violenţă şcolară din relaţia elev‑elev, majoritatea
agresiunilor din cadrul relaţiei profesor‑elev se reduc aproximativ la jumătate. Intimidarea
rămâne la cote similare, dar menţionăm că ea nu este, desigur, identică cu cea din relaţia
elev‑elev, deoarece implică o componentă suplimentară, cea a autorităţii şi a practicii
evaluării activităţii şcolare. Apoi, constatăm că încă se mai utilizează pedeapsa corporală
(8,4%), deşi este interzisă de legile româneşti. Furturile şi ameninţările cu arme (cu cuţite
sau cu alte obiecte cu caracteristici similare) sunt reprezentate de câteva cazuri care ridică
probleme deontologice grave pentru breasla profesorilor. În 7,5% dintre cazuri s‑a raportat
exploatare fizică şi credem că este vorba despre situaţii similare cu cele relatate în presa
românească din ultimii ani, când elevii mai mari au fost folosiţi la muncile casnice sau
agricole din gospodăriile unor profesori.
Dacă, în ansamblu, se observă că numărul actelor de violenţă şcolară este mai scăzut
în relaţia elev‑profesor decât în celelalte două situaţii, totuşi cifrele rămân destul de ridicate.
Aceste rezultate atrag atenţia asupra dificultăţilor şi riscurilor în practicarea acestei
profesii. Dacă lipsa de politeţe, care este actul de violenţă şcolară cu cea mai ridicată
frecvenţă, rămâne în sfera comportamentelor suportabile, alte acţiuni, din categoria celor
fizice, sunt îngrijorătoare. Astfel, cu frecvenţe ridicate sunt lovirile (1,0%), pedepsele
corporale (1,1%), ameninţările cu arme (1,8%) şi distrugerile de bunuri materiale (2,6%).
VIOLENŢA ÎN MEDIUL ŞCOLAR: UN STUDIU AL FENOMENULUI LA ELEVII DE LICEU
43
Aceste date sunt colectate din perspectiva elevilor, prin urmare nu putem suspecta o
supraevaluare a cifrelor.
Aceleaşi categorii de violenţă şcolară au fost evaluate şi în situaţia‑„ţintă”. O privire de
ansamblu arată că, fără excepţie, frecvenţa cazurilor de elevi agresaţi fizic în mod repetat
este mai ridicată la băieţi decât la fete, dar nu diferă semnificativ. Pentru această categorie
de vârstă, datele concordă cu cele obţinute în alte cercetări, aşa cum am arătat în prima
parte a acestui articol. Diferenţa semnificativă statistic obţinută între cele două sexe la
categoria „lovire” întăreşte teza potrivit căreia băieţii se comportă mai agresiv la nivel fizic
decât fetele. Situaţia se schimbă însă atunci când este vorba despre violenţa şcolară verbală
şi nonverbală. Înjurarea şi poreclirea sunt mai caracteristice băieţilor, dar ironizarea,
umilirea, jignirea, intimidarea şi dispreţul sunt practicate într‑o măsură mai mare de către
fete. Aceste date susţin ideea că există o preferinţă a băieţilor pentru violenţa şcolară fizică,
în timp ce fetele sunt orientate mai degrabă spre cea verbală şi relaţională.
O comparaţie pe vârste nu relevă deosebiri mari. Pentru majoritatea categoriilor putem
spune că numărul actelor de violenţă scade cu cât creşte vârsta, chiar dacă nu semnificativ
statistic. Totuşi, anumite comportamente de violenţă şcolară cresc în frecvenţă pe măsură
ce elevii urcă spre anii mai mari, cele mai importante fiind solicitarea de bani, poreclirea
şi ameninţarea (unde se înregistrează şi o diferenţă semnificativă). Explicăm aceste rezultate
prin aceea că la vârste mai mari cresc nevoile de bani, iar aceste solicitări sunt însoţite şi
de ameninţări. Poreclirea poate fi şi expresia unei familiarităţi, având conotaţii mai puţin
negative, care se manifestă adesea între liceeni spre sfârşitul acestui ciclu de învăţământ.
Din perspectiva mediului de origine ne este mai greu să facem aprecieri globale deoarece
eşantioanele nu sunt aproximativ egale ca în cazul celorlalte două variabile discutate anterior.
Însă pentru comportamente precum ironizarea, lovirea şi furtul, unde am identificat diferenţe
statistic semnificative, apreciem că la cei născuţi în mediul urban frecvenţa violenţei şcolare
este mai ridicată. Explicăm aceste rezultate prin faptul că printre elevii provenind din mediul
rural întâlnim mai puţine cazuri de „tocilari” sau nedezvoltaţi fizic, aceştia fiind de obicei
ţinta predilectă pentru agresori.
Am explorat comportamentele autoagresive plecând de la ipoteza că acestea vor fi mai
frecvente în cazul băieţilor decât al fetelor, la vârsta mai mică decât la cea mai mare, în
liceele centrale decât în cele periferice şi în liceele mari mai degrabă decât în cele mici.
Rezultatele confirmă parţial ipotezele noastre, şi anume doar în ceea ce priveşte variabila
gen şi cea de poziţionare a liceului. Băieţii raportează mai multe cazuri de agresiune şi
rănire demonstrativă decât fetele, dar nu putem, în mod direct, să le atribuim doar lor. Cu
toate acestea, dat fiind faptul că astfel de acte sunt posibile doar în pauze şi mai degrabă
în curtea şcolii sau pe coridoare, locuri în care grupurile de elevi se strâng pe sexe, putem
spune, cu prudenţă, că mai degrabă băieţii pot fi asociaţi cu aceste comportamente decât
fetele. Rezultatul ar fi în concordanţă şi cu teza expusă anterior, privitoare la un nivel mai
ridicat de agresivitate fizică în cazul băieţilor.
Situaţia este valabilă şi în cazul poziţionării liceului, la itemul referitor la distrugerea
unui bun propriu, unde vedem că în liceele centrale se înregistrează mai multe cazuri decât
în cele periferice. Vom explica acest rezultat ceva mai încolo, în contextul discutării datelor
privind incidenţa evenimentelor negative din şcolile centrale. În ceea ce priveşte perturbarea
orelor, o privire rapidă asupra mediilor arată aprecieri ridicate pentru itemii privind
tulburarea liniştii clasei (2,75), întârzierea elevilor la ore (2,85), absentarea lor (2,78) şi
copiatul temelor în pauze (2,90). Aceste rezultate confirmă expectanţele noastre, primele
trei comportamente fiind şi actele „tradiţionale” de indisciplină pentru elevii de la noi. Însă
nu ne aşteptam la un scor atât de ridicat la scala prin care s‑a evaluat copiatul temelor.
44
MIHAI CURELARU, BEATRICE ABĂLAŞEI
Observăm, de asemenea, că frecvenţa evenimentelor negative este mai mare (statistic
semnificativă) în şcolile centrale decât în cele periferice, la aproape toţi itemii, cu excepţia
copiatului temelor şi a întârzierii elevilor la ore. Este un rezultat neaşteptat, deoarece am presupus
prin ipoteză că şcolile periferice sunt mai expuse violenţei decât cele din centrul oraşelor.
O posibilă explicaţie este prezenţa în zona centrală într‑un număr mai ridicat a elevilor
provenind din familiile îmbogăţite rapid după 1989. Unii dintre aceşti tineri dispun de bani
care le oferă un statut înalt în grupurile de care aparţin, dar au repere morale precare. Adesea,
nu au respect pentru disciplină şi pentru munca şi statutul profesorului. Deşi aparţin unor
şcoli de stat, părinţii sunt finanţatori în mod indirect ai şcolilor la care învaţă copiii lor, fapt
care uneori contează în atitudinea tolerantă a conducerii şcolilor faţă de actele lor de indisciplină.
Am formulat, de asemenea, ipoteza că în liceele mai mari vom descoperi o frecvenţă mai
ridicată a cazurilor de perturbare a orelor. În liceele mai mici, am considerat că se poate
exercita un control mai riguros asupra disciplinei, atât a elevilor, cât şi a profesorilor, dat fiind
numărul mai mic de persoane cuprinse în aceste instituţii. Datele arată însă lipsa în general
a unor diferenţe semnificative statistic, prin urmare această variabilă nu are impact asupra
desfăşurării cursurilor. Totuşi, se observă că, în mod semnificativ, profesorii din liceele mari
absentează mai frecvent de la ore decât cei din liceele mici, iar acest fapt arată dificultăţi
de gestionare din partea directorilor a unor colective mai mari. Pe de altă parte, elevii
copiază mai frecvent în pauze în liceele mai mici decât în cele mai mari. Credem că o posibilă
explicaţie este aceea că în liceele mici există relaţii interpersonale mai strânse între elevi,
un grad de cooperare mai ridicat, în cadrul unei comunităţi mai mici care apropie elevii.
Concluzii
În final, putem afirma că rezultatele obţinute prin această anchetă, realizată pe un eşantion
de elevi din România, sunt comparabile cu cele obţinute în cercetările asupra violenţei
şcolare din alte ţări. Următoarele dimensiuni sunt concordante: 1) în general, frecvenţa
cazurilor de violenţă şcolară verbală este mai ridicată decât cea a cazurilor de violenţă
şcolară fizică; 2) băieţii practică mai degrabă comportamente agresive fizic, în timp ce
fetele se caracterizează prin practicarea celor agresive verbal sau nonverbal şi 3) nu sunt
diferenţe semnificative între liceeni în funcţie de vârstă.
Trebuie să remarcăm însă că metoda folosită nu permite o comparaţie riguroasă cu datele
obţinute în anchetele realizate în alte ţări, care să arate diferenţe semnificative statistic. O
altă limită din perspectiva unei astfel de analize comparative este aceea că studiul nostru
este limitat doar la o regiune acoperind aproximativ un sfert din populaţia de liceeni a
României. De aceea, credem că pasul următor este derularea unei anchete la nivel naţional
privind violenţa şcolară, cu o metodologie comună cu cel puţin o parte apreciabilă de
anchete deja realizate, pentru a avea evaluări ştiinţifice comparative.
Violence in schools: A study on the phenomenon
at highschool students
Abstract: In this study we present the results of a survey conducted in Romania, on a sample of
1.100 students from 35 highschools in the North‑East of the country. We explored through a
questionnaire the frequency of different forms of bullying (physical, verbal, and non‑verbal), and
VIOLENŢA ÎN MEDIUL ŞCOLAR: UN STUDIU AL FENOMENULUI LA ELEVII DE LICEU
45
the impact of socio‑demographic variables on them, such as gender, age, and type of school. The
results of this study generally confirm the data obtained in other countries.
Key words: bullying, violence, aggression, school, highschool
La violence en milieu scolaire:
une étude du phénomène aux lycéens
Résumé: Dans cette étude nous présentons les résultats d’une enquête menée en Roumanie, sur
un échantillon de 1.100 étudiants appartenant à 35 écoles secondaires dans le nord‑est du pays.
Nous avons exploré par l’intermède d’un questionnaire la fréquence des différentes formes de
violence à l’école (physique, verbale et non verbale), ainsi que l’impact des variables sociodémo­
graphiques sur eux, tels que le genre, l’âge et le type d’école. Les résultats de cette étude confirment,
en général, les données obtenues dans d’autres pays.
Mots‑clés: violence scolaire, violence, agression, école, lycée
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Valérie Fointiat1
La rationalisation en acte à l’épreuve du paradigme
du choix: Lorsque la dissonance consécutive à un choix
est réduite par voie comportementale
Résumé: La théorie de la rationalisation envisage que le processus de réduction de la dissonance –
rationalisation – peut emprunter des voies alternatives, cognitive versus comportementales. Cette
hypothèse a été validée dans de nombreuses recherches, toutes réalisées dans le paradigme de la
soumission forcée. Nous nous sommes attachés ici à tester cette hypothèse dans le paradigme du
choix, jusqu’alors inexploité par les théoriciens de la rationalisation. Les participants commençaient
par évaluer la désirabilité de 15 CD; puis on leur demandait de choisir entre deux CD préalablement
classés en seconde et troisième position (dissonance forte) soit préalablement classés en seconde
et huitième position (dissonance faible). Pour la moitié d’entre eux (conditions de choix paradigma­
tiques), l’expérimentateur leur demandait alors de réévaluer les 15 CD avant de leur proposer le
comportement‑cible mesurant la rationalisation comportementale: participer à une future recherche
très coûteuse. Pour l’autre moitié (conditions originales), ce comportement‑cible était présenté avant
la réévaluation des 15 CD. Comme attendu, on observe un effet de rationalisation comportementale
plus marqué dans les conditions originales que classiques. La dissonance réduite via la modification
de la désirabilité de l’objet rejeté n’a plus besoin d’emprunter la voie comportementale de réduction de
la dissonance. En revanche, dans les conditions originales, le comportement‑cible est présenté avant
le second classement. Ici, l’état de dissonance n’a pu être réduit par la voie cognitive; on comprend
alors qu’il le soit par voie comportementale.
Mots‑clés: rationalisation en acte, paradigme du choix, dissonance cognitive, changement comportemental
Introduction
La théorie de la rationalisation
Depuis cinq décennies, la théorie de la dissonance cognitive (Festinger, 1957) stimule
l’imagination des chercheurs. Elle a depuis ces nombreuses années suscité un nombre très
important de recherches, de controverses, de reformulations et de révisions (Bem, 1972;
Aronson, 1999; Harmon‑Jones, 1999; Fazio et Cooper, 1984). Parmi celles‑ci, la théorie
de la rationalisation (Beauvois et Joule, 1981, 1996, 1999) propose une lecture radicale des
propositions de base de Festinger, tout en conservant le noyau dur. La co‑existence dans
l’univers cognitif d’un individu de deux cognitions psychologiquement inconsistantes éveille
1. Université de Lorraine, Interpsy/ETIC, Campus du Saulcy, BP 30309, 57006 Metz, France; valerie.
fointiat@univ‑lorraine.fr.
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VALÉRIE FOINTIAT
un état psychologiquement désagréable, un état de tension motivationnelle, qui appelle en
tant que tel sa réduction. Cette réduction s’opère dans la plupart des recherches par un
changement cognitif, qu’il est coutume d’appeler le changement d’attitude. La grande
majorité des recherches sur la dissonance a été réalisée dans le paradigme de la soumission
forcée (Festinger et Carlsmith, 1959). Ainsi, l’état de dissonance est éveillé dès lors que
l’individu émet librement un comportement problématique, c’est‑à‑dire à l’encontre soit de
ses opinions, idées, croyances – on parlera de comportement contre‑attitudinal, soit allant
à l’encontre de ses motivations – on parlera alors de comportement contre‑motivationnel.
La réduction de la dissonance s’opère généralement par un rajustement a posteriori des
idées au comportement émis. La spécificité de la version radicale de la théorie de la
dissonance cognitive tient à la place accordée au comportement de soumission. En effet,
selon les tenants de la version radicale, c’est le comportement de soumission qui est à
l’origine de l’éveil de la dissonance. Le processus de réduction de la dissonance – ou
rationalisation dans l’acception de Beauvois et Joule – est ainsi orienté vers la restauration
de la valeur de ce comportement de soumission, et non pas la restauration d’un état global
de cohérence cognitive.
Par ailleurs, la rationalisation étant un processus motivationnel, il doit pouvoir emprunter
des voies alternatives, lorsque la tension motivationnelle n’est pas du tout ou partiellement
réduite. De nombreuses recherches (Joule, 1986; Fointiat, 1996, 1998; pour revue cf.
Joule, 1999) réalisées dans ce cadre théorique ont montré par exemple que la rationalisation
est un processus à deux voies alternatives: une voie cognitive, qui équivaut à un rajustement
des cognitions au comportement de soumission (e.g., rationalisation cognitive), et une voie
comportementale, qui correspond à l’engagement dans un comportement encore plus
problématique que celui ayant éveillé l’état de dissonance (e.g., rationalisation en acte).
Cependant, que la rationalisation s’exprime par la voie cognitive ou comportementale, sa
finalité reste la même. Il s’agit d’un processus post‑comportemental dont la finalité est la
restauration de la valeur du comportement de soumission. Par exemple, dans son expérience
princeps, Joule (1986) démontre que des sujets fumeurs étaient d’autant plus nombreux à
accepter de s’arrêter de fumer pendant trois jours, qu’ils avaient tout d’abord accepter de
s’arrêter pendant 18 heures. Tout semble se passer comme si le fait d’accepter une longue
privation (trois jours) rendait l’abstinence courte (18 heures) moins problématique pour
eux. En revanche, cet effet disparaissait lorsqu’on laissait aux sujets le temps de rationaliser
cognitivement leur première abstinence de 18 heures. Beauvois, Joule et Brunetti (1993)
ont également montré que favoriser la rationalisation cognitive d’un comportement problé­
matique rendait moins probable sa rationalisation en actes. Ainsi, des sujets fumeurs qui
devaient justifier leur engagement à s’abstenir de fumer pendant 18 heures étaient moins
enclins à accepter une abstinence plus longue. Pour les auteurs, la recherche de justifications
du comportement de soumission permet un travail cognitif inférentiel favorisant la rationa­
lisation cognitive de ce comportement. Ces recherches ainsi que d’autres ultérieures
(Fointiat, 1996; Joule et Martinie, 2000) attestent toutes que le processus de rationalisation
est un processus à deux voies alternatives: l’utilisation de la voie cognitive de rationalisation
rendant moins probable l’utilisation de la voie comportementale et vice‑versa.
Le paradigme du choix
Si comme nous l’avons déjà souligné, le paradigme de la soumission forcée a permis de
tester bon nombre d’hypothèses de dissonance cognitive, d’autres paradigmes ont été
délaissés. C’est le cas du paradigme du choix (Brehm, 1956). Nous pensons que les
LA RATIONALISATION EN ACTE À L’ÉPREUVE DU PARADIGME DU CHOIX
49
hypothèses dérivées de la théorie de la rationalisation gagneraient à être validées dans ce
paradigme. C’est la raison pour laquelle nous testerons le caractère alternatif du processus
de rationalisation dans ce paradigme.
La logique paradigmatique est la suivante: le fait de choisir un objet parmi deux (au
moins) éveille chez l’individu un état de dissonance. La raison en est simple: choisir l’objet
A implique le rejet de l’objet B. Autrement dit, choisir l’objet A revient à en accepter les
avantages, mais aussi les inconvénients; cela revient aussi à accepter de se priver des
avantages de l’objet B. Afin de réduire la dissonance, l’individu va augmenter l’écart entre
ces alternatives – spreading of alternatives – (objets A et B), en surévaluant l’objet choisi
et/ou en sous‑estimant l’objet rejeté. Dans sa recherche princeps, Brehm (1956) demandait
à des ménagères de classer huit objets présentés par ordre de préférence (par exemple une
cafetière, un toaster1, etc.). Une fois ce premier classement réalisé, l’expérimentateur
proposait à chacune d’elle de garder un objet parmi deux qu’il leur présentait. Dans les
conditions de forte dissonance, les sujets avaient le choix entre deux objets qu’ils avaient
classés de façon proche; au contraire, dans les conditions de faible dissonance, l’écart de
classement entre les deux objets était grand. Une fois leur choix effectué, l’expérimenta­
teur leur demandait de classer à nouveau l’ensemble des huit objets. Il apparaît tout
d’abord que les sujets surévaluent l’objet choisi dans leur second classement et qu’ils
dévaluent l’objet rejeté. Il s’avère également que cet effet est plus marqué dans les
conditions de forte dissonance que dans les conditions de faible dissonance. Cette tendance
à surestimer l’objet choisi et/ou à dévaluer l’objet rejeté a été obtenue à de nombreuses
reprises. (Heine et Lehman, 1995; Steele et al., 1993; Gilovitch et al., 1995; Stone, 1999;
Harmon‑Jones, 1999).
Prises ensemble, ces recherches attestent que choisir un objet plutôt qu’un autre amène
à une surestimation de l’objet choisi et/ou une sous‑évaluation de l’objet rejeté. Cet écart,
connu sous le nom de spreading of alternatives peut être assimilé à un processus de
rationalisation cognitive. Ainsi, on peut considérer que sous‑évaluer l’objet rejeté a pour
finalité de restaurer la valeur du comportement, en l’occurrence le bien‑fondé du choix.
Imaginons maintenant que l’on empêche expérimentalement le sujet de se livrer à ce
travail cognitif de ré‑évaluation des objets (choisi et rejeté). On inhibe par conséquent la
rationalisation cognitive. Sur la base du caractère alternatif du processus de rationalisation,
on fera l’hypothèse que la tension motivationnelle – e.g., l’état de dissonance – est toujours
présente, mais qu’elle ne peut pas être réduite par la voie «traditionnelle». Imaginons que
l’on offre à ce sujet toujours en état de dissonance une voie alternative de réduction, par
exemple compor­tementale. On peut alors raisonnablement penser que le sujet saisira cette
opportunité.
En d’autres termes, en empêchant les sujets de rationaliser par voie cognitive, on rend
probable l’utilisation de la voie comportementale de rationalisation. Ainsi, les sujets en
situation paradigmatique de choix seront moins enclins à rationaliser en acte que les sujets
n’ayant pas eu la possibilité de ré‑évaluer leur choix (hypothèse 1). Cet effet devrait par
ailleurs être plus marqué en situation de forte dissonance qu’en situation de faible dissonance
(hypothèse 2).
1. En 1956, ces objets nouveaux étaient très attractifs.
50
VALÉRIE FOINTIAT
Expérience
Méthode
Vue d’ensemble
Comme dans les recherches de Heine et Lehman (1997) et Stone (1999), les participants
étaient recrutés pour participer à une recherche de psychologie commerciale, portant
soi‑disant sur les goûts musicaux des jeunes de 15‑25 ans. Leur tâche étaient d’évaluer la
désirabilité de 15 CD audio. Cette tâche terminée, ils se voyaient offrir un CD (soit qu’ils
appréciaient beaucoup: forte dissonance, soit qu’ils appréciaient moins: faible dissonance)
en guise de remerciement. Dans la condition paradigmatique, les sujets devaient ensuite
ré‑évaluer l’ensemble des CD avant que l’expérimentateur ne leur propose de participer à
une future expérience comparable à celle‑ci, mais plus coûteuse. Dans la condition originale,
l’expérimentateur proposait tout d’abord la participation à une future expérience, puis
demandait une nouvelle évaluation des CD.
Plan et variables
Il s’agit d’un plan 2 (dissonance: forte versus faible) x 2 (rationalisation cognitive avant
versus après la rationalisation comportementale), avec comme VD principale l’acceptation
du comportement‑cible: participer à une future expérience coûteuse.
Participants
88 étudiantes participèrent à la recherche. 8 ont été éliminées de l’analyse des résultats. 3 parce
qu’elles possédaient plus de la moitié des CD à évaluer; 5 pour incompréhension des
consignes. Les 80 participantes restantes ont été réparties dans chacune des quatre conditions
expérimentales à raison de 20 par condition.
Procédure
Dans la condition paradigmatique, les sujets devaient évaluer 15 CD en termes de désirabilité,
puis les classer par ordre croissant de préférence1. Puis l’expérimentateur souhaitant
soi‑disant les remercier de leur participation leur offrait de choisir un CD parmi deux. Une
fois leur choix fait, l’expérimentateur demandait aux sujets de faire une nouvelle évaluation
des CD. A la fin de cette seconde évaluation, il leur proposait de participer à une future
recherche de psychologie commerciale se déroulant à une heure matinale le samedi matin.
Il prenait également soin de préciser qu’il ne pourrait pas leur offrir un nouveau CD
(comportement‑cible).
Dans la condition originale de choix, les sujets commençaient comme dans la condition
précédente par évaluer la désirabilité des CD, puis leur demandait de les classer. Ces tâches
terminées, l’expérimentateur leur proposait le comportement‑cible. Ce n’est qu’ensuite qu’il
proposait la seconde évaluation des CD.
1. Cette procédure de classement nous permettait ensuite d’opérationnaliser le facteur forte versus
faible dissonance.
LA RATIONALISATION EN ACTE À L’ÉPREUVE DU PARADIGME DU CHOIX
51
Dans les conditions de forte dissonance, les CD offerts au choix sont ceux que les sujets
avaient classés en seconde et troisième position.
Dans les conditions de faible dissonance, les deux CD offerts au choix avaient été classés
en seconde et huitième position.
Démystification
Dès que l’expérimentateur avait recueilli les VD, il expliquait aux sujets les tenants et les
aboutissants de la recherche et leur expliquait qu’il était dans l’impossibilité de leur offrir
effectivement le CD qu’ils avaient choisi. Aucun des participants n’a marqué de désappointement
de ne pas recevoir le CD qu’il avait choisi. Après avoir répondu à l’ensemble des questions
des participants, l’expérimentateur les remerciait vivement pour leur participation.
Résultats1
Les résultats concernent l’acceptation du comportement‑cible, à savoir l’engagement à
participer à une future recherche sur le même thème, mais se déroulant à un horaire matinal.
Ils sont reportés dans le tableau 1 ci‑dessous.
Tableau 1. Acceptation du comportement‑cible, effectif et pourcentage entre parenthèses
Conditions paradigmatiques
faible dissonance (décision facile)
forte dissonance (décision difficile)
Conditions originales
faible dissonance (décision facile)
forte dissonance (décision difficile)
(n = 20)
(n = 20)
4 (20%)
2 (10%)
(n = 20)
(n = 20)
8 (40%)
16 (80%)
Conformément à notre hypothèse 1, on observe un effet global de rationalisation en acte
plus marqué dans les conditions originales que dans les conditions paradigmatiques. En d’autres
termes, lorsque les sujets ont la possibilité de ré‑évaluer l’objet rejeté (rationalisation cognitive),
ils sont significativement moins enclins (6/40) à s’engager ensuite dans un comportement
ultérieur coûteux, que lorsqu’ils n’ont pas cette opportunité (24/40), Chi²(1, 80) = 17,28,
p < 0,0000, φ = 0,46.
Tout semble se passer comme si les sujets dans les conditions paradigmatiques avaient
rationalisé cognitivement leur choix; on comprend alors qu’ils n’éprouvent plus le besoin
1. Analyse Préalable. Nous nous sommes tout d’abord attaché à reproduire l’effet classique du choix, à
savoir une dévaluation de l’objet rejeté. Pour cela, nous n’avons analysé que les données concernant les
conditions paradigmatiques, à savoir les conditions rationalisation cognitive avant la rationalisation
en acte. En termes de dévaluation de l’objet rejeté, nous reproduisons bien les effets classiquement
attendus. Ainsi, comme attendu, le CD rejeté est évalué moins favorablement après l’éveil de la
dissonance (6,65) qu’avant (5,7), F(1,38) = 14,96, p = 0,0004. Tout semble se passer comme si les
participants altéraient les aspects de leur décision pour réduire la dissonance. Par ailleurs, alors qu’on
n’observe pas de différence entre les conditions sans dissonance (5,7) et dissonance faible (4,85),
la différence entre les conditions faibles et fortes dissonance est significative: 4,85 versus 6,65,
F(1, 38) = 12,17, p = 0,0012. Ces résultats montrent dans le droit fil de la littérature que la réduction
de la dissonance est plus forte en situation de choix difficile qu’en situation de choix facile.
52
VALÉRIE FOINTIAT
de rationaliser par une voie comportementale. En revanche, les sujets qui n’ont pas eu cette
possibilité de rationalisation cognitive sont toujours en état de dissonance; ils optent alors
par la première voie ouverte par l’expérimentateur, à savoir une voie de rationalisation
comportementale.
Par ailleurs, cet effet de rationalisation en acte en situation originale de choix s’avère
d’autant plus marqué que les sujets sont en situation de forte dissonance (hypothèse 2). Les
sujets ayant eu à faire un choix difficile sont plus enclins à accepter le comportement‑cible
lorsque la rationalisation cognitive est entravée (16/20) que lorsque la rationalisation
cognitive est facilitée (2/20), Chi²(1, 40) = 17,07, p < 0,0000, φ = 0,65. Cet effet ne
se manifeste pas en situation de faible dissonance (4/20 versus 8/20, ns).
Une analyse de régression logistique (modèle logit) révèle un effet d’interaction entre
nos deux facteurs Chi²(2, 80) = 20,66, p < 0,0000. Cet effet est néanmoins essentiellement
du à la condition dissonance forte/situation choix original (16/20), qui diffère par ailleurs
de chacune des autres conditions expérimentales.
Discussion
Les résultats obtenus ici suggèrent que lorsque le sujet est en situation de choix, la tension
motivationnelle éveillée peut être réduite soit par voie cognitive, ce que les nombreux travaux
en termes de «spreading of alternatives» ont déjà montré, soit par voie comportementale,
lorsque c’est la seule voie possible. Par ailleurs, cet effet s’avère plus marqué en situation
de forte dissonance qu’en situation de faible dissonance. Autrement dit, un choix difficile
éveille un état de dissonance plus grand qu’un choix facile; même si cet effet n’est que
tendanciel, il va néanmoins dans le sens des recherches antérieures réalisées dans le
paradigme du choix.
Mais le plus stimulant reste que la tension éveillée par le choix peut être réduite par
une voie jusqu’alors peu explorée: une voie comportementale. Ainsi, un individu venant
d’être confronté à une situation de tension désagréable accepte de revivre une expérience
future similaire, alors qu’il devrait en toute logique chercher à éviter toute autre situation
susceptible de le mettre à nouveau dans un état d’inconfort psychologique (Festinger, 1957).
Ceci nous amène à interroger le statut du comportement‑cible. Autrement dit, il convient
de se demander si ce comportement‑cible offre au sujet une alternative susceptible de lui
permettre de rationaliser le comportement ayant éveillé l’état de dissonance.
Dans cette recherche, on proposait à l’individu de s’engager à réaliser une seconde
expérience suivant la même logique que celle à laquelle il venait de participer. On prenait
également soin de lui signaler que lors de cette future recherche, aucun «cadeau» ne lui
serait fait, et cela afin d’éviter que les sujets s’engagent à nouveau dans l’espoir de repartir
avec un CD. Par ailleurs, on proposait une recherche plus coûteuse: elle devait se dérouler
à une heure parti­culièrement matinale, un samedi matin, ce qui représente un coût réel
pour les étudiants. En acceptant de participer à cette future recherche susceptible de le
confronter à un nouvel état de dissonance, on peut penser que l’individu ne fait que
rationaliser le comportement premier.
Reste à savoir si la finalité du processus de rationalisation est de restaurer ou maintenir
la valeur de l’engagement dans la situation expérimentale ou bien s’il vise la valorisation
du choix per se. La recherche de Beauvois, Bungert, Rainis et Tornior (1993) peut nous
donner quelques éléments de réflexion. Les résultats suggèrent que l’objet du processus de
LA RATIONALISATION EN ACTE À L’ÉPREUVE DU PARADIGME DU CHOIX
53
rationalisation serait la valorisation de la situation de soumission, plutôt que la valorisation
du comportement problématique1.
La recherche que nous venons de présenter ne peut en l’état répondre à cette question. Elle
n’a que le mérite d’appeler à un prolongement de la réflexion théorique et expérimentale.
Il nous semblerait intéressant de poursuivre les investigations en tenant compte, par
exemple, d’une autre voie de réduction de la dissonance: la trivialisation. L’existence de
cette voie de réduction de la dissonance fut préssentie très tôt par Festinger (1957), mais
il aura fallu attendre Simon et al. (1995), pour en apporter la démonstration expérimentale.
Selon ces auteurs, trivialiser le comportement à l’origine de l’état de dissonance revient à
en minimiser l’importance. Des recherches ont déjà montré que trivialisation et rationalisation
étaient des voies alternatives de réduction de la dissonance (Joule et Martinie, 2000;
Martinie et Joule, 2000; Michel et Fointiat, 2002). Ces travaux ont été réalisés dans le
paradigme de la soumission forcée. Il nous semble néanmoins qu’ils pourraient trouver un
écho dans le paradigme du choix, et permettrait d’éclairer le comportement qui fait l’objet
de la réduction de la dissonance: le choix per se ou bien la situation expérimentale
impliquant par définition la soumission de l’individu.
Nous espérons pouvoir convaincre que ces résultats ouvrent un nouveau champ de
recherches stimulant pour les théoriciens de la dissonance.
Rationalization in Act in the Free Choice Paradigm.
Post‑decisional Dissonance Could Be Reduced by Behavioral Path
Abstract: Radical Dissonance theory (Beauvois & Joule, 1996) defines rationalization as a
post‑behavioral process through which a problematic behavior becomes less problematic. This
reduction dissonance process can be achieved either by the classical attitude change – the so‑called
cognitive rationalization – or by performing another behavior more costly than the one that caused
the dissonance – the so‑called rationalization in act. This alternate path of dissonance reduction has
been exclusively put to the test in the forced compliance paradigm. The aim of this research was
to test the rationalization in act hypothesis in the free‑choice paradigm. In a classical free‑choice
procedure, participants were led to arrange in preference order 15 CDs, before allowing them to
choose between two highly preferred CDs (high dissonance) or lowly preferred CDs (low dissonance).
The target‑request (to participate in a costly future research, that is the rationalization in act
measure) was presented either before (original free‑choice conditions) or after (paradigmatic
free‑choice condi­tions) the evaluation of the CDs. As predicted, we replicate the classical spreading
of alternatives effect (cognitive rationalization); more interestingly, rationalization in act was
higher in the paradigmatic free‑choice conditions. Implications for future experimental investigations
were exposed.
Key words: rationalization in act, cognitive dissonance, behavioral change, spreading of alternatives
1. Il convient d’être prudent; cette recherche testait une situation de soumission forcée. Le transfert à un
autre paradigme mérite que l’on prenne quelques précautions.
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VALÉRIE FOINTIAT
Références
Beauvois, J.‑L., Joule, R.‑V. (1981). Soumission et idéologies. Psychosociologie de la rationalisation.
Paris: PUF.
Beauvois, J.‑L., Joule, R.‑V. (1996). A Radical Dissonance Theory. London: Taylor & Francis.
Beauvois, J.‑L., Joule, R.‑V. (1999). A radical point of view on dissonance theory. In E. Harmon‑Jones,
J. Mills (eds.). Cognitive Dissonance: Progress in a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology.
Washington, DC: APA.
Beauvois, J.‑L., Joule, R.‑V., Brunetti, F. (1993). Cognitive rationalization and act rationalization
in an escalation of commitment. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14, 1‑17.
Beauvois, J.‑L., Bungert, M., Rainis, N., Tornior, L. (1993). Statut d’agent, rationalisation et
explication causale dans la soumission forcée. In J.‑L. Beauvois, R.‑V. Joule, J.M. Monteil
(eds). Perspectives cognitives et conduites sociales: Contextes et contextes sociaux.
Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé.
Brehm, J.W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 52, 384‑389.
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, III: Row Peterson.
Festinger, L., Carlsmith, J.M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203‑211.
Fointiat, V. (1996). Rationalisation cognitive versus rationalisation en acte dans le paradigme de la
fausse attribution de l’éveil de la dissonance. Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale,
30, 10‑21.
Fointiat,V. (1998). Rationalization in act and problematic behaviour justification. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 28, 471‑474.
Fointiat, V., Potier, S. (2000). Rationalisation d’un comportement problématique: Théorie radicale
de la dissonance cognitive versus théorie de la gestion des impressions. Revue Internationale
de Psychologie Sociale/International Review of Social Psychology, 13 (1), 59‑68.
Heine, S.J., Lehman, D.R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self‑affirmation. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 23, 389‑400.
Joule, R.‑V. (1986). Rationalisation et engagement dans la soumission librement consentie. Thèse
pour le doctorat ès Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université des Sciences Sociales, Grenoble.
Joule, R.‑V., Martinie, M.‑A. (2000). Fausse attribution de l’éveil de la dissonance: Revue de
question et nouvelles pistes. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 13 (2), 33‑60.
Martinie, M.‑A., Joule, R.‑V. (2000). Trivialisation et rationalisation en acte dans le paradigme
de la fausse attribution: Deux voies alternatives de réduction de la dissonance. Revue
Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 13 (2), 93‑114.
Michel, S., Fointiat, V. (2002). Trivialisation versus rationalisation cognitive: Quand l’adhésion
à la norme de consistance guide le choix du mode de réduction de la dissonance. Cahiers
Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 56, 58‑63.
Shultz, T.R., Lepper, M.B. (1996). Cognitive dissonance reduction as constraint satisfaction.
Psychological Review, 103 (2), 219‑240.
Stone, J. (1999). What exactly have I done? The role of self‑attribute accessibility in dissonance.
In E. Harmon‑Jones, J. Mills (eds.). Cognitive Dissonance: Progress in a Pivotal Theory
in Social Psychology. Washington, DC: APA.
Luminiţa Samson‑Secrieru1
L’influence de la dimension culturelle
individualisme‑collectivisme sur la soumission
sans pression2
Résumé: Dans la première étude de cette article on expose les résultats de comparaisons entre le
contexte roumain et celui moldave sur la dimension culturelle individualisme‑collectivisme (IND/COL).
