Structures financières et transition de la politique monétaire
6
Second, the debts to which these variations of interest rate apply are of unequal
importance through out Europe. The debt of the Italian private agents represents 60 % of
the GDP, as opposed to 90 % in France, 117 % in the United Kingdom and 125 % in
Germany. These differences stem partly from regulations on the access of the households to
mortgages, which are particularly stringent in Italy. But, overall the distribution of credit
between households and companies converges towards an average of " 50 / 50 ". Also, the
traditional opposition between heavily indebted British households and heavily indebted
companies of the continent has lost its relevance. We thus envisage that the wealth effects
of European monetary policy will be less effective in Italy than in the other countries.
Moreover, an increase in the interest rate instrument of the monetary policy results
in a fall of the bank deposits in the four countries. Following this fall of resources, the
intermediaries can either issue certificates of deposit or reduce the size of their assets stocks,
either by selling stocks and, or, by adjustment of their supply of credit. The portfolio of
stocks held by the financial intermediaries represent between 15 and 25 % of their credit. It
thus seems that the asset management of liquidity is still largely practised in Europe. It can
also be observed that there is a very strong inertia of intermediaries in their traditional
trades (savings and loans banks, commercial banks...) and a strong dispersion of
profitability through out Europe.
Third, the level of exposure of the financial intermediaries balance sheets to
interest rate risks which appears very heterogeneous through out Europe. In the United
Kingdom, both credits and deposits are indexed on short term market interest rates. In the
three other countries, the intermediaries hold a long position on long rates, which amounts
to half aggregate assets in Germany, and a third in Italy and France. Moreover, German
intermediaries are characterized by a short position on short rates which represents 20 % of
their assets. With unchanged assets, a rise in the short rates should deteriorate the profits of
the German intermediaries much more clearly than those of the intermediaries elsewhere.
Lastly, empirical work on the existence of a credit channel in the European
countries does not show a quantitative rationing of borrowers following shocks to monetary
policy. It can however not be excluded that, among the redistributive effects of a rise of the
short rates, a "broad credit channel " operates in the European countries. For example, a
drop in real prices largely affected the borrowing capacity of households and companies in
the United Kingdom, and in France at the beginning of the 1990’s. But these mechanisms
do not necessarily depend on a fall in the credit supply. It is due rather to a decrease in
credit demand or to a fall of loanable funds. Italy and France dissociate themselves by
systems which make it possible for borrowers to protect themselves from a contraction of the
credit supply. Italian banks propose credit lines, and French companies have the possibility
of substituting commercial credit for bank credit. Although it is difficult to show, the costs
associated with these substitutions—either through on increase in the rate of the credit, or
by a hardening is the access to credit—, can affect final demand.