Aquinas, Avicenna, Averroes on the Intellect 2013

AQUINAS AND 'THE ARABS':
AQUINAS'S
FIRST CRITICAL ENCOUNTER
WITH THE DOCTRINES OF A VICENNA AND A VERROES
ON THE INTELLECT, IN 2 SENT. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 11
Richard C. TAYLOR
(Marquette University, Milwaukee)
Throughout his entire career as a theologian and philosophical thinker,
Thomas Aquinas was deeply concerned with the interpretation
of Aristo-
telian teachings on the nature
of the human soul and intellect as provided by
Averroes in the latter's Long Commentary on the
De Anima of Aristotle 2.
As is well known, Aquinas engaged the reasoning of Latin followers of
Averroes as well as that of Averroes himself in his polemical De unitate
intellectus contra averroistas written in 1270 by drawing upon arguments
already set forth in critical accounts in the Summa contra gentiles ( 1259-
64), the Compendium theologiae (ca. 1265-67), the Quaestiones dispu-
tatae de anima ( 1265-68), the Quaestio Disputata De Spiritualibus
Creaturis ( 1267-68), the Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle ( 1267-
1268), and the Summa theologiae (1267-1268). However, his first critical
engagement with the doctrine
of Averroes on the intellect is found in his
Scriptum super Sententiis (1252-1257) at book 2, d. 17, q. 2, a. I, entitled,
I. This study is a product of the Aquinas and the Arai>s Project. For information. see
www .AquinasAndTheArabs.org.
2. AVERROES, Commentarium Mal!.llllm in Aristotelis Oe Anima Lihros, ed. Crawford.
Hereafter this work will be cited as LCOA with page numbers in brackets {}.An English
translation
of this is now available. See T AYLOR-DRUART (2009). This translation will be
cited in what follows as LCOA, Taylor, tr.
Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the
Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, Luis Xavier
López-Farjeat & Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp, ed.
(Paris: J. Vrin, 2013), 142-183 & 279-296

'li1
I'
1:,]
142 RICHARD C TAYLOR
"Whether there is one soul or intellect for all human beings"'· Posed in this
fashion, the question
driving his analysis is seen by Aquinas to bear upon
the teachings of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius,
Avicenna, and Ibn Bajjah (Avempace), as well as Averroes
4, since, as
Aquinas writes,
nearly all the philosophers after Aristotle are in agreement that the agent
intellect and the possible [intellect] differ in substance and that the agent
intellect is a certain separate substance both last among the separate
intelligences and related to the possible intellect as that by which we
understand, as higher intelligences [are related] to the souls of the spheres:;_
In forming this view of post-Aristotelian philosophy Aquinas drew
primarily upon two philosophical sources: (i) the
LonK Commentwy by
A verroes for all the teachings
of the other philosophers mentioned above
and for the doctrine
and arguments of Averroes himself and (ii)the Latin
translation
of Avicenna's De Anima for the Persian philosopher's own
teachings on the soul 6. In the present article and the translation in the
Appendix, my primarly focus is on the use
of A verroes by Aquinas though
the important role
of Avicenna in the development of the thought of
Aquinas on epistemology will also be addressed.
In the first section
below I provide an analysis of Aquinas's accounts of
his philosophical predecessors and of their reasoning for their positions
3. A provisional text of this article of Aquinas's Commenrary on rile Sentences of Peter
Lom/Jard was prepared by the late P.-M. Gils. 0. P. My English translation is found in the
Appendix at the end of this book. My thanks to Dr. Adriano Oliva. 0. P., president of the
Commissio Leonina. for providing the provisional Latin text used here. My thanks also to
Prof. Isabelle Moulin for her helpful comments on a draft of my translation.