L’IND/COL a été évalué avec le questionnaire Individualisme‑Collectivisme crée par Triandis (1995).
Le questionnaire – composé de 32 items, 16 évaluant l’échelle IND et 16 évaluant l’échelle COL – a
été administré aux 342 étudiants: 181 roumains et 161 moldaves. Les résultats ont montrées que les
étudiants roumains se sont révélés plus individualiste que les étudiants moldaves. Dans la deuxième
étude nous avons comparés l’efficacité d’une procédure de la soumission sans pression dans la culture
répertoriée comme collectiviste (Moldavie) et dans la culture répertoriée comme individualiste
(Roumanie). L’analyse a indiqué que la procédure est efficace qu’en Roumanie.
Mots‑clés: contexte culturelle, individualisme‑collectivisme, soumission
De manière générale, le champ d’étude portant sur la soumission sans pression a pour
objectif de mettre en évidence un certain nombre de paradigmes permettant d’amener autrui
à effectuer un comportement qu’il n’aurait pas émis spontanément tout en laissant au sujet
le sentiment qu’il a effectué le comportement en question en toute liberté. Ces procédures,
dont l’étude commence avec les recherches‑actions de Kurt Lewin, sont nombreuses
(Cialdini, 1984; Girandola, 2003; Guéguen, 2002; Joule et Beauvois, 2002). La technique
du «vous êtes libre de...» proposée par Guéguen et Pascual (2000) compte parmi les
paradigmes de soumission sans pression les plus récents. Son principe est simple: augmenter
une requête faite à autrui de la proposition «vous êtes libre de...» permet d’augmenter
significativement l’acceptation de cette requête. La simple induction verbale d’un sentiment
de liberté peut donc favoriser la soumission des individus à divers types de requêtes non
problématiques comme le don d’argent, le remplissage d’un questionnaire, la visite d’un
1. Université «Alecu Russo» de Bălţi, Moldavie; Département de Psychologie; e‑mail: linasamson2003@
yahoo.fr.
2. Cette recherche a été réalisée pendant un stage de mobilité dans le cadre du programme de bourse
«Eugen Ionescu», mis en place par l’Agence universitaire de la Francophonie et par le Gouvernement
roumain. Cette mobilité s’est déroulée au Laboratoire «Psychologie du champ social» Associé
Francophone de la Faculté de Psychologie et Science de l’Education de l’Université «Alexandru
Ioan Cuza» de Iaşi. Ce stage m’a permis de faire une avancée considérable dans les travaux de
recherches.
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LUMINIŢA SAMSON‑SECRIERU
site web ou encore la vente de calendrier (Guéguen et Pascual, 2000; Guéguen, Pascual
et Dagot, 2001; Guéguen, Pascual, Jacob et Morineau, 2002; Pascual et Guéguen, 2002).
Pour expliquer cet effet, deux théories peuvent être mises en avant: la théorie de
l’engagement (Kiesler et Sakumura, 1966; Kiesler, 1971) et la théorie de la réactance
psychologique (Brehm, 1966; Miron et Brehm, 2006).
Selon Kiesler, plusieurs facteurs permettent d’augmenter le degré d’engagement des
individus dans leurs actes. Parmi ces facteurs, le sentiment de liberté est selon l’auteur l’un
des plus puissants. A ce titre, plus un individu est placé dans un contexte de liberté lorsqu’il
effectue un comportement, plus il est engagé par ce comportement. Or, «rien de plus facile
que de créer un contexte de liberté. Il suffit d’assortir la requête faite à l’acteur d’une
phrase affirmant qu’il est libre de faire ou de ne pas faire ce qu’on attend de lui. Nous
tenons cette phrase comme l’une des plus fascinantes de la littérature scientifique. Cinquante
années de recherches nous montrent qu’elle est un puissant facteur d’engagement des gens
dans leurs actes, certainement même le facteur d’engagement le plus puissant» (Joule et
Beauvois, 1998, p. 71). C’est ainsi que dans le cadre d’une demande d’argent faite à un
inconnu dans la rue, non seulement les sujets déclarés libres accèdent plus souvent à la
requête, mais ils se montrent également plus généreux en consentant des dons supérieurs à ceux
des sujets d’une condition contrôle (Guéguen et Pascual, 2000; Pascual et Guéguen, 2002).
En fait, tout semble ici se passer comme si le contexte de liberté généré par la proposition
«vous êtes libre de...» engageait davantage les sujets dans le comportement altruiste attendu,
ce qui se traduirait par des montants moyens plus élevés.
Mais la théorie de la réactance psychologique interprète aussi les effets produits par la
technique du «vous êtes libre de...». La réactance se caractérise par un état de motivation
négatif faisant suite à une menace (supposée réelle) d’une restriction de la liberté individuelle
et se traduit par une résistance à l’influence. Cette théorie postule donc qu’une menace ou
perte de liberté motive l’individu à reconstituer cette liberté. Ainsi, lorsqu’un individu X
formule une requête à un individu Y, il est probable que dans la plupart des cas Y soit
susceptible de ressentir de la réactance puisque X tente de «dicter» à Y un comportement
à effectuer. Il y aurait donc en quelque sorte une restriction de la liberté de Y. A ce stade,
pour recouvrer sa liberté, Y aurait tendance à rejeter la requête de X. Or, si X agrémente
sa requête de la proposition «vous êtes libre de...», il est probable que le taux de réactance
de Y s’en trouve nettement diminué, ce qui se traduirait par une acceptation plus probable
de la requête.
Notre propos ne sera pas ici de rendre compte de la pertinence respective d’une théorie
par rapport à l’autre. En effet, les théories de l’engagement et de la réactance psychologique
ne sont pas incompatibles et peuvent toutes deux aider à la compréhension des effets de la
technique du «vous êtes libre de...». A ce titre, concernant le pied‑dans‑la‑porte, après une
trentaine d’années durant lesquelles les chercheurs ont tenté d’imposer une théorie explicative
de l’ensemble des résultats expérimentaux, Burger (1999, pp. 322‑323), dans sa méta‑analyse,
conclut de la façon suivante: «Notre revue a fourni une compréhension des processus étant
à la base de l’effet du pied‑dans‑la‑porte. La plupart des investigations antérieures menées
sur cette question ont seulement examiné une explication possible, typiquement en termes
de processus d’auto‑perception. Des résultats contradictoires ont mené quelques chercheurs
à proposer que la théorie de l’auto‑perception devrait être remplacée par une autre
explication, rendre compte de l’effet du pied‑dans‑la‑porte. En revanche, nos analyses ont
révélé beaucoup d’éléments venant soutenir une explication en termes d’auto‑perception.
Cependant, nous arguons du fait que l’auto‑perception fait seulement partie d’un ensemble
de processus à l’œuvre dans le pied‑dans‑la‑porte et que plusieurs des résultats contradictoires
L’INFLUENCE DE LA DIMENSION CULTURELLE INDIVIDUALISME‑COLLECTIVISME...
57
dans la littérature peuvent être compris en considérant l’impact des processus venant
s’ajouter à celui de l’auto‑perception».
Par analogie, dans le cadre du «vous êtes libre de...», nous soutiendrons la réflexion en
prenant en compte les deux processus explicatifs suggérés par la théorie de l’engagement
et de la réactance, que nous examinerons à travers la dimension culturelle individualisme/
collectivisme. En effet, la technique du «vous êtes libre de...» a uniquement été étudiée
dans une culture «individualiste» (la France) et certains éléments nous amènerons à envisager
que la procédure «vous êtes libre de...» soit d’une efficacité moindre dans des cultures
«collectivistes». Au regard de la littérature issue de la psychologie culturelle et interculturelle,
dans les cultures individualistes, «les gens sont autonomes et indépendants de leur groupe
d’appartenance; ils donnent priorité à leurs buts personnels avant les buts de leur groupe
d’appartenance, ils se comportent d’abord sur la base de leurs attitudes plutôt que sur les
normes de leur groupe»; dans les cultures collectivistes, «les gens sont interdépendants avec
leur groupe d’appartenance (famille, ethnie, nation, etc.) et donnent la priorité aux buts de leur
groupe d’appartenance» (Triandis, 2001, p. 909). En réalité, cette distinction avait déjà été
faite par Hofstede (1980) dans le cadre de la psychologie organisationnelle. Pour cet auteur,
«l’individualisme fait référence à une société dans laquelle les liens entre les individus sont
lâches: on n’attend rien de plus d’un individu que de veiller sur lui‑même et sur ses proches».
Inversement, «une société collectiviste est une société dans laquelle l’individu est intégré,
dès la naissance, à un endogroupe cohésif et fort qui, en échange d’une indéfectible loyauté,
l’assure de sa protection». Sur la base de ces définitions, nous pouvons entrevoir que la
signification de la liberté «individuelle» est toute relative selon les contextes culturels. A ce
titre, sur la base des classements annuels réalisés par la Freedom House dans le monde, les pays
les plus libres sont très majoritairement les pays individualistes. Ce classement est notamment
basé sur un indice des libertés civiles mesuré pour chaque pays. La conséquence de ces
quelques considérations pourrait être que la technique du «vous êtes libre de...» s’avère peu
pertinente dans les cultures collectivistes. Cette hypothèse semble prendre sens, d’un point
de vue théorique, si l’on se penche sur les travaux étudiant la relation de la théorie de
l’engagement et de la réactance au sein des cultures individualistes et collectivistes.
Théorie de l’engagement et individualisme/collectivisme1
Selon Joule et Beauvois (1998, p. 60), «l’engagement correspond, dans une situation donnée,
aux conditions dans lesquelles la réalisation d’un acte ne peut être imputable qu’à celui
qui l’a réalisé». Cette définition est essentiellement fondée sur la base des travaux issus de
cultures individualistes. Or, il est possible que dans les cultures collectivistes, de par
l’interdépendance des individus, les conditions dans lesquelles la réalisation d’un acte ne
soit imputable qu’a celui qui l’a réalisé soient difficilement appréciables par les individus.
Bien que peu de travaux aient été menés pour rendre compte des effets de l’engagement au
sein des cultures collectivistes, certaines données suggèrent des résultats contrastés en
fonction du contexte culturel. Kim et Sherman (2007) ont ainsi montré que l’expression
d’un choix amenait des étudiants américains (culture individualiste) à être ultérieurement
1. Ces explications sur la théorie de l’engagement et théorie de la réactance psychologique emprunte
l’essentiel au dernier article commun de Pascual, A., Oteme, C., Samson, L., Wang, Q.,
Falkowicz‑Halimi, S., Souchet, L., Girandola, F., Guéguen, N., Joule, R.‑V. (à paraître).
Cross‑cultural investigation of compliance without pressure: The «you are free to...» technique in
France, Ivory Coast, Romania, Russia and China. The Journal of Comparative Social Science, 47 (1).
58
LUMINIŢA SAMSON‑SECRIERU
plus investis dans leur choix que des étudiants originaires de l’est de l’Asie (culture
collectiviste). Cette observation suggère que la théorie de l’engagement et, du même coup,
la technique du «vous êtes libre de...» puissent être moins efficaces dans des cultures
collectivistes comparativement à des cultures individualistes.
Théorie de la réactance psychologique
et individualisme/collectivisme
La théorie de la réactance psychologique est généralement présentée comme universelle
dans le champ de la psychologie sociale. Cependant, l’importance de la liberté individuelle
dans cette théorie laisse penser qu’elle puisse être limitée aux valeurs individualistes. Bien
que peu de travaux aient été menés sur la question, en utilisant une méthode classique issue
de la théorie de la réactance, Savani, Markus et Conner (2008) ont observé davantage de
réactance chez des étudiants nord‑américains (individualistes) comparativement à des
étudiants indiens (collectivistes). De la même manière, Jonas, Graupmann, Kayser, Zanna,
Traut‑Mattausch et Frey (2009) ont montré que des sujets issus d’une culture individualiste
(étudiants d’Europe de l’Ouest) ressentaient davantage de réactance lorsque leur liberté
individuelle était menacée, comparativement à des sujets issus d’une culture collectiviste
(étudiants de l’est de l’Asie). Si, comme l’avons vu précédemment, l’induction d’un
sentiment de liberté généré par la technique du «vous êtes libre de...» permet une baisse
de la réactance chez les individus, il est possible que ce ne soit pas le cas dans les cultures
collectivistes, où la réactance est un état plus difficile à observer. De ce fait, la procédure
«vous êtes libre de...» ne serait pas efficace dans les cultures collectivistes alors qu’il serait
efficace dans les cultures individualistes, où les individus sont davantage susceptibles de
ressentir de la réactance dans leur vie quotidienne.
Etude 1: Contexte culturelle
Afin de tester ces hypothèses, tout d’abord nous cherchons à vérifier certains des résultats qui
ont été obtenus dans le domaine de la psychologie culturelle. Plus concrètement, nous avons
directement mesuré les scores d’individualisme/collectivisme dans deux pays: Roumanie
et Moldavie, avant de tester la technique du «vous êtes libre de…» auprès de cette population.
Dans la littérature, ces deux pays ont été considérés comme des pays collectiviste (Hofstede,
Hofstede et Minkov, 2010). Concernant la Roumanie, par rapport à la Moldavie, il semble que
cela ne soit plus le cas aujourd’hui avec l’influence de certains paramètres tels que les évolutions
technologiques, économiques ou encore politiques. Le degré d’indivi­dualisme d’un pays
peut donc varier au cours du temps. Par exemple, le Mexique initialement classé parmi les pays
collectivistes par Hofstede (1980) a été ultérieurement classé parmi les cultures individualistes
par Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina et Nicholson (1997). Les auteurs expliquèrent cette transfor­
mation par le développement économique de ce pays entre les deux mesures.
Hypothèse
De ce fait, les sujets roumains devraient avoir des scores d’individualisme plus élevés que
les sujets moldaves.
L’INFLUENCE DE LA DIMENSION CULTURELLE INDIVIDUALISME‑COLLECTIVISME...
59
Méthodologie
L’échantillon
Un total de 342 étudiants en premier cycle licence (181 étudiants roumains et 161 étudiants
moldaves) ont participé à cette étude. A souligner que, le premier échantillon sont des
étudiants à l’Université «Alexandru Ioan Cuza» du Iassi/Roumanie (42 étudiants au Faculté
du Droit, 48 étudiants au Faculté du Géographie, 36 étudiants au Faculté de Psychologie,
19 étudiants au Faculté du Philosophie, 36 étudiants au ID) et le deuxième échantillon sont
des étudiants à l’Université «Alecu Russo» du Balti/Moldavie (51 étudiants au Faculté
du Droit, 42 étudiants au Faculté du Philologie, 25 étudiants au Faculté du Psychologie,
43 étudiants en Assistance Sociale).
Le matériel
Dans cette première étude nous nous intéresserons plus particulièrement aux attitudes qui
différencient les individualistes des collectivistes. Nous avons utilisé l’instrument recommandé
à cet effet par Triandis (1995). Il s’agit d’une échelle d’attitude Likert de 32 items à neuf
points scorés de 1 «Fortement en désaccord» à 9 «Fortement en accord», soit huit items
pour chacune des quatre dimensions sous‑jacentes: collectivisme horizontale (par exemple,
«Je me sens bien lorsque je coopère avec d’autres»; «Mon bonheur dépend du bonheur de
ceux qui m’entourent»; «Il est important pour moi de maintenir l’harmonie dans mon
groupe» etc.), collectivisme verticale (par exemple, «Je ferais ce que voudrais ma famille,
même si je détesterais l’activité en question»; «Habituellement, je sacrifie mon propre
intérêt pour l’intérêt commun du groupe» etc.), individualisme horizontale (par exemple,
«Je préfère être direct et sincère pour parler aux gens»; «Lorsque je réussie, c’est en général
grâce aux aptitudes personnelles» etc.), individualisme verticale (par exemple, «Gagner signifie
tout pour moi»; «Pour moi, il est important de réaliser les tâches mieux que les autres» etc.).
Ces quatre facettes se définissent par deux dimensions. La première recouvre le fait d’être
indépendant (individualisme) ou interdépendant par rapport aux autres (collectivisme). La
seconde décrit la volonté de chacun d’être différent des autres (vertical) ou semblable aux
autres (horizontal). Ainsi, les personnes verticales acceptent l’inégalité et le fait que certains
rangs donnent droit à certains privilèges. Les personnes horizontales, quant à elles, considèrent
que tout le monde devrait être similaire sur la majorité des attributs, et spécialement par
rapport au statut (Triandis, 1995).
Les scores aux quatre sous‑échelles ont été calculés à partir des moyennes des huit items
les concernant (après, bien sûr, avoir inversé les items nécessaires).
En répondant aux éléments du questionnaire individualisme‑collectivisme, les participants
doivent évaluer l’intensité des attitudes, des valeurs, croyances et comportements en relation
à eux‑mêmes et non en relation de ce qui se passe dans leur propre contexte culturel.
Enfin, concernant les qualités psychométriques du questionnaire individualisme‑collecti­
visme, nous avons vérifié que, pour l’échelle individualisme (IND), le coefficient alpha de
Cronbach a une valeur de 0,67, alors que pour l’échelle collectivisme (COL), alpha de
Cronbach a une valeur de 0,78.
Au niveau des sous‑échelles, alpha de Cronbach a les valeurs suivantes: 0,46 pour
sous‑échelle individualisme horizontale (IH), 0,60 pour sous‑échelle individualisme verti­
cale (IV), 0,68 pour sous‑échelle collectivisme horizontale (CH), 0,70 pour sous‑échelle
60
LUMINIŢA SAMSON‑SECRIERU
collectivisme verticale (CV). Pour assurer la cohérence interne, le test de fiabilité a été
effectué pour chacune des dimensions. Tous les alpha de Cronbach ont une valeur de 0,69.
La procédure
Nous avons traduit l’échelle individualisme‑collectivisme (Triandis, 1995) en roumain, procé­
dure visant à obtenir une précision linguistique et culturelle équivalente de l’instrument original.
Dans cette étude, dans les deux pays on a adopté les mêmes conditions d’administration
du questionnaire individualisme‑collectivisme, à savoir gestion collective, pendant les heures
des cours, en sollicitant une participation volontaire, aussi l’opinion sincère des participants.
La confidentialité et l’anonymat des réponses ont été garantis. Les données ont été recueillies
dans une Université du Iassi/Roumanie et une Université du Balti/Moldavie, analysées par
la suite avec le programme statistique SPSS, version 13.0.
Résultats
D’abord, une analyse de variance one‑way ANOVA a été menée avec le contexte culturel,
comme variable indépendante dans le but d’explorer les effets principaux de la variable
indépendante sur les dimensions mentionnées ci‑dessus, individualisme et collectivisme.
Les résultats ont montré un effet du contexte culturel (cf. tableau 1). Les étudiants
roumains (MR1 = 7,02) révèlent un score d’individualisme significativement plus élevé
que les étudiants moldaves (MM2 = 6,51). Nous observons aussi que les étudiants moldaves
(MM = 7,32) révèlent un score de collectivisme significativement plus élevé que les
étudiants roumains (MR = 6,18). Ces résultats confirment notre hypothèse concernant le
fait que les étudiants roumains sont plus individualistes que les moldaves.
Tableau 1. Les différences entre les sujets roumains et moldaves
et les dimensions Individualisme/Collectivisme (IND/COL)
IND
COL
Roumanie
M
SD
7,02
0,89
6,18
1,14
Moldavie
M
SD
6,51
0,96
7,32
0,76
F
26,18
115,1
ANOVA
df
1
1
p
0,000
0,000
Envisageons maintenant la distinction horizontale et verticale au sein de l’individualisme
et du collectivisme pour voir des différences à travers les deux cultures. Les résultats sont
présentés dans le tableau 2.
Comme est illustré dans le tableau 2, les résultats montrent un effet d’orientation
culturel. Les étudiants roumains se perçoivent comme plus horizontalement individualistes
(IH) que les étudiants moldaves: MR = 7,51, SD = 0,88 vs MM = 7,06, SD = 1,03; ils
se perçoivent aussi comme plus verticalement individualistes (IV): MR = 6,54, SD = 1,24
vs MM = 5,95, SD = 1,28. A partir de ces résultats nous pouvons avancer l’idée que la
Roumanie met l’accent sur un moi indépendant plutôt qu’interdépendant, par rapport à la
Moldavie, mais insiste aussi sur l’égalité, désapprouvant le désir de se différencier des autres.
1. Roumanie.
2. Moldavie.
L’INFLUENCE DE LA DIMENSION CULTURELLE INDIVIDUALISME‑COLLECTIVISME...
61
Tableau 2. Les différences entre les sujets roumains et moldaves
et l’orientation culturelle (HVIC)1
IH1
IV2
CH3
CV4
Roumanie
M
SD
7,51
0,88
6,54
1,24
6,80
1,34
5,56
0,92
Moldavie
M
SD
7,06
1,03
5,95
1,28
7,43
0,95
7,22
1,27
Independent Samples
t
df
–4,30
340
–4,25
340
4,95
340
13,50
340
T‑Test
p
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Chez les sujets moldaves, harmonie et comportement social semblent être importants.
Cela témoigne les résultats du test T pour la sous‑échelle collectivisme horizontale
(CH) – t(340) = 4,95, p < 0,0001. Les étudiants moldaves ont plus fortement approuvé
les déclarations, telles que mon bonheur dépend beaucoup de la joie de ceux autour de
moi; il est important pour moi de maintenir l’harmonie dans mon groupe; j’aime à partager
la joie/les petites choses avec mes voisins; si un parent a des difficultés financières, je vais
l’aider avec toutes mes possibilités etc. Les relations, le sacrifice et l’intégrité familiale sont
perçus comme ayant une plus grande importance chez les sujets moldaves. Cela témoigne
les résultats de la sous‑échelle collectivisme verticale – t(340) = 13,50, p < 0,0001.
Discussion et conclusion
Dans cette première étude nous avons tenté de vérifier si les Moldaves étaient collectivistes,
comme nous l’avons prédit, et les Roumains individualistes. Les résultats montrent effecti­
vement qu’en moyenne les Roumains sont significativement plus individualistes que les
Moldaves, ces derniers étant plus collectivistes que les Roumains.
Quoique tous les deux pays, la Roumanie et la Moldavie, aient traversé un régime de
dictature (communisme) qui a conduit, par les mécanismes idéologiques, politiques, cultu­
relles, sociales, à la structuration d’une mentalité collective, elles se différencient en ce qui
concerne le degré dans lequel ils ont adopté des normes d’un modèle de vie plus individualiste.
La Moldavie a été considérée dans la littérature comme un pays collectiviste (Hofstede,
Hofstede et Minkov, 2010). Elle a passé à une nouvelle culture, mais seulement au niveau
déclaratoire et non par assumassions. La plupart des gens se sentent bien dans la culture
collectiviste, qui ne nécessite pas d’initiatives personnelles. Le psychiatre Ion Vianu explique
que après avoir vécu en collectivisme plus de 70 ans (URSS), ces populations sentent
toujours la nécessité d’un père fort, même si oppressif, qui assume la responsabilité, qui
dirige et distribue des avantages, les bénéfices. Un homme qui se développe dans ce style
a des difficultés ŕ sauter, tout à coup, au style individualiste.
Concernant la Roumanie, il y a eu une culture traditionnelle de la coopération, entraide,
qui a donné naissance ŕ des institutions spécifiques (travail dans devălmăşie, conseil des
anciens, le voisinage etc.). Ils ont développé une philosophie de la communauté, mais aussi
une assumassion individuelle. Plus tard, le collectivisme soviétique a imposé l’égalité dans
la pauvreté et précarité (cf. Neculau, 1989).
1.
2.
3.
4.
Individualisme Horizontal.
Individualisme Vertical.
Collectivisme Horizontal.
Collectivisme Vertical.
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LUMINIŢA SAMSON‑SECRIERU
Même si la classification d’Hofstede (1980) avait clairement repérée la Roumanie comme
un pays collectiviste, il semble que cela n’est plus valable aujourd’hui. Nos résultats ont
donc montré que les Roumains sont plus individualistes que les Moldaves. Ces résultats
concordent avec ceux obtenus par Ciochină et Faria (2009). A l’origine, toute société
humaine est d’orientation collectiviste; la montée de l’individualisme a été générée par
l’influence des certains paramètres tels que les évolutions technologiques, économiques ou
encore politiques (Hofstede, Hofstede et Minkov, 2010; Triandis, McCusker et Hui, 1990).
Le degré d’individualisme dans un pays peut donc varier avec le temps (Spector, Cooper
et Sparks, 2001). Depuis la classification de la Roumanie parmi les pays collectivistes
(Hofstede, 1980), ce pays a connu au moins deux évènements sociaux importants: 1) la fin
d’une dictature communiste en 1989 pour basculer vers une démocratie et 2) l’entrée dans
l’Union Européenne en 2007. Or, l’individualisme est surtout présent dans les pays dits
démocratiques et l’Union Européenne est essentiellement composée de cultures indivi­
dualistes. La Roumanie est donc passée d’une orientation collectiviste à une orientation
individualiste. De plus, l’analyse des rapports annuels de la Freedom House depuis 1972
montre la Roumanie classée parmi les pays non libres de 1972 à 1990, puis parmi les pays
partiellement libres jusqu’en 1995 et parmi les pays libres jusqu’à aujourd’hui.
Etude 2: Tester l’effet de la technique
«vous êtes libre de…» dans des cultures répertoriées
comme étant individualistes ou collectivistes
Dans l’étude précédente, nous avons mesuré les scores d’individualisme/collectivisme. Les
résultats ont montrée que les étudiants roumains sont plus individualiste que les moldaves.
Hypothèse
La Moldavie étant un pays d’orientation collectiviste et la Roumanie étant en train d’acquérir
une orientation individualiste, nous formulerons l’hypothèse suivante: la technique du «vous
êtes libre de...» ne serait efficace qu’en Roumanie.
Dans cette deuxième étude, nous avons tenté de tester l’effet de cette technique dans le
cas d’une interaction par e‑mail dans ces deux pays. L’objectif était de voir si on peut
augmenter le trafic sur un site contenant un message insistant sur la liberté du sujet
comparativement à un site sans un message pareil.
Méthodologie
L’échantillon
Un total de 222 étudiants (114 moldaves et 108 roumains) ont participé à l’étude. Les sujets
sont les mêmes que dans la première étude (sauf que parmi 342 sujets, 120 sujets ont été
éliminés parce que leurs adresses mails étaient invalides au moment de l’expéri­mentation:
plus de serveur, destination inconnue du serveur, ou les sujets n’ont pas donné leurs adresses
mail). Les adresses mail étaient obtenues au moment du remplissage d’échelle indivi­
dualisme‑collectivisme, au cours de la première étude.
L’INFLUENCE DE LA DIMENSION CULTURELLE INDIVIDUALISME‑COLLECTIVISME...
63
La procédure
Un site a été construit pour réaliser cette deuxième étude. Compte tenu de la nature
pro‑sociale de la plupart des requêtes utilisées dans les recherches sur la technique du «vous
êtes libre de…», nous avons opté pour un site dédié aux enfants victimes de violence physique,
affective, sexuelle. Le site s’appelait «Mettre fin à la violence» (le site était en roumain, il
s’appelait «Stop violenţei», http://stopviolentei.do.am) et présentait directement, dans sa page
d’accueil, des photos d’enfants tombés victimes aux abus physiques, sexuels, émotionnels,
ainsi qu’un texte de sensibilisation. Un courrier était adressé à 114 étudiants moldaves et
un autre courrier était adressé à 108 étudiants roumains, dont les adresses avaient été prises
au moment du remplissage d’échelle individualisme­‑collectivisme (Triandis, 1995), au cours
de la première étude. Ce message contenait le texte suivant: «Donnez cinq minutes de votre
temps aux enfants victimes de violence physique, affective, sexuelle en cliquant sur…».
Sous ce texte était une page html qui contenait un bouton de 1 × 7 centimètres. Les messages
suivants était inscrits sur ce bouton: «Cliquez ici» pour un groupe et «Vous êtes libre de
cliquez ici» pour le deuxième groupe (le même message était envoyé pour les participants
moldaves et pour les participants roumains). Un lien hypertexte était associé au bouton et
activait l’affichage du site conçu pour l’occasion. Ce site contenait une seule page et la
seconde partie de celui‑ci sollicitait aux étudiants à signer une pétition contre les violences.
Les étudiants étaient encouragés à signer cette pétition en inscrivant leur nom, prénom sur
un formulaire comprenant ces deux champs de saisie. Un bouton d’envoi permettait de
concrétiser cette decision. Après que les sujets aient reçu le mail, 72 heures leur étaient
laissées pour accéder au site et signer la pétition.
Résultats
Le comportement des sujets était mesuré à l’aide de deux variables dépendantes: 1) le nombre
de sujets qui ont cliqué sur le bouton d’accès au site après avoir reçu le e‑mail; 2) le nombre
des sujets ayant rempli et adressé le formulaire de pétition présent sur le site. Les résultats
obtenus sont présentés dans les tableaux 4 et 5.
Tableau 4. Taux de visites du site et de signature de la pétition dans les deux conditions
expérimentales (en Roumanie, n = 108)
VD
Taux des visites du site
Taux des signatures de la
pétition
Message sur le bouton
«Cliquez ici»
«Vous êtes libre de cliquer ici»
50%
72,2%
(27/54)
(39/54)
14,8%
35,9%
(4/27)
(14/39)
Tableau 5. Taux de visites du site et de signature de la pétition dans les deux conditions
expérimentales (en Moldavie, n = 114)
VD
Taux des visites du site
Taux des signatures de la
pétition
Message sur le bouton
«Cliquez ici»
«Vous êtes libre de cliquer ici»
29,8%
42,1%
(17/57)
(24/57)
17,6%
41,6%
(3/17)
(10/24)
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LUMINIŢA SAMSON‑SECRIERU
Envisageons tout d’abord les résultats obtenus en Roumanie. L’analyse statistique montre
un effet général du type de message utilisé sur le comportement des sujets roumains. Les
résultats (cf. tableau 4) montrent que le groupe «Vous êtes libre de cliquer ici» (72,2%)
présente un taux de visite statistiquement supérieur à celui du groupe «Cliquez ici» (50%),
(χ² = 5,61, p < 0,02). Cela confirme donc l’efficacité de l’évocation de la liberté sur le
comportement des sujets roumains. En ce qui concerne le taux de signatures de la pétition,
seul un effet tendanciel entre ces deux groupes est observé (35,9% vs 14,8%), (χ² = 3,58,
p < 0,10). Il semble que le message n’ait eu qu’un faible impact sur le comportement
ultérieur du sujet.
Les résultats présentés dans le tableau 5 pour les sujets moldaves, en ce qui concerne
le taux des visites du site, aucune différence significative entre les deux groupes
(χ² = 1,87, ns) et aussi aucune différence significative pour la deuxième variable dépendante:
taux des signatures de la pétition (χ² = 2,65, ns), même si les résultats vont dans le sens
attendu. Ces résultats montrent que la technique «vous êtes libre de…» est efficace seulement
en Roumanie.
Discussion et conclusion
Presque tantes les recherches sur les stratégies de soumission sans pression sont d’origine
nord‑américaine. On pouvait se demander si toutes ces techniques restent valides dans
d’autres contextes culturels. Nous avions supposé que la technique du «vous êtes libre de…»
serait efficace dans la deuxième étude que dans le contexte culturel individualiste, le cas
de la Roumanie. En effet, c’est dans ce type de contexte culturel que le sentiment de liberté
individuelle est davantage susceptible de constituer une aspiration majeure chez les individus.
A l’inverse, dans les cultures collectivistes où les individus sont davantage interdépendants,
le concept de liberté individuelle n’a que peu de valeur sociale, voire de sens, ce qui rend
la technique du «vous êtes libre de…» inefficace. C’est en tout cas ce que laisse penser le
résultat obtenu dans le pays collectiviste que nous avons observé, la Moldavie. Les résultats
ont montré que la moyenne du «vous êtes libre de…» obtenue en Roumanie est nettement
supérieure à celle obtenue au sein de la culture collectiviste (la Moldavie). Ces résultats
étaient attendus puisque les individus collectivistes sont moins facilement engageables et
moins sujets à la réactance que les individualistes. Or, nous avons vu dans la partie théorique
que les théories de l’engagement et de la réactance psychologiques sont invoquées pour
expliquer les effets de la technique du «vous êtes libre de…».
Si l’on admet que les sociétés individualistes sont caractérisées par une plus grande
liberté individuelle, il est à noter que c’est dans le pays classé comme un pays libre
(Roumanie) par la Freedom House que la technique du «vous êtes libre de…» a été efficace.
The Influence of the Cultural Dimension Individualism‑Collectivity
on the Submission without Pressure
Abstract: The first study of the given article presents the results of a comparison of cultural dimensions
Individualism‑Collectivity (IND/COL) in Romania and Moldova. IND/COL were assessed with the
Individualism‑Collectivity questionnaire, created by Triandis (1995). The questionnaire – consisting
of 32 items, 16 of which evaluate the IND scale and 16 evaluate the COL scale – was distributed
L’INFLUENCE DE LA DIMENSION CULTURELLE INDIVIDUALISME‑COLLECTIVISME...
65
among 342 students: 181 students from Romania and 161 students from the Republic of Moldova.
The results demonstrate that Romanian students proved to be more individualistic than those from
Moldova. In the second study of the article we have compared the effectiveness of a technique of
“submission without pressure” in a culture which is considered to be collectivistic and in a culture
considered to be individualistic. The analyses proved that the technique appears effective only within
the individualistic culture (Romania).
Key words: cultural context, individualism‑collectivity, presentation
Influenţa dimensiunii culturale individualism‑colectivism
asupra supunerii fără presiune
Rezumat: Primul studiu al acestui articol prezintă rezultatele comparării dimensiunii culturale
individualism‑colectivism (IND/COL) în România şi Moldova. IND/ COL a fost evaluat cu chestio­
narul Individualism‑Colectivism creat de Triandis (1995). Chestionarul – compus din 32 de itemi,
16 evaluând scala IND şi 16 evaluând scala COL – a fost administrat unui număr de 342 de studenţi:
181 din România şi 161 din Republica Moldova. Rezultatele demonstrează că studenţii români s‑au
arătat mai individualişti decât studenţii moldoveni. În al doilea studiu al acestui articol, am comparat
eficacitatea unei tehnici de supunere fără presiune într‑o cultură considerată colectivistă (Moldova)
şi într‑o cultură considerată individualistă (România). Analizele au arătat că tehnica este eficace
doar în contextul cultural individualist (România).
Cuvinte‑cheie: context cultural, individualism‑colectivism, supunere
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Cristian Tileagă1
Public Apologia, Moral Transgression
and Degradation Ceremonies
Abstract: This paper discusses some socio‑psychological aspects of reconciliation with the recent
communist past in Eastern Europe using the example of a public apologia of a Romanian public
intellectual on his alleged collaboration with the Securitate, the former communist secret police.
The paper argues that public apologia for wrongdoing displays a double dynamic of degradation:
personal and institutional. It is argued that public apologia serves a two‑fold function: on the one
hand, it is an attempt to manage a personal “spoiled” identity and provides the grounds for
atonement. On the other hand, it is an attempt to (re)write biography by elucidating the influence
of the wider social context relevant to identity transformation. By drawing on sociological work on
degradation ceremonies and discourse analysis in social psychology, the paper shows how public
apologia can be understood as a social product and discursive accomplishment.
Key words: biography, degradation ceremonies, discursive psychology, communist past, public
apologia, reconciliation, moral transgression
Apologia
Public apologia coming from politicians, public figures, etc. is the quintessentially speech
act in political life (cf. Abadi, 1990). As I have shown elsewhere (Tileagă, in press), contem­
porary researchers of apologia are interested more in its felicitous aspects (Simons, 2000;
Kampf, 2009) or its role as image restoration strategies (Benoit, 1995) than in its situated
discursive organization. For instance, speech‑act theorists are interested in the structural
features of apologies and their felicity conditions. According to Lakoff (2001), in order to
be felicitous, apologies “require at least the appearance of contrition” (p. 203, italics in
original). For Simons, apologists face “dilemmas of pragmatic nature” (2000, p. 442).
Simons analyzes the Clinton apology of 1998 and concludes that the “force” and impact
of political apologia come from sounding like a genuine apology. The apologist needs to
make the most of the “rhetorical situation” in order to manage successfully a “spoiled”
personal and political identity. Other researchers treat apologia as a complex of image
restoration strategies (Benoit, 1995). They are interested in the effectiveness of certain
image restoration strategies (for instance, denial). For image restoration theorists such as
Benoit, “it is time to focus more on offering suggestions concerning when to use certain
1. Discourse and Rhetoric Group, Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, UK.
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image restoration strategies” (1995, p. 29). For both speech‑act and image restoration
theorists one needs to understand first and foremost “what works, when, under what
circumstances”. The most common assumption of apologia is that what lies behind it is a
strategic motivation to save face. Apologia brings into the foreground the cultural norm of
remedial work on social relationships through language (Owen, 1983). Apologies can
manage threats to face (Goffman, 1971), restore or protect one’s reputation (Benoit, 1995)
or reconstruct moral relations (Walker, 2006).
Public apologia can always be constructed by commentators as serving some ulterior,
strategic motive of image restoration or reparation. One can always find problems with
issues such as insufficient remorse, less penitent discourse, self‑serving rhetoric. But saving
face, image restoration or reparation are not the sole motivations that explain how public
apologia is structured to accomplish social actions: displaying regret, mitigating guilt,
making amends, and so on. It can be argued that this perspective on apologia downplays
the idea that apologia is also an exercise of managing moral self‑assessment that presupposes
entering into a dialogical relationship of mutual orientation to “what it means to be moral”,
“what it means to say sorry”, and so on. Public apologia, either as expression of a guilty
conscience or an attempt to save face, is first and foremost a discursive performance. Apologia
is a social activity, part and parcel of a performative discursive order. As Meier has cogently
put it, apologia provides an “especially apt object of study for exploring the relationship
between underlying cultural assumptions and linguistic behavior” (1998, p. 227).
Apologia displaces the (confessional) self into the “social”, opening a public space of
judgment. The problem is less whether apologies are felicitous or not, whether they are
composed of effective image restoration strategies, but what they do, what they accomplish
in a space of public visibility. The simplest way of approaching public apologia is to consider
it as some attempt at self‑defense. That is, incidentally, the cultural meaning of apologia
we get from Plato’s Apology. As such, apologia is a species of argumentative discourse.
As Potter (1996) suggested, every piece of argumentative discourse necessarily can be
described in terms of “offensive” (critical) rhetorical aspects in so far as it explicitly or
implicitly seeks to undermine rival versions of events, and “defensive” (justificatory) aspects
in so far as speakers attempt to “inoculate” their accounts from attack by rivals. One can
go even further and argue that apologia is more than a special case of offensive and defensive
rhetoric. What also counts is the rhetorical trajectory of accounts. When you apologize you
start something – you start a rhetorical chain of explicit and implicit meanings, presuppositions,
implications. Rhetorical claims can support, qualify or undermine earlier claims. Attack
or defense can be rhetorically tailored to respond to cultural demands related to atonement,
regret, morality, and so on.
Apologia is not a self‑sufficient speech act; it opens a dialogical relation between
apologist and “public”. Research has shown that public apologies are not “accepted” in the
same way as personal apologies are (those in face‑to‑face conversation, for instance, see
Robinson, 2004). For instance, in her analysis of perpetrators of extreme violence, Payne
has shown how “paradoxically, the act of confession [and apology] makes perpetrators seem
less, not more, trustworthy: that they could commit atrocity casts doubt on the earnestness
of their subsequent remorse. Perpetrators only rarely craft the kind of remorseful confessions
that convince audiences of their sincerity” (2008, p. 56). Apologia places a psychological
and moral “burden” on both producer and recipient/audience (Lakoff, 2001). One needs
to be able to analyze how this psychological and moral “burden” is managed, especially
by apologists but also by audiences. We usually tend to assume that there is a “public” out
there that is easily identifiable, that demands an apologia, that passes a judgment, and who
PUBLIC APOLOGIA, MORAL TRANSGRESSION AND DEGRADATION CEREMONIES
69
is coherent in its stance of indignation directed at alleged wrongdoing. It is usually assumed
that the “public” embodies a unitary and coherent moral vision of society that informs
decisions of who is (or not) decent or respectable (Goode, 2004). Yet, the moral vision of
society is not unitary, as it can include different moral visions, can be quite diverse,
heterogeneous, and including a variety of morality stances, on a continuum from absolutist
to relativist stances (Tileagă, 2012).
Moral transgression and degradation ceremonies
Public apologia is in most cases the consequence of moral transgression. Indignation,
outrage, disgust, disbelief are just some reactions to moral transgression. Moral indignation is
perhaps the strongest of reactions. Moral indignation is expressed through public denunciation
(Garfinkel, 1956, p. 421). Public denunciation brings with it various forms of identity
degradation and transformation (see for instance, the McCarthy era in the United States or
Stasi informers in East Germany). Once denounced, an individual’s identity is transformed,
degraded. He or she has to justify the self to others.
The same applies to what one might call self‑denunciations, self‑confessions of wrongdoing.
In this context it is perhaps more beneficial to conceive of public apologia as an identity
demotion or self‑degradation ceremony (cf. Garfinkel, 1956). The atonement rituals of
politicians and public figures create a very specific form of moral justice based on the
degradation of one’s self in front of others, a form of identity management whose consequences
are sometimes very hard to predict. The chosen method of self‑degradation can have different
effects on successful spoiled identity management and successful reintegration, reconstruction
of moral relations. In the context of coming to terms with the past in Eastern Europe, I am
concerned with how public apologia as self‑degradation ceremony constructs the subjectivity
of the apologist and how it can offer a different perspective on social remembering not in
terms of retrieval and storage, and generally, “representation” of the past, but rather as
social practice that facilitates the creation of subjectivities, of different perspectives on the
sources of self and context. As this paper will hopefully show, subjectivities are created
and “spoiled” identities are managed by recounting different versions of the past through
the mediation of other selves, material traces, narratives (cf. Brown, 2012).
What Garfinkel (1956) referred to as “degradation ceremonies” are exercises of identity
management. Garfinkel insists mostly on the formal aspects of degradation ceremonies in
settings such as courts of law, or the army. Formal settings are sanctioned by a set of strict
rules – behaviour is judged against objective, organizationally relevant and ratified standards
of behaviour. When describing degradation ceremonies, Garfinkel describes a process from
which there is no escape, no loophole. It is a process that follows the formal sequence:
disapproval > degradation > exclusion. The process of formal degradation insists upon
fitting an identity of “total” deviance with a single, coherent set of motives, into a black
and white scheme of things. As Erikson argues, degradation ceremonies “are almost
irreversible” (1962, p. 311). You cannot go back to what you were. If you have been found
to transgress the rules of an institutional community you will be demoted by that institution
to a lesser species of identity or excluded. What happens when you extend the notion of
degradation ceremonies to the public sphere? What happens when you have to deal with
what one might call self‑degradation?
The essence of a self‑degradation ceremony is: I call upon you (the audience) to bear
witness that I am not what I appear! To degrade someone is to declare that person “no
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longer one of us” (this can take the form of exclusion or demotion). Self‑degradation
involves self‑demotion. In the public sphere, degradation is not posited on some hierarchical
structure (like in the case of military, courts of law), but rather is linked to the contingency
of the public sphere, where different opinions can be held and ideological dilemmas exist
(Billig, 1991). Demoting someone in the military can seem uncontroversial. Usually “one
is found guilty” and brought to face the others (his/her peers). What happens when one
finds himself/herself guilty? What happens when the apologist willingly diminishes his
own community status?
The paper argues that public apologia as self‑demotion, self‑degradation ceremony opens
and takes into account “multiple interpretations of responsibility” (Braithwaite & Mugford,
1994, p. 146). I contend that public apologia (especially that related to alleged collaboration
with the Securitate) can be considered a special case of self‑degradation. In the context of
alleged collaboration with the secret police, the apologist declares himself to be a certain
sort of degraded person (a “snitch”, an “informer”). The broader question is how is
self‑degradation accomplished? Self‑degradation is akin to an auto‑ethnography where the
“ethnographic exemplar” (Gergen & Gergen, 2002) is the “self”. Taking oneself as an
“ethnographic exemplar” is a way to ensure that a deviant, morally transgressive, identity
“does not become a master status trait that overwhelms other identities” (Braithwaite &
Mugford, 1994, p. 142). As the analysis will show, auto‑ethnography cannot be accomplished
without relying on a documentary version of reality (Smith, 1990; Prior, 2004). The self
is bound by the formal archive of the Securitate and by Securitate’s work as professional
degrader, as producer and user of “technologies of self” for control, oppression and
manipulation, and surveillance of individuals. Such technologies of self have created diverse
“moral careers”, to use Goffman’s term, for various individuals (both those directly
participating to the system and those suffering the consequences of its implementation).
The Securitate as a “total” institution
The Securitate can be likened to a structure whose role is primordially to “degrade”, that
is, to transform, constitute and reconstitute identities and biographies. As Garfinkel suggested,
it is usually “organizational variables” that will “determine the effectiveness of a program
of degradation tactics” (p. 420). The foremost degradation tactic of the Securitate was to
ensure that no one was what he or she appeared to be! The essence of Securitate’s work
was to transform an individual’s self‑identity and replacing it with a range of “new” identities
(from the apparatus of surveillance to the on‑the‑ground operatives or informal collaborators).
Its method of “degradation” relied on an organizational ethic and pragmatics that constituted
identities through the mediation of the Securitate “file”. The Securitate’s degradation work
was directed towards transforming an individual’s identity into an identity lower in the
relevant group’s scheme of social types. Securitate’s degradation work created moral
categories. One of them is that of the “informer”, the “snitch”1. “Informer” is a moral
category that derives from a whole array of practices, ways of apportioning responsibilities,
surveillance and reporting activities, etc. The Securitate, as a “total” (Goffman) or “complete”
1. Depending on the socio‑communicative context in which it is used, in actual social usage or as an
institutional label, the category “informer” can sometimes have a vague or a very definite meaning,
and can be applied to people loosely or strictly.
PUBLIC APOLOGIA, MORAL TRANSGRESSION AND DEGRADATION CEREMONIES
71
(Foucault)1 institution, was a world cut off from the rest, with its own rules, responsibilities,
and serving the interests of social oppression and the ruling communist order. Its “totality”
comes from subordinating individual subjectivities, needs, actions, and motivations to state
bureaucratic and social control. The “total” institution of the Securitate functioned as a
perverse social arrangement that personified a rational plan of social control that exercises
power over all the spheres of an individual’s life – private and public life, sexuality, wishes,
desires, motives, and so on.
As a “total” institution serving the interests of a totalitarian social and political order,
the Securitate reproduced itself as a control system of creating subjectivities and identities
for whoever was located in its documents (regardless whether you were an informer, or
informed on). The Securitate created an “archontic infrastructure”2 (Middleton & Brown,
2005), where categories of knowledge, memory and practice, but also individual biographical
“durations” became collected, stored, in the name of an oppressive ruling, institutional/
state order (Smith, 1999). The Securitate’s operational archive (files, documents, guidelines,
orders, etc.) was such an archontic infrastructure. The “archon” (the Securitate) charged
with the safekeeping of the archive constructed an authoritative version of reality that not
only controlled, but also transformed the self‑definition of whoever was indexed in the
archive. Individuals were irretrievably attached and defined by this archontic structure.
Any contemporary attempt at (re)writing or re‑claiming biography from under the sway
of the Securitate is required to take into account this structure (and its internal mechanism).
Personal recollections, self‑disclosures, stand in a sine qua non relation to an intricate
“network of mediated activities” (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 147) around state control
and surveillance. The Securitate archive is not simply a support to remembering biographical
details, but mediates a complex rhetoric of identity and memory. The individual can place
the Securitate’s documentary reality within “biographical” time, and use it as a resource
to fill biographical “gaps” and manage a “spoiled” identity. At the same time, the individual
is placed by the Securitate’s documentary reality within a semiotic sequence of surveillance
practices and organizationally accomplished sense of identity.
Historians and social scientists have demonstrated cogently how an analysis of Securitate’s
documents can reveal the inner workings of the Securitate (see for instance, Albu, 2008).
They could demonstrate how Securitate’s central authority was subordinated to the state
and party’s authority. They could show the ways in which the Securitate served the goals
of “total” control and “total” incarnation of the guiding values of the socialist project. They
could expose its ultimate goal: to produce disciplined and docile selves that would serve
the reproduction of the communist social, political and ideological order. Although important
in its own right, historical and documentary analysis focuses less on identity transformation
itself, on how people are transformed once they are located, mentioned, in the Securitate
“file” or descriptions accompanying documents. Identity transformation is a process linked
to personal identity, memory, biography and an organizational accomplishment of accounta­
bility (see Tileagă, 2011). The public apologist is engaged in a process of understanding the
social mechanism and social arrangements that have led to its identity transformation.
1. On the notion of “total institutions” see Goffman (1961). On “complete” institutions see Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish. For “degradation” linked to institutions, and on the humiliating organization,
see Smith (2002).
2. By archontic infrastructure I mean the use of formal classifications, and standards, and other
“technical” ways of capturing subjectivities (cf. Middleton and Brown, 2005).
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Public apologia and self‑degradation
The example discussed here is that of a public apologia of a Romanian public intellectual
on his alleged collaboration with the Securitate in an open letter sent to a national newspaper.
The letter is divided by the writer into two parts: the “Essence” and the “Existence”. The
letter is described by the newspaper as a “harrowing document”. It is placed under “Current
affairs” (“Actualitate”) with the gist prefaced by the author’s name: “Am turnat la Securitate”
(“I was an informer for the Securitate”). The letter (and apologia contained in it) is
suggestive of an identity transformation (see Tileagă, 2009b for a discursive analysis of the
“Essence”). From the outset the writer declares himself to be a certain sort of degraded
person, a person of a lower identity in the relevant group’s scheme of social types – an
“informer”, a “snitch”. As I have mentioned previously, in formal terms, degradation
presupposes a process of demotion in terms of grade, rank, or status. It also entails
undergoing certain stages or imposition of certain degrading postures. In Goffman’s terms,
a person’s self is “mortified” by the dispossession of the person from previously held roles,
dispossession of the person of cherished possessions, forcing the adoption of stances
inconsistent with one’s notion of self, degrading postures or deference stances, exposure
to humiliating circumstances, restrictions imposed on self‑determination and autonomy. The
subsequent examples taken from the “Existence” show how similar concerns can be applied
to issues of self‑mortification, self‑degradation in public apologia.
In extract 1 one can see the writer engaged in an effort of “de‑certifying” moral
transgression by placing it within a self‑reflexive stance that turns the self into an “object”
of public and self‑scrutiny. Notice the use of rhetorical questions that follow the opening
sentence to frame the issue as one of genuine moral concern (on the use of rhetorical
questions in discourse see Ilie, 1999). The questions are presented as genuine moral
questions with a predictable psychological answer: “the stigma of duplicity”1.
[1] The 1980‑1982 phase of my collaboration with the Securitate was for me one of intense
moral crisis… How did I live through that period? How is that period inscribed in my memory?
With the stigma of duplicity. Nonetheless, as I have shown, I contend that I did not ultimately,
in the last analysis, betrayed my friends and acquaintances.
The rhetorical questions act as premises to a morality stance. The “stigma of duplicity”
indexes a self‑degradation move whereby, as Goffman argued, the writer can “split” himself
into two parts, “the part that is guilty of an offence and the part that disassociates itself
from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule” (1971, p. 113). The use of the
psychological term “stigma” signals how duplicity was experienced: as degradation of self,
as symbolic identity “mark” that one cannot “shed”, “get rid of”. “Duplicity” has the effect
of lowering self‑identity on the group’s morality scheme. Yet duplicity does not tell the
whole story. The writer creates a symbolic pecking order of degradation, and is careful to
distance himself from the lowest and despicable position on the group’s morality scheme:
“betraying your friends and acquaintances”.
Depicting the writer as trying to “save face” would be too simple an explanation. What
one notices instead is an intricate justificatory scaffolding that includes moral self‑assessment
1. The writer seems to assume that the implied addressee knows what it means to experience an
“intense moral crisis”.
PUBLIC APOLOGIA, MORAL TRANSGRESSION AND DEGRADATION CEREMONIES
73
and management of moral identity. In extract 2 the writer justifies his “silence” by pointing
to an implicit paradox: the paradox of “freedom”. In order for a moral identity to be uphold,
silence needs to be explained. The prolonged silence is construed as an opportunity to
postpone the recognition of an undignified identity. Not confessing, not disclosing the details
of a tarnished past, means breaking free of a subjectivity “regimented” by the bureaucratic
and archontic infrastructure of the Securitate. Paradoxically, it is not confession that liberates
the person, but silence. The writer can be seen as symbolically opposing the degradation
work of the Securitate, one that restricts an individual’s autonomy and freedom of action.
He points to a paradoxical situation where freedom is not actually “freedom” as everyone
knew or experienced it.
[2] if I haven’t talked about these things not even after 1989, when my life wasn’t threatened
by the “system”, it is because I wanted to be free for a while and to build myself a new life
before the past would catch up with me. In this way I have gained a biography… a free biography
for the first time, although, until today, sabotaged from the inside, and from today in the public
space, by my silence. Anyway, all those who have had to hide anything serious from others will
understand what I mean.
Implicitly, the writer points to the degrading power of the Securitate. Recounting and
reclaiming his biography are conducted under the aegis and degrading authority of the
Securitate. The writer finds himself in the position of having to “curtail” his own self and
expresses a feeling of being “trapped” in the situation created by his own disclosure. He is
reflexively aware that he lacks the freedom to defend himself, or the freedom he had before the
disclosure. Rhetorically, the writer inoculates himself against being seen as having concealed
the truth from some ulterior motive. He describes concealment as forced concealment rather
than stemming from some hidden motivation. A “new life” and “free biography” are
constrained both by inner resolutions as well external constraints.
In extract 3 one can see how the stance from extract 2 is further explicated through an
account that testifies to losing one’s capacity to present a genuine self, image to others,
due to “passage” through the institution of the Securitate.
[3] I hated the Securitate, the whole party‑state and all its followers, with a double hate: for
what they were doing to the country, and for what they were doing to me, from the privations
that we were all suffering to the pressure that made me lower myself to the undignified condition
of a snitch. All that remains is that all those who will judge me harshly not believing what I
have to say in my defense – the defense of a person who recognizes his guilt – to take nonetheless
into account all my life.
The reference to “hate” places the confession in the realm of a psychological and
emotional relation to personal history. Hate is a psychological term for denoting an extreme
emotional position, in this case describing a “total” ethical positioning. As Edwards (1999)
noted emotion terms can be used to bolster a subjective view/position and support the
factuality and plausibility of narrative accounts. The writer provides a basis for his relationship
with the Securitate by placing it inside a strong subjective emotional stance. Hate is not an
emotional stance from without; it needs to be justified through reference to self and the
collective (“the country”), which are the two sides of the same coin. In another self‑reflexive
move the degradation operated by the Securitate and its “pressure” mechanisms is recognized
as identity degradation to a lower condition, the “undignified condition of a snitch”.
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What is interesting here is how the writer constructs his self‑identity as the (inevitable)
outcome of past and present subject positions and social practices (Wetherell, 2007). A
variety of social practices (including especially those of the Securitate) have the power to
demote the person to a transgressive, “undignified” category – the informer, the snitch. He
describes and enacts a “deference stance” to the Securitate’s power of degradation. It is
this deference stance which mortifies the self and forces it into an undignified posture. The
indignity that the Securitate has placed upon himself is complemented by the indignity that
he must suffer now, opening the self to the public, facing friends and acquaintances, and
the wider public.
The account ends with an implicit appeal to impartiality and thoroughness; to a type
of judgment that includes the whole scope of biographical details (“all my life”). The
emphasis is on “all”, as an indication of a total commitment to fair judgment. It is implied
that only a comprehensive judgment can counter or oppose the identity degradation by
status – or institu­tional “contamination”. Considering biography as a whole, and taking into
account the formal degradation process of the Securitate is seen as the basis of a fair and
moral judgment.
The writer can flexibly bring into play the “objective” and “subjective” features that
are relevant to the trajectory of his account as showing genuine atonement. Public apologia
involves a ratio of degradation as well as reintegrative meanings/orientations. Among the
“subjective” features (see extract 4) are direct expressions of remorse (“I always felt
culpable”, “I feel guilty today”) and recognition of the “sin” (“having lied to them through
omission”). “Objective” features are linked to the loss of individual control over personal
information, information and knowledge on (and of) the self, that is violated and relinquished
to the formal archive (see extract 5).
[4] I always felt culpable, it was very difficult to see eye to eye with my friends. And I don’t
know whether I would ever be able to do it. I feel guilty today, as I did then, mostly for having
lied to them through omission.
[5] Only the re‑finding of my Securitate dossiers (or theirs) from that time will bring a little
emotional balance. Until then, only penitence and persistence in a sentiment of culpability is
left for me, one that I had always experienced towards them.
The loss of an individual’s control over personal and biographical evidence compels the
writer into a deference stance to the “archontic” power of the Securitate. This is a context
where self‑assessment and self‑defense is almost impossible. By virtue of being indexed in
the Securitate’s dossiers, he is continually exposed to status‑contamination (until otherwise
proven, he is a “snitch”, he is like the other despicable “informers”). The lack of evidence
stemming from the Securitate archive denies the writer the right to defend himself and
distinguish himself from others. Social actors display and put together their own “truth‑finding
engine” (Lynch & Bogen, 1996). The writer’s method goes through the Securitate archive.
Self‑degradation is placed in the context of the “success” of the institutional degradation
ceremony (that of the Securitate) and the perverse effect of the Securitate’s transformation
of identity.
Displaying atonement does not absolve him, but rather places him in a paradoxical
situation. He can affirm his side of the story, but he cannot fully defend it. Apologia is
usually accompanied by a “plea for closure”, yet the writer is unable to close the hermeneutic
circle opened by the “archive”. Knowledge (as yet undisclosed) of a person’s deeds has the
power to demote the person to a lower moral type (Garfinkel, 1956) and “keep” it there.
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Concluding comments
In all the examples presented here, one can see the writer engaged in a struggle against an
imputation of a deviant moral essence. Reflexively, accounts are framed as a self‑dialogue
or self‑interrogation. The writer is the “interrogator” who is trying to get himself to make
admissions about his own past and biography. The writer dramatizes, he “stages” the story
of his own self‑degradation. The moral of the story is that passage through institutions (like
the Securitate) can have both dramatic and subtle effects. These effects continue, perniciously,
even long after the institutions lost their active force as manipulators of subjectivities. As
professional degrader, the Securitate can extend its reach even after it ceased to fulfill its
function as a control and disciplinary mechanism of an authoritarian state.
As a consequence, the writer’s moral self‑portrait (and associated moral implications)
is unfinished. Deviance, transgression, guilt, though expressed and justified, are paradoxically
undecidable. Individual memory needs to be complemented by organizational memory;
individual subjectivity, experiential biography needs to be complemented by “subjectivity”
as a product of organizational processing. Organizational memory is potentially available
there to confirm, use, erase, or deny the identity degradation “record”, to promote a different
version of identity, one that may bring absolution. The personal (personal biography, personal
identity) and the institutional web of the Securitate are not separate dimensions of social
life but rather stand in a complex relationship. The perverse effect of the Securitate’s
degradation of identity is complemented by a move of self‑degradation and attempt at
reintegration (when the confessor/apologist faces the public). What I referred to as a process
of (re)writing biography (see Tileagă, 2011) is not simply a process of re‑claiming identity
from under the control of the Securitate archive. (Re)writing biography is mediated by a
double dynamic of degradation. Any public moral judgment or social scientific analysis has
to be sensitive to this double dynamic of degradation.
This has implications for how we study identity, especially when focusing on social
practices of reconciliation with the recent communist past. Public apologia is a social
practice whose effect is to constitute a “psychology, formulate a mental life” (Wetherell,
2007, p. 668) and a distinctive identity for the apologist. It is sometimes too easily forgotten
that public apologia is a performance, ritual, ceremony, which opens a space for “dignified
restoration of the harm resulting from wrongdoing” (Braithwaite, 2000, p. 129). The
repentance rituals of politicians and public figures create a very specific form of restorative
justice (Braithwaite, 1999) where the apology is the necessary (and sometimes, sufficient)
condition for successful degradation and successful reintegration. Analyses of public
apologies tend to focus less on their restorative properties and ways of discursively managing
moral identity and moral accountability (Tileagă, 2009b; 2011).
Analyzing apologia as a social product and discursive accomplishment, researchers can
also draw attention to the various sources of subjectivity and identity. Identity can be sourced
from the inside, the outcome of a self‑reflexive exercise (the narratives people tell about
themselves reflect on their own selves), as well as from the outside (the way individuals or
groups are situated by other people’s stories or institutions of social regulation and control).
Individuals are involved in the construction of “usable” pasts (Wertsch, 2007) which rely
on constructing some version of “usable” identities – acceptable to self and others. The
interplay between inside and outside sources or constraints on identity construction can
help us understand the vagaries, ambivalences of personal and social positioning, the
difficulties and ambiguities of personal and social memory in Eastern Europe.
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CRISTIAN TILEAGĂ
The process of degradation (personal and institutional) discussed in this paper can be
seen as encompassing both inside and outside sources of identity construction. Social actors
can use degradation, in its various forms, as a moral resource for re‑thinking personal and
social identities. In order to do so, social actors need to engage with a textually mediated reality
(Lynch, 1999; Tileagă, 2011). In the context of public apologia for wrongdoing, individual
self‑degradation is the creative practice that provides the possibility of resisting the “archontic
power” (Derrida, 1997) and the institutional degradation operated by the communist state and
its secret police. Social actors’ own identity demotion, their thoughts, personal recollections
or material archives act as “memory devices” (Featherstone, 2006) and identity sources,
means of resisting or opposing the “success” of past institutional degradation.
Apologia publică, transgresiunea
şi ceremoniile de degradare
Rezumat: Acest articol se opreşte asupra câtorva aspecte psihosociale ale reconcilierii cu trecutul
recent în Europa de Est aplecându‑se asupra unei apologii publice a unui intelectual public român
pe tema colaborării sale prezumtive cu Securitatea, fosta poliţie secretă comunistă. Articolul
sugerează că apologia publică pentru greşelile făcute în trecut ia forma unei dinamici duble de
degradare: personală şi instituţională. Apologia publică indeplineşte două funcţii: pe de o parte, e o
încercare de a „negocia” o identitate personală „pătată”. Astfel, oferă justificarea necesară răscumpărării
păcatului. Pe de altă parte, e o încercare de (re)scriere a biografiei prin elucidarea influenţei şi
rolului contextului social mai larg relevant al transformării identitare. Folosindu‑se de rezultate ale
cercetărilor sociologice asupra ceremoniilor de degradare şi analiza discursului în psihologia socială,
articolul arată cum apologia publică poate fi înţeleasă ca produs social şi realizare discursivă.
Cuvinte‑cheie: biografie, ceremonii de degradare, psihologie discursivă, trecut comunist, apologie
publică, reconcliere, transgresiune morală
Excuses publiques, trangression morale
et cérémonies de dégradation
Résumé: Cet article présente certains aspects psychosociaux de la réconciliation avec le passé
récent dans l’Europe de l’Est en s’appuyant sur une apologie publique d’un intellectuel publique
roumain sur le thème de sa collaboration présomptive avec la Securitate, l’ancienne police secrète
communiste. L’article suggère que l’apologie publique pour fautes commises dans le passé prend
la forme d’une double dynamique de degradation: personnelle et institutionelle. L’apologie publique
a deux fonctions: d’une part, est une tentative de «négocier» une identité personnelle «tachée».
Ainsi, elle offre la justification nécessaire pour la réparation du péché. D’autre part, est une tentative
de réécrire la biographie en élucidant l’influence et le rôle du contexte social plus large lié à la
transformation identitaire. L’article souligne l’apport des recherches sociologiques sur les cérémonies
de dégradation et l’analyse du discours en psychologie sociale comme moyens de comprendre
l’apologie publique comme produit social et accomplissement discursif.
Mots‑clés: biographie, cérémonies de dégradation, psychologie discursive, passé communiste,
apologie publique, reconciliation, transgression morale
PUBLIC APOLOGIA, MORAL TRANSGRESSION AND DEGRADATION CEREMONIES
77
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Inès Skandrani‑Marzouki1
Effet de la valence positive vs négative de l’étiquetage
fonctionnel vs social sur le travail universitaire collectif
Résumé: Plusieurs travaux ont montré l’efficacité de la procédure d’étiquetage lorsque celui‑ci est
en rapport avec le comportement cible (e.g., Strenta et Dejong, 1981). Par ailleurs, des travaux ont
montré que cette efficacité est plus importante d’une part lorsque l’étiquetage est positif que négatif
(e.g., Goldman, Seever et Seever, 1982; Kraut, 1973), et d’autre part lorsqu’il porte sur une valeur
sociale plutôt que fonctionnelle (e.g., Fointiat, Caillaud et Martinie, 2004). L’objectif de ce travail
consiste à examiner l’impact que peut avoir le type d’étiquetage (fonctionnel vs social) sur la perfor­
mance des étudiants en situation de classe naturelle tout en faisant varier la valence (positive vs
négative) dans la formulation verbale de cet étiquetage. Les participants étaient aléatoirement regroupés
en petits groupes de 4 étudiants. L’expérience comprend 6 conditions expérimentales 1. étiquetage
fonctionnel positif («Je pense que vous êtes les plus efficaces: en répondant ainsi/en choisissant
cette façon de faire/de répondre/d’analyser…»), 2. étiquetage fonctionnel négatif («vous êtes les
moins efficaces...»), 3. étiquetage fonctionnel simple («vous êtes efficaces...»), 4. étiquetage social
positif («vous êtes bien meilleurs…), 5. étiquetage social négatif («vous n’êtes pas les meilleurs…»),
6. étiquetage social simple («vous les meilleurs...») et la condition contrôle: aucun étiquetage. Les
variables dépendantes sont les taux de participation et de bonnes réponses. Les résultats attestent
de l’efficacité de l’étiquetage fonctionnel positif aussi bien pour le taux de participation que pour
les bonnes réponses. Les implications théoriques et pratiques de ces résultats sont discutées.
Mots‑clés: communication engageante, étiquetage fonctionnel/valeur, travail collectif
Introduction
Les recherches en psychologie sociale montrent qu’il est possible d’influencer les convictions,
les choix, ou même les actes d’autrui, sans avoir à recourir à la persuasion. Les procédures
de «soumission librement consentie» (pour synthèse voir Joule et Beauvois, 1998, 2002;
Girandola, 2003; Guéguen, 2004; Cialdini, 2004), permettent d’augmenter la probabilité
de voir quelqu’un faire de lui‑même ce qu’on attend de lui et qui consiste à renvoyer à
l’individu une information sur sa valeur ou sur son comportement. Par exemple, afin
d’amener une personne à aider un inconnu à transporter un bagage lourd le message verbal
«vous êtes serviable» est censé activer en lui la caractéristique de serviabilité qui est
susceptible d’augmenter les chances à ce que cette personne donne un coup de main à cet
1. Laboratoire de psychologie sociale (EA 849), Aix‑Marseille Université. Correspondances: Inès
Skandrani‑Marzouki, [email protected], 29 avenue R. Schuman, 13621, Aix‑en‑Provence,
cedex 1, tel: +33 (0)786338210.
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INÈS SKANDRANI‑MARZOUKI
inconnu. La congruence entre l’attribut activé chez la personne et le comportement cible
explique ces effets d’attribution. En effet, cette technique consiste à favoriser chez les sujets
des attributions internes liées à l’attitude ou au comportement ultérieur attendu. Dans leur
expérience princeps, Miller, Brickman et Bolen (1975, expérience 1) sont parvenus, au
terme d’une leçon sur l’ordre et la propreté, à amener des élèves à ne pas jeter des papiers
de bonbons sur le sol, en recourant à un simple étiquetage. Ces mêmes chercheurs (Miller
et al., 1975, expérience 2) ont obtenu des résultats similaires en matière de performance
scolaire (résultats obtenus à des exercices de mathématique).
Cet effet d’étiquetage a été répliqué avec succès par les mêmes auteurs dans une situation
d’apprentissage scolaire qui avait pour objectif l’amélioration des performances des écoliers
en mathématiques. En appliquant la même procédure d’étiquetage que dans leur première
expérience, Miller et al. (1975, expérience 2) ont placé les enfants dans trois conditions
expérimentales distinctes sur une période de 8 jours consécutifs. Les enseignants ont fait
des déclarations sur la capacité des élèves en mathématiques: ces déclarations incluaient
des expressions telles que: «Il faut vraiment travailler très dur en maths» (la condition
d’attribution), «Vous devez être bons en maths» (la condition de persuasion), et une troisième
condition (de renforcement) dans laquelle les enseignants répétaient à plusieurs reprises
aux enfants qu’ils sont fiers de leur performance en mathématiques. Les résultats ont montré
que le meilleur rendement (score en mathématiques) a été obtenu par les élèves de la
condition d’attribution et que les élèves de la condition de renforcement avaient une meilleure
performance que les élèves de la condition de persuasion.
Des recherches ultérieures ont montré l’efficacité de la procédure d’étiquetage lorsque
celui‑ci est en rapport avec le comportement visé (Batson, Coke, Chard, Smith et Talaferro,
1979; Strenta et Dejong, 1981; Guéguen, 2001). Beauvois a conduit en 2002 une expérience
dont l’objectif consistait à amener des enfants à accepter de se faire une piqûre par une
infirmière. Un groupe a été étiqueté de façon interne («Je vois que tu es un enfant courageux.
Tu sais ce que ça veut dire courageux»), l’autre groupe a été étiqueté de façon externe («Je
vois que tu comprends que les adultes savent ce qui est bon pour les enfants») et un troisième
groupe qui n’a pas eu d’étiquetage. Les résultats ont montré que les élèves les plus nombreux
à accepter de se faire piquer étaient ceux du premier groupe (étiquetage interne), suivi des
élèves du groupe d’étiquetage externe, suivi du groupe sans étiquetage. En effet, cet
étiquetage interne qui porte sur un trait de personnalité socialement désirable et qui a été
attribué aux élèves («Tu es courageux»), a permis aux élèves d’acquérir une norme sociale,
la norme d’internalité (Dubois, 1994) cette norme qui permet à la personne de voir la cause
de ce qu’il fait et de ce qui lui arrive (cf. Joule et Beauvois, 2002).
Beaucoup de travaux ont montré que la technique d’étiquetage est plus efficace quand
elle porte sur une valeur sociale plutôt que fonctionnelle (Joule, Tamboni et Tafani, 2000;
Fointiat, 2006; Fointiat, Caillaud et Martinie, 2004). Avec l’étiquetage fonctionnel, il s’agit
de centrer l’individu sur l’efficacité de son comportement, par exemple: rendre service
versus ne pas rendre service. Alors qu’avec l’étiquetage social, il s’agit de donner à l’individu
une information quant à sa propre valeur sociale, par exemple: serviable versus non
serviable (Fointiat et al., 2004).
C’est autour de cette distinction théorique et empirique que s’articule la problématique
de ce travail. En effet, nous avons pris comme point d’ancrage la recherche réalisée par
Fointiat et al. en 2004 qui s’inscrit dans la continuité d’une expérience de Joule et al.
(2000). Ces premiers auteurs ont réalisé une expérience dont le but consiste à aider une
jeune femme égarée (complice) dans un jardin public et munie d’un plan de la ville de
Poitiers. Cette femme s’adressait aux personnes assises seules afin qu’on lui indique la
EFFET DE LA VALENCE POSITIVE VS NÉGATIVE DE L’ÉTIQUETAGE FONCTIONNEL...
81
direction d’un des plus fameux monuments de la ville. Fointiat et al. (2004) ont manipulé
deux types d’étiquetage associés à la procédure du pied‑dans‑la‑porte (PDLP). Le principe
de base de cette technique consiste à formuler une requête peu coûteuse dans un premier
temps suivie d’une demande cible plus coûteuse. Dans l’expérience princeps de Freedman
et Fraser (1966), les sujets (des ménagères) ont été contactés par téléphone. On leur a
demandé de répondre à 8 questions concernant l’utilisation de produits ménagers. Quelques
jours plus tard l’expérimentateur formule une deuxième demande – requête plus coûteuse
qui concerne le comportement cible – qui consiste à accepter la venue de 5‑6 hommes afin
d’inventorier dans la maison tous les produits ménagers.
Dans l’expérience de Fointiat et al. (2004), le premier type d’étiquetage a permis de
donner une information sur la valeur propre de l’individu en renvoyant un étiquetage social
à son propre comportement: «merci, vous êtes serviable». Le deuxième est plutôt un étiquetage
fonctionnel du comportement: «merci, vous m’avez bien indiqué le chemin sur le plan»,
qui met l’accent sur l’efficacité du comportement préparatoire (obtenir du sujet qu’il renseigne
le complice en lui indiquant la bonne direction). Dans la condition contrôle, il n’y a pas
d’interaction entre l’expérimentateur et le sujet. Ces auteurs ont pu montrer que l’étiquetage
social améliorait la procédure de PDLP, alors que l’étiquetage fonctionnel l’entravait.
La dimension qui nous intéresse de près dans ce type de contexte expérimental est la
valence de l’étiquetage. Kraut (1973) a déjà démontré cet effet de l’étiquetage positif versus
négatif dans une expérience où les ménagères étiquetées comme «généreuses» donnèrent
plus que celles du groupe témoin ou celles étiquetées comme «pingres». La plupart des travaux
ont rendu compte d’un effet plus important de l’étiquetage positif par rapport à l’étiquetage
négatif (e.g., Goldman, Seever et Seever, 1982) où les sujets étiquetés positi­vement (par
activation du trait: serviable) réalisent plus le comportement attendu – par exemple
participer à un téléthon en assurant pendant deux heures le standard téléphonique – que ceux
étiquetés négativement (par activation du trait: non serviable).