4.lt is curious that Aquinas neglects to mention al-Farabi in this context since the latter's
Lerrer on tile Intellect orne illfellnru was available in Latin translation. Perhaps the reason
for this was that this work was not easily at hand for Aquinas. Another reason may be that.
while he made extensive use of the Long Commentary on til<' /)e A11111111 of' Aristotle b)
Averroes as will he shown below, he did not fully understand the critical accounts of the
teachings ofal-Farabi as set forth by Averroes. The Latin text ofai-Farabi's ne lnrellenu was
edited and discussed by Etienne GILSON ( 1929). 4-149: sec I 15-126. For a discussion of the
importance of the teachings of al-Farabi to the development of the thought of Aquinas. see
TAYLOR (2006). 151-168. For a general account of the thought of al-Farahl. see DA VIDSO.'>
( 1992). 44-73: and REISMAN (2005). 52-71
5. A()l'II\AS./112
Snu .. d. 17. </- 2. o. I. sol. Sec Appendix. Solution. section [CJ.
6.
Among the key texts in Averroes arc LCnA Book 3. Texts and Comments 5. 18-20. and
36. For AVICEI\'IA. the key text IS Kirci/J ai-Sifii', ui-Nall. Part 5. ed. F. Rahman. 202-269:
AVICE'I'IA LATIN\IS. Li/Jer f>e Anima .1eu Sexru.1 tie Narum/i/Ju.l 1-1/-111, cd. S. Van Riel.
Li/Jer /)e A111ma seu Snru.1 tie Narum/i/Ju.1 IV- V. S. cd. Van Rict. vol. 2. 69-185.
,
AQUINAS AND 'THE ARABS'
143
together with his critical rejection of their views asserting in various ways
that human intellect or intellective soul is one for all human beings. This
will make clear his own impressive depth of understanding of his sources
as well as his sophisticated critical insights into
arguments relevant to the
formation
of his own quite distinct doctrine. I will also indicate important
limitations
of his understanding of the philosophical teachings of his chief
source, A verroes, of which Aquinas was unaware. As we shall see,
consideration of those teachings will go far toward saving A verroes from
definitive refutation by Aquinas. In the
second section I focus on
Aquinas's exposition of his own teaching on the nature of the intellect or
intellective soul and provide an analysis of the arguments and presup-
positions underlying his novel
account of the multiplicity of individual
human intellects and of the multiplication of sets of intelligible species in
individual intellects. I then
conclude with a summary and some remarks
about Aquinas's natural and supernatural epistemologies.
I. AQUINAS ON THE UNITY OF INTELLECT IN
"NEARLY ALL THE PHILOSOPHERS AFTER ARISTOTLE''
Thomas [A] 7 begins his solution to the issue of whether there is one
intellect or one intellective soul for all human beings by stipulating, first,
that he will not
consider here views that there exists just one intellect for all
reality
or that the intellect is nothing but the divine essence and, second,
that his main
concern will be the unity and diversity of the human rational
soul.
While he treats of this issue in Avicenna, Alexander, Theophrastus
and Themistius, Ibn Bajja (Avempace), and Averroes, it is clear that his
primary source is the Long Commentary by A verroes and that his
chief
concern is the challenge posed by the doctrine of intellect set forth in that
work.
This is evident [B] in his account of the terminology of intellect:
possible intellect, agent intellect and intellect in a positive disposition
(intellectus in habitu) 8 which is based on this work by Averroes. For
his explanation that this is a state consequent upon the attainment of
abstracted knowledge which enables the intellect to operate per se 9,
Aquinas draws on Averroes who holds the intellect in a positive
disposition
7. These bracketed references are to my divisions of the text found in the translation in the
Appendix.
8. This is ul-'oql /Ji-1-molaku/i. In my translations of the LCnA. I render intellecrus in
lw/Jiru as
"intellect in a positive disposition"
9.AQL'It\AS,/n2Senr.d.l7.q.2.a.l,sol.:section[B].