Skandrani‑Marzouki, Marzouki, Marchand et Joule (2012) ont proposé récemment une
procédure modifiée de la technique d’étiquetage social qu’ils ont utilisé comme outil péda­
gogique. Les participants de leur étude sont des étudiants du premier cycle de psychologie
qu’ils ont rassemblés en petits groupes de travail (des binômes) afin d’effectuer un exercice
de lecture de texte en situation de classe habituelle. Contrairement à la procédure standard
qui se base sur un étiquetage formulé individuellement, Skandrani‑Marzouki et al. (2012)
ont étiqueté des binômes d’individus avant de commencer l’exercice. Une autre originalité
de leur étude a consisté à manipuler de façon indirecte la formulation de l’étiquetage qu’ils
ont qualifié de tournure verbale de l’étiquetage. Chaque binôme a reçu oralement une
formulation verbale de l’étiquetage soit positive, soit négative. Les binômes du groupe
témoin n’ont reçu aucun étiquetage. Dans la 1ère condition expérimentale (étiquetage à
tournure positive), l’enseignant s’adressait à certains binômes en spécifiant «je pense que
vous pouvez faire une bonne synthèse et une bonne présentation orale si…». Dans la 2ème
condition expérimentale (étiquetage à tournure négative) l’enseignant s’adressait à d’autres
binômes en spécifiant «je pense que vous pouvez éviter une mauvaise synthèse et une
mauvaise présentation orale si…». Enfin dans la condition contrôle, l’enseignant ne formulait
aucun étiquetage aux participants.
La performance des binômes a été mesurée sur la base d’une grille d’évaluation
spécialement conçue pour l’expérience et qui regroupait les quatre variables dépendantes
suivantes: 1. qualité de synthèse, 2. compréhension, 3. participation et 4. réponses correctes.
Les résultats ont révélé un effet robuste de la «tournure d’étiquetage» sur les performances
avec des scores nettement meilleurs pour les binômes de la condition d’étiquetage à tournure
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INÈS SKANDRANI‑MARZOUKI
positive par rapport aux binômes de la condition négative. Les résultats indiquent également
que l’étiquetage à tournure négative a un effet néfaste sur les performances quand on
compare les dyades témoins avec les binômes de la condition d’étiquetage à tournure positive.
Cette étude vient généraliser les résultats princeps de Miller et al. (1975) pour le cas des
groupes et avec une formulation modifiée (i.e., indirecte) de l’étiquetage.
Pour notre part, et dans la suite logique des deux travaux clés présentés plus haut (Fointiat
et al., 2004; Skandrani‑Marzouki et al., 2012), nous nous sommes intéressés à l’impact
d’un étiquetage fonctionnel positif vs négatif et l’étiquetage social positif vs négatif sur la
qualité d’un travail universitaire réalisé en groupe. Tout en partant d’un contexte éducationnel
naturel (plus précisément un travail dirigé en classe), nous avons constaté que les informations
qui sont renvoyées à un étudiant ne relèvent pas toujours d’une dimension de valeur sociale
à savoir vous êtes intelligent ou pas, vous êtes le meilleur ou pas... mais peuvent aussi
concerner la fonctionnalité de son comportement. En d’autres termes, a‑t‑il bien fait ce
qu’on attend de lui? est‑il efficace en réalisant ce comportement? etc.
Etude
L’objectif principal de notre travail a consisté à favoriser la participation des étudiants et à
stimuler leur performance. La question centrale était: «Dans quelle mesure la manipulation
du type d’étiquetage (social vs fonctionnel) interagit avec la valence verbale de l’étiquetage
(tournure positive vs tournure négative) pour expliquer les comportements ultérieurs des
étudiants dans un contexte naturel d’apprentissage (i.e., situation de classe)»? L’examen
de cette question s’est fait sur deux niveaux d’une part sur a) le taux de participation qui est
censé refléter une mesure immédiate (on‑line) de la participation active des étudiants récoltée
directement pendant le déroulement de l’expérience et d’autre part sur b) le taux de bonnes
réponses qui est censé refléter une mesure de l’exactitude de la réponse indépendamment
de leur volonté des sujets à participer en classe. L’analyse de ces deux critères permet de
nous fournir plus d’indicateurs comportementaux de la performance.
Hypothèses
Nous formulons à cet égard les hypothèses suivantes:
– Au vu des résultats trouvés par Goldman et al. (1982) et Skandrani‑Marzouki et al.
(2012), on s’attend à ce que la valence positive aura un impact plus important sur le
taux de participation et sur le taux de bonnes réponses comparée à la valence négative
et ceci indépendamment du type d’étiquetage manipulé (social ou fonctionnel).
– Les travaux cités ont montré que l’étiquetage social est plus efficace que l’étiquetage
fonctionnel. Par ailleurs, Skandrani‑Marzouki et al. (2012) ont montré un fort avantage
de la tournure positive de l’étiquetage. On s’attend à une forte interaction entre le type
(social vs fonctionnel) et la valence de l’étiquetage (tournure positive vs tournure
négative). Autrement, l’étiquetage fonctionnel n’aura pas les mêmes effets sur la
performance des étudiants que l’étiquetage social compte tenu du niveau de la valence
manipulée.
EFFET DE LA VALENCE POSITIVE VS NÉGATIVE DE L’ÉTIQUETAGE FONCTIONNEL...
83
Méthode
Plan expérimental
Il s’agit d’un plan mixte avec comme:
– facteur inter‑sujets: le type d’étiquetage à deux modalités (fonctionnel vs social):
– facteur intra‑sujets: la valence de l’étiquetage à trois modalités (positive vs négative vs
simple)
Les variables dépendantes sont: le taux de participations et le taux de bonnes réponses.
Le groupe contrôle est une condition hors‑plan.
Participants
28 étudiants de psychologie (5 garçons, M = 22 ans) à Aix‑Marseille Université ont pris
part à l’étude. L’effectif des participants (N = 28) n’est pas déterminant du N utilisé dans
la génération des degrés de liberté (ddl) des tests statistiques utilisés, ces derniers étant
calculés sur N = 93 pour la première VD et sur N = 62 (le nombre total de bonnes réponses)
pour la deuxième VD.
Procédure
a) Le contexte: lors d’une séance de deux heures de travaux dirigés (TD) pour des étudiants
en Licence 3 de psychologie d’une durée de deux heures, l’enseignant a pris le rôle de
l’expérimentateur en les assignant à différentes conditions expérimentales par une simple
manipulation verbale de l’étiquetage tel que décrit dans le Tableau 1. L’exercice à réaliser
par les étudiants consiste à répondre à des questions relatives à un article sur l’amorçage
subliminal en psychologie sociale expérimentale. Les consignes sont présentées comme
un exercice habituel réalisé souvent lors des séances de TD. Un exemple de questions
posées est: «Quelles sont les variables manipulées par les auteurs?». Les étudiants
sont supposés répondre en se référant au texte tantdis que l’expérimentateur repère des
mots‑clés en rapport avec la bonne réponse (par exemple: «le type de mots‑amorces
présentés») sur une grille d’évaluation. Cette dernière permet aussi de comptabiliser le
nombre de participations en fonction de chaque condition expérimentale décrite dans le
Tableau 1. Les étudiants ne savent pas qu’ils sont testés expérimentalement.
b) Le déroulement de l’expérience: les participants étaient aléatoirement regroupés en
petits groupes de 4 personnes. Les groupes sont disposés de telle façon qu’ils ne peuvent
pas entendre l’étiquetage de l’enseignant adressé pour chaque groupe. Mais les questions
sur lesquelles les sujets doivent travailler et donner une réponse sont posées en même
temps et à haute voix pour tout le monde. L’expérience comprend six conditions
expérimentales et une condition contrôle tel que décrit dans le Tableau 1.
Tableau 1. Liste des différents conditions expérimentales en fonction du type
d’étiquetage verbal émis par l’expérimentateur
Conditions
1. étiquetage fonctionnel positif
la formulation verbale de l’étiquetage
Je pense que vous êtes bien efficaces: en répondant ainsi/en
choisissant cette façon de faire… 2. étiquetage fonctionnel négatif Je pense que vous êtes les moins efficaces: en répondant
ainsi/en choisissant cette façon de faire…
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INÈS SKANDRANI‑MARZOUKI
3. étiquetage fonctionnel simple Je pense que vous êtes efficaces: en répondant ainsi/en
choisissant cette façon de faire…
4. étiquetage social positif
Je pense que vous êtes bien les meilleurs en répondant ainsi/
en choisissant cette façon de faire… 5. étiquetage social négatif
Je pense que vous n’êtes pas les meilleurs: en répondant
ainsi/en choisissant cette façon de faire…
6. étiquetage social simple
Je pense que vous êtes les meilleurs: en répondant ainsi/en
choisissant cette façon de faire…
7. condition contrôle
Pas de formulation verbale
Résultats
Taux de participation:
Figure 1. Répartition du nombre de participation en fonction du type
et de la valence de d’étiquetage
Le nombre total de participations recensées est N = 93. Le test de khi‑deux d’indépendance
a montré qu’il existe une forte relation entre la Valence dans la formulation verbale de
l’étiquetage et le Type d’étiquetage, χ2(2, N = 93) = 13,5, p < 0,0005. La Figure 1 montre
qu’à l’inverse de la condition d’étiquetage de valeur, celle de l’étiquetage fonctionnel ne
fait émerger aucune participation de la part des sujets exposés à la formulation verbale
négative de l’étiquetage. Les analyses statistiques ont montré qu’il y a une supériorité de
la valence positive (89% des réponses) sur la simple (19%) en présence d’un étiquetage
fonctionnel, χ2(1, N = 42) = 7,0, p < 0,001. En présence d’un étiquetage social, il n’y
a pas d’effet de la valence sur la performance des sujets (23,5% pour négative vs 51,0%
pour positive vs 25,5% simple, tous les ps > 0,1).
EFFET DE LA VALENCE POSITIVE VS NÉGATIVE DE L’ÉTIQUETAGE FONCTIONNEL...
85
Les bonnes réponses:
Le nombre total de bonnes réponses recensées est N = 62. Contrairement au taux de
participation, la Valence dans la formulation verbale de l’étiquetage n’a pas d’effet sur le
Type d’étiquetage, χ2(2, N = 62) = 5,3, p = 0,07. Aucune bonne réponse n’a été observée
dans la condition d’étiquetage fonctionnel en présence de formulations verbales négatives.
La supériorité de la valence positive a été aussi observée pour l’étiquetage fonctionnelle,
χ2(1, N = 28) = 6,9, p < 0,05. Dans la condition d’étiquetage social, il y a des différences
significatives entre la condition positive (70,6 %) et négative (8,8 %), χ2(1, N = 34) = 4,7,
p < 0,05 mais pas entre la condition positive et simple (20,5 %), χ2(1, N = 34) = 2,5,
p > 0,1 (voir Figure 2).
Figure 2. Répartition des bonnes réponses en fonction du type
et de la valence de d’étiquetage
Discussion
L’objectif de ce travail consistait à examiner l’impact que peut avoir le type d’étiquetage
(fonctionnel vs social) sur la performance des étudiants en situation de classe naturelle tout en
faisant varier la valence (positive vs négative) dans la formulation verbale de cet étiquetage.
Les résultats attestent, à travers cette expérience, de l’efficacité de l’étiquetage positif. En
effet, les sujets étaient plus performants aussi bien pour le taux de participations que pour le
nombre de bonnes réponses. L’efficacité de l’étiquetage positif a été déjà constaté dans les
travaux de Goldman et al. (1982), Kraut (1973) et tout récemment de Skandrani­‑Marzouki
et al. (2012).
Deux interprétations sont envisageables dans l’explication de cet effet massif de la
valence positive. D’une part à l’aide de la norme d’internalité (Dubois, 1994). En effet,
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INÈS SKANDRANI‑MARZOUKI
selon certains auteurs l’efficacité de l’étiquetage est attribuable à une interaction complexe
entre des facteurs intrinsèques et extrinsèques qui s’appuient sur un mécanisme d’auto‑perception
(Bem, 1972). Ce dernier est censé favoriser l’attribution des inférences internes en renvoyant
à une personne son/ses traits de personnalité ou des valeurs. Il n’est pas exclu que nos
participants s’auto‑attribuent les formulations verbales positives de l’expérimentateur (i.e.,
enseignant) selon une certaine norme sociale (e.g., Joule et Beauvois, 2002) leur permettant
de mieux percevoir la finalité du contexte immédiat de l’étiquetage: réussir l’exercice
académique.
D’autre part, il y a l’hypothèse de l’auto‑perception qui permet aussi d’interpréter ces
résultats. Pour Miller et al. (1975), la perception de soi peut être affectée par les informations
qu’une personne peut recevoir. L’expérience de Strenta et Dejong (1981) a montré la
plausibilité d’une telle explication à travers un étiquetage véhiculé électroniquement par
ordinateur. Pour un groupe on stipulait la générosité des sujets (étiquetage pro‑social). Pour
un autre groupe on stipulait l’intelligence des sujets (étiquetage de compétence). L’étiquette
«généreux» a amené les sujets à aider davantage un compère que les sujets étiquetés par
«intelligents». L’étiquetage pro‑social a mieux fonctionné par rapport au comportement
attendu (l’aide d’autrui), où le sujet qualifié de «généreux» s’est auto‑attribué ce trait comme
une caractéristique de sa personnalité et a fini par aider la personne en besoin (voir aussi
Kraut, 1973; Steel, 1975).
Ces différentes expériences ont révélé la force du lien entre l’étiquetage et la caractéristique
personnologique attribuée (Joule et Beauvois, 2002). Aussi bien dans notre expérience que
celle de Skandrani‑Marzouki et al. (2012), les résultats ont montré que pour activer la
qualité de la performance attendue, l’auto‑attribution des sujets s’avère plus congruente
avec l’étiquetage à valence positive que négative ou sans valence, et que le sujet s’engage
activement dans la tâche afin d’agir en cohérence avec la caractéristique positive attribuée
et/ou véhiculée par la formulation verbale de l’étiquetage.
Nos résultats montrent aussi que l’étiquetage fonctionnel ne fait apparaître aucune
participation (voir Figure 1) et aucune bonne réponse (voir Figure 2) chez les participants
qui ont reçu une formulation verbale négative de l’étiquetage. Ceci prouve la grande
sensibilité de cette forme d’étiquetage à la manipulation de la valence. Par contre, et malgré
un taux relativement faible de réponses, l’étiquetage social résiste mieux à une formulation
dont la valence est négative ce qui peut suggérer que la dimension auto‑attributive est moins
sollicitée dans cette forme d’étiquetage.
En conclusion, l’émergence dans la littérature d’une première forme de distinction entre
étiquetage fonctionnel vs social a été confirmée et revisitée dans notre travail. En effet,
nous sommes allées plus loin dans l’investigation de cette distinction en montrant que la
valence positive vs négative associée à chacune des deux formes d’étiquetage faisait
apparaître une réponse comportementale différenciée. La nature de l’interaction entre ces
types d’étiquetage et la formulation verbale qui leur est associée semble s’articuler autour
de l’auto‑perception. Il est possible que cette dimension soit plus prégnante dans le cas de
l’étiquetage fonctionnel que social. Il s’agit ici d’une hypothèse qui mérite d’être testée de
manière systématique dans les travaux futurs. De façon plus opérationnelle, la mesure de
l’auto‑certitude, par exemple, à l’aide de la Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck, Baruch,
Balter, Steer et Warman, 2004) peut apporter une information supplémentaire aux résultats
issus de notre paradigme et de mieux les confronter à cette hypothèse d’auto‑perception.
EFFET DE LA VALENCE POSITIVE VS NÉGATIVE DE L’ÉTIQUETAGE FONCTIONNEL...
87
The Effect of Positive vs Negative and Social vs
Functional Labeling on Academic Teamwork
Abstract: Several studies have shown the effectiveness of the labeling procedure when it is related
to the target behavior (e.g., Strenta & Dejong, 1981). Subsequent studies have shown that this
efficiency is more important when the labeling is positive rather than negative (e.g., Goldman,
Seever, & Seever, 1982; Kraut, 1973), and when it concerns a social value rather than a functional
value (e.g., Fointiat, Caillaud, & Martinie, 2004). The aim of the present study is to examine the
potential impact of the type of labeling (functional vs social) on students’ performance in a natural
classroom setting while manipulating its valence (positive vs negative) using different verbal
formulations. Participants were randomly assigned to small groups of four students each. The
experience includes six experimental conditions, as follows: 1. positive functional labeling (“I think
that you are the most effective by answering/by choosing this approach/by responding/analyzing...”,
2. negative functional labeling (“you are the less effective...”), 3. simple functional labeling (“you
are efficient...”), 4. positive social labeling (“you are much better...”), 5. negative social labeling
(“you are not the best...”), 6. simple social labeling (“you are the best...”) and the control condition:
no labeling. The dependent variables are the participation rate and the number of correct answers. The
results showed the effectiveness of the functional positive labeling on the participation rate and the
number of correct answers. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.
Key words: binding communication, social labeling, teamwork
Références
Batson, D., Coke, J., Chard, F., Smith, D. et Talaferro, A. (1979). Generality of the “glow of
good‑will”: Effects of mood on helping and information acquisition. Social Psychology
Quaterly, 42, 176‑179.
Beck, A.T., Baruch, E., Balter, J.M., Steer, R.A. et Warman, D.M. (2004). A new instrument for
measuring insight: the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale. Schizophrenia Research, 68, 319‑329.
Bem, D.J. (1972). Self‑perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (vol. 6, pp. 1‑62). New York: Academic Press.
Cialdini, R. (2004). Influence et manipulation. Paris: First.
Fointiat, V. (2006). “You’re helpful” versus “that’s clear”. Social versus functional label in the
foot‑in‑the‑door paradigm. Social Behavior and Personality, 34, 461‑466.
Fointiat, V., Caillaud, J. et Martinie, A.M. (2004). Etiquetage social versus étiquetage fonctionnel:
quels effets sur le pied‑dans‑la‑porte avec demande implicite?. Revue Européenne de
Psychologie Appliquée, 54 (4).
Freedman, J. et Fraser, S. (1966). Compliance without pressure: The foot‑in‑the‑door technique.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 195‑202.
Girandola, F. (2003). Psychologie de la persuasion et de l’engagement. Besançon: Presses Universi­
taires de Franche‑Comté.
Goldman, M., Seever, M. et Seever, M. (1982). Social labelling and the foot‑in‑the‑door effect.
Journal of Social Psychology, 117, 19‑23.
Guéguen, N. (2004). Psychologie de la manipulation et de la soumission. Dunod.
Joule, R.‑V. et Beauvois, J.‑L. (1998). La soumission librement consentie. Paris: Presses Universi­
taires de France.
Joule, R.‑V. et Beauvois, J.‑L. (2002). Petit traité de manipulation à l’usage des honnêtes gens.
Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.
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Joule, R.‑V., Tamboni, F. et Tafani, E. (2000). Le pied‑dans‑la‑porte avec étiquetage: une nouvelle
procédure de soumission librement consentie?. In Communication orale au 3ème congrès
international de psychologie sociale en langue française, Valencia (Espagne), 19‑21 septembre.
Kraut, R. (1973). Effects of social labeling on giving to charity. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 9, 551‑562.
Miller, R.L., Brickman, P. et Bolen, D. (1975). Attribution versus persuasion as a means for
modifying behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 430‑441.
Skandrani‑Marzouki, I., Marzouki, Y., Marchand, M. et Joule, R.‑V. (2012). The coupled effects
of functional labeling and approach vs avoidance‑oriented statements on dyadic academic
performance. North American Journal of Psychology, 14, 549‑562.
Strenta A. et Dejong W. (1981). Effects of a prosocial label on helping behavior. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 44, 142‑147.
Camelia Soponaru1, Andreea‑Oana Petriciac2
Existential Meaning and Religious Orientation
in Adulthood
Abstract: By using qualitative and quantitative research methods, this study investigates, on the
one hand the meaning and the sources of meaning in life and, on the other hand, the influence of
religious orientation, the sources of meaning profile, and the gender of the subjects regarding the
meaning of life in adulthood. In order to achieve the first target we carried out our study on a
number of 150 adult subjects by applying the free association method (to write down the first
5 words that come into their mind when they hear “meaning of life” and “sources of meaning”).
The most important images for the meaning in life are connected to the religious perspective
(salvation) and the folk traditional one (meaning is life itself), as for the sources of the meaning in
live, these ranged in the private circle. For the second study, the general hypothesis (the religious
orientation, the sources of meaning profile and the gender of the subjects influence the meaning of
life in adulthood) has been partially proven. The meaning of life in adulthood differs according to
the religious orientations and the gender of the subjects. The results, both the qualitative analysis
and the statistic ones, generally confirm the clinical importance of meaning in laying out one’s life.
Key words: meaning in life, meaning sources, religious orientation, adulthood
Religion and existential meaning are two major problems of the contemporary society
because, without any fundamental values, mankind cannot exist. Furthermore, in a post‑commu­
nist Romania, researching the religious phenomenon and the meaning in life is of utmost
importance. In the East, and in Romania particularly, religion and the religious studies were
restricted, even banned, only atheism and “the fight against the religious obscurity” being
supported. After the fall of the communism regime, the revenge came – people fervently
discovered an universe denied to them which enabled them to widen their existential
perception. The new religious opening offered not only a reflexive frame but also answered
and gave solutions to their problems. As a result, the religious phenomenon scores in this
last decade a major interest among all age categories and professions, and especially with
the young generation which began to shift more and more towards religious studies.
The purpose of this paper is to review the modalities of analyzing the religious orientation
and the meaning in life by summing up a whole range of theories and psychological patterns
alongside a research of the connection between the existential meaning and the religious
orientation in adulthood. This type of analysis is an alternative to the religious, philosophical,
1. “Al.I. Cuza” University, Iaşi.
2. Psychologist, “Salvaţi Copiii”, Suceava.
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CAMELIA SOPONARU, ANDREEA‑OANA PETRICIAC
anthropological and social ones. This paper discusses a unique field in which the number of
research articles is constantly growing but, at the same time, a border area influenced by multiple
theoretical influences. The human personality is analysed taking into consideration the
family and the social influence combined with the impact of the moral and religious values.
The range of personal interpretations and meanings is thoroughly analyzed, thus making
the problem of the existential meaning at all levels a vital element for the therapeutic success.
During the past years the traditional medical approach has changed its perspective,
nowadays religion being considered a possible healing tool based on the idea that the patient’s
history also includes a spiritual background (Debats, 1996; Day & Rottinghaus, 2003;
Gelso & Woodhouse, 2003). The interest in religion as an important part of the individual
identity is constantly growing and developing a constructive relationship with the medical
and behavioural science; a real psychotherapeutic approach needs to go beyond the clinical
frame and the etiopathogenetic mechanisms.
The existential meaning – theoretical base and empirical studies
The problem of finding the meaning represented a challenge for the representatives of
philosophy, theology and literature but lacked any important position in the mass psychology
(Debats, 1998). Due to the their “vague” and “unlimited” theoretical nature, the empirical
approaches encounter difficulties in dealing with this concept (Debats, 1998). Measuring
the variability of meaning in life meets obstacles, including pragmatic ones, like the
subjective measuring experiences. Such barriers derive from the inevitable problems of
trying to quantify and refer to the spiritual problems of a person, such experiences being
unique and subjective (Schulenberg, 2003).
In the last decades the psychological implications of the individual meaning have been
recognized, both in common and in grieving situations (Yalom, 1980; Janoff‑Bulman, 1992).
There has been noticed a certain preoccupation to descriptively investigate the concept in
different life situations: psychogerontology (Dittmann‑Kohli, 1994), psychotherapy (Debats,
1990), religion (der Lans, 1990), person‑centred therapy (der Kalmthout, 1994). Traditionally,
the concept of meaning in life was considered a part of a network including other different
concepts like: fulfilment and self‑updating (Maslow, 1962); engagement and responsibility
(Yalom, 1980), feeling of coherency (Antonovsky, 1979), self‑transcedency (Frankl, 1963),
and feeling of fulfilment (Weiskopf‑Joelson, 1968).
Battista (1973) deals with the concept of meaning in life as having two major components
as a starting point, which also include previous dimensions: a frame component representing
the degree to which an individual considers life as unfolding itself within the limits of a
general perspective and the fulfilment component suggesting the degree to which a person
considers himself fulfilled. By doing a meta‑analysis of the different theories regarding the
meaning of life, Battista and Almond (1973) discovered that there are four main concepts
about the meaning in life which are common to every theoretical approach. These may be
described as follows: the subjects claim that their lives have a meaning, this implying they
are positively engaged into concepts circumscribing the meaning in life; they have a set of
different goals in life; they see themselves as having these goals fulfilled or being in a
process of doing so and living this experience with a deep feeling of awareness.
The research of the concept of existential meaning suggests that it affects a person’s
health (Drost & Hansen, 1995), stress resistance (Chamberlain & Zika, 1988) and his/her
satisfaction in life (King & Napa, 1998). On the other hand, a lack of meaning in life may
EXISTENTIAL MEANING AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN ADULTHOOD
91
cause negative effects, including nervous breakdowns (Westgate, 1996). According to
Westgate (1996) a low level of the existential meaning correlates with a high level of
depression. Debats (1996) suggested that the lack of meaning may convey to depression or
to a deep desire of the person to hurt himself/herself. The existential meaning, boredom
and depression are strongly and significantly correlated (Weinstein & Cleanthous, 1995).
Newcomb and Harlow (1986) demonstrated that the loss of control and the lack of
meaning favours the relationship between stress and drug consumption. Harlow and Bentler
(1986) suggest that the lack of meaning is a mediator for depression and avoiding any
responsibility as well as for drug consumption in women. The drug‑addicted persons, as
compared to the non‑addicted ones, have a less evolved concept of meaning (Kaplan & Downing,
1986). Research pointed out that the lack of meaning goes hand in hand with a destructive
behaviour and, respectively, with the abuse of drugs. Vann A. Smith performed a study on
students noticing that 85% of them said life had no meaning although 93% of them were
in a perfectly healthy state, they were actively engaged in social life obtaining excellent
academic results and had a very good relationship with their families; 60 of the students
that took part in the study and who had tried to commit suicide had no psycho‑physical or
socio‑economical reasons at all to do that (Frankl, 2008). As far as alcoholism was
concerned, 90% of the subjects suffered from an extreme feeling of lack of meaning
(Forstmeyer, 1968). At the same time, criminality and the meaning in life are in a reverse
relationship (Crumbaugh, 1972, in Frankl, 2008).
Some psychologists have discussed the importance of the existential meaning on such
variabilities as: general health (Day & Rottinghaus, 2003), psychotherapy (Gelso & Woodhouse,
2003), psychology of health (Harris & Thoresen, 2003), career counselling (Savickas, 2003).
According to Debats (1996) there is a relationship between the existential meaning and
the psychological health, the personal meaning being positively linked to the psychological
welfare scoring high rates. Some researchers talked about the existential meaning as a
constitutive element or an element of manifesting the personal welfare while others referred
to it as an antecedent of the welfare status (Savolaine & Granello, 2002). Melton and
Schulenberg (2008) showed that the meaning in life is positively related to a stability of the
state of mind and of the social behaviour. It was considered as important the clear distinction
between the search for meaning and the search for happiness, yet underlining the bond
between meaning and happiness (Debats, 1990). It was also introduced the concept of
existential meaning within an organised structure, the meaning at the working place
becoming a main factor of engagement. The persons who find a meaning at their working
place are more satisfied and willing to make sustained efforts (Sparks & Schenk, 2001).
Chamberlain (1996) examined the sources of meaning of different persons, considering
their private experiences. The participants spoke about the following sources of meaning:
relationship with people, creativity, personal development, relationship with nature, religion
and spirituality, society and politics (O’Connor & Chamberlain, 1996).
The existential meaning is considered a positive resource; from a psychosocial point of view
it promotes health in the societies undergoing radical political and economical changes
(Rethelyi & Rahe, 2005). It was demonstrated that the personal meaning is important not only
for personal survival but also for health and a good physical and mental welfare (Wong & Fry,
1998). Finding the meaning in life leads to a higher level of self‑efficiency, coping centred
on problems, religiosity and social support (Reker & Wong, 1987). The capacity of giving
a meaning to life as well as establishing goals and targets proved to be constant indicators
of the welfare in all aspects of life, from adolescence to maturity (King & Napa, 1998).
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CAMELIA SOPONARU, ANDREEA‑OANA PETRICIAC
The persons who can find a meaning in their life’s experiences, like a terminal illness
(Hamera & Shontz, 1978), cancer (Lichtman & Wood, 1984), AIDS (Schwartzberg, 1993),
the loss of a child (Friedman & Hamburg, 1964), being the victim of an incest (Boon &
Stones, 1983), are more capable of dealing with such negative aspects of life than those
unable to find a meaning. The meaning in life seems to be more important for those who
are confronted with inevitable social and physical losses. Only an inner religious orientation
may provide a meaning of life and death. Many studies show a positive relationship between
the inner orientation and the fear of death and an insignificant association between the outer
religious orientation and the anxiety concerning death (Rhorson & Powell, 1990). Persons
with an inner religious orientation have less fear of death and they rarely avoid to think of
it because they believe in a reward for their religious behaviour in the afterlife (Hood &
Morris, 1983). The inner religious orientation correlates positively with the acceptance of
death (Wong, Reker & Gesser, 1994).
The existential meaning – Frankl’s outlook
Among the limited number of theories addressing the problem of the meaning in life, there
are those of Frankl (1976), Mas (1971) and Yalom (1980). Frankl agrees that the fundamental
motivation of a person is finding a meaning and it is presented as opposed to the will for
pleasure (Freud) and the will for power (Adler). Life has a meaning in all its circumstances,
even in those implying an intense and inevitable suffering (Frankl, 1990; Lukas & Hirsch,
2002). The real challenge is finding that singular meaning. Life does not offer a meaning
in itself but the possibility of deciding individually what is important (Lukas & Hirsch,
2002). Similarly, Crumbaugh (1971) says that the main motivation resides in finding a goal
for the personal experience thus making each individual different from the other.
The logotherapy derives from the Greek word “logos”, involving several key principles
(Frankl, 1976). Firstly, life can always be meaningful, even in extremely difficult situations.
Secondly, the main human motivation is to live in order to find a meaning in life. Thirdly,
people can always search and find a meaning in their experiences and activities.
Frankl (1976) conceived the meaning in life as being a process of discovery in an inner
significant world. His theory says that the meaning is not invented and can be found only
outside the person through personal research. Frankl defined meaning as a manifestation
of values centred on creativity, experience and attitude. Finding the meaning always implies
taking decisions. The author talks about three ways of finding the meaning in life: doing
something, creating a work of art – creative values, experiencing goodness, beauty, truth
or knowing somebody – experimental values, behaving well in spite of all adversities –
attitude values. The creative values inspire the individuals to produce, create and reach
their ideals. The experimental values include positive human experiences such as love and
appreciation. The attitude values make the person choose its side when facing inevitable
negative situations.
Most of these theories and therapeutic interventions were developed in order to create
a feeling of meaning and purpose in life. The logotherapy is meant for the persons looking
for the meaning in life, making easier the recognition of the authentic goal, beyond any
social rules and obligations. According to V. Frankl, tradition, religion and social structures
gave meaning to life, clarifying the direction, the target and also the modalities of achieving
these. Due to the fact that such structures partly eroded themselves, people should assume
the responsibility to look for their true significance, avoiding thus an existential void.
EXISTENTIAL MEANING AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN ADULTHOOD
93
Apparently, nowadays, the problem of the meaning of life represents a threat for many
persons. People are more willing to discuss intimate matters rather than problems like the
meaning in life (Freedman, 1978).
Frankl (1974) alongside Crumbaugh (1972), Lukas (2002), Smith (2001) and Young
proved that finding and fulfilling the meaning are not in a direct connection with age, gender,
level of knowledge or religious orientation, stating that a person can overpass his/her own
biological and social circumstances and reach a certain level of spirituality which allows
him/her to create the meaning in life.
Theoretical considerations regarding
the concept of religious orientation
The religious orientation refers to the modality in which a person lives its own religious
convictions and values (Batson & Ventis, 1982). The concept of religious orientation was
defined for the first time by Allport (1967), being consequently developed by other
researchers which offered a pertinent frame for understanding religion. Allport and Ross
(1959; Allport & Ross, 1967) proposed two main religious orientations: the inner and the
outer, which are highly used nowadays. In Allport’s point of view, these orientations
represent the extremities of the same continuum. More recent research confirmed that these
two orientations are in fact two distinct dimensions, motivating that there are four religious
orientations: the inner, the outer, the pro‑religious and the anti‑religious (Hood, 1978;
Thompson, 1974). The inner religiosity identifies religion as a purpose in itself. These
persons follow the religious belief for its own sake. For an inner religious person, his/her
strong personal convictions are everything that matters while the social aspects of the religion
are of no consequence. This type of persons are engaged in manifesting their religious
believes and values in a manner close to self‑sacrifice (McFarland & Warren, 1992;
Gorsuch, 1994). For such a person, the religious motivation is the core of his/her existence.
The persons having an outer religious orientation may use religion as an instrument to
achieve non‑religious goals (Nielsen, 1995). For the persons having an outer religious
orientation, the reasons to justify their religiosity are social or external values. In other
studies, this orientation was defined as exploiting the practical aspects of religion in order
to get comfort and prestige (Hunt & King, 1971) and describes the persons that pursue these
self‑concerned targets and use religion in order to gain social approval (Hunsberger, 1999).
This type of outer religiosity is a less mature orientation compared to the inner one
(Hunsberger, 1999). In order to enlarge these two types of religiosity, Batson and his
associates developed a third religious type, the Quest which is a more mature and flexible
orientation compared to the previous two. The persons having a Quest orientation are ready to
experience religious doubts, confronting them in a mature and self‑critical manner (Batson &
Schoenrade, 1991; McFarland & Warren, 1992).
The religious orientation is linked to the psychological health and welfare. Thus, the inner
religiosity leads to low levels of depression (Genia & Shaw, 1991) and has been positively
linked to an optimal mental health, with the lack of feelings like worries and guilt (Batson &
Ventis, 1982) while the outer religious orientation links with depression (McFarland & Warren,
1992). Furthermore, it was noticed that the persons having an inner religiosity have a more
spiritual approach to any sort of negative life experiences (Pargament et al., 1992).
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The religious orientation – empirical studies in clinical practice
The religious practice and beliefs become good clinic and therapeutic indicators, meaning
that the treatment and the prognostication could be influenced by the religious profile. The
spiritual and religious domains are associated with different degrees of personal adaptation
as demonstrated by many cases which deal with the significant relationships between spiri­
tually and religious functioning and finding the meaning in life (Clark, 1958), maintaining
the feeling of hope and optimism (Sethi & Seligman, 1983), the confrontation with life’s
difficulties (Pargament, 1997). Religiosity influences the different behavioural patterns
having an impact upon one’s health, for example, the drug consumption and the dietary
regime (Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 2003). Cheong and Nagoshi (1998) say that the persons
having an inner religious orientation have a better control over their dietary behaviour.
Some research was made in order to see how the level of the religious functioning may
be affected by a psychic disorder. Kroll and Sheehan (1989) noticed that, within the adult
population, the hospitalized patients suffering from psychic disorder do not involve themselves
in any religious practice as compared to the non‑patients.
There is an important amount of scientific evidence that underlines the relationship
between the religious aspects and the personality dimension, especially when extroversion,
psychoticism and neuroticism are concerned (Eysenck & Barrett, 1985); thus, an introverted
patient is more tolerant towards religious ideas and the ethical behaviour (Eysenck, 1954).
The psychoticism is a fundamental dimension of the personality when we need to establish
the individual approach to religiosity (Argyle, 2000). Argyle (1998) noticed that the
members of the church showed considerably low levels of neurotic construct as compared
to the persons that do not attend the same religious environment.
For Taylor and MacDonald (1999), the levels of the neurotic manifestation were higher
with the female patients having no religious affiliation. A meta‑analysis conveyed by
Saroglou (2002) claims that the outer religiosity comes in association with higher levels of
neurosis while the inner religiosity is more mature and reflects an emotional stability. The
religious beliefs have been frequently associated with low levels of depression, explaining thus
the fact that the patients having religious or spiritual believes use them as coping models.
The majority of the empirical studies based on the relationship spirituality‑depression in adult
persons show a reversed relation between religiosity and depression (Koenig et al., 1998).
A study on depression performed on elder hospitalized patients showed that the persons
with an inner religious orientation developed positively, out of depression and to complete
healing; the study did not find any connection between the remission of the depression and
the religious affiliation or any private religious activity (Koenig & Peterson, 1998).
The frequency of the participation in the religious rituals was positively associated with
the mental health (Levin & Vanderpool, 1987). Hannay (1980) suggested that submission,
as an aspect of the religious behaviour, has a minor role as compared to other religious aspects
of the religious behaviour. Children raised in a protective environment in which the family’s
care and warmth was at the bottom of the relationship, develop a solid religious capacity and
prove themselves ready to cope with stress and psychological hardships (Ingram & Ritter, 2000).
Carson and Green (1992) analysed the relationship between the spiritual welfare and
the resistance on a group of subjects diagnosed with AIDS, drawing the conclusion that the
persons with a good spirituality, meaning and goals in their lives were the strongest. Another
qualitative study performed by Fryback and Reinert (1999) examined the concept of
spirituality from the perspective of the people living with a terminal disease diagnosis, the
EXISTENTIAL MEANING AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN ADULTHOOD
95
results suggesting that spirituality is an essential part of the mental welfare. Woods and
Ironson (1999) interviewed people afflicted by serious diseases like cancer or heart attack,
noticing that the younger female persons with a high education proved to be more spiritual.
Some authors noticed that an inner religious orientation seems to be more present with
the elder persons as compared to the younger ones, with women rather than with men and
with persons with a higher education (Strickland & Shaffer, 1971).
A study on the existential meaning and the religious
orientation in adulthood
The study presented in this article is exploratory and tries to show the link between the
religious orientation, the sources of meaning profile and the meaning in life with Romanian
adult persons. The present paper evaluates some characteristic features of the meaning in
life, the religious orientation and the sources of meaning profile with adult persons.
The objectives of the research
1. To explore the adult subjects’ perception of the meaning sources and the meaning in life.
2. To explore the influence of the religious orientation, the sources of meaning profile and
the gender of subjects on the meaning of life in adulthood.
Operationalization of the concepts
The meaning of life it is a process of discovery of a free spiritual and emotional experience,
a process of adopting an authentic attitude and a responsible behaviour towards oneself and
the world. The existential meaning represents orientation towards action, experience and
engagement into an action with the best outcome. It could also be considered the meaning
of a certain real life situation, the specific meaning of a person’s life in a certain moment,
the result of the reciprocal influence between the personal I and the surrounding environment
to which a certain value is given. The world of values and its practical realisation are seen as
decisive for the meaning in life, Frankl’s concept of meaning triggering the concept of value.
The religious orientation refers to the modality in which a person lives his/her own
religious beliefs and values. The religious orientation is of two types: inner and outer. The
inner religious orientation refers to practicing the religious belief and values for their own
sake in a manner close to self‑sacrifice while the outer religious orientation uses religion
as an instrument for achieving non‑religious goals, this meaning in fact the exploitation of
the practical aspects of religion which offers comfort and prestige.
The sources of the meaning profile refer to indicators which make up the meaning of
life of a person. These indicators may be: social relationship, personality type, creativity,
personal development, relationship with nature, religion and spirituality but also society
and politics.
Research development
In order to achieve the desired objectives, our research was divided into two stages. In the
first stage the subjects were requested to write down the first words that came to their mind
when hearing the phrases “meaning of life” and “sources of meaning in life”. After they
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CAMELIA SOPONARU, ANDREEA‑OANA PETRICIAC
filled in the verbal associative questionnaire, they received three scales used. The subjects
undertook the same questionnaires, in similar conditions of evaluation, and the results of
the groups were then analysed quantitatively and qualitatively.
The hypothesis of the research
1. The religious orientation, the sources of meaning profile and the gender of the subjects
influence the meaning of life in adulthood. Thus, our expectancies are:
a. the subjects having an outer religious orientation may feel their life is more meaningful
as compared to the subjects with an inner religious orientation;
b. the subjects with an outer meaning profile may feel their life is more meaningful as
compared to the subjects with an inner meaning profile;
c. the male subjects may feel their life is more meaningful as compared to the female
subjects.
2. There is a close interaction between the independent variable (like the religious orienta­
tion, the sources of meaning profile and the genre of the subjects) and the dependent
variable (like the meaning in life).
The research variables
The dependent variable: the meaning in life; the independent variables: the religious
orientation (having inner and outer levels), the sources of meaning profile (having inner
and outer levels); variables considered: the gender of the subject (masculine and feminine).
The instruments of research
In order to validate the assumptions of this study, we used:
a. Meaning in life questionnaire – Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger, Frazier, Oishi &
Kaler, 2006) made of 10 items with 7 answering possibilities, rated on the Lickert scale
(alpha = 0.706).
b. Religious orientation scale – Religious Orientation Scale Revised (Gorusch & McPherson,
1989) made up of 14 items with 5 answering possibilities, rated on the Likert scale. This
questionnaire points out the type of religious orientation, inner or outer (alpha = 0.706).
c. The sources of meaning profile – Sources of Meaning Profile Revised (Reker, 1996)
made up of 17 items rated on the Likert scale with 7 answering possibilities and
measuring the sources of meaning profile (inner and outer). The main factors to
determine the meaning in life are: relationship with people, personality type, creativity,
personal development, relationship with nature, religion and spirituality as well as society
and politics (alpha = 0.706).
The subjects
The sample used for this study was made up of 150 persons, 71 women and 79 men from
the Moldavia region, both urban and rural residents, having medium and higher education,
and the age between 22 and 50.
EXISTENTIAL MEANING AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN ADULTHOOD
97
Research findings
A.Data processing regarding the subjects’ perception
of the meaning in life and the meaning sources
A.1. The perception of the meaning in life
Consequently to analysing the content, a large number of answers referred to the following
categories: destiny (fate/fatality/predestination) (73.33%); religious perspective (salvation,
discovering God, a good relationship with God, etc.) (66%); evolution, personal development
(64%); happiness/fulfilment (57.33%); entertainment (the search for a blissful state and
pleasant sensations) (54.66%); knowledge/reason/lucidity (52%); searching and finding
the truth (48.66%); love (46%).
The results of the analysis show that the subjects connect the phrase “meaning in life”
with existence itself and general human values. The most numerous choices are from the
spiritual field. The material aspect of the human existence was also present but in a smaller
percentage. There have not been found studies to point out the outlook on the meaning in life.
The study will be re‑staged on a larger sample with more variables especially those which
seem to be important and informative in studying the meaning in life and the meaning sources
(material status, social background, educational level, age, personal experiences, etc.).
A.2. The perception of the meaning sources
The most frequent answers of the subjects regarding the meaning sources are: the relationship
with one’s own person (80%), the husband‑wife relationship (70%), the relationship within
the family (65.33%), profession (62.66%), the type of personality (the human nature
influences his/her choices in life) (57.33%), religion (52.66%), the relationship with nature
(50%), society (47.33%).
In the reference literature we identified other possible meaning sources. David Servan­
‑Schreiber presents the following meaning sources: physicalness (sensations/pleasure),
intimacy, community (social relationship, relationship with nature/the universe), family,
spirituality (the system of belief and practice), while Bell (2007) speaks about authenticity
(experimenting events in an authentic way and behaving in a manner according to one’s
inner self), coherency (he/she has the feeling that life has a meaning and is based on order),
connection (refers to a feeling of social connection with somebody’s past but also to a
connection with nature), continuity (identifies the feeling that there is a continuity of life),
creativity (expressing oneself freely, spontaneously, creatively), orientation towards goals
(the feeling that life has meaning and purpose), integrity (the feeling of fulfilment as a
result of personal experiences) (Debats, 1995).
Debats, (1995) accomplished a study on patient and non‑patient subjects, pointing out
the following categories and subcategories: social relationship (family, friends, partner/lover);
professional activity (academic studies, job); personal welfare (a subjective appreciation
of life, physical and mental health, hedonism/pleasure); self‑updating (attainable goals,
talents); beliefs/convictions (spiritual religious beliefs/convictions, social political beliefs/
convictions); altruism (charity activities) materialism (economical and financial status);
future expectations (hopes, goals) (Debats, 1995).
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CAMELIA SOPONARU, ANDREEA‑OANA PETRICIAC
The results of our asserting study, although we used a small number of subjects and we
did not take into consideration some important variables for the Romanian socio‑cultural
and economic context, point out that the meaning sources are focusing on the self and on
the private aspect which seem to be under the direct control of the subject.
B.The influence of religious orientation, the sources of meaning
profile and the subject’s gender on the meaning of life in adulthood
After rating the items and introducing the scores in the database, the median proof was
used in order to divide the subjects into two groups according to their religious orientation,
inner or outer, respectively according to the level of the sources of meaning profile, internal
or external.
The results and their psychological interpretation
1. The first assumption confirms that the meaning of life in adulthood differs according to
the religious orientation and the subjects’ gender.
a. As a result of the statistic analysis, we noticed important differences among the average
of the subjects having an inner religious orientation and those having an outer one
(M1 = 48.91, M2 = 51.59). The T test for independent samples T(148) = –2.248,
p = .026, that is p < .050, statistically states this hypothesis. Thus, the persons
having an outer religious orientation feel their lives are more meaningful than those
having an inner religious orientation, the reason being that the first can use religion
as an instrument of reaching non‑religious targets, allowing them to look for certain
goals, fulfilling their personal desires, irrespective of what they are.
b. There are no significant differences among the averages for the variables’ values of
the meaning sources, both inner and outer (M1 = 49.58, M2 = 50.90). The T test
for independent samples T(148) = –1.09, p = .274, do not statistically confirm this
hypothesis, concluding that the meaning in life in adulthood does not differ in accordance
with the sources of meaning profile, the subjects having an outer source of meaning
profile do not feel their lives are more meaningful than those having an inner sources
of meaning profile. Man’s attitude towards the world is submitted to a lot of parameters.
It seems that finding and fulfilling the meaning in life are strictly personal and do
not depend on the external or internal sources in which a person is anchoring himself/
herself (taking part in entertaining, educational or personal development activities,
satisfying personal needs, engaging in personal communicative relationships, taking
part in religious activities, personal culture and tradition, financial situation, rela­
tionship with nature).
c. There are significant differences among the averages for the variables’ values of
the gender of the subjects, feminine and masculine (M1 = 48.23, M2 = 52.00),
T(148) = –3.16, p = .002, statistically confirming this hypothesis. The male subjects
feel that their life is more meaningful than the female ones, so the meaning of life
in adulthood differs according to gender.
Men feel their life is more meaningful as compared to women because the former
believe that life should be lived moment by moment, their analytic rational thinking
regards the events of their life as logical and less emotional and therefore having
less visible consequences at the personal level. Men do not value routine, monotony,
a smooth life cycle, looking constantly to interact with other persons and activities so
EXISTENTIAL MEANING AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN ADULTHOOD
99
as their life should not be boring and meaningless whereas women are more responsible
and more interested in the family and professional life, keeping within a lot of
unshared feelings which may lead to frustration and dissatisfaction. Therefore we could
say that men are the searchers for new sensations, without saying they are not responsible,
while women are more emotionally engaged and involved in everyday life.
2. In order to study the combined effect of the independent variables – such as the religious
orientation, the sources of meaning profile and the genre of the subjects – on the
dependent variable “meaning in life”, we used the Anova Univariate analysis obtaining
an interaction effect only between the gender of the subjects and the sources of meaning
profile F(1.149) = 4.45, p = .037.
Other results: the influence of the religious orientation and of the sources of meaning
profile on the meaning of life in groups of female and male subjects. There have been
statistically significant results only with the male group:
a. the male subjects having outer religious orientation and outer sources of meaning profile
feel their life is more meaningful when compared to male subjects having outer
religious orientation but inner sources of meaning profile [t(47) = –2.96, p = .005].
b. the male subjects having outer religious orientation and outer sources of meaning profile
feel their life more meaningful when compared to male subjects having inner religious
orientation but outer the sources of meaning profile [t(38) = –2.127, p = .040].
Inside the female group there have been no significant differences, which suggests that
women can feel the meaning in their life regardless of their religious orientation or the
sources of meaning profile.
A possible explanation for this difference between men and women can be the fact that
men have precise and pre‑established roles which include responsibilities and activities that
have not changed much in time whereas women have been confronted with a confusion of
roles due to emancipation movements in time, which may influence the process of finding
the meaning in life. On the other hand, the behaviour of finding the meaning in life is more
predictable if the number of the categories involved in the research is larger. Denying certain
domains or focusing on a single one leads to a smaller number of options which facilitate
the finding of the meaning in life. The more a person is involved in different fields of life,
the greater the probability to identify abstract and material modalities of finding the meaning
in life. Appreciating the social norms and values of the relationships makes the outer
orientation more predictable. The choice of an outer religious orientation may be connected
to the social aspect and affiliation to a certain group. The outer religious orientation should
be analysed taking into consideration the idea that the spiritual evolution comes from within
and goes towards the exterior world. Jung (1998) reminds us about the self‑abnegation as
a characteristic of the individual human being. Frankl (2009) speaks about finding the
meaning by comparing oneself with the others, introducing thus a new approach which is
that of the human interaction with the persons next to you in order to live an authentic
religious feeling. In our study we found differences only with the male group that have a
more accentuated outer religious orientation.
Conclusions and discussions
A person’s meaning in life is not the unique pattern of a society. We are marked by a society
based on performance which imposes certain requests, giving the illusion that the meaning
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in life is somewhere inside the limits of these requests such as: the material requests, the
physical appearance, the academic instruction and also the psychological requests. But there
is not a unique pattern, the meaning of one’s life is not the same for everybody, so it is not
generally valid. It is a personal development, that is why it is impossible to design a textbook
postulating a number of criteria that one must fulfil in order to have a meaningful life. As
soon as a person finds a meaning in his/her own personal life, he/she is able to balance
inwardly, being capable of dealing with suffering, living his/her life at the fullest, against
all odds. Although there may be some experiences which deprive us from spontaneously
finding a meaning in life, once this realisation is completed, the discovery is not an
egocentric activity but a selfless one.
During this present research we set out to study the adult perception of the meaning
sources and the meaning in life, the influence of the religious orientation, the sources of
meaning profile as well as the gender of the subjects, all influencing the meaning in life in
adulthood. As for the first asserting study, the results were similar to those of other studies,
yet we could notice some specific elements for the Romanian social and cultural frame
(Debats, 1995). Thus, most answers referred to two main perceptions: destiny, life has its
own meaning and the meaning in life is the perspective given by the religious outlook. As
for the sources of meaning, those belonging to the personal domains are in greater number
than the social and material ones.
During the second sequence of the study, the hypothesis of our research have been
partially confirmed. Thus, the meaning in life in adulthood differs from one religious
orientation to the other, from one gender to another (the male subjects having an outer
religious orientation feel their live more meaningful as compared to the female subjects
having an inner religious orientation). We obtained inter‑working effects between the
variables gender of the subjects and profile of meaning sources regarding the meaning in
life in adulthood.
The results of our studies may be under the influence of certain variables that were not
taken into consideration like age, professional status or cultural level which usually impose
the choice of certain meaning sources rather than others, or different aspects that link to
the social background, the financial status of the subjects and their educational level as well
as mediating factors of choice towards a certain religious orientation. Such variables
underlining the limitations of our studies will be the object of our future studies.
Our research may look like a minor attempt to limit the factors that contribute to the
building up of the meaning in life. Researching the meaning in life needs an interdisciplinary
study technique (anthropology, psychology, sociology, ethnology) and a transgenerational
one, having thus the possibility of observing the building up and the evolution of the meaning
in different time and space situations of a person’s life. In our study we started from the
idea that, by analysing these domains, there are psychological benefits. The relationship
between religion as a whole and the physical and mental health is very complex and still
has many undiscovered aspects. This field has not updated completely its potential role in
the functioning of the human psychic. This constructive relationship between religion and
health as well as the therapeutic message brought in by religion remains a permanent
preoccupation for the contemporary psychology; minimizing these aspects could lead to
ignoring essential characteristics of the reconstructing and redefining process of organisation
the mental service facilities.
EXISTENTIAL MEANING AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN ADULTHOOD
101
Sensul vieţii şi orientarea religioasă la vârsta adultă
Rezumat: Acest studiu investighează, prin intermediul unor metode de cercetare calitative şi
cantitative, pe de o parte, sensul şi sursele sensului în viaţă, iar pe de altă parte, influenţa orientării
religioase, a profilului surselor de sens şi a genului subiecţilor asupra sensului vieţii la vârsta adultă.
În vederea atingerii primului obiectiv am aplicat, pe un numar de 150 de subiecţi adulţi, metoda
asociaţiei libere (să scrie primele 5 cuvinte care le vin în minte când aud expresiile „sensul vieţii”
şi „surse ale sensului”). Cele mai importante imagini ale sensului vieţii sunt legate de perpectiva
religioasă (mântuirea) şi de cea tradiţional‑populară (sensul este viaţa însăşi), iar ca surse ale sensului
în viaţă au fost cele din domeniul privat. Pentru cel de‑al doilea studiu, ipoteza generală (orientarea
religioasă, profilul surselor de sens şi genul subiectului influenţează sensul vieţii la vârsta adultă)
s‑a confirmat parţial. Sensul vieţii la vârsta adultă diferă în funcţie de tipul de orientare religioasă
şi de genul subiectilor. Rezultatele, atât cele de la analizele calitative, cât şi cele statistice confirmă,
în general, relevanţa clinică a sensului în construirea vieţii.
Cuvinte‑cheie: sensul vieţii, surse ale sensului, orientare religioasă, vârsta adultă
Signification existentielle et orientation religieuse à l’âge adulte
Résumé: Cette étude examine, à travers des méthodes de recherche qualitatives et quantitatives,
le sens et les sources du sens dans la vie et l’influence de l’orientation religieuse, du profil des
sources de sens et du genre des sujets sur le sens de la vie à l’âge adulte. Pour atteindre le premier
objectif nous avons appliqué sur 150 sujets la méthode de la libre association (écrire les premiers
5 mots qui leur viennent à l’esprit loresqu’ils entendent «sens de la vie» et «sources du sens»). Les
images les plus importantes du sens de la vie sont liées à la perspective religieuse (le salut) et à
celle traditionnelle‑populaire (le sens c’est la vie elle‑même) et les sources du sens dans la vie ont
été celles du secteur privé. Pour la deuxième étude, l’hypothèse générale (l’orientation religieuse,
le profil des sources de sens et le genre du sujet influencent le sens de la vie à l’âge adulte) est
partiellement confirmée. Le sens de la vie à l’âge adulte varie en fonction du type d’orientation
religieuse et du genre des sujets. Les résultats des analyses qualitatives, aussi bien que celles
statistiques confirment en général la pertinence clinique du sens dans la construction de la vie.
Mots‑clés: sens de la vie, sources du sens, orientation religieuse, l’âge adulte
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II. SINTEZE
Dorin Nastas1
Redefining Culture from a Psychological Perspective2
Abstract: The main purpose of this conceptual paper is to introduce a personal perspective to
complement the ongoing quest for defining culture within the cultural and cross‑cultural psychology.
Based on the short history of the discipline it is shown that the present moment is most favorable
for overcoming past skepticism and achieving a widely shared definition of culture. It is proposed
that, for easing the task, it is important to state and approach culture in a truly and deeply
psychological way. Also it is advocated that the definition must reflect the leading dynamic and
mostly automatic nature of the human cognition and also be useful for germinating new research
ideas. After analyzing the past definitions through the lenses of the proposed criteria a definition
proposed by Chiu and Hong (2006) is selected and further refined. Finally, from a subjective
psychological standpoint, culture is defined as a dynamic network of specific and cognitively
represented shared knowledge and meanings that while activated, in an implicit or explicit manner,
shape and influence individuals’ cognitions, emotions, motivations and behaviors. It is shown that
this definition originates and has support within the newly emergent social psychological perspective
on culture; it is also consonant with the unifying cognitive perspective within psychology, and the
knowledge‑meaning approach toward culture that is rapidly growing within modern anthropology,
cultural and cross‑cultural psychology.
Key words: definition, culture, subjective culture, cognition, knowledge, meaning
Introduction and a brief history of the culture‑mind research
It is a distinct feature of our days that intercultural communication and contacts between
peoples, groups, ethnicities and nations are constantly increasing in number, variety and
intensity. Simultaneously, that increases the public need and demand for efficient multicultural
policy design and implementation. It also fuels and broadens the interdisciplinary scientific
interest toward a better understanding of cultures and the cultural processes, and psychologists
from all areas are also more and more attracted to the study of the culture‑mind relationships
and implications (Triandis, 2007).
1. Romanian Academy, Iaşi branch; correspondence concerning this article should be addressed via
e‑mail to [email protected].
2. This paper was made within The Knowledge Based Society Project supported by the Sectoral
Operational Program Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European
Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU 89/1.5/S/56815.
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Main historical phases and the current state
Historically, psychologists are not novices in studying culture, but they had no constant and
successful interest in it. For instance, the monumental work done by Wilhelm Wundt in his
10‑volume opus Völkerpsychologie (1900‑1914) did not convince enough psychologists at
that time that studying collective cultures is as important as investigating individuals’
psyche; as a result, his magnificent effort was left almost without continuity. So psychologists
started researching culture much later and, meantime, being more heavily outperformed
and influenced by anthropologists, for whom the concept of “culture” was essential, of
central concern. The initial phase of the continuous studies of the culture‑mind relationships
is located between 1950 and 1970. And it was not a successful start again, being appreciated
later by Jerome Brunner (1974) as mainly a series of “magnificent failures” (as cited in
Triandis, 2007, p. 62). The failures were mainly due to the erroneous approach to conceive
and measure cultures by personality traits, backed by a heavily relativist position toward
culture. Finally, no reliable and consistent findings were found and widely accepted.
The next phase was characterized by an extreme universalism and lasted for a decade
(1970‑1980). On a global scale, for many years, the general tendency within the field was
to accept and use anthropologically saturated definitions and perspectives on culture, many
of them being advanced by psychologists themselves. At the same time, the empirical work was
heavily focused on contrasting survey data collected from different countries and ethnic groups.
During the next phase (1980‑2000) the psychological study of cultures began to mature.
This period was dominated by searching for and documenting cultural syndromes such as
“collectivism” and “individualism” (e.g., Triandis, 1994, 1995) and also by the advance
of research on acculturation (e.g., Berry, 1980, 1990; Padilla, 1980).
Traditionally, an investigation of the culture‑mind relationships was carried by researchers
that identify themselves as cultural or cross‑cultural psychologists. But nowadays, according
to the appreciations made by Harry Triandis (2007), a well‑known expert in the field, the
cultural and cross‑cultural psychology entered a new phase of evolution that is characterized
by the inte­gration of the field in the mainstream psychology. More and more psychologists
from different other areas of psychology are showing an increasing interest in cultural
aspects of the human mind, opening new perspectives and lines of research and thus fostering
the progress of the field.
The legacy to overcome
There are still some obstacles from the fields’ short history that need to be addressed for
speeding the overall progress. One of the main problems consists in the lack of widely
accepted coherent and solid conceptual foundation. There is still no shared and large support
within the research community for how it is better to conceive and measure the “culture”
itself (Faulkner, Baldwin, Lindsley, & Hecht, 2006; Fischer, 2012).
The aim of this paper is to make a personal contribution to these ongoing definitional debates.
The main distinction of the proposed approach is that of conceiving culture from a systematic
and true or deep psychological perspective. The reason I decided to make this contribution reside
in the fact that, recently, while becoming interested in research on psychological acculturation
and biculturalism, I found an impressive and rapidly growing amount of data that was, with
a few exceptions, rather piecemeal and puzzling than coherent and enlightening. It gradually
became evident to me what could be the main reason behind this overall state of affairs. In
REDEFINING CULTURE FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
109
my opinion, this happens because many of the authors were not careful or tenacious enough to
arrive at a coherent and clear and, maybe, at least to some degree, shared conceptual foundations
just before starting their empirical work. Acknowledging this, I decided to arrive to such
a conceptual clarity for myself, starting with the fields’ cornerstone concept – “cuture” –
and I share here the results of my searches and reflections.
The first part of this article consists of a series of helpful interrogations through which
basic ideas to consider in before defining culture are revealed. It is shown that within social
sciences “how we define” impacts heavily on “what and how we are researching”, and thus, a
definition highly matters. Also, it is argued that for cultural and cross‑cultural psychology
all definitions, starting with that of “culture” itself, could and should have clear psychological
content and meaning, reflecting simultaneously classical and nowadays mainstream conceiving
of the mind within psychology. This part ends with summarizing the ingredients a psychologically
saturated definition of culture must satisfy.
The second part of the article present the process of (re)defining culture. It starts with
the search for a definition that might more closely correspond to the formulated criteria.
After overcoming searching difficulties a definition proposed by Chi‑Yue Chiu and Ying‑Yi
Hong (2006) is picked. The article ends with a personally refined and complemented version
of the chosen definition that depicts in detail what culture is conceived from a true subjective
or psychological perspective.
Why do we need a definition?
It might be surprising to acknowledge, even for some researchers in the field, the fact that
a lot of empirical research done within the cultural or cross‑cultural psychology has never
shown interest in stating at least a working definition of culture (Adams & Brewer, 2004).
Some voices have even argued that the clarity in defining culture is hard and unattainable,
or even unnecessary at all (e.g., Cohen, 2009; Segall, 1984).
In my opinion, besides being a difficult task, defining culture or subscribing to an
already stated definition is a must before entering any research endeavor. I adhere to the
positions previously advocated within the discipline itself, stating that “what is in the name”
(Veroff & Goldberger, 1995, p. 3) or how we define culture (Sweder, 1990) has a subsequent
“snowball impact” on the theory, methods, results and, finally, on conclusions (Fischer,
2009). In a very deep sense, approaching from a constructivist perspective the social science
fabric itself, a definition (in this case, a definition of “what culture is”), could start a
depiction of a scientifically based version of the world we live in. And therefore a different
definition of a basic concept could produce a different picture of the world; at least in
social sciences it happens frequently.
To summarize, key definitions are like guiding maps and a scientist should carefully choose
or construe them before starting a research trip. Also, as science is consonant with searching
for clarity and avoiding ambiguity, starting with a set of precise definitions is highly desirable.
How to achieve a widely shared definition?
It is generally understandable in social sciences to have a lot of different definitions and
perspectives on the same phenomenon. When the phenomenon at hand is a very complex
one (and “culture” certainly is), being simultaneously at the core of several disciplines (in
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this case, “culture” is an essential concept at least for cultural anthropology, cultural
sociology, cultural and cross‑cultural psychology), the definitional entropy is even more
expectable and temporarily tolerable.
It was frequently stated that there is no common or widely shared definition of culture
within the cultural and cross‑cultural psychology and that it is even not possible (or desi­
rable) to attain such a goal (Segall, 1984). We oppose these fatalistic positions arguing that
if the field wants to achieve integration and then to move on, it needs to arrive to a state
of art when a common ground in defining the basic concepts is established. Of course,
the aim could not be unanimity, but a widely shared understanding of the very basic
concepts in the field (such as “culture”, “acculturation”, and “multiculturalism”) is an
attainable goal.
My proposal is that in order to arrive to a widely accepted definition within the cultural
and cross‑cultural psychology it is necessary first to restate all the central concepts in a
truly psychological way (e.g. as “psychological culture”, “psychological acculturation”,
“psychological biculturalism” and so on). Of course that needs to remind ourselves what
this “psychological” means itself.
What is psychological?
At a first glance, it seems self‑evident what psychological is, at least for the psychologists
it should be. When actually trying to answer the question it turns that it is not so obvious,
or, to be more precise, the obvious needs sometimes short and systematic refreshment to
achieve bold clarity and coherence (see Adams & Brewer, 2004, for a similar, but different
exercise of this kind). I start with a brief outline or refreshment of the established and, in
a sense, implicit basic conceptual framework for understanding the psyche or mind. Next
I turn to briefly outline the nowadays emphasis within this framework.
Basic conceptual framework
Psychology is frequently mentioned as reflecting a microcosmic or atomic perspective in
social sciences, and it is true. In its focus it needs to stay close to the individual psyche,
also because of not loosing its distinct flavor and the specific focus on the person. In time
it emerged that as a science of the human mind it will always speak about psyche as a
four‑grained phenomenon: a cognitive, affective, motivational and behavioral reality.
Consequently, everything that is presumed to reside or be active within the psyche, (including
the “psychological culture”) should be described in cognitive, affective and motivational
terms and when emerging outside the psyche, as a variety of behavioral outputs. The psyche
operating within as a subjective reality is also modeled and understood in terms of mental
structures, states and processes that could be evident to the person through awareness and
introspection (conscious) or could not (stay unconscious).
To summarize, “the psychological” could be conceived of as a subjective reality composed
of cognitive, affective and motivational structures, states and processes about which a subject
is conscious or not; the output of the functioning of this subjective or psychological reality
is reflected in behavior, which pertains to the domain of objective reality.
REDEFINING CULTURE FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
111
All equal but cognition still leads
All the dimensions of the within psyche – the cognitive, affective and motivational – are
inter­vened and it has been demonstrated repeatedly and in various ways that each could
prevail and determine the other two on some occasions. But it is also true that the conceiving
of affective and motivational dimensions became gradually dominated by cognitive theories
and perspectives much more than the reverse. An emergent picture of the mind is that of
being most of the time led by cognitive processes. For instance, cognitive appraisal theories
of emotions and current multi‑component perspectives on emotions emphasize heavily the
triggering and construal properties of the cognitive elements within an emotional episode
(e.g., Power & Dalgleish, 2008; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Also, looking at
the motivational dimension, cognitive processes related to goal representation, goal setting
and goal activation are essential explanatory constructs (e. g., Aarts & Elliot, 2011;
Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012).
Highly cognitive but mostly unaware
Another common understanding that emerged recently, following the ascension of cognitive
perspective, conceive humans as being very sophisticated information processors, but mostly
without knowing or having access to “what’s going on within the mind”. Researches on
human automaticity (e.g., Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair, & Nosek, 2007; Bargh, 1994,
1996, 1997) and on the erroneous self‑introspection (e.g., Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Gilbert,
2003, 2005) are illustrative of this.
What kind of definition do we need?
Considering previously mentioned aspects, the truly psychological definition of culture needs
to fulfill at least several criteria. First, it should locate and define culture simultaneously within
all the dimensions of the mind – cognitive, affective, motivational – and also acknowledge its
behavioral expression. And that is because culture is a very global and pervasive phenomenon,
affecting all the dimensions of the psyche. Second, for being in line with the most recent
psychological depictions of the mind, it should emphasize the dynamic and mostly automatic
(unconscious) nature of the cognition (information processing) and behavior.
It was advocated repeatedly that definitions could not be true or false of themselves but they
might be instead useful (or not) for organizing the existing knowledge and, especially, for
stimulating the production of the newly one (Jahoda, 1984; Chiu & Hong, 2006). So finally,
a psychological definition of the culture needs to be of empirical utility. As said before, the
empirical utility I am mostly interested in is that of clarifying and advancing knowledge on
psychological acculturation and psychological biculturalism or multiculturalism.
Defining psychological culture
There is a good advice frequently restated within psychometrics: that is always better to
spend some time to find an instrument that measures a variable at interest (and maybe to
adjust it to the current research project) than to start building another one from the ground
(De Vellis, 2003). The same seems true when coming to the issue of defining concepts: it
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is better to search for a definition that suits your perspective and research goals, and maybe
to tailor it, than to craft an entirely new one.
How many choices are there?
The entropy with defining culture is impressively high. In their seminal work Kroeber and
Kluckhohn (1952) reported more than 150 definitions collected from the beginning of the
systematic interest in culture in anthropology and related fields. A half of century later and
close to our days, the definitional Babylonia is even higher: Faulkner et al. (2006) collected
more than 300 definitions across the social sciences. If interested in a definition, the
psychologist seems to favor a mix of three kinds: (a) structural or pattern definitions that
usually refer to culture as a system or framework of elements (answering what culture is);
(b) functional definitions showing the reasons the culture exists (answering the why of
culture); and (c) process definitions that focus on how culture influences social and
psychological processes and the way it is socially constructed (Fischer, 2012).
Illustrative of this kind of definitions is that proposed by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952)
themselves: “Culture consists of explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and
selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts; cultural patterns
may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other hand as condi­
tioning elements of further action” (p. 357; as cited in Adams & Markus, 2004). Beside this
definition frequently cited and advocated by leading psychologists, it seems at the surface not
entirely or purely psychological; usually additional comments and interpretations are needed
to reveal the psychological within it (e.g. Adams & Markus, 2004). The same objection applies
to other definitions proposed by renowned psychologists; for instance, to that proposed by
Allan Page Fiske (2002): “A culture is a socially transmitted or socially constructed constellation
consisting of such things as practices, competencies, ideas, schemas, symbols, values, norms,
institutions, goals, constitutive rules, artifacts, and modifications of the physical environment”
(p. 85). Here the list of elements includes a mix of concepts pertaining to the material,
societal and psychological aspects of the culture that are conceived as homologous, each being
easily mapped on another. The author is than directly suggesting visiting anthropologists
for the more clear answers of what culture is composed of (Fiske, 2002).
Examples could be added but the main picture would not change: definitions vary a lot,
are not entirely psychological and point to different parts of the complex phenomena, mixing
at their best the psychological level elements (e.g., schemas, goals) with collective level elements
(e.g., practices, artifacts). And there is always an anthropological understanding that prevails.
Main difficulties in finding or crafting a psychological definition
Opposing the definitional skepticism some authors insist that to define culture is hard, but
it still needs to be done (e.g., Cohen, 2009; Fischer, 2012). And there are some problems
to address before defining it. I refer to at least three of them, and also to some possible
solutions for overcoming each.
Differences in content
One difficulty in defining culture lays in its inevitable multifold nature. An individual lives
simultaneously within three worlds build one over another: a physical world, a social world
and a cultural world or a “world of meaning” (Baumeister, 2005, p. 11). Higher order
REDEFINING CULTURE FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
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worlds attempt to seek and incorporate better and more refined adjustments to environments,
including for the lower level worlds. In this respect each culture is at least threefold: it has
a material culture (mainly for the purpose of a better adjustment within the physical world),
a social culture (aimed at organizing the social life and societal interactions), and a subjective
culture (for the purpose of providing individuals with a shared frame of reference to make
sense of reality and coordinate their activities; Baumeister, 2005).
This vision of a tripartite culture advocated by Baumeister (2005) from a function
perspective matches perfectly with that proposed by Chiu and Hong (2006) from a structural
perspective. They also split culture into three classes of elements: material (methods by
which people share goods, services, technology), social (shared rules of social behavior,
institutions), and subjective (ideas and knowledge shared within a collection of people).
While material and social culture could be situated mostly “outside the mind”, the subjective
culture, by definition and in essence could be equated with the psychological, “inside the
mind” culture.
So when limiting the search for definitions that are preferentially oriented to define
subjective culture (form a structural, functional or mixed position), or that defines it
firsthand, the task of finding a suitable definition is more manageable.
Differences in levels of analysis
Another difficulty pertains to the fact that culture is a collective or societal phenomenon
while psychologists approach it collecting and analyzing mainly individual, psychological
level data, later aggregating them statistically. So it is hard to define something as collective
in essence and simultaneously keeping the focus on individuals and individual level data.
To partially solve this problem a definition could use mostly an individualistic language
and focus (i.e., psychological concepts) but show how psyche is connected in before and
after to the societal level phenomena. A task hard to manage and therefore a few definitions
are expected to be of this format. Another way to solve the level of analysis discrepancy is
to find a definition that has a sort of level neutrality and thus easily could be connected to
each of them.
Differences in units of analysis
Still another difficulty emerges from the previous one: traditionally cultures were understood
firsthand as large‑scale collective phenomena (i.e., as national, ethnic, racial cultures).
Naturally, the distance between, for example, a person and a nation is great and a definition
that was crafted with a focus on national culture will not be very suitable for a psychological
depiction of what culture is within an individual mind.
Recently more small‑scale collective cultures are being proposed to be considered as possible
and valuable units of analysis for cultural psychology (e.g., regional cultures, religiousness,
socio‑economic status or social class cultures; Cohen, 2009). Within the literature on
organizations or small group research there are cultural units of an even smaller scale.
Considering these lower‑scale cultures might bring valuable definitional examples or insights.
To solve this scale problem it might be a good strategy to search or construe a definition
that is in no way bound, in an explicit or implicit manner, to any concrete unit. That kind
of definition will allow cultural analysis starting with very tiny units (i.e., small groups) to
very large units (i.e., nations).
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The cognitive essence of culture: knowledge and meaning
Starting with the seminal work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) it has been a
continuous increase in popularity to define culture as a system of meanings and symbols
(e.g., D’Andrade, 1984; Shweder & Haidt, 2000). To lower the degree of abstractedness
and point toward a more instrumental and mundane use of the culture, some authors stated
instead that culture is a system of information or knowledge (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;
Lumsden, 1989). The distinction between those two kinds of definitions is mainly in specific
focus and language preferences (Cohen, 2009; Fisher, 2012). It might be better even to
consider those types of definitions as connected, as briefly summarized by Chiu and Hong
(2006): “shared knowledge (information) gives rise to shared meanings (interpretations,
understandings)” (p. 17, text in italics is added).