i
144
RICHARD C. TAYLOR
to refer to the human being who is the one understanding. It is necessary to
add in the account: insofar as it makes it understand everything in its own
right and when
it wishes. For this is the definition of a positive disposition.
namely, that what has a positive disposition understands in virtue of it what
is proper to itself in its own right and when it wishes, without it being the
case that
it needs something external in this IO
In contrast, for the Latin Avicenna read by Aquinas, the intellect in
habitu or intellect in a positive disposition instead is a disposition of the
intellect
in virtue of the possession of general principles of the
understanding
known per se such as that a thing cannot he and not he in the
same respect at the same time
11
. A similar affinity for the phraseology
found
in A verroes can also he seen in the initial definitions used by
Aquinas for the agent intellect and possible intellect
12
, this latter called
"material intellect" by both A vicenna and Averroes, a term bequeathed to
the tradition by
Alexander of Aphrodisias
13
. The description of Aquinas
coincides broadly with the functions attributed to these intellects by both
these thinkers, though A vicenna and A verroes have strongly contrasting
differences
in the details, as Aquinas will make clear. Here Aquinas
describes the possible intellect as
"what is in potency for receiving all
understood forms"
14
• For Avicenna the material intellect is a "pure
aptitude" (aptitudo pura)
15
for "universal intelligible intentions altogether
separate from matter"
16
. For Averroes the material intellect is said to have
"no nature according to this except the nature of the possibility for
receiving intelligible material forms"
17 and to he defined as "that which is
I 0. A VERROEs. LC/M { 438) Taylor tr., 350: "[ .. ] Referri ad hominem intelligentem. Et
oportct addere in sermone: secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne ex se et quando
volucrit. Hec enim est diftinitio habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligat per ipsum illud
quod est sibi proprium ex se et quando voluerit, absque eo quod indigeat in hoc aliquo
extrinseco"
II. A VIC'ENNA LATI~·HIS, f)~ An una V I, 81.78-82: Arabic, 209.
12. The term "possible intellect" is taken from ARISTOTLE, Oe Anima 429a21-24.
13. See ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, Oe Anima U/Jer Cum Mantissa. ed. lvo Bruns,
81.24.
14. AQtiiNAS, In 2 Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. I, sol. A vcrroes provides a precise definition oft he
material intellect: AVERROES, LCOA, {387): Taylor tr .. 304: "ldest, diftinitio igitur
intellect us material is est illud quod est in potentia omnes intcntiones formarum materialium
universalium, et non est in actu aliquod entium antcquam intelligat ipsum".
15. AVIC'ENNA, Latin, /)e Anima VI, 81.77: Arabic. 20'1.
16. A VICDit\A, Latin, /)e Anima V I. 76.5-6; Arabic. 206.
17. A VERROES, LCf)!l, { 387): Taylor tr., 304: "Non habet naturam secundum hoc nisi
naturam possihilitatts ad recipiendum formas intellectas matcriales". Aquinas writes in
AQt:INAS,/n2 Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. I. sol.: "Et dicitur intellect us possibilis qui est in potentia ad
Jill""""
AQUINAS AND 'THE ARABS'
145
in potency all the intentions of universal material forms and is not any of
the beings in act he fore it understands any of them"
1
8, functioning as "the
subject of the theoretical intelligihles and of the agent intellect"
19
.
Regarding the agent intellect, Aquinas writes that this term "names what
makes intelligihles in potency to he [intelligihles] in act, as light which
makes colors visible in potency to be visible in act" 20.
The agent intellect
performs that function for both Avicenna and Averroes. However, for
Avicenna it
is more properly understood as "the intellect in act" which
causes the human soul to go from potency to act hy giving separate or
abstract intelligible form to the soul by way of emanation 2t. For Averroes,
the agent intellect "makes that intellect which is in potency to understand
everything in act"
22 and "makes everything intelligible in potency to be
intelligible in act after it was in potency" 23, not hy emanation hut hy a
genuine abstraction when an imagined intention "is transferred
in its being
from one
order into another" 24• With the clarification of the vocabulary of
intellect complete, Aquinas states directly what motivates the discussion of
the intellect in this his first theological work.
These two accounts of agent intellect and possible intellect differ in
substance and must he rejected according to Aquinas [C] as entailing
consequences deeply contrary to the Catholic faith. For while the philoso-
phers hold that the conjoining
of human beings to the agent intellect yields
ultimate
human perfection of knowing and thereby ultimate human
happiness, such a view would
mean that human salvation would he brought
about by a separate intelligence or angel and not by God Himself. Noting
that
some Catholic teachers seek to correct and in part accept this view hy
recipiendum omnes formas intellectas, sicut uisus est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes
col ores".
18. See note 14 fort he text.
19. A
VERROES, LCf)A { 499): Taylor tr .. 398: "Nos autem cum posuerimus intellectum
materialem esse eternum et intellecta speculativa esse generabilia et corruptibilia eo modo
quo diximus, et quod intellect us materialis intelligit utrunque, scilicet formas materiales et
fonnas abstractas. manifestum est quod subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et
intellectus agent is secundum hunc modum est idem et unum. scilicet material is"
20. AQUINAS,/n2 Sent. d. 17.q. 2, a. I, sol.: section [B].
21.
AVIC'ENNA, Latin, De Anima V 5, 126.28-127.47: Arabic, 234-35.
22. A VERROES. LCD !I { 437): Taylor tr .. 349: "[ .. ] Facit intellectum qui est in potentia
intelligere omnia in actu ".
23. A
VERROES, LCf)!l { 438): Taylor tr.. 350: "Facit omnern rem intellectam in potentia
intellectam in actu postquam erat in potentia".
24. AVERROES. LCf)A { 439): Taylor tr., 351: "[ .. I Transferri in suo esse de ordine in
ordinem". On the roots of this notion in al-Farabi, see Taylor (2006 ).

.I
IIi II
!
146
RICHARD C. TAYLOR
identifying the agent intellect with God 25, since "by devotion to Him our
soul is blessed, which they confirm in virtue of what is written at John I, 9:
He was the true light which illumines all human beings coming into this
world", Aquinas here is content that their view has a certain reason-
ableness, though he
himself rejects that view 26. In the present context,
then, his motivation is clearly
and expressly theological, though, as we
shall see, his
engagement with the philosophical tradition will be on philo-
sophical grounds.
Aquinas proceeds [D J to his critical analysis of the views of the
philosophers on the unity of intellect by considering those of Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Ibn Bajja (Avempace), Avicenna, Theophrastus and
Themistius, and finally Averroes, dividing them into three groups.
The
first [E-Gj is that of Alexander and Ibn Bajja (Avempace) who regard the
possible intellect as corruptible with the body.
The second [Hj is that of
A vicenna who holds the possible intellect to be multiplied and distinct in
individual
human beings, with its subject not the body or a bodily power
but the essence of the rational soul itself, and to come into being with the
human body but to persist in existence after the death
of the body 27. The
third view [I-M] is that ''the possible intellect is one for all [human beings],
which
Aquinas subdivides into two: [I] the view of Themistius and
Theophrastus with [J] a refutation by A verroes and [K-M] the view of
Averroes with [N] a refutation by Aquinas. Aquinas concludes the Solutio
with his own views [0-P] which involve accepting principles from
Avicenna and Averroes and incoporating them into his own understanding
of agent intellect and possible intellect as powers belonging individually to
particular human souls. However, with the exception of two sentences on
the teaching
ofAvicenna [H], the sole source for Aquinas on these thinkers
appears to be the Long Commemary by A vermes.
25. This may include William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon among others. See GILSON
(I '126-27). 5-127; in
particular, 67-72.
26.
Note that Aquinas rejects this v1ew in all his works with the exception of a brief and
troubling remark in his late [)e 1111itate intel/ectu.1 where he mentions that the principle of
intellectual light is a separate substance. "uel Deus secundum Catholicos. uel intelligentia
ultima secundum Avicennam" ("either God according to Catholics or the last intelligence
according to Aviccnna"). See AQUINAS. ne Ullltate intel/euus. V, 368-70, 314. On this issue.
see LIBERA (2004 ). 497-S.
27. This is an accurate account of the view of Aviccnna available 111 Latin texts. Sec the
brief account of Avicenna's view by WISNOVSKY (2005), 92-136, spccitically 96-J 05. Also
see WISNOVSKY (2003), Ch. 6 "Avicenna on Perfection and Soul. The Issue of Separability",
I 13-141. Also sec DA VID>ON ( 1992).