What is evident for a psychologist is that the whole string of the above mentioned
concepts – information, knowledge, meaning, interpretation, and understanding – is cognitive
in nature and has easily traceable equivalences within psychology research literature.
Therefore, given the leading and unifying role of the cognitive domain, it comes that the
definition we seek must have as a central point the knowledge‑meaning perspective on
culture. This perspective emerged within the mainstream anthropological literature at the
time the cognitive perspective in psychology was only at the beginnings. The direct advantage
is that it used the concepts identical or very close to the now evolved cognitive perspective
in psychology and could be easily restated in a psychological manner while also keeping
the connection with the original anthropological background.
The chosen definition and perspectives
Taking into consideration the whole lines of ideas expressed so far, the definition I find more
appropriate to choose and to refine is that advanced by Chi‑Yue Chiu and Ying‑Yi Hong (2006).
In its briefest version they conceive culture as “a network of shared knowledge that is produced,
distributed, and reproduced among a collection of interconnected individuals” (p. 18).
The explicit reference to knowledge as a single and unifying content term easily permits
a psychological interpretation of the definition. It also permits, to a slightly lesser degree,
to understand the social and material cultures as being bound, in essence, to the knowledge
dynamics and depending on it. Indeed, a material cultural artifact, as a car, for instance,
is a reflection of the accumulated knowledge; at the same time its production is the result
of the social cultural organization, more precisely, of the industrial production that it is
again, based on the accumulated knowledge.
This general and brief definition has also the advantage of keeping a sort of “level neutrality”
we mentioned before: it represents a suitable starting point for both a more elaborated
societal‑level definition and a more refined individual‑level, psychological definition. Indeed,
the authors themselves provide a lot of insights in both directions (Chiu & Hong, 2006).
The neutrality of the chosen definition also extends to the unit of analysis: the collection
of interconnected individuals could be seen as a small group (highly interconnection
expected) or a nation (loosely or imperfectly interconnection presumed).
As evidenced from the title of the source we used – Social Psychology of Culture (Chiu &
Hong, 2006) – the definiton is highly consonant and representative of recent advances within
the social psychological perspective on culture. Within the past decade social psychologists
proposed several new ways for understanding and investigating culture: the situated cognition
REDEFINING CULTURE FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
115
perspective (Oyserman, 2011), the dynamic constructivist approach (Hong, Morris, Chiu, &
Benet‑Martinez, 2000), the subjective or descriptive norm approach (Shteynberg, Gelfand, &
Kim, 2009) and the related intersubjective culture perspective (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi,
Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Wan et al., 2007). The comprehensive analysis of the social
psychological contribution to (re)defining the subjective or psychological culture proves that
it has also far reaching implications on the whole cycle of research, starting with interrogations
and ending with conclusions (Nastas, 2012a, 2012b).
It is important to say that, at the same time, the social psychology perspective and defi­
nitions (including the chosen one) are also in tone with the dominant and unifying cognitive
perspective in mainstream psychology. They are also consonant with the knowledge‑meaning
perspective widely shared within the cultural and cross‑cultural psychology, and anthropology.
Societal level definition: material and social culture
outside the mind
The main idea for a societal level definition of culture is that a culture exists before an
individual is “born into it” via enculturation or “brought to it” via acculturation; culture
at the societal level is an outside the mind reality and therefore does not need classical
psychological concepts to be defined. In this sense it is still worth speaking about culture
as knowledge and meaning system that is instantiated within the shared physical and social
environments. Chiu and Hong (2006), for instance, put it this way: “shared knowledge
gives rise to shared meanings, which are carried in the shared physical environment (such
as the spatial layout of a rural village, the subsistence economy), social institutions (e.g.,
schools, family, and workplace), social practices (e.g., division of labor), the language,
conversation scripts, and other media (e.g., religious scriptures, cultural icons, folklores,
idioms) […] Instantiation of cultural meanings in external media is a necessary condition
for transmission of culture; it ensures that shared meanings in the culture can be transmitted
effectively to other people (newcomers) and to the new generation (newborn)” (p. 17;
italics and text in parentheses added).
Individual level definition: subjective or psychological
culture within the mind
While defining culture with an individual level emphasis, the main idea is that culture inside
the mind consists of a set of shared and learned knowledge that is cognitively represented
within the mind. Nobody has a perfect or the same cognitive representation of the same
culture within his or her mind; but each culturally well‑saturated individual has a workable
and similar version of it (Chiu & Hong, 2006).
It has been recognized that sometimes, especially in social sciences, it seems useful to
define complex phenomena, including culture, in a metaphoric way (Kroeber & Kluckhohn,
1952). Since human beings heavily rely on visual information, metaphors that refer to visual
experiences are especially vivid. Imagine that the cognitively represented shared knowledge
(the culture inside the mind) is like a pair of glasses one must use on a permanent basis.
So the glasses will stay most of the time in between the reality outside the mind and the
reality a person construes inside the mind helping to have a “good and accurate vision”.
Additionally, these glasses have a special optic, so when in use, they will constantly influence
what, how and why one sees things; consequently, they will also impact how or why he
or she reacts to what is seen. From time to time the glasses may change, but usually on a
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DORIN NASTAS
very slow rate. Being so accustomed to see things through the glasses a person will most
of the time be unaware of wearing and using them.
Mirroring the above metaphor, the cognitively represented culture, while activated, will
constantly provide a frame of reference that will affect and shape cognitive, emotional, and
motivational processes and reactions; it will also influence and shape behaviors. Most of
the time the influence of the cognitively represented culture will happen in an implicit,
unconscious manner, following the process of automatic activation and use of the situational
relevant cognitive structures.
The final definition
Starting with the definition proposed by Chiu and Hong (2006; see above) and the previously
mentioned ideas I finally arrive at a more psychologically refined and complemented version
of it:
It is proposed that as a subjective, psychological reality, culture is a dynamic network of
specific and cognitively represented shared knowledge and meanings that while activated, in an
implicit or explicit manner, shape and influence individuals’ cognitions, emotions, motivations
and behaviors. Shared cultural knowledge is highly diverse and is continuously learned and
changes at various paces through the processes of active or passive enculturation, acculturation
and socialization, usually, within a collection of interconnected individuals. Nowadays an
individual frequently acquires, stores and uses more than one culture and has diverse and
dynamic identification ties with each of it.
The first part of the definition satisfies the previously mentioned criteria of a truly
psychological and contemporary definition of culture. First, it emphases all the psychological
dimensions as being shaped and influenced by cultural knowledge: cognition, emotion,
motivation, and behavior. Second, it acknowledges the dominant information processing
perspective in psychology and the automaticy of cognitive‑behavioral functioning. It has
also direct implications for extending the range of empirical research design, especially by
allowing more easily planning of experiments or quasi‑experiments.
The second part of the proposed definition was thought of as fulfilling the third criteria:
empirical utility. In our specific case, the empirical utility of interest is that of clarifying
and advancing knowledge on psychological acculturation and biculturalism/multiculturalism.
Acculturation is depicted as a constant, malleable and multidimensional learning process
(with respect to different kinds of knowledge and meanings) that could have also different
progress rates (Arends‑Tóth & van de Vijver, 2006; Sam, 2006). It is stated that acculturation
takes place normally within a collection of interconnected individuals, within an ongoing
firsthand contact, but the definition offers room for accounting also remote and indirect
acculturation processes, at least for some parts of the shared cultural knowledge (e.g.,
foreign language learning at a distance from the original speaking community).
Finally, the definition conceives the issue of multiculturalism in a two‑fold manner. It
firstly acknowledges that an individual usually internalizes more than one culture (considering
both large‑scale collective cultures and small‑scale collective cultures; Cohen, 2009) and
secondly, specifies that the degree of identification with each of this cultural knowledge is
a variable and distinct process (Hong, Wan, No, & Chiu, 2007). Developing in detail the
definitional implications for the purpose of guiding acculturation and multiculturalism
research transcend the scope and space of this article and is discussed elsewhere (Nastas, 2012c).
REDEFINING CULTURE FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
117
Concluding thoughts
Acknowledging that defining culture is a long staying challenge in social science that remains
unsolved (Fischer, 2012) and that trying to approach and face this problem could be “tricky”
(Cohen, 2009, p. 194), I tried through this article to reach some clarity for myself regarding
this issue. I have done this with the hope that some of my reflections and insights will
stimulate and be helpful for others also. But I am aware that there is still room for a more
refined, extensive and deeper analysis and understanding of what culture is as an inside the
mind, outside the mind and between the minds reality.
Redefinirea culturii dintr‑o perspectivă psihologică
Rezumat: Scopul principal al acestui articol conceptual este de a aduce o contribuţie personală la
provocarea definirii culturii în psihologia culturală şi transculturală. În baza unei incursiuni în scurta
istorie a disciplinei se arată că momentul actual este cel mai prielnic pentru depăşirea scepticismului
şi găsirea unei definiţii a culturii care să fie larg acceptată de comunitatea cercetătorilor. Pentru
uşurarea sarcinii se propune ca abordarea culturii să se facă într‑o manieră cu adevărat şi profund
psihologică. De asemenea, se argumentează necesitatea ca definiţia să reflecte caracterul dominant,
dinamic şi preponderent automatic al cogniţiei umane, fiind totodată utilă pentru germinarea de noi
idei de cercetare. Ca urmare a analizei definiţiilor anterioare prin prisma criteriilor avansate este
selectată şi dezvoltată definiţia propusă de Chiu şi Hong (2006). În final, din punct de vedere
subiectiv, psihologic, cultura este concepută ca o reţea dinamică şi împărtăşită de cunoştinţe specifice
reprezentate cognitiv care, odată activată într‑o manieră implicită sau explicită, modelează şi
influenţează cogniţiile, emoţiile, motivele şi comportamentul individului. Se arată faptul că această
definiţie provine din şi se bazează pe o perspectivă recentă şi emergentă ce abordează cultura din
punct de vedere al psihologiei sociale. Definiţia propusă este, de asemenea, consonantă cu perspectiva
cognitivă unificatoare pentru psihologie şi abordarea culturii ca un set de cunoştinţe şi sensuri,
viziune în expansiune rapidă în antropologia modernă, psihologia culturală şi cea transculturală.
Cuvinte‑cheie: definiţie, cultură, cultura subiectivă, cogniţie, cunoaştere, sens
Une redéfinition d’un point de vue psychologique
Resumé: Le principal but de cet article théorique est d’apporter une contribution personnelle à la
définition de la culture dans la psychologie culturelle et trans‑culturelle. En réalisant une incursion
dans la courte histoire du domaine, on a établit que le moment actuel est le plus propice au
dépassement du scepticisme et à l’identification d’une définition de la culture qui serait largement
acceptée par les chercheurs. On s’est proposé d’aborder la culture d’une manière profondément
psychologique. En plus, on insiste sur la nécessité d’une définition qui pourrait mettre en valeur
l’importance de la cognition humaine sous son aspect dominant, dynamique et surtout automatique,
fait qui est utile pour la recherche de nouvelles idées. En tenant compte de tous ces critères et en
analysant les définitions antérieures, on a choisi et développé la définition proposée par Chiu et
Hong (2006). La culture, donc, est conçue du point de vue subjectif et psychologique comme un
réseau dynamique et partagé de connaissances spécifiques, représentées d’une manière cognitive
qui, une fois activée d’une manière implicite ou explicite, forme et influence les cognitions, les
émotions, les motifs et les comportements de l’individu. On a démontré que cette définition rejoint
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DORIN NASTAS
la perspective récente et émergente de la culture du point de vue de la psychologie sociale. La
définition proposée rejoint aussi la perspective cognitive qui essaie de mettre ensemble la psychologie
et l’approche de la culture comme un système de connaissances et de sens, approche en expansion
rapide dans l’anthropologie moderne, la psychologie culturelle et trans‑culturelle.
Mots‑clés: définition, culture, culture subjective, cognition, connaissances, sens
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Andreea Ernst‑Vintilă1
L’implication personnelle, variable explicative majeure
de la pensée sociale. Quelques rappels du modèle
tridimensionnel proposé par M.‑L. Rouquette2
Résumé: Ce texte propose un bref regard rétrospectif sur la notion d’implication personnelle,
variable explicative majeure de la pensée sociale, introduite par M.‑L. Rouquette il y a un peu plus
de 30 ans et faisant depuis l’objet de nombreuses recherches. Nous rappelons la définition de
l’implication personnelle, son opérationnalisation la plus courante (le modèle tridimensionnel), et
quelques exemples de travaux récents illustrant sa portée. Enfin, nous évoquons un chantier de
recherche récent, qui explore deux niveaux ou types d’implication, l’implication culturelle et
l’implication factuelle, ou circonstancielle, à partir de leurs différences.
Mots‑clés: implication personnelle, modèle tridimensionnel, implication culturelle vs factuelle
(circonstancielle)
La notion d’implication personnelle a une certaine ancienneté en psychologie sociale.
Ancienneté théorique, d’abord, un peu plus de 30 ans depuis la thèse d’Etat où Michel‑Louis
Rouquette la posait comme déterminant des processus cognitifs intervenant dans les phéno­
mènes de rumeur. Mais également une ancienneté empirique, car dès le départ il l’a testée
expérimentalement. Enfin, on marque en 2012 dix ans depuis le renouveau de l’intérêt pour
cette notion, avec la publication de l’étude expérimentale du rôle de l’implication de soi
dans les modalités de raisonnement intervenant dans le cadre des représentations sociales,
étude menée par C. Guimelli (2002). Ces dix dernières années, l’implication personnelle
a fait l’objet de plusieurs dizaines d’articles scientifiques, six chapitres d’ouvrages, et cinq
thèses, dont la dernière arrive bientôt en soutenance.
Je rappellerai ici brièvement comment M.‑L. Rouquette a introduit cette notion, puis je
présenterai son opérationnalisation la plus courante et quelques exemples de travaux récents
pour illustrer sa portée, enfin j’évoquerai le dernier chantier ouvert avec M.‑L. Rouquette
sur l’étude de l’implication personnelle ou, si vous voulez, le chantier le plus récent.
Trente ans, à l’échelle de notre discipline, la psychologie sociale, c’est déjà un quart de
l’histoire. On peut penser qu’il est légitime de tenter un regard rétrospectif sur la portée
d’une notion comme l’implication personnelle. Mais trente ans c’est aussi, comme l’aurait
dit M.‑L. Rouquette avec un fin sourire, une bonne opérationnalisation de la notion de
1. Université de Reims Champagne‑Ardenne.
2. Présenté aux XXIIIe Rencontres de Béziers: Mémoire, Rumeurs, Propagande. Hommage à Michel‑Louis
Rouquette (1948‑2011) – Béziers, 20 octobre 2012.
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ANDREEA ERNST‑VINTILĂ
génération. Je fais partie de cette seconde génération qui tente de contribuer par des données
empiriques et expérimentales à formaliser la notion d’implication personnelle, cette variable
explicative majeure de la pensée sociale, comme la qualifiait C. Guimelli.
Est‑ce facile d’être dans cette seconde génération‑là? En un sens, c’est même confortable.
Car comme souvent, comme il l’a fait aussi avec une autre notion centrale de la psychologie
sociale, et tout aussi riche, celle de représentation sociale (Rouquette et Rateau, 1998),
M.‑L. Rouquette a procédé avec l’implication personnelle avec précision et soin pour
l’élucider parfaitement, en visant sa compréhension univoque (Rouquette, 1980, p. 190).
Mieux, il en a donné d’emblée une définition générale à caractère opérationnel.
Définition générale à caractère opérationnel
«On parlera d’implication lorsque la sémantique de l’expérience inclut de façon explicite
une ou plusieurs caractéristiques propres à un sujet expérimental (y compris, éventuellement,
le sujet lui‑même)» (Rouquette, 1980, p. 192).
Quelles sont ces caractéristiques? «L’intuition et l’observation» (Rouquette, 1980, p. 190)
ont conduit M.‑L. Rouquette à en proposer trois. Ce modèle tridimensionnel est celui qui
est le plus utilisé aujourd’hui pour désigner l’implication personnelle.
Le modèle est une chose très simple à exposer. L’implication personnelle est à comprendre,
selon son auteur, comme un référentiel subjectif, mais socialement déterminé, qui traduit
le rapport d’un individu à un objet. Ce rapport, dans la vision de M.‑L. Rouquette, est
«historiquement déterminé et se trouve médiatisé par les pratiques» (Flament et Rouquette,
2003, p. 126). Mais «à l’intérieur de ces conditions générales d’élaboration et d’évolution,
le rapport à l’objet peut être attribué à un facteur d’implication psychosociale» (ibid.).
Cette implication psychosociale, M.‑L. Rouquette l’a théorisée et en a proposé une façon
de principe de la mesurer.
Comme nous l’avons vu un peu plus haut, l’implication personnelle est un référentiel
défini par trois dimensions supposées indépendantes. Il y a implication maximum relativement
à un «objet» lorsque je me sens concernée (1), que l’affaire est d’importance (2) et que j’y
peux quelque chose (3). Tout cela se mesure à partir d’échelles permettant de déterminer
ces trois coordonnées: l’identification de l’individu à l’objet, la valorisation de l’objet et
la possibilité perçue d’action (Rouquette, 1997). L’implication personnelle décroît quand
l’intensité décroît au moins sur une de ces dimensions.
C’est dans «l’espace “tri‑dimensionnel” ainsi défini [et mesurable, donc par les trois
«coordonnées» de l’implication personnelle] que se détermine la position d’un objet dans
l’univers particulier de l’individu. La fonction principale de ce référentiel est “de distribuer
en toute circonstance […] l’important et le futile, le permis et l’interdit, entre ce qui est
convenable et ce qui est inconvenable». La capacité à faire ces distinctions et ces répartitions
sont «proprement vitales en ce qu’elles permettent la décision, […] commandent l’engagement
ou le retrait et définissent aussi bien l’identité que l’altérité» (Rouquette, 1998b, p. 509).
Bien sûr, «l’individu ne fait pas ces jugements indépendamment de son contexte social et
ces jugements ne sont pas de nature objective» (Rouquette, 1997). La théorie suppose même
qu’ils dépendent de l’appartenance de l’individu dans le groupe, de sa position économique
et symbolique, ses relations immédiates avec sa communauté etc. (Rouquette, 2006).
L’IMPLICATION PERSONNELLE, VARIABLE EXPLICATIVE MAJEURE DE LA PENSÉE SOCIALE 123
Quel est l’intérêt de la notion d’implication personnelle?
Ce référentiel subjectif, mais socialement déterminé, traduisant le rapport d’un individu à
un objet permet de différencier le tissu social selon des dimensions psychosociales – et «il
s’agit précisément ici de l’articulation fondamentale entre psychologique et social» (Flament
et Rouquette, 2003, p. 126).
Voici comment M.‑L. Rouquette expliquait ceci: «Le citoyen a, envers un objet social,
le sentiment d’être plus ou moins partie prenante et d’y pouvoir ou non quelque chose. De
là découle la pluralité des rôles cognitifs adoptés par les individus et qui contribuent à la
différenciation circonstancielle des audiences: à strictement parler, ce ne sont pas toujours
les “mêmes” qui écoutent […] et qui s’engagent. Ou plutôt, les “mêmes” changent tour à
tour de position dans un espace de repérage défini par au moins trois dimensions: la
personnalisation de la pertinence de l’objet, la valorisation de celui‑ci et l’estimation d’une
possibilité d’action» (Rouquette, 1998b).
Plus précisément, la position d’un «objet» dans la pensée d’un individu est définie par «ses
coordonnées» dans l’espace tridimensionnel de l’implication personnelle. M.‑L. Rouquette
pensait que celle‑ci distribue les objets en deux catégories: ceux envers lesquels on agit
et ceux envers lesquels on s’abstient d’agir. Ainsi, grâce à la notion d’implication personnelle,
l’indifférence et l’engagement peuvent être étudiés comme conduites sociales, c’est‑à‑dire
inscrites dans les rapports sociaux.
Quelques résultats sur l’implication personnelle
Michel‑Louis Rouquette avait testé dès 1980 l’implication personnelle comme déterminant
des processus cognitifs intervenant dans les phénomènes de rumeur. Il a ainsi montré
expérimentalement que l’implication inhibait la rétention de certains éléments d’un message
(un contenu impliquant est plus difficile à mémoriser qu’un contenu «neutre» – Rouquette,
1980, p. 201) et cet effet est d’autant plus marqué que ces éléments sont sémantiquement
plus complexes (ibid., p. 209). Ces effets lui ont permis d’avancer l’implication comme un
facteur premier dans l’étiologie des phénomènes de rumeur (ibid., p. 219). Mais ils ont
surtout permis un changement de paradigme – et j’utilise ce terme ici précisément dans le
sens de Kuhn: l’approche que Rouquette a proposée des phénomènes de rumeur, qui les
saisit en tant que modalité d’expression de la pensée sociale, a redéfini l’objet que nous
avons à étudier, les questions à poser et les moyens de les vérifier et l’interprétation des
résultats des recherches.
Ainsi, en montrant comment la réduction spectaculaire subie par les messages relayés
ne saurait être imputée à quelque défaillance ou insuffisance «technologique» que pourrait
prétendre étudier une psychologie générale de la mémoire (Rouquette, 1980, p. 219), il a
placé les phénomènes de rumeur en tant que fait social, c’est‑à‑dire soumis aux conditions
de cognition, communication et sociabilité (Rouquette, 1998a).
C’est précisément ici que s’est opéré le changement de paradigme: les phénomènes de
rumeur sont ainsi devenus objet d’étude pour la psychologie sociale – une certaine psychologie
sociale, celle où le social est irréductible à la somme des individus, celle aussi d’un «Sujet
[…] dont les activités cognitives sont à la fois motivées et conditionnées par son insertion sociale
particulière, autrement dit par sa citoyenneté au sens étymologique du terme; et c’est donc
du côté même de cette insertion [dont un des reflets psychosociaux est l’implication
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ANDREEA ERNST‑VINTILĂ
personnelle – n.d.a.] qu’il convient de rechercher les principes de production et de régulation
de ces activités cognitives» (Rateau et Moliner, 2009, p. 7; Rouquette, 2009, p. 8). «A propos
des rumeurs, les déterminismes sont à rechercher bien davantage dans les situations que
dans les “capacités”, et dans les singularités sociales que dans les universaux individuels»,
avait tranché M.‑L. Rouquette en clôturant le chapitre sur l’implication personnelle de sa
thèse d’Etat (Rouquette, 1980, p. 219).
Résultats récents
Ce que nous avons pu faire depuis a confirmé les intuitions de M.‑L. Rouquette et ses
observations. Nous avons ainsi montré (c’est un «nous» collectif) que la spectaculaire
réduction qu’opérait l’implication personnelle dans le cas des rumeurs intervenait aussi dans
les modalités de raisonnement de la pensée sociale (Guimelli, 2002; Wolter, 2008 etc.:
une variation dans l’implication personnelle entraîne la préférence pour tel ou tel canevas
de raisonnement) et que l’implication personnelle pouvait ainsi affecter, notamment dans
le cas des «objets de peur collective», la mobilisation sélective des modalités d’expression
de la pensée sociale. Ainsi, nous avons pu montrer que dans certaines conditions, l’implication
personnelle conduit à l’abandon des formes plus rationnelles de pensée sociale (les repré­
sentations sociales) au profit de nexus (Rouquette, 1994), qui sont des formes de pensée sociale
situées en amont de la rationalité, plus tranchantes que les représentations, plus affectives,
largement collectives et profondément mobilisatrices, mais dépourvues de prescriptions
comportementales concrètes: résultats de Ernst‑Vintilă, 2007, au sujet du terrorisme; et
Ernst‑Vintilă et Tavani, sous presse, au sujet de la catastrophe nucléaire de Fukushima de
mars 2011. Enfin, nous avons réussi par des données empiriques, obtenues sous sa direction
dans le cadre d’une thèse soutenue en 2005, confirmer, dans un cas de risque collectif
(Gruev‑Vintilă, 2005; Gruev‑Vintilă et Rouquette, 2007), l’intuition que M.‑L. Rouquette
avait posée comme l’hypothèse générale au sujet de l’implication en 1980: «lorsqu’il y a
l’implication [envers un objet social], la structure des représentations correspondantes
comprend davantage de cognèmes (est “enrichie”) et comprend davantage de relations entre
ces cognèmes (“connectivité” élevée de la structure)» (Rouquette, 1980, p. 195).
Mais tout ceci était déjà dans le travail de 1980, nous n’avons eu en vérité à faire que
le travail de seconde génération, administrer la preuve.
L’implication personnelle: chantier récent
Fin 2009, nous avons été quelques uns à être «convoqués» par notre Professeur sur un
chantier au sujet de l’implication personnelle resté encore inédit. En effet, M.‑L. Rouquette
avait proposé en 1997 de considérer deux types ou «niveaux» d’implication: l’implication
culturelle et l’implication factuelle, ou circonstancielle (Rouquette, 1997). L’implication
culturelle (au sens anthropologique du terme), induite par la sociabilité‑même, héritée,
caractéristique d’un groupe social, s’engage sur le long terme et a une emprise collective.
Au contraire, l’implication circonstancielle est activée par une situation, elle est ancrée
dans l’instant présent, et elle a une emprise individuelle. Un programme de recherche lancé
en 2010 se propose d’illustrer les deux niveaux d’implication à partir des points qui les
différencient. Les premiers résultats confirment que l’implication culturelle est liée à
l’emprise sociale et collective (Ernst‑Vintilă, Balan et Lo Monaco, 2010) et à la prise en
L’IMPLICATION PERSONNELLE, VARIABLE EXPLICATIVE MAJEURE DE LA PENSÉE SOCIALE 125
considération des conséquences à plus long terme (Demarque, Lo Monaco, Apostolidis et
Guimelli, 2011), par contraste à l’implication circonstancielle, dont l’emprise est individuelle
et les effets sont locaux, «ici et maintenant». Ce chantier sur les deux niveaux de l’implication
est, comme disait Michel‑Louis Rouquette, «in progress».
J’espère n’avoir rien omis de l’essentiel sur la notion d’implication personnelle. Si c’est
le cas, je demande pardon dans les termes de notre Professeur: «Ils oublient tant de choses
parce qu’ils sont impliqués» (Rouquette, 1980, p. 216).
The Personal Implication, a Major Explanatory Variable
of Social Thinking. Reminders of the Tridimensional Model
Proposed by M.‑L. Rouquette
Abstract: This text suggests a brief retrospective look at personal involvement, 30 years after
M.‑L. Rouquette placed it as a major explicative variable of social thinking. Personal involvement
has become an object of active research and dozens of publications. Here we remind its definition,
most common operationalisation (the tridimensional model), and recent work witnessing its relevance.
Finally, we mention how recent research explores two levels of personal involvement, cultural vs
factual (or circumstancial) involvement, based on their differences.
Key words: personal involvement, tridimensional model, cultural vs factual (circumstancial) involvement
Implicarea personală, variabilă explicativă majoră a gândirii sociale.
Evocarea modelului tridimensional propus de M.‑L. Rouquette
Rezumat: Acest text propune o privire retrospectivă asupra noţiunii de implicare personală, propusă
ca variabilă explicativă majoră a gândirii sociale acum mai bine de 30 de ani de M.‑L. Rouquette,
devenită obiectul unor cercetari active şi în cadrul a zeci de publicaţii. Reamintim definiţia noţiunii,
operaţionalizarea cea mai curentă (modelul tridimensional) şi câteva exemple de cercetări recente
care îi ilustrează importanţa. În sfârşit, evocăm un şantier de cercetare recent care explorează două
niveluri de implicare, cel cultural şi cel factual (sau circumstanţial), plecând de la diferenţele dintre ele.
Cuvinte‑cheie: implicare personală, model tridimensional, implicare culturală vs factuală (circum­
stanţială)
Références
Baggio, S. et Colliard, C. (2006). Tsunami et bien‑être subjectif: effet de l’implication personnelle
et de la sociabilité. Cahiers internationaux de psychologie sociale, 74, 19‑28.
Baggio S. et Rouquette, M.‑L. (2006). La représentation sociale de l’inondation: influence croisée de
la proximité au risque et de l’importance de l’enjeu. Bulletin de psychologie, tome 59 (1), 481.
Demarque, C., Lo Monaco, G., Apostolidis, T. et Guimelli, C. (2011). Socialisation, perspectives
temporelles et implication personnelle: une étude dans le champ de l’environnement.
Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 92, 353‑369.
Ernst‑Vintilă, A. (2009). Le rôle de l’implication personnelle dans l’expression de la pensée sociale
sur les risques collectifs. In M.‑L. Rouquette (ed.), La pensée sociale. Questions théoriques
et recherches appliquées. Ramonville‑Saint‑Agne: Erès, 161‑190.
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ANDREEA ERNST‑VINTILĂ
Ernst‑Vintilă, A., Balan, I. et Lo Monaco, G. (2010). Implication «culturelle» et implication
«factuelle»: une illustration expérimentale. 10ème CIRS, Tunis, juillet 2010.
Ernst‑Vintilă, A., Delouvée, S. et Roland‑Levy, C. (2011). Under threat. Lay thinking about
terrorism. M.‑L. Rouquette and the three‑dimensional model of personal involvement. A
social psychological analysis. Journal of Risk Research, 14, (1‑2), 1‑28.
Flament, C. & Rouquette, M.‑L. (2003). Anatomie des idées ordinaires. Comment étudier les
représentations sociales. Paris: Armand Colin.
Gruev‑Vintilă, A. et Rouquette, M‑L. (2007). Social Thinking about Collective Risk: How Do
Risk‑related practice and Personal Involvement Impact Its Social Representations?. Journal
of Risk Research, 10, (3‑4), 555‑581.
Guimelli, C. (2002). Etude expérimentale du rôle de l’implication de soi dans les modalités de
raisonnement intervenant dans le cadre des représentations sociales. Revue Internationale
de Psychologie Sociale, 15, 1, 129‑162.
Guimelli, C. et Abric, J.‑C. (2007). La représentation sociale de la mondialisation: rôle de
l’implication dans l’organisation des contenus représentationnels et les jugements évaluatifs.
Bulletin de psychologie, 60 (1), 487, 49‑58.
Gurrieri, C., Wolter, R.P. et Sorribas, E. (2007). L’implication personnelle: un outil pour comprendre
le lien population‑objet. Psichologia eM.‑L. Estudo, XII, 2, 423‑432.
Lheureux, F., Lo Monaco, G. et Guimelli, C. (2011). Entre Représentations Sociales et Intentions
de Pratiques: l’Implication. Revista Interamericana de Psicología/Interamerican Journal
of Psychology, 45, 1, 61‑76.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (1980). La Pensée sociale et les phénomènes de rumeurs. Thèse de doctorat d’État,
Université de Provence.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (1988). La Psychologie politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (1994). Chaines magiques. Les maillons de l’appartenance. Neuchatel: Delachaux
et Niestlé.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (1997). La chasse à l’immigré. Violence, mémoire et représentations. Sprimont:
Mardaga.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (1998a). La communication sociale. Paris: Dunod.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (1998b). Les communications de masse. In S. Moscovici (ed.), La psychologie
sociale (pp. 499‑516). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1984, 7éme réédition 1998).
Rouquette, M.‑L. (2006). Représentations sociales, pratiques et implication personnelle: un regard
psychosocial sur l’expérience des Calandretas. In H. Boyer (ed.), De l’école occitane à
l’enseignement public: vécu et représentations sociolinguistiques (pp. 81‑87). Paris:
L’Harmattan.
Rouquette, M.‑L. (2007). Le rôle de l’implication personnelle dans la réception des campagnes
d’information et de prévention. In M.‑L. Rouquette (ed.), Evaluation et perception de
l’exposition à la pollution atmosphérique. Paris: La Documentation Française.
Rouquette M.‑L. et Guimelli, C. (1995). Les «canevas de raisonnement» consécutifs à la mise en
cause d’une représentation sociale: essai de formalisation et étude expérimentale. Cahiers
Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 28, 32‑43.
Rouquette M.‑L. et Rateau, P. (1998). Introduction à l’étude des représentations sociales. Grenoble:
PUG.
Tafani, E., Marfaing, B. et Guimelli, C. (2006). Rôle de l’implication et des émotions dans le
traitement et la diffusion d’un message: une approche expérimentale des rumeurs. Cahiers
Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 70, 2, 3‑20.
Wolter, R.P., Gurrieri, C. et Sorribas, E. (2009). Empirical illustration of the hierarchical organi­
sation of social thought: A domino effect?. Revista Interamericana de Psicología, 43 (1), 1‑11.
III. NOTE
Adrian Neculau1
Porto: Colocviul, oraşul şi o capitală europeană
a culturii (Guimarães)
9e Colloque International de Psychologie Sociale
en Langue Française
În 2008 s‑a desfăşurat la Iaşi al VII‑lea congres ADRIPS (asociaţie europeană a psihosociolo­
gilor de limba franceză), înscriind Iaşul pe o hartă pretenţioasă, după ce precedentele
întâlniri s‑au desfăşurat la Montréal, Torino, Atena, Valencia, Lausanne, Grenoble. După
Iaşi, a urmat Nisa, iar pentru anul acesta a fost ales oraşul portughez Porto. Organizatoarea
de acolo, profesoara Gabrielle Poeschl, văzând că nu m‑am înscris, mi‑a scris, întrebându‑mă
dacă nu vreau totuşi să particip, ea fusese la Iaşi şi a fost impresionată de organizarea
noastră. Şi aşa am ajuns la Porto, capitala provinciei Norte, un oraş de peste un milion de
locuitori, pitoresc, asaltat de turişti. Dacă nu participam la congres, exact la începutul lunii
iulie (1‑4), nu aş fi avut şansa să vizitez una dintre cele două capitale europene ale culturii,
în 2012, Guimarães. Şi nici să cunosc viaţa unui oraş care nu seamănă deloc cu Lisabona,
cu sudul Portugaliei.
Obiectivele colocviului au fost acelea de a provoca dezbateri şi de a facilita prezentarea
unor cercetări care să pună în valoare zona francofonă a psihologiei sociale, diferite centre
de cercetări şi echipe; se înţelege, şi să stimuleze schimbul de informaţii, să pună în contact
cercetătorii comunităţii ştiinţifice internaţionale care utilizează limba franceză ca mijloc de
contact. Mai ales, din câte mi‑am dat seama, să stimuleze tinerii cercetători, doctoranzi
sau universitari la debut de carieră. Decupez din raportul final asupra congresului, pe care
Gabrielle Poeschl mi l‑a pus la dispoziţie cu amabilitate, următoarele date: din totalul comu­
nicărilor supuse Comisiei Ştiinţifice au fost selectate 239, prezentate în 63 de simpozioane
şi sesiuni de comunicări, având 632 de autori provenind din Algeria, Belgia, Brazilia,
Canada, Chile, Elveţia, Franţa, Grecia, Italia, Noua Zeelandă, Polonia, Portugalia, România,
Spania, SUA şi Turcia. A mai fost o masă rotundă luând în dezbatere perspectivele viitoare
ale difuzării cercetărilor ştiinţifice în psihologia socială (animată de Patrick Rateau, Willem
Doise, Ewa Drozda‑Senkowska, Dominique Müller, Pascal Pansu, François Ric) şi o sesiune
de omagiere a lui Robert‑Vincent Joule, de la Universitatea Aix‑Marseille, căruia foştii
doctoranzi i‑au adus un omagiu plin de miez şi afecţiune. Între cei 17 doctoranzi figura şi
Luminiţa Samson, de la Universitatea din Bălţi, aflată atunci la Iaşi cu o bursă postdoctorală
francofonă. La Porto au fost prezenţi 232 de participanţi, mi se pare că ceva mai mulţi ca
la Iaşi, cu câteva zeci. Dar la Iaşi a fost o mai mare densitate de personalităţi care au lipsit
1. Universitatea „Al.I. Cuza”, Iaşi, România; [email protected].
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la Porto şi consemnez aici câteva nume de notorietate: Jean‑Pierre Deconchy, Michel‑Louis
Rouquette, Nicole Dubois (atunci preşedinte al ADRIPS), Jean‑Claude Deschamps, Christian
Guimelli, Christine Roland‑Lévy, Xenia Chryssochoou, André Sirota. Într‑o vizită de
explorare, pentru a evalua condiţiile de la Iaşi, a fost şi Jean‑Léon Beauvois. Între cei
prezenţi atunci amintesc şi numele câtorva români vizibili în Franţa: Andreea Vintila, Irena
Talaban, Radu Clit, Constantina Badea.
Conferinţa plenară de deschidere a fost susţinută de profesorul Emanuele Castano, de
la New School for Social Research din New York („Tout ce que vous avez toujours voulu
savoir sur la mort, sans oser jamais le demander”), un om tânăr, creativ, atractiv. Cea de
închidere a fost încredinţată profesorului Richard Y. Bourhis, de la Universitatea Québec
din Montréal („Relations intergroupes entre les minorités immigrantes et la majorité
d’accueil dominante: Le modèle d’acculturation interactif”), bine cunoscut la noi, datorită
unui manual tradus la Editura Polirom, pe care l‑am întâlnit după mulţi ani şi cu care am
avut un profitabil schimb de idei, la banchetul de gală de la elegantul Grand Hotel do Porto,
de pe Rua de Santa Catarina.
Între temele prezentate în simpozioane şi sesiuni ştiinţifice au figurat: compararea
socială, atitudinile, impactul emoţiilor asupra regularizării şi partajului social, persuasiunea,
disonanţa socială, reprezentările sociale (mai multe simpozioane şi sesiuni), educaţia,
sănătatea, identitatea, organizarea muncii, dominanţa, normativitatea şi coeziunea socială,
judecata socială, mediul, sexismul şi genurile, stereotipurile, sinele, lumea justă, devianţa,
aculturaţia şi discriminarea, procesele sociocognitive, comunicarea, normele şi influenţa
socială, metodologia. În ce mă priveşte, am participat cu o comunicare la simpozionul de
istoria psihologiei (textul intervenţiei mele este publicat în acest număr). Mi s‑au pus
întrebări, au arătat interes îndeosebi colegi cunoscuţi din ţări care au trecut prin momente
dramatice în existenţa lor, cum ar fi Spania, Brazilia, Algeria. Puţini din Europa veche,
doar colegi tineri. În acelaşi simpozion, Willem Doise a prezentat un interesant punct de
vedere asupra psihologiei sociale în fosta RDG în perioada Zidului Berlinului.
Manifestarea s‑a desfăşurat într‑o atmosferă de convivialitate şi deschidere, beneficiind
şi de o supervizare socioafectivă plină de umor din partea noului preşedinte ADRIPS,
Thierry‑Marcel Meyer, de la Universitatea Paris Ouest Nanterre, a profesorului Patrick
Rateau, tradus şi cunoscut în România (cred că e acum trezorier) şi a comitetului local, în
frunte cu omniprezenta şi neobosita Gabrielle Poeschl şi colegul său José M. Marques, cel
care a susţinut la Iaşi conferinţa de închidere.
Porto, o civilizaţie!
Porto e un oraş extrem de dinamic, bogat, caracteristici ale oraşelor nordice din ţările aflate
în sudul Europei. Industrii, comerţ, agricultură, învăţământ, totul e aici alert. E cunoscut
mai ales prin textile (bumbac), metalurgie (tehnica fonderiei), industria chimică, alimentară,
pielăriei, ceramică şi artizanat (orfevrărie). Spre deosebire însă de marile oraşe din Europa,
preţurile nu te inhibă, uneori sunt chiar atractive. Aproape totul ni s‑a părut mai ieftin decât
la noi, se poate lua masa la un restaurant bun, meniu complet, cu doar 4‑5 euro. E plin de
turişti, mai ales francezi, toată lumea ştie un pic de franceză, în magazine sau pe stradă,
inclusiv vânzătoarele din piaţă. Dacă ceri o explicaţie pe stradă, cel întrebat nu numai că e
amabil, dar te conduce o vreme să‑ţi arate mai exact direcţia, să‑ţi explice. Nu sunt cerşetori,
n‑am văzut nici „muzicanţi” balcanici, o decenţă demnă te primeşte cu calm şi te asigură
că te poţi simţi în siguranţă. Criză, declin economic? Nu sunt semne exterioare. Portughezii
PORTO: COLOCVIUL, ORAŞUL ŞI O CAPITALĂ EUROPEANĂ A CULTURII (GUIMARÃES)
131
de pe stradă sunt calmi, serioşi; sunt cei mai sobri europeni din Vest, funcţionarii nu renunţă
la costume închise şi cravată, nici chiar în timpul verii, iar femeile au un aer de doamne
care se respectă. Deşi relieful e deluros, se urcă şi se coboară pante abrupte, au metrou şi
funcţionează fără greş. O plimbare cu unul dintre autobuzele de turism, la etaj, ghidat de
explicaţii transmise în cască, îţi dezvăluie bogăţia monumentelor şi semnificaţiile identitare
ale acestora. Un mic amănunt despre acest soi de turism: o umbrelă uitată la coborâre a
fost recuperată a doua zi; fapt banal. Opriri pentru fotografii, precum cea de la Podul
Maria Pia, un mare viaduct feroviar care traversează Douro, un arc metalic proiectat de
compania de construcţii Eiffel & Co., deschis în 1877. Un fel de turn Eiffel pe orizontală.
Un climat social‑psihologic permisiv şi creativ a favorizat dezvoltarea artelor, muzicii,
sporturilor. Din lunga listă a personalităţilor născute şi formate aici am selectat doar două:
José Saramago, scriitorul şi jurnalistul care a luat Premiul Nobel pentru Literatură în 1998
(am la capătul patului Toate numele, tradusă la Editura Polirom în 2011, din care citesc
câteva pagini în fiecare seară) şi José Mourinho, cunoscutul antrenor de fotbal care şi‑a
început cariera la FC Porto.
Un bilet pe două zile (urci şi cobori când vrei şi unde vrei) asigură şi o vizită la o cramă
de pe malul celălalt al râului Douro. Sunt mai multe, fiecare cu specificul său. Noi am
nimerit la Casa Croft, fondată în 1678 de un englez, care a dus peste hotare faima vinului
de Porto. Unul dintre descendenţi, mort în 1935, ar fi spus nişte vorbe celebre: „Timpul
care a trecut fără să fi băut un pahar de vin de Porto este timp pierdut!”. Strugurii sunt
recoltaţi din zonă, de pe plantaţii celebre din valea Douro, şi preparaţi după reţete vechi,
strict controlate. Acest vin celebru este fructul unei alianţe fericite între climat (ierni reci
şi veri calde şi aride), sol (roşu, bine nutrit, dar obligând viţa să se înrădăcineze adânc) şi
calitatea viţei. Cantitatea e limitată, rar depăşind o jumătate de litru de vin pe butuc. Dar
e bogat şi concentrat. Iar vinul, depozitat în pivniţe vechi, săpate în stânca de pe malul
râului Douro, are un şarm inimitabil, dens şi puternic, fructuos şi amplu. E un vin lucrat,
i se întrerupe la un moment dat fermentaţia, mai târziu este alcoolizat, se extrage atâta
tanin şi aromă cât e necesar. Într‑o excursie de o jumătate de oră, grupurile fiind formate
în funcţie de limbile vorbite de vizitatori, se explică procesul de fermentaţie şi de fabricaţie,
tehnica veche a prelucrării, păstrându‑se obiceiurile vechi; ni se dau informaţii despre
importanţa butoaielor de stejar şi a mediului oxidant, despre procedeele îmbătrânirii în
butoaie de lemn, proces ce durează de la patru la şase ani. Se sugerează apoi criterii de
apreciere, insistându‑se pe caracteristicile acestui vin, pe stilul, complexitatea şi caracterul
său inimitabil, de la aromă şi savoarea intrinsecă până la momentul servirii (de regulă ca
aperitiv) şi al etichetei cuvenite. La ieşire suntem invitaţi să degustăm două sorturi de vin,
alb şi rosé, în jurul unor măsuţe‑butoaie sau pe o terasă, afară, din pahare de cristal care
pun în valoare culoarea şi armonia acestui dar al naturii deloc comun. Nu e un vin pentru
băutori, ci pentru spirite alese.
Guimarães: aqui nasceu Portugal
Guimarães e un orăşel de cincizeci de mii de locuitori, la doar 40 de kilometri de Porto.
În Portugalia, o reţea densă de căi ferate, bine administrată, te pune în legătură comodă cu
tot ce e în jurul marilor oraşe. Trenurile circulă fără întârzieri, conductorii sunt extrem de
politicoşi, atenţi, civilizaţi. Spre Guimarães sunt trenuri din oră în oră, vagoane elegante,
curate, deloc „inscripţionate”, ca în alte ţări europene. Iar preţurile sunt extrem de mici,
nu numai la transport, neverosimil pentru cineva care vine dintr‑un loc unde scumpetea e
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galopantă. La cumpărarea biletelor se acordă, automat, numai pe baza cărţii de identitate,
o reducere de 50% tuturor seniorilor din UE. Ei ţi‑o propun, examinându‑te.
La Guimarães s‑a născut statul portughez, această inscripţie se găseşte imprimată cu
litere mari pe un zid vechi, motiv pentru care l‑am împrumutat şi eu, ca titlu pentru aceste
însemnări. E un vechi orăşel medieval ale cărui rădăcini se găsesc în secolul X, atunci când
a fost construită aici o mănăstire, pol de atracţie pentru populaţia din zonă, tentată să se
aşeze în jur. Apoi s‑a construit un castel, la mică distanţă, pe o colină, creând cel de‑al
doilea centru de fixaţie. S‑a deschis apoi o stradă, între castel şi mănăstire, Rua de Santa
Maria. Iată şi oraşul. Locul a devenit treptat un sanctuar reputat şi o atracţie pentru pelerini,
au apărut ziduri de apărare, viaţa oraşului s‑a organizat cu temei, s‑au construit biserici,
s‑a deschis în mijlocul urbei o piaţă largă; câteva secole au însemnat o transformare lentă,
prin adăugire. Toate schimbările urbanistice, ameliorări şi restaurări, au fost bine controlate,
ceea ce a permis conservarea unui magnific centru istoric. Nimic nu s‑a dărâmat, mai ales
pentru a construi blocuri oribile, ca în alte părţi!
N‑am să înşirui numele tuturor fondatorilor şi constructorilor, desigur importanţi pentru
istoria acestei mici ţări, fapt e că de aici a pornit istoria regilor Portugaliei. De aceste locuri
se leagă multe evenimente, aici s‑au desfăşurat bătălii, au fost consemnate fapte eroice.
Castelul a devenit un nod al conflictelor şi proiectelor de dezvoltare, loc al iniţiativelor în
centrul cărora s‑a găsit, totdeauna, regalitatea portugheză. După ce şi‑a pierdut din impor­
tanţa defensivă, a început şi degradarea treptată, până în secolul XX, când, clasat monument
istoric, a cunoscut lucrări de restaurare şi a devenit loc de pelerinaj. Când l‑am vizitat, am
întâlnit un furnicar de oameni care urcau şi coborau pe metereze, majoritatea autohtoni
care se impregnau de identitatea naţională. În centrul oraşului, pe un zid impunător, o
inscripţie ce nu poate să scape nici unui vizitator: AQUI NASCEU PORTUGAL.
Palatul Ducilor de Bragança, astăzi muzeu, are dimensiuni impresionante, a fost conceput
ca un edificiu fortificat, cu arhitectură seniorială. Abandonat un timp, a fost refăcut în 1937
şi transformat în muzeu. Viaţa la o curte bogată este reconstituită în toate amănuntele,
mobilierul, obiectele decorative, tapiseriile, tablourile, totul reuşeşte să ofere o imagine de
ansamblu asupra vieţii cotidiene şi normelor de etichetă ale unei importante reşedinţe
medievale. Turişti, grupuri cărora li se vorbeşte în toate limbile europene, dar şi mulţi
portughezi, cred că asta m‑a impresionat cel mai mult.
Centrul medieval e conservat în toată splendoarea lui: străzi înguste, o reţea în care te
pierzi, balcoane din fier forjat, mici restaurante în vechi clădiri sau pieţe, biserici‑bijuterii,
bogate, care inspiră respect, nimic însă ostentativ. Impresionează mai ales piaţa centrală,
Largo do Toural, inima cetăţii, creată în secolul al XVII‑lea, în afara zidurilor medievale.
Clădirile nu sunt foarte înalte, dar impun prin arhitectura lor omogenă, relativ uniformă,
dar reliefată prin grilajuri de fier forjat. O civilizaţie a fierului prelucrat cu gust, deloc
ostentativ, îşi pune amprenta pe toate clădirile mai importante. S‑o luăm pe Rua D. João I,
către ieşirea din oraş, în direcţia Porto. Case vechi, oarecum vetuste, sobre, perfect
conservate şi îngrijite; iar construcţia în memoria regelui al cărui nume îl poartă strada,
cu un baldachin în stil Renaissance, conferă personalitate acestei artere pline de mişcare.
Casele de pe Rua Nova, cu trei etaje şi grădină, unele renovate, altele în curs de restaurare,
ne oferă o imagine despre ceea ce a însemnat o stradă medievală, iniţiativă pedagogică ce
atrage şi educă, mai ales pe cei tineri. Restaurările şi consolidările nu afectează deloc
faţadele, ele se conservă, clădirile sunt modernizate în interior, dar nu se atinge nimeni de
spiritul iniţial al construcţiilor, mărturii ale unei civilizaţii de care portughezii se simt
mândri. Vechea primărie, construită în secolul al XV‑lea, cu arcadele ei maiestuoase şi
plafonul în lemn pictat, în Piaţa Măslinilor, impresionează omul modern, născut şi crescut
PORTO: COLOCVIUL, ORAŞUL ŞI O CAPITALĂ EUROPEANĂ A CULTURII (GUIMARÃES) 133
printre blocuri. Piaţa Santiago, largă, pitorească, dă mărturie despre locuinţele medievale
de tip popular. Casa Lobo Machado, în stil rocaille, din secolul al XVII‑lea, realizată în
granit, material tipic regiunii, contrastează admirabil cu albul pereţilor şi conferă o nobleţe
aparte, discretă, acestui edificiu în care e instalată astăzi Asociaţia de comerţ şi industrie
a oraşului. Bisericile, multe şi bogate, fiecare cu o personalitate aparte, unele foarte vechi
şi sobre, altele relativ „moderne”, îndrăzneţe, de doar câteva secole, impun prin importanţa
ce li s‑a conferit cândva şi o păstrează şi astăzi. Portugalia e, poate, ţara din Vest în care
biserica joacă încă un rol important în societate.
Am scris aceste rânduri provocat şi de iniţiativa unui grup de oameni de cultură care
se gândesc că Iaşul ar putea să devină, cândva, capitală culturală. Trăiesc în Iaşi de 55 de
ani, am mai prins vechea Piaţă a Unirii, străduţele cu prăvălii care dădeau farmec vechii
cetăţi, monumente şi case emblematice. Totul sau aproape totul a fost ras. Nici măcar Cuza
Vodă, care mai păstrează ceva din stilul vechiului oraş, n‑a fost recondiţionată. Ce am putea
arăta în centrul Iaşului? Blocurile oribile din Piaţa Unirii, Palas, noile borduri? Înainte
de a insista, îi rog pe tinerii care, ştiu bine, iubesc ca şi mine Iaşul să facă o vizită la
Guimarães.
Gabrielle Poeschl, José M. Marques
Tendances actuelles de la recherche en psychologie
sociale de langue française.
Retour sur le 9e Colloque International de l’ADRIPS
tenu à Porto en juillet 2012
L’été 2012 aura été l’été de la psychologie sociale au Portugal. Trois réunions interna­tionales
se sont en effet succédé dans diverses universités du pays. Tout d’abord, Evora a accueilli
la Conférence Internationale sur les Représentations Sociales du 25 au 28 juin, puis le
séminaire international «Narratives and social memory: Theoretical and methodological
approaches» a eu lieu à Braga du 29 au 30 juin. Enfin, le 9e Colloque International de
Psychologie Sociale en Langue Française s’est tenu à Porto du 1er au 4 juillet.
Le colloque de Porto, tout comme les réunions d’Evora et de Braga, a fourni aux
participants l’occasion de prendre connaissance des plus récents développements de la
recherche actuellement menée en psychologie sociale, ainsi que de renouer ou d’établir de
toujours enrichissantes relations de collaboration. Cependant, si les réunions d’Evora et de
Braga avaient été organisées autour d’une problématique définie, tel n’était pas le cas du
colloque de Porto, où seule la langue française constituait le point commun entre les
participants. Il nous a donc semblé intéressant d’examiner quels ont été les sujets le plus
souvent abordés par les psychologues sociaux qui présentaient à Porto les dernières avancées
de leurs lignes de recherche.
Mentionnons tout d’abord les thèmes sélectionnés par les deux conférenciers invités.
Ainsi, Emanuele Castano, de la New School for Social Research de New York, a ouvert le
colloque en se proposant de répondre à «Tout ce que vous avez toujours voulu savoir sur la
mort, sans jamais oser le demander». Pour sa part, Richard Bourhis, de l’Université du
Québec à Montréal, a clos la réunion en présentant ses travaux sur les relations intergroupes
entre les minorités immigrantes et la majorité d’accueil dominante, ainsi que son modèle
d’acculturation interactif.
Entre ces deux conférences, sept plages horaires comportant chacune six sessions
parallèles de communications orales, ainsi que deux sessions de communications affichées
proposant chacune vingt posters se sont déroulées. Pour avoir un aperçu des problématiques
abordées qui, sans constituer un échantillon représentatif de la recherche actuelle en
psychologie sociale, apportent néanmoins un éclairage sur les orientations de recherche
présentes au colloque de Porto, nous avons analysé les 226 titres de l’ensemble des
communications (orales ou affichées) proposées. Les mots les plus fréquents sont ordonnés
dans le Tableau 1.
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GABRIELLE POESCHL, JOSÉ M. MARQUES
Tableau 1. Mots apparaissant dans les titres des communications
Social
Effet
Rôle
Groupe
Attitude/attitudinal
Identité/identitaire
Comportement/comportemental
Représentation
Emotion/émotionnel
Stéréotype/stéréotypé
Personne
Norme/normatif
Valeur
Menace
Contexte
Comparaison
Femme
Discrimination/discriminatoire
Etude
Cognitif
Handicap/handicapé
Perception
62
43
20
19
18
17
16
16
15
15
14
13
13
13
12
12
11
11
10
10
10
10
On peut constater sans surprise, de la liste de mots contenue dans le tableau, que tous les
concepts fondamentaux de la psychologie sociale (comme, par exemple, les concepts d’attitude,
de norme ou de valeur) ont été référés dans beaucoup de titres et que les communications
sont portés aussi bien sur les comportements, les émotions ou les cognitions. Les femmes,
ainsi que les personnes souffrant d’un handicap, figurent également toujours parmi les
groupes sociaux particulièrement dignes d’attention.
Parmi les 3.608 mots présents dans les titres, 1.136 sont différents, ce qui révèle une
extrême richesse de langage. En dépit de cette profusion de termes, l’analyse des titres
réalisée avec le programme Alceste a permis d’en extraire huit classes de mots, renvoyant
aux principaux thèmes traités. Il ressort ainsi de cette analyse que les travaux présentés
s’inscrivent avant tout dans des lignes de recherche portant, par ordre d’importance, sur
les représentations sociales, le jugement social, l’étude des personnes en situation de
handicap, la réaction à la déviance, la dissonance cognitive, les biais intergroupes et les
stéréotypes, le changement d’attitude et de comportement, l’identité (minoritaire ou menacée).
S’il est vrai que ces lignes de recherche sont loin de représenter l’ensemble des travaux
menés par les psychologues sociaux, il n’en reste pas moins qu’elles s’affirment parmi les
grandes tendances actuelles de la psychologie sociale en langue française.
Relevons pour terminer que divers moments du colloque de Porto ont aussi été consacrés
à la vie ou aux préoccupations de la communauté des psychologues sociaux de langue
française. Outre l’Assemblée générale de l’ADRIPS qui s’est déroulée le mardi, une table
ronde a permis de débattre de la diffusion scientifique de la recherche en psychologie
sociale, et un hommage a été rendu à Robert‑Vincent Joule, de l’Université de Provence
TENDANCES ACTUELLES DE LA RECHERCHE EN PSYCHOLOGIE SOCIALE...
137
(Aix‑Marseille), dont les travaux constituent, comme on le sait, une contribution importante
à la psychologie sociale.
Pour notre part, nous avons été heureux de pouvoir participer à la vie de la communauté
des chercheurs francophones et francophiles, en cherchant à contribuer, à court terme, au
bon déroulement du 9e Colloque International de Psychologie Sociale en Langue Française
et, à long terme, au développement de la psychologie sociale en langue française.
Joaquim Pires Valentim1
Un compte rendu sur la 11e Conférence Internationale
sur les Représentations Sociales
La 11e Conférence Internationale sur les Représentations Sociales (CIRS) a eu lieu du 25 au 29
juin 2012. Il s’agit d’un rencontre devenu régulier par la suite des réunions précédentes qui
ont commencé à Ravello, en 1992, et qui, après, ont eu lieu tous les deux ans, successivement,
à Rio de Janeiro (Brésil), à Aix‑en‑Provence (France), à Mexico (Mexique), à Montréal
(Canada), à Stirling (Grande Bretagne), à Guadalajara (Mexique), à Rome (Italie), à Bali
(Indonésie) et à Tunis (Tunisie).
Cette fois‑ci ce rendez‑vous entre les chercheurs qui travaillent dans le domaine des repré­
sentations sociales s’est déroulé à Evora, ville historique classée comme Patrimoine Culturel
de l’Humanité depuis 1986, située bien au cœur de l’Alentejo, dans la région sud du Portugal.
Le thème organisateur des travaux de cette Conférence a été «Représentations sociales
et sociétés en mutation» et les sessions ont été organisées selon dix «axes thématiques»:
1) Questions théoriques et méthodologiques; 2) Problèmes découlant de la globalisation;
3) Crises économiques, sociales, politiques, culturelles; 4) Relations intergroupes – des
communautés aux régions, aux sociétés; 5) Problèmes dans les domaines spécifiques de la
santé, de l’éducation, de l’environnement et de la justice; 6) Relations intergénérationnelles;
7) Mémoire collective et sociale; 8) Médias, communication, discours, publicité;
9) Stigmatisation et discrimination et 10) Science, technologie et nouvelles pratiques sociales.
Simultanément a eu lieu le 3e Colloque Luso‑Brésilien de la Santé, de l’Education et des
Représentations Sociales et le 5e Forum International de la Santé, le Vieillissement et les
Représentations Sociales.
Le format de la 11e CIRS a compris des conférences plénières (key lectures), qui ont
été assurées par José Alberto Machado, János László, Willem Doise, Jaan Valsiner, James
Liu, Christian Staerklé, Ivana Marková, Dorra Ben Alaya, Jorge Vala, Angela Arruda et Denise
Jodelet. Ces conférences ont été précédées d’une présentation du conférencier et suivies
d’une discussion du contenu. En multiples sessions parallèles, il y a eu 68 symposiums,
433 communications libres organisées en sessions thématiques, 121 posters, 4 tables rondes,
un séminaire de formation et 6 réunions scientifiques spécifiques (Jesuíno, 2012).
Et la Conférence n’a pas été seulement des présentations et discussions scientifiques. Le
symbolique a été bien marqué avec l’attribution d’un Doctorat Honoris Causa par l’Université
de Evora à Serge Moscovici dans une cérémonie qui a eu lieu le matin du 27 juin.
La Conférence a été aussi l’occasion pour rappeler ceux qui ne sont plus entre nous et
leur rendre hommage: Michel‑Louis Rouquette et Javier Uribe. Ce que nous ignorions
c’est que ce moment de tristesse ne finirait pas là. En fait, il faut encore apprendre la mort
1. Université de Coimbra.
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JOAQUIM PIRES VALENTIM
de Jean‑Claude Abric, moins de trois mois après la CIRS dans laquelle il a participé, malgré
sa maladie, avec une visible vitalité.
742 personnes ont participé dans toutes ces activités avec un rythme impressionnant,
car les travaux commençaient à 9,00 h du matin et se prolongeaient jusqu’à 20,30 h. Non
seulement la diversité géographique d’origine des participants a été remarquable, mais
surtout il faut signaler la diversité linguistique, car les langues de la Conférence ont été le
portugais, l’anglais et le français. Il s’agit d’une ouverture qui n’est pas si fréquente
aujourd’hui dans les grands événements scientifiques de la psychologie, où les autres langues
cèdent, de plus en plus, la place à l’anglais. Ça ne veut pas dire que l’affaiblissement du
rôle des autres langues au‑delà de l’anglais est un fait consensuel. Loin de ça (cf., par exemple,
Doise, 2012). Mais l’acceptation de cette diversité linguistique est devenue aussi une marque
distinctive des rencontres en représentations sociales. Au‑delà des autres questions que cette
diversité géographique et linguistique soulève, elle trouve un rôle particulier dans les études
sur les représentations sociales, étant donnée la place centrale qu’y prennent les dimensions
culturelle, historique, de communication et de signification, dans les «métasystèmes»
descriptifs et explicatifs. En outre, ça peut aider – et au moins ça ne doit pas l’empêcher – un
mouvement dans le sens de ce que mutatis mutandis Festinger avait déjà défendu du passage
«d’une psychologie sociale des États Unis» à une «psychologie sociale des êtres humains»
(Moscovici et Marková, 2006, p. 17).
Un autre point qui ne sera pas une simple curiosité: il s’agissait de la première des
CIRS 50 ans après la première édition de l’ouvrage princeps de Serge Moscovici (1961).
Un demi‑siècle après, à mon avis, il faut registrer la vitalité dont ce champ de recherches
a fait épreuve à Evora. En fait, même s’il ne s’agit pas d’une conception dominante en
psychologie sociale (bien au contraire), on doit signaler comme un nombre si grand de
chercheurs continue à faire son travail scientifique en utilisant les concepts et les méthodes
provenant des différentes approches dans le champ des représentations sociales. Le temps
le dira. Mais je suis convaincu que, sur cet aspect, la Conférence de Évora a été encourageante
par sa capacité de renouvellement, d’ouverture et même d’attirer de jeunes chercheurs dans
un contexte difficile.
Bien sûr, il faut reconnaître que cette vitalité va parfois de pair avec des faiblesses qui
donnent le flanc aux critiques de la théorie, notamment à celles qui lui reprochent de rester
au niveau de simples généralités vagues qui risquent de persister, par une voie banale, dans
ce que Bourdieu et Passeron (1970/s.d., p. 59) avaient déjà critiqué comme traduisant «la
naïveté des philosophies sociales du consensus» auxquelles il faut «échapper». Pourtant, à
mon avis, si c’est sûr que ce problème existe dans le domaine, ça n’a pas été la marque de
la CIRS d’Evora. Bien au contraire. Elle était pleine de travaux sur de nouveaux thèmes,
problèmes et défis, qui peuvent très bien se constituer comme des points de départ – ancrés
dans les travaux de nature déjà classiques –, capables de renouveler et d’ouvrir de nouveaux
horizons, de bâtir de nouveaux chemins et thermes épistémologiques, théoriques et méthodo­
logiques, notamment en dialogue avec autres disciplines qui, au‑delà de la psychologie
sociale, peuvent être aussi proches du domaine des représentations sociales.
On ne peut passer en silence l’extraordinaire capacité de travail, d’ingéniosité et de
patience dont nos collègues organisateurs de l’Université de Evora ont donné épreuve pour
résoudre le possible et l’impossible de toutes les demandes qui sont tombées sur eux. Et
je pense que c’est juste de registrer ici l’importance de Jorge Correia Jesuíno dans tout ce
processus. Bien avant le début de cette CIRS, il a été décisif comme organisateur et
particulièrement comme un persistant et clairvoyant mobilisateur de capacités et d’énergies.
Cherchant, avec un art et une sagesse particuliers et très efficaces, que chacune et chacun
UN COMPTE RENDU SUR LA 11E CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE...
141
puissent donner ce que de meilleur et de spécifique elle ou il pouvait donner, son rôle a
été décisif. Car ça a été fondamental pour assurer un saut qualitatif important, ambitionné
pour chacun de ces rencontres.
Il nous faut attendre maintenant les publications des travaux présentés à la 11e CIRS qui
méritent et doivent être publiés. Attendons ces éditions tandis que ceux qui font de la
recherche dans le domaine des représentations sociales savent déjà que la prochaine CIRS,
en 2014 – nous l’avons appris à Evora –, aura lieu au Brésil, à São Paulo.
Références
Bourdieu, P., Passeron, J.‑C. (1970/s.d.). A Reprodução. Elementos para uma teoria do sistema
de ensino (C.G. Silva, trad. portugaise). Lisboa: Vega.
Doise, W. (2012). On a persistent failure in the recent policy of the EASP. European Bulletin of
Social Psychology, 24 (1), 8‑10.
Jesuíno, J.C. (2012, June). Opening Ceremony. 11st International Conference on Social Representations.
Evora, Portugal.
Moscovici, S. (1961). La psychanalyse, son image et son public. Paris: PUF.
Moscovici, S., Marková, I. (2006). The Making of Modern Social Psychology. The Hidden Story
of How an International Social Science was Created. Cambridge: Polity Press.
IV. EVOCARE
Serge Moscovici
Jean‑Claude Abric – Une évocation
Cher(e)s collègues et ami(e)s,
C’est un choc affectif profond que j’ai ressenti en apprenant la mort de Jean‑Claude
Abric. Notre rencontre remonte à plus d’un demi siècle et diverses images traversent mon
souvenir de tout ce temps écoulé, images toujours marquées par les mêmes qualités de
l’homme et du chercheur auquel j’ai toujours été attaché. Celle d’abord de l’assistant de
recherche qui avait rejoint notre Laboratoire de psychologie sociale, créé rue de la Sorbonne,
par Daniel Lagache, avant de m’aider à mettre sur pieds celui que j’ai fondé à la VIe Section
de l’Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, devenue depuis l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en
Sciences Sociales. Il y resta en tant que Chef de Travaux jusqu’à son départ pour l’Université
d’Aix‑en‑Provence.
Esprit curieux, inventif, ouvert, il s’est intéressé et a pris part à tout ce que nous
entreprenions sur les représentations sociales: les recherches sur le corps mais surtout les
premières recherches expérimentales concernant l’influence des représentations sur les
comportements en situation de jeu qu’il a prolongées par ses propres travaux sur la
coopération et la compétition. Ceux‑ci furent à la base de sa thèse de Doctorat d’Etat, l’une
des premières, sinon la première, de sa génération. Je me rappelle qu’il prenait un plaisir
amusé à dire sa fierté d’être le premier Docteur d’Etat de sa région. Derrière son humour,
pointaient son enracinement terrien et sa fidélité à ses origines. Deux qualités qui vont se
retrouver dans toute son activité et toute son œuvre comme dans ses relations amicales et
professionnelles.
L’enracinement dans la réalité fait la force de sa contribution à l’étude des représentations
sociales, la fidélité n’a jamais cessé de s’affirmer, faisant de lui une personne inspirant au
premier chef la confiance, qualité rare. Jean‑Claude est quelqu’un en qui j’ai toujours eu
confiance et il ne m’a jamais démenti. Nombreuses ont été les occasions où il l’a justifiée
et les coopérations scientifiques qu’il a établies avec d’autres la confirment. Mais quand je
pense à lui, l’image qui domine est celle de l’homme de foi, de passion. Il a su suivre avec
rigueur et ténacité une voie, raison pour laquelle il a joué un rôle important dans la
psychologie sociale française.
Abric a su élargir le champ des représentations sociales et restituer à notre discipline
une pertinence sociale. A la différence de Durkheim qui a développé sa théorie des
représentations à propos de phénomènes sociaux comme la religion qui sont de nature
subtile, spirituelle ou idéelle, Abric a porté son attention sur le champ des pratiques sociales
concrètes. Unissant le souci théorique et l’envie d’intervenir dans les affaires humaines, il
voyait dans la psychologie sociale une pratique sociale qu’il a réalisée avec talent dans ses
applications à divers domaines d’activité. Et quand il s’occupait de cognition, ce n’était
pas d’un point de vue logique mais en tant qu’elle a un répondant dans l’action. De ce fait,
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SERGE MOSCOVICI
il a donné à la psychologie sociale la capacité de résoudre des problèmes courants et sa
véritable portée sociale.
Jean‑Claude Abric ne s’est pas contenté d’être un authentique psychologue social, il fut
aussi un véritable pédagogue dont témoignent le rayonnement de son œuvre et l’impact
qu’il a eu dans divers pays. Il a rendu le concept de représentation sociale accessible et par
là a contribué à sa diffusion. Ses qualités de synthèse des concepts et des modèles proposés
pour l’étude des représentations sociales, l’intégration harmonieuse qu’il réalisait entre les
structures abstraites et les données de l’expérience concrète ont ouvert l’accès de notre
champ à de nombreux chercheurs qui ont pu reproduire les approches qu’il diffusait et
produire des résultats éclairants sur leur propre réalité. La clarté et la rectitude de son style ont
été pour beaucoup dans l’applicabilité de ses propositions et dans sa force de transmission.
Parler de force est sans doute la manière la plus juste de parler de Jean‑Claude. Il avait
une force de vie dont il a fait montre non seulement dans les différentes facettes de son
existence, mais aussi de manière exemplaire dans la maladie. Une force de vie qui a animé
toute sa créativité. Nous lui en seront pour toujours reconnaissants.
J’adresse mes plus sincères condoléances à sa famille et à tous nos amis dont je partage
l’affliction.
Adrian Neculau , Mihai Curelaru
In memoriam Jean‑Claude Abric
Ne‑a părăsit, de curând, la 13 septembrie 2012, Jean‑Claude Abric, cel care a marcat decisiv
evoluţia psihologiei sociale europene în ultimele decenii, bine cunoscut şi în România. Şi‑a
început cariera în Laboratorul de psihologie socială de la Ecole des Hautes Etudes en
Sciences Sociales, alături de Serge Moscovici şi echipa sa care a deschis calea cercetărilor
în teoria reprezentărilor sociale. Şi‑a legat apoi numele de Laboratoire de Psychologie
Sociale d’Aix‑Marseille, al cărui director a devenit, şi de revista Psychologie et Société,
publicată de Observatoire Européen des Représentations Sociales, instituţie europeană
fondată în 1999, sub patronajul lui Serge Moscovici. Cărţile sale, Psychologie de la
communication, théories et méthodes (tradusă şi în limba română), Pratiques sociales et
représentations, méthodes d’étude des représentations sociales, exclusion sociale, insertion
et prévention, au devenit bibliografie obligatorie pentru cei care se ocupă de studiul
reprezentărilor sociale.
Numele lui Jean‑Claude Abric rămâne legat, ca teoretician, de contribuţii substanţiale
la dezvoltarea teoriei reprezentărilor sociale. Interesul său pentru această arie a psihologiei
a devenit semnificativ începând cu anii ’80, odată cu cercetările asupra reprezentărilor
sociale ale artizanului şi artizanatului (Abric, 1984).
Alături de alţi colegi de la Aix‑en‑Provence, cum ar fi Claude Flament şi Christian
Guimelli, dar şi de Michel‑Louis Rouquette, de la Paris V, Jean‑Claude Abric devine în
această perioadă unul dintre promotorii cei mai importanţi ai abordării structurale, potrivit
căreia orice reprezentare socială este un ansamblu sociocognitiv dual, compus dintr‑un nucleu
central şi un sistem periferic. În concepţia sa, primul se caracterizează prin stabilitate, coerenţă,
capacitate de organizare a întregului ansamblu şi rezistenţă la schimbare, în timp ce al
doilea are rol mai degrabă în nuanţare, asigurarea diversităţii şi protecţie a nucleului central.
Numeroase studii, empirice şi teoretice, vor susţine această perspectivă. În volumele
colective editate de Christian Guimelli (1994) şi de el însuşi (1994), Jean‑Claude Abric a
elaborat, pe larg, argumentele ştiinţifice pentru validarea organizării interne a reprezentării
sociale, modul de funcţionare al acesteia, rolul celor două componente, transformarea şi
raporturile reprezentărilor cu practicile sociale.
Poziţia sa a fost consecvent empirică, deoarece a pledat pentru experimentalism şi formare
metodologică variată şi complexă, în culegerea şi analiza datelor. În acest sens, volumul
colectiv coordonat în 2003 a adus în atenţia cercetătorilor teme metodologice importante,
cum ar fi problema triangulării în studiul reprezentărilor sociale, cercetarea „zonei mute”,
analiza computerizată a datelor şi rolul metodei experimentale în acest domeniu.
S‑a dovedit un pasionat al cercetării, un spirit laborios, productiv şi tenace.
Pentru noi, cei din grupul de psihosociologi de la Iaşi, a fost un colaborator eficient,
un mentor şi un bun prieten. A fost membru în comitetul ştiinţific al revistei noastre,
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ADRIAN NECULAU, MIHAI CURELARU
Psihologia socială, i‑a primit în laboratorul său pe studenţii şi cercetătorii veniţi de la Iaşi,
a colaborat în formarea doctoranzilor români, îndeosebi ieşeni, în cadrul proiectului
European PhD on Social Representations and Communication and So.Re.Com.THEmatic
NETwork, organizat de Universitatea „La Sapienza” din Roma, în calitate de membru în
comitetul executiv.
Numele său va rămâne gravat în memoria colegilor şi studenţilor ieşeni şi din întreaga
Românie.
V. RECENZII
Adrian Neculau
Serge Moscovici, Raison et cultures,
Editions EHESS, 2012, 92 pp.
Am primit, de curând, de la Editura Şcolii de Înalte Studii în Ştiinţele Sociale din Paris un
volum de mici dimensiuni, elegant, îngrijit şi prefaţat cu dăruire şi iubire de către Nikos
Kalampalikis. Pe coperta interioară, editorul îşi asumă doar meritul de a fi „stabilit” şi „pre­
zentat” acest text considerat pierdut. Dar a făcut mai mult de atât şi vom arăta meritele sale.
Istoria acestei scrieri „rare şi preţioase”, inedite în franceză, îşi are începuturile într‑o
conferinţă ţinută de Serge Moscovici la Universitatea din Sevilia, la 22 septembrie 1993,
ca act inaugural al celui de‑al IV‑lea Congres naţional de psihologie socială din Spania,
având ca temă „Înainte de noua Europă”. A fost, în acelaşi timp, şi discursul său la ceremonia
de atribuire a titlului de Doctor Honoris Causa de către universitatea spaniolă. Era al
patrulea titlu de acest tip primit de Moscovici, astăzi s‑a ajuns la 14 titluri, între care şi
cel acordat de Universitatea din Iaşi. Ceremonia, scrie Nikos, solemnă, fastuoasă, celebrând
aportul unei personalităţi de renume internaţional, care a contribuit prin opera sa la avansul
major, ştiinţific şi politic, al unei ştiinţe, s‑a desfăşurat după toate ritualurile cunoscute; o
punere în scenă plină de distincţie.
Recuperarea acestui text are o istorie interesantă, e o adevărată operă de arheologie, iar
editorul ne introduce în culisele acestei poveşti pe care o numeşte o „aventură culturală”.
Ca toate scrierile lui Moscovici, a fost scris mai întâi de mână şi apoi dactilografiat şi
corectat de autor. Aşa s‑a întâmplat şi cu prefaţa la primul nostru manual de psihologie
socială, publicat în 1996. Ne‑a trimis o dactilogramă, pe care a difuzat‑o mai multor
prieteni, am informaţia de la Jean‑Claude Deschamps. Se adresa, de fapt, mai mult colegilor
din Vest decât colegilor români. Mai târziu am publicat acest document cu un comentariu,
numindu‑l „Préface‑«Manifeste»” (Les Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 2004,
62, pp. 13‑17). După această dactilogramă şi‑a ţinut Moscovici discursul la Sevilia. Textul,
trimis mai înainte, după uzanţe, a fost tradus în spaniolă şi imprimat de către universitate,
având o „difuziune protocolară”, doar pentru cei prezenţi, într‑un tiraj confidenţial. Tânărul
profesor Kalampalikis a descoperit textul în spaniolă mai târziu, când lucra la teza sa, graţie
unui exemplar de autor, depus la biblioteca Laboratorului de psihologie socială de la EHESS.
Dar n‑a găsit documentul original, autorul nu l‑a conservat. Nici traducătoarea în spaniolă
nu‑l mai avea. Cu acordul autorului s‑a întreprins o retraducere atentă din spaniolă în franceză.
Versiunea recuperată acum este un hibrid, crede editorul, drumul sinuos al textului l‑a
transformat într‑o asemenea producţie. Întrebarea ar fi: a suferit astfel textul original distor­
sionări? Probabil că stilul discursului, expresivitatea conferită de oralitatea lui s‑au pierdut,
dar au fost restabilite conţinutul şi spiritul său. Pentru că acest discurs a fost ţinut într‑un
moment cultural unic: cariera lui Serge Moscovici ajunsese la apogeu, luase mai multe
premii internaţionale, iniţiase Laboratorul de psihologie socială de la EHESS care luase o
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turnură impresionantă (nu după mult timp am intrat şi noi, cei de la Iaşi, în acest cerc
cultural‑ştiinţific select) şi el era preocupat mai mult, acum, de posibilităţile psihologiei
sociale de a contribui la fondarea Noii Europe. Ideile de la Sevilia vor fi reluate, într‑un
fel, în prefaţa la care m‑am referit mai sus.
În acest text, Moscovici propune, fără îndoială, un bilanţ al teoriei sale. Va proceda şi
mai târziu la fel, în diferite etape; atunci venea un moment unic, istoric – lărgirea
Comunităţii Europene – şi el se gândea şi îi invita şi pe alţii să i se alăture la implicaţiile
acestui proces. E o ocazie de a aminti câţiva piloni principali ai teoriei care trebuia, de
acum, să ocupe un loc capital în psihologia socială europeană şi internaţională. Cu doar
treizeci de ani în urmă lansase conceptul de sens comun, iar acum invită confraţii să se
gândească la modul în care această cunoaştere socială, de esenţă populară, cu limbajul său
propriu şi credinţele ce o nutresc, poate fi recuperată pentru a facilita dezvoltarea democraţiei
europene, ajutându‑ne să trăim împreună şi să acţionăm împreună. Nu uită, în alocuţiunea
sa, nici unul dintre conceptele de bază care formau producţiile mentale sociale: cunoaşterea
socială comună, fenomenul credinţei şi cel religios, importanţa miturilor, formele ideologice
ale gândirii şi acţiunii colective – tot ceea ce societăţile au creat ca valori şi adevăruri.
Erau, atunci, comandamente urgente şi ştiinţa oralităţii i‑a permis lui Moscovici să transmită
un mesaj important: trebuie să ne implicăm. După părerea editorului, atunci a enunţat,
pentru întâia oară, argumentul coexistenţei unei pluralităţi în aceeaşi cultură. De aceea această
carte este o scriere singulară şi vizionară. Au mai trecut două decenii, şi astăzi constatăm
că multele antagonisme europene au scos la suprafaţă orientări nebănuite atunci, unele
neaşteptate, între care plonjonul în „l’irrationalité du pluriel”. Dar mesajul de atunci rămâne
ca un moment unic în ştiinţa noastră.
Chiar din primele fraze, laureatul din 1993 face o afirmaţie importantă: psihologia
socială are vocaţia de a deveni o antropologie a lumii contemporane, adică o psihologie a
culturii. În măsura în care reprezentările sociale şi comunicaţiile constituie o antropologie
a culturii noastre, psihologia socială este o antropologie a altor culturi. E o consecinţă
logică a interesului pentru studiul sensului comun ca valoare culturală. Psihologia culturii
nu este însă o psihologie aparte, ea are sens numai ca psihologie socială.
Moscovici abordează trei teme în această conferinţă: măsura în care teoria reprezentărilor
sociale se asociază cu psihologia şi antropologia; sensurile pe care le‑a primit, în epocă,
noţiunea de cultură; cum se poate desena un program de cercetare pe tema: psihologia
socială, antropologie a culturii noastre.
Putem găsi sensuri noi în cercetarea temei: raison et cultures, aceasta pare să fie
întrebarea capitală, nucleul intervenţiei sale. Cuvântul raison semnifică, la Moscovici, după
părerea mea, formată după ce i‑am citit acest text şi altele, mai puţin raţiune, judecată
individuală, şi mai mult bun‑simţ, înţelepciune, bună socoteală, înţelegere a contextului.
Adică o pătrundere în spiritul timpului, valorificând contribuţiile comune, credinţele pe
care le împărtăşim. Omul dotat cu o raţiune acceptantă este rezonabil, se lasă guvernat de
experienţă şi practici deprinse în comun, are o cunoaştere superioară a ceea ce este achiziţie
comună, adică înglobează cunoaşterea ştiinţifică şi cunoaşterea naturală, credinţele.
Adrian Neculau
Psihologi‑scriitori
Genoveva Logan, Puterea celor lipsiţi de putere/
Il potere dei senzapotere,
Limes, Cluj‑Napoca, 2012, 269 pp.
Corporaţiile profesionale puternice, cum sunt cea a medicilor sau cea a inginerilor, au dat
scriitori cunoscuţi, renumiţi în toată lumea. Nu ne trebuie decât câteva exemple pentru a
ilustra această afirmaţie. Medicii A.P. Cehov, Mihail Bulgakov sau Vasile Voiculescu sunt
mai cunoscuţi ca scriitori decât ca doctori. Şi inginerii sunt bine reprezentaţi, nu exemplific
decât cu două nume: Alain Robbe‑Grillet (1922‑2008), romancier şi cineast, reprezentant
de vârf, şef de şcoală al „noului roman”, a fost la origine inginer agronom şi şi‑a câştigat
o vreme existenţa ca specialist la Institutul de fructe şi legume coloniale din Maroc. Norman
Manea a fost şi el inginer prin provincie; la ora actuală este cel mai tradus şi cunoscut
scriitor român. Din ordinul psihologilor, în schimb, redus ca număr, fără mare anvergură
socială, au ieşit puţini scriitori. Un caz aparte îl constituie cei care‑şi valorifică experienţa
profesională în opere ficţionale, cum e cazul lui Irvin Yalom, care, alături de tratate, a
publicat romane inspirate din viaţa psihoterapeuţilor şi a pacienţilor lor. La noi ştiu puţine
cazuri în care psihologii au produs şi literatură. Cu câţiva ani în urmă am scris în revista
noastră despre Corneliu Buzinschi, absolvent la Iaşi, coleg de generaţie, care a publicat
romane cu cheie sau cărţi inspirate din viaţa adolescenţilor. Ion Radu, din Bucureşti, profesor
de psihologie socială, autorul mai multor lucrări pe acest profil, este şi un prolific romancier,
descriind viaţa rurală. Paul Popescu‑Neveanu a scris poezie, din păcate n‑a apucat să o publice,
un volum – versuri pline de sensibilitate, de neaşteptat pentru firea sa tumultuoasă – a
apărut, prin grija fiului şi a nurorii sale, după moartea sa. Mi‑ar trebui pagini multe ca să
evoc contribuţiile lui Costache Olăreanu, absolvent de psihologie şi cercetător la Institutul
de Ştiinţe Psihologice şi Pedagogice, membru al vestitei Şcoli de la Târgovişte, ale cărui
cărţi erau, nu cu mulţi ani în urmă, analizate şi înalt apreciate de critică. Tudor Ţopa, coleg
cu Olăreanu la institut şi membru al aceleiaşi grupări literare, n‑a fost mai puţin lăudat de
critică. Din acelaşi grup de la institut e şi Romeo Dăscălescu, poet, cândva preferatul lui
Onisifor Ghibu, pe care l‑a părăsit în anii săi de fanatism ideologic şi pe care l‑a evocat
apoi, cu iubire, asumându‑şi eroarea de situare socială din tinereţe. Membră şi ea a corpului
de cercetători de la Institutul de psihologie al Academiei, Aurora Liiceanu publică în ultimii
ani cărţi în care talentul de a creiona personaje şi situaţii aparţine mai degrabă ficţionalului
decât clinicianului preocupat de cazuri, de analiză critică. În fine, despre Vasile Pavelcu se
spune că a rămas cunoscut şi ca „scriitor de psihologie”. Cărţile sale, chiar începând cu
teza de doctorat, se remarcă prin scriitura alertă, departe de stilul sec, plat şi dogmatic al
unor colegi contemporani lui. Doar în lucrările lui Mihai Ralea mai găsim seva de scriitor,
dobândită în perioada de ucenic şi apoi mentor la Viaţa românească. Încă două cazuri, doi
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absolvenţi de psihologie de la Iaşi: Liviu Antonesei, cercetător în echipa lui Ion Holban,
la Iaşi, şi apoi profesor de pedagogie, scriitor şi publicist activ şi cunoscut, şi Mihai Dinu
Gheorghiu, care însă a abandonat preocupările de critic literar şi eseist, domeniu în care
s‑a afirmat viguros în tinereţe. În aceeaşi companie trebuie amintit timişoreanul George
Şerban, din aceeaşi generaţie ieşeană, căruia i‑am condus şi lucrarea de licenţă, cunoscut
şi el ca romancier, dar şi ca om politic; este cel care a susţinut cu vehemenţă Proclamaţia
de la Timişoara, în care se cerea, la „punctul opt”, lustrarea foştilor activişti şi securişti.
A plătit cu viaţa curajul său civic. Om de mare caracter.
Genoveva Logan (Pogorilovschi) este absolventă la Iaşi, colegă de generaţie, a făcut un
doctorat despre atitudini, cu Vasile Pavelcu, şi a lucrat toată viaţa ca psiholog: în selecţia
profesională, la Laboratorul de psihologie de la CFR din Iaşi, făcând parte din şcoala lui
Ion Holban, şi apoi în orientare profesională, la Institutul de Ştiinţe Pedagogice din
Bucureşti. La Iaşi, sub patronajul lui Ion Holban, se înfiripase un fel de cenaclu literar, el
însuşi a scris şi publicat poezii şi chiar un volum de literatură pentru copii. Petre Botezatu,
condei subţire şi spirit ales, care a lucrat şi el la laborator, până a plecat la universitate, nu
a lăsat doar cărţi şi studii de logică şi psihologie, ci şi eseuri pline de miez, într‑un stil
inimitabil. Genoveva a făcut parte şi din gruparea de scriitori de la Institutul de cercetări
bucureştean, grup pe care l‑am evocat mai sus. Ca toţi membrii institutului, a cunoscut şi
ea experienţa „meditaţiei transcendentale” şi pregăteşte acum o lucrare despre acest episod
terifiant din viaţa psihologilor români. Dar a debutat de tânără ca romancieră, în 1969, unele
cărţi valori­ficând cunoştinţele şi experienţa de psiholog. Înainte de 1989 a mai publicat trei
romane: Alergie (1973), Fără identitate (1982) şi Pentru toate vine o zi (1986). Cărţile acestea
i‑au fost republicate după 1989, a mai scris şi altele, romane şi versuri. Cea pe care o prezentăm
aici este însă un experiment psihosociologic inedit: o suită de scenete, situaţii, portrete în
context, evidenţiind puterea de diagnoză a persoanei prin recursul la literatură, la ficţiune.
Scriitoarea Genoveva Logan îşi numeşte prozele de mici întinderi „ghemuri” (sau
gheme!?) şi le caracterizează astfel: „Ele nu sunt nici roman, nici nuvelă, nici povestire
armonios închegată. Vom spune că sunt mici nuclee, mici cuiburi, sau, dacă vreţi, agenţi
de fermentaţie, asemenea bobului de orez care se pune în sticla cu cvas. Într‑o accepţie
simbolică, ghemul adună în el începutul şi sfârşitul, este spirala condensată în ou”. Ghemele
Genovevei ar fi nişte „formule condensate” de comunicare a „mesajului fabulatoriu”, o
strategie de recâştigare a cititorilor care nu mai au timp şi dispoziţie să citească romane
ample. Concizia prozelor de acest tip, adresate cititorului grăbit, hărţuit şi debusolat, poate
avea efect benefic: invită actorul social la meditaţie, la o nouă „lucrare” asupra lui însuşi
şi asupra universului psihologic în care este plasat. Proze concise, relatând întâmplări
semnificative – personaje în situaţii –, ele se desfăşoară după o schemă precisă, oarecum
formală, precum basmul sau legenda: descrierea sumară a locului (contextului, situaţiei);
scurte prezentări ale personajelor implicate, unul până la trei; presimţirea norocului, care
„stă să fie”; deznodământul, de obicei tragic. Un ghem poate avea doar o pagină, dar
ecoul poate fi amplu: cititorul simte nevoia să reia lectura, iar efectul se propagă în
„adâncuri”, creând noi rezonanţe. Poate fi interpretat ca un şoc terapeutic, ca o consiliere,
ca o problemă supusă simţirii cititorului, dar apelând la simboluri, imagini încărcate de
sensuri ascunse, semne şi noduri psiho(socio)logice.
Curios, locurile din care îşi extrage scriitoarea personajele este lumea satului, o lume
parcă neatinsă de modernizări şi schimbări, deşi au trecut peste ea uragane devastatoare, o
lume care şi‑a păstrat valorile ancestrale şi obiceiurile (practicile!) care au ajutat‑o să
reziste. O lume parcă apusă, un social care a dobândit ştiinţa conservării, o lume sensibilă
la imediat şi, în acelaşi timp, atemporală, noncontextuală. O lume a imaginarului şi puterii
RECENZII
155
credinţei în vechile alcătuiri. Credinţa – am găsit într‑un text uitat al lui Henri Bergson – este
un revers al realităţii, al contextului social. Mediul social oferă omului un loc şi un mijloc de
realizare, de afirmare, de integrare socială. Dar el se poate împlini şi prin credinţă, mobili­
zându‑şi toate resursele pentru a se împotrivi vremii netrebnice. Credinţa personajelor din
cartea aceasta nu este o opţiune cognitivă, „raţională”, ci implică întregul insului, afectivul,
memoria sa (experienţele sale sociale), proiectele şi tendinţele de dezvoltare personală în
context social. Personajele cred cu întreaga personalitate şi se implică total, credinţa lor e
puternică, solidă, capabilă să schimbe natura umană a celor din jur. Ea se menţine, se consoli­
dează prin practici de întărire. Aici e secretul ruralului pe care pariază Genoveva Logan.
Cândva, înainte de 1989, am citit un eseu al lui Nicolae Manolescu, reluat în unul din
volumele sale de „teme”, după care satul, ruralul nu poate deveni subiect de roman dacă
scriitorul vrea să devină universal. Numai romanul urban poate deschide calea spre lumea
modernă de astăzi. Genoveva Logan încearcă, iată, să infirme această aserţiune. Poate nu întâm­
plător ghemele sale apar în română şi italiană, timpul va arăta dacă vor avea ecoul scontat.
Primul ghem, de doar două pagini şi jumătate, are o simplitate clasică: din motive
diverse, două familii megieşe au ajuns în conflict, în „duşmănie”: nu‑şi mai vorbeau, nu
se ajutau, „nu‑şi dădeau plusul peste pârleaz”. O femeie singură, vrednică, rămasă văduvă
după război, cu destui copii, trebuie să le asigure traiul şi zestrea, dar şi să suporte starea
de război intergrupal, cu toate consecinţele psihosociologice: suspiciune, neîncredere, frică
de a se dezvălui. Până într‑o seară, când băiatul mai mic al vecinului strigă, târziu în
noaptea friguroasă, la poartă, s‑o anunţe că în ocolul ei a apărut un miel şi mielul ar trebui
ferit de vijelia iernii. Gest ce dezgheţă relaţia, „de atunci au prins a‑şi vorbi, şi ce‑a mai
fost negru în inima lor s‑a topit, încetul cu încetul”. O fabulă cu morala la urmă: un cuvânt,
un gest mărunt pot reface legăturile.
O femeie uitată de timp, împovărată, singură şi neputincioasă, ca multe din sat, se mişcă
prin gospodărie după nişte reguli pe care şi le‑a format în tinereţe. Dar mecanismele schemei
de sine nu mai funcţionează. Se adaugă şi umbrele celor duşi, sfârtecându‑i memoria,
făcându‑i viaţa şi mai grea. Dar ea poartă o aură: cei din jur cred că îi poate ajuta prin
puterea inimii ei largi. Când pornesc la o treabă, cer de la ea cu împrumut o sumă mică,
să le aducă noroc. Forţa credinţei. Când puterile o lasă, se adună vecinii s‑o ajute, s‑o
pregătească. Şi atunci se întoarce „cel plecat”, fiul iubit care s‑a înstrăinat; deja diferit,
atipic, rupt de context. Purtând cu el dorinţa de a afla secretul care l‑a însoţit toată viaţa,
pierdut prin lume, în exil. Nădăjduind să se regăsească. Dar simte că nimic nu se mai leagă,
că e străin. Şi deodată relaţia sa cu mama neputincioasă se inversează: ea devine puternică
şi încearcă să‑i dea curaj, iar el simte că este neajutorat, pierdut, răpus de pierderea
legăturilor originale. El are nevoie de ajutor şi nu ea, muribunda.
O altă bătrână, uitată de moarte, care n‑a plecat la timp, inutilă şi ignorată de acum de
comunitate pentru că n‑a ţinut regula, reuşeşte, prin rugăciunile şi exemplul ei, prin prezenţa
sa semnificativă, să‑i schimbe pe cei din jur, „să dea în vileag ce‑i putred în inima oame­
nilor”, să‑i aducă pe calea virtuţii. În final, satul, comunitatea, o redescoperă şi o cinsteşte.
Un alt înstrăinat, venit să aranjeze treburile casei lăsate de izbelişte, este chestionat de
cei din jur asupra intenţiilor, rod al neîncrederii lor în cei plecaţi. Repară, duce la moară,
convoacă femeile să pregătească o reuniune care să consfinţească reîntoarcerea şi să‑i
pomenească pe cei pierduţi, dar n‑are curaj să dea ochii cu satul. N‑are puterea să se
prezinte la judecata celorlalţi, să‑şi dezvăluie „rănile şi vindecările”, să explice de ce a
cărat mereu cu sine „greul pământului” natal. Iese şi lasă în urmă, fără un cuvânt, adunarea
convocată şi mesele întinse. Se simţea inutil, ştia că nimeni nu‑l va mai întreba, după această
fugă, care‑i probează, încă o dată, eşecul. Ghemul se cheamă „Pământ în pământ”!
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RECENZII
Citind aceste reflecţii despre lumea satului, ne putem pune întrebarea: mai reprezintă
satul o comunitate complexă, încă bogată socioafectiv, suport social şi furnizoare de nădejdi?
Mai poate găsi omul modern, grăbit şi secularizat, sprijin în această lume atemporală, închis­
tată, întoarsă doar asupra sieşi? Mai putem vorbi despre un ethos al omului din sat când primim
zilnic ştiri şi imagini despre o lume rurală dezabuzată, deturnată de televiziunile subculturale,
sfârtecată, dărâmată de mizerie, ignoranţă, alcool şi violenţă? Nu cumva acest sat ancestral
mai dăinuie doar în imaginarul câtorva intelectuali ridicaţi cândva din această lume?
Alte secţiuni ale cărţii identifică boli incurabile ale civilizaţiei actuale: indiferenţa,
uscăciunea sufletească (un câine lovit de o maşină, acoperit treptat de zăpadă, pe lângă
care oamenii trec indiferenţi); „abandonul total”, o istorie angoasantă despre o profesoară
aruncată într‑o şcoală de surdomuţi, „unde nimeni nu te strigă pe nume”, încercând să
înţeleagă universul acesta paralel; o întâlnire a două cupluri, rătăcite prin lume, cu „oraşul
iubirii” lor din tinereţe şi grădina (Copou?) de care‑i leagă amintiri, aspiraţii, idealuri;
încercând să redescopere „cota zero”, de care s‑au despărţit de mult. Doi cai abandonaţi,
fugăriţi de câinii parcului, trec în goană pe lângă ei, mesageri ai neantului, vestitori ai
viitorului. Peste un timp, trei dintre cei patru, reuniţi la întâlnirea cu burgul cel drag, o
iau pe urma colegului al cărui nume îl poartă aşezământul cultural din parc.
Am mai găsit, transfigurate, teme care au dominat cândva viaţa intelectualilor români,
inclusiv a psihologilor, marcându‑i sociocognitiv în toată fiinţa lor, afectându‑le schema de
sine şi evoluţia ulterioară. Iată inevitabila întâlnire cu „băieţii cu ochi albaştri”, omniprezenţi,
parte din peisaj, la slujbă, pe stradă, acasă, scormonindu‑ţi viaţa, imposibil de evitat („Te‑am
mai văzut undeva”). O profesoară, nevoită să‑şi schimbe mereu locul de muncă, mergând
„de mai bine de zece ani pe sârmă”, încearcă mereu să‑şi pună viaţa în ordine, dar e
împiedicată de zeloşii sprijinitori ai regimului care o suspectează că ar fi putut „complota
împotriva organelor”. E într‑un noiembrie al vieţii, se simte urmărită, hăituită, „stingheră
printre chipurile tăcute din jur, umilită chiar de condiţia ei normală”. Lumea controlată de
sistem o înconjoară într‑un cerc de ochi atenţi şi impersonali, o adulmecă, o „vede” şi prin
ceaţă, nu are unde evada, nu are decât soluţia acceptării.
O altă scenă, datată chiar în ajunul schimbării, trimiţând la inevitabilitatea prăbuşirii:
„O breşă în sistem”. Un examen de admitere la facultate, cu ceremonialul epocii şi măsurile
de supraveghere ridicole, frizând patologicul, dar care lasă, de fapt, loc arbitrarului. Nimeni
nu vrea să vadă fisura, intri în sistem sau dispari, n‑ai unde te refugia, accepţi să fii anihilat
sau te autodistrugi, „fărâmă cu fărâmă”. Independenţa gândirii şi gestului e o iluzie pe care
nu şi‑o poate permite nici un individ.
Un grup de colegi (psihologi) pleacă într‑o excursie, fiecare fugind de ceva, de o realitate
acaparatoare; dar revin obstinat la temele vieţii lor. Discuţiile ajung la valoarea diagnostică
a introspecţiei, la scenarii de hăituire camuflată îndărătul bunelor intenţii, la inevitabila
„afacere” cu nume conspirativ care le‑a schimbat viaţa, la „conjuraţia” care i‑a lăsat pe
unii fără pâine. Diagnoza unui participant la acest improvizat grup de discuţie: „Nu există
adevăr. Iar dacă există, nu poate fi spus”.
Două ultime observaţii: aceste proze, să le zicem „psihologice”, poartă uneori o datare
la sfârşit. Au fost scrise în diferite etape ale vieţii autorului, ale contextelor sociale prin
care a trecut, cum spune un personaj, România, „mamă bună”. Deşi ficţionale, ghemele
sunt încărcate de date (auto)biografice, temă de reflecţie pentru psihologi şi pentru autor.
Pentru psihologii robiţi de cercetarea standardizată, de căutarea individului statistic, lipsiţi
de lecturi literare şi de compasiune pentru subiecţii lor, cazurile Genovevei Logan nu au nici o
relevanţă. Eu gândesc însă că acest tip de psihologie ficţională poate trezi întrebări şi
îndoieli, măcar unora.
Luminiţa Mihaela Iacob
Dana Gavreliuc, Alin Gavreliuc,
Şcoală şi schimbare socială. Axiome sociale,
autonomie personală şi integrarea
schimbării în mediul educaţional românesc,
Editura Universităţii de Vest, 2012, 211 pp.
Şi cărţile pot fi ca oamenii: interesante după titlu, dezamăgitoare prin conţinut; interesante
prin titlu şi conţinut sau chiar mai interesante prin conţinut. Pentru cei care practică şi/sau
urmăresc procesul diagnozei psihologice aplicat mediului educaţional, cea de‑a treia variantă
are, în cazul de faţă, consistent câştig de cauză. Lucrarea Şcoală şi schimbare socială se
impune prin altitudinea teoretică a survolului şi unghiul original al „intrării” în sistemul
diagnosticat, prin pertinenţa măsurării şi fineţea interpretării, prin hipersemnalul de alarmă
pe care îl trage. Suntem în faţa unui demers novator ancorat teoretic, extrem de solid prin design
şi, în acelaşi timp, deschizător de drum spre aplicativ, prin diagnozele sale. Atenţie, se
cuvine spus, este vorba de un diagnostic dur, greu digerabil, indiferent de nivelul receptării!
Că redutabila echipă a colegilor de la Universitatea de Vest, Dana şi Alin Gavreliuc, a
produs o nouă lucrare de referinţă nu este o noutate pentru cei care le cunosc atât activitatea,
cât şi apetenţa pentru paradigme din domenii de graniţă ale ştiinţei noastre: psihologia şi
pedagogia interculturală, imagologia, sociologia educaţiei. Ei fac parte din categoria celor
care, în termeni de calitate a cercetării, sunt sub presiunea autodepăşirii, şi nu a reconfirmării.
Din punctul nostru de vedere, cea mai preţioasă demonstraţie a cărţii este măsura în
care o fericită opţiune fundamentală, vitală oricărei cercetări, cea teoretică, poate influenţa
decisiv calitatea întregului demers. În termeni operaţionali, o aceeaşi realitate – în cazul
de faţă, schimbarea socială şi şcoala –, „survolată” în cheia unor paradigme teoretice puţin
generoase sau, uneori, inadecvate, chiar dacă cu acelaşi efort şi acurateţe metodologică,
oferă adevăruri diferite ca profunzime şi generalitate. Or, marele merit al autorilor – vădind
nu doar o excelentă cunoaştere a domeniului psihologiei, ci şi o asumată cerinţă a epistemo­
logiei cercetării – este că nu au vizat doar planul descriptiv‑constatativ al realităţii vizate,
ci, mai ales, pe cele superioare gnostic: explicativ şi prognostic. Ştiind şi urmărind deliberat
aceasta, ei şi‑au creat un cadru teoretic excelent. Autorii au făcut o inspirată combinaţie
între paradigmele psihologiei individuale şi cele ale psihologiei culturale. Este o frumoasă
lecţie pentru acei cercetători (începători sau consacraţi) care, neverosimil, încă se mai
întreabă de ce este neapărat nevoie de teorie „de import” în cercetarea psihologică pe
tematică românească şi dacă nu ucide ea cumva creativitatea!?
Astfel, prima parte a cărţii argumentează şi construieşte inspiratul eşafodaj teoretic în
cauză. Punctul de ancorare a interesului autorilor este impactul schimbării sociale a României
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RECENZII
postdecembriste şi accelerarea deloc benefică, prin cronicizarea şi pe temei politic, a
„spiritului manolic” în planul sistemului de învăţământ. Concret şi direct spus, educaţia ca
succesiune de începuturi a noi şi noi „reforme”, niciodată duse până la capăt şi nici asumate
de la un diriguitor la altul. Ideea originală a autorilor este că implicaţiile unui atare
experiment natural – nedorit, nebenefic, dar prezent de peste două decenii încoace – nu
pot fi surprinse parcelar, doar în plan individual sau în cel colectiv. Soluţia optimă este cea
care reuneşte cultural cele două dimensiuni, permiţând citirea subiectivităţii sociale a celor
din sistemul educaţional prin inevitabila sa ancorare axiologică.
Pentru a diagnostica care sunt valorile reper ale cadrelor didactice, principala resursă
modelatoare a ethosului educaţional dintr‑un sistem şcolar sau academic, autorii apelează
inspirat la două paradigme ale psihologiei interculturale: dimensiunile culturale (Hofstede)
şi axiomele sociale (Bond, Leung). Aceste teme, cu statut de piloni teoretici ai cercetării
proprii, se bucură de câte un capitol distinct în carte, autorii reuşind, în fapt, două autentice
minitratări monografice (capitolul I – „Axiomele sociale ca model de cercetare a dimen­
siunilor culturale”, pp. 15‑46; capitolul III – „Dimensiuni culturale şi articularea identităţii
personale în context organizaţional”, pp. 69‑96). Ambele opţiuni sunt extrem de valoroase
şi purtătoare de noutate. O noutate absolută, în cazul axiomelor sociale care, iată, îşi fac intrarea
în psihologia socială românească, via Timişoara. O noutate prin schimbare de statut – de la
perspectivă diagnostică la resursă explicativă –, în cazul dimensiunilor culturale, de altfel
puternic legate prin cercetările anterioare ale autorilor de primul manual românesc de
psihologie interculturală (Gavreliuc, 2011).
În cazul autonomiei personale, cel de‑al treilea pilon teoretic al cercetării, cartea ne propune
un capitol de sine stătător (capitolul II – „Autonomia personală – repere teoretice şi
operaţionalizarea conceptului”, pp 46‑68). Şi în acest caz, experienţa de cercetare şi cultura
psihologică a autorilor rodesc în opţiunea de operaţionalizare făcută: autodeterminarea,
stima de sine şi locul controlului.
Numitorul comun al celor trei capitole teoretice se vădeşte a fi capacitatea de a sintetiza.
Referinţe la zi, pertinente, cercetări emblematice, idei primare sau derivate sunt elegant
prezentate, discutate, comparate, analizate, sistematizate, ilustrate grafic. Nimic nu este doar
invocat, ci atent personalizat. Claritatea şi atractivitatea discursului facilitează cititorului
parte­neriatul cu autorii.
Partea a doua a cărţii este dedicată prezentării demersului de cercetare. Este un excelent
model de articulare pertinentă şi elegantă a ceea ce este de neomis în a te face înţeles, de
la intenţiile vizate şi până la semnificaţiile posibile ale rezultatelor. Nimic nu lipseşte, nimic
nu este în plus. Calitatea şi claritatea expunerii demersului întreprins îşi fac concurenţă
reciproc.
Prin intermediul studenţilor psihologi ca operatori, o treime dintre cadrele didactice din
domeniul ştiinţelor umaniste şi socioumane din Timişoara au devenit subiecţii acestei
cercetări. Acoperind cinci tranşe de vârstă, respectând raportul de gen existent în încadrarea
din învăţământ (56% femei, 46% bărbaţi) şi vizând ambele expresii de organizare –
preuniversitar (48,46%), universitar (51,54%) –, eşantionul de 522 de persoane a fost
constituit aleatoriu din titulari de la 14 unităţi preuniversitare şi trei universitare. Fiecare
subiect a răspuns unui chestionar unitar, care a înglobat câte un instrument specific pentru
cele cinci variabile măsurate: axiomele sociale (SAS‑ul lui Bond şi Leung), dimensiunile
culturale (VSM94 a lui Hofstede), autodeterminarea (SDS‑ul lui Sheldon, Ryan şi Rice),
locul controlului (LCS‑ul lui Rotter) şi stima de sine (RSE‑ul lui Rosenberg).
Tratamentul statistic rafinat al impresionantului volum de date obţinute a conturat urmă­
torul tablou al implicitului social urmărit de autori: pentru axiomele sociale (cinism social
RECENZII
159
ridicat, răsplată pentru angajare – mare, complexitate socială moderată, control al destinului
redus, religiozitate relativ ridicată), pentru dimensiunile culturale (distanţă faţă de putere – foarte
ridicată, colectivism pronunţat, feminitate mare, evitarea incertitudinii – foarte ridicată,
perspectivă preponderent pe termen scurt), la scalele autodeterminării (scoruri foarte
reduse, mai ales la conştiinţa de sine şi alegerea percepută), la stima de sine (valoare scăzută
faţă de măsurătorile anterioare, actualmente sub media scalei), pentru locul controlului
(preponderent extern).
Analizate din perspectiva variabilelor independente, aceste rezultate se modulează astfel:
un cinism social mai accentuat în cazul bărbaţilor şi un externalism mai puternic în cazul
femeilor, o diminuare a autonomiei personale, atitudini dezangajante, onestitate interpersonală
dimi­nuată şi o accentuare a cinismului social în mediul academic, un mai puternic cinism
social, externalism şi o mai mare distanţă faţă de putere la cadrele didactice tinere.
Un sector aparte din acest capitol este dedicat analizei raporturilor dintre cele cinci
variabile, măsurii în care ele corelează, poziţionării distanţei faţă de putere şi cinismului
social ca variabile dominante în modelarea explicativă şi predictivă a rezultatelor. Discutarea
şi interpretarea rezultatelor se realizează analitic, cu trimiteri comparative la cercetări
similare din ţară sau străinătate, cu deosebită atenţie la nuanţe, dar direct şi necosmetizat.
De aceea, realitatea astfel investigată nu are cum să apară la final altfel decât aşa cum este:
îngrijo­rătoare şi alarmantă. Concluzia finală este amară: autoportretul psihosocial al
slujitorului de azi al şcolii apare ca fiind „unul precar determinat, cu o stimă de sine
diminuată şi pre­ponderent externalist, sau, global, cu un deficit consistent de autonomie
personală” (p. 160).
O particularitate a acestei cărţi este ambivalenţa. Ea oferă egală satisfacţie şi psihologilor
„umanişti”, şi adepţilor perspectivelor cantitative. Primii, cei cu o profundă apetenţă pentru
perspectiva holistică asupra fenomenului psihic, cu aplomb şi condei analitic, cu proiecţia
propriului spirit de observaţie în reconstrucţia teoretică a realităţii, seduşi definitiv de o
abordare calitativă, vor fi câştigaţi de valoarea paradigmelor culturale, de calitatea şi
generozitatea cognitivă a datelor şi valoarea interpretării lor. Fanii şi profesioniştii analizelor
statistice rafinate vor avea plăcerea unor certitudini „măsurate la cheie”, cu niveluri variate
de profunzime a analizelor, multiple, complementare, realizate controlat şi riguros, prin şi
pentru exploatarea superioară a datelor.
Probabil că, dacă am privi concluziile acestei cărţi ca pe oglinda fermecată a împărătesei
din Albă‑ca‑Zăpada, orice om al şcolii, la o primă oglindire, ar fi tentat să nu se recunoască
şi să activeze, ca mecanism de apărare, negarea. Dar, rămânând cu pilda tot în lumea
basmului, i‑am putea întreba pe cei care nu ar avea puterea de a reveni la oglinda extrem
de utilă, dar neconvenabilă, ce s‑a dovedit mai viabil în poveste: mierea sau sarea în bucate?
www.polirom.ro
Bun de tipar: decembrie 2012. Apărut: 2012
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