~
AQUINAS AND 'THE ARABS'
147
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Ibn Bajjah
Following closely the Long CommentaJy by Averroes, Aquinas argues
[E] that Alexander
28 held
"that the possible intellect is nothing other than a
disposition 29 which is in human nature for receiving the impressions of the
agent intellect
and that this is a bodily power consequent upon the human
constitution" 30. In the work of Averroes he found the following quotation
from the Arabic version of the De intellectu of Alexander.
Since, therefore, from this body, when it is mixed in a certain mixture,
something will be generated from the whole mixture such that it is fit for
being an instrument of that intellect which is in this mixed thing, since it
exists in all the body, and that instrument is also a body, then it will be
called the intellect in potency. It is a power made from a mixture which
occurred in bodies, [a power] disposed to receive the intellect which is in
act 3t.
28. The [)e imel/ectu of Alexander was available in Latin translation from Arabic, but
Aquinas makes no use of it here and instead relies completely on Averroes. R. A. Gauthier in
his introduction to the Leonine edition of Aquinas's Commentary on the De Anima finds that
Aquinas never directly read this treatise by Alexander. See AQUINAS, Sententia de anima,
Opera omnia
XLV, I, ed. R. A. Gauthier, 230-31. Averroes himself had in Arabic translation
both Alexander's the paraphrasing De Anima and his De intellectu. See AVERROES, LCDA,
Taylor, tr., introduction, lxxxi-lxxxii; and DAVIDSON ( 1992). 259-60. The Latin translation of
the ne intel/ectu is edited by THERY ( 1926), 3-120; see 74-82.
29.preparationem.
The corresponding Greek is epitedeiotes. See ALEXANDER OF
APIIRODISIAS, De Anima Liher Cum Mantissa, ed. lvo Bruns, [Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca, Suppl. It, pt. 1], 84.24-85.5.
30. A VERROES. LCDA ( 444}; Taylor. tr., 355: "Qui dam enim dicunt intellectum
possibilem nichil aliud esse quam preparationem que est in natura humana ad recipiendam
impressionem intellectus agentis, et hanc esse uirtutcm corporalem consequentem
complexionem humanam". In lines 134-137 we lind, "Potest enim intelligi secundum
Alexandrum quod intendebat per intellectum in potentia preparationem existentem in
complexione humana, scilicet quod potentia et preparatio que est in homine ad recipiendum
intellectum in respectu uniuscuiusque individui est prior tempore intellectu agenti". In the text
that immediately follows Averroes explains that this intelligible comes about when the
immortal Agent Intellect is united to us as "form for us",jimua nobis, according to Alexander.
31. A VERROES, LC DA ( 394}; Taylor tr., 310: "Cum igit ur ex hoc corpore, quando fuerit
mixtum aliqua mixtione, generabitur aliquid ex universo mixti ita quod sit aptum ut sit
instrumentum istius intellectus qui est in hoc mixto, cum cxistit in omni corpore. et istud
instrumentum est etiam corpus, tunc dicetur esse intellectus in potentia; et est virtus facta a
mixtione que cecidit in corporibus, preparata ad recipiendum intellectum qui est in actu". For
the Greek, see ALEXANDER OF APitRODIStAS, De Anima Liha Cum Mantissa. ed. lvo Bruns.
112.11-16. On the unsatisfactory status of the editions of the Arabic of the De lntellectu, see
DAVIDSON ( 1992), 7 n. 2.

It,
I
148
RICHARD C. TAYLOR
For his criticism of Alexander that the possible intellect is intended by
Aristotle to be itself receptive
of intelligible species and that Aristotle
refutes the notion that intelligible forms may be received into a body
or a
power in a body, Aquinas relies wholly on Averroes's refutation of
Alexander in the Long Commentary32. Aquinas saw in Averroes himself a
great disdain for the materialist view
of Alexander where A verroes writes,
A more unthinkable aspect of the opinion of Alexander is that he said that
the first dispositions for the intelligibles and for the other later actualities of
the soul are things produced from the mixture, not powers produced by an
external mover as is well known of the opinion of Aristotle and all the
Peripatetics. For that opinion regarding the apprehensive powers of the
soul, if it is as we have understood it, is false. For from the substance and the
nature
of the elements there cannot come to be an apprehensive discerning
power. For if it were possible that there come to be such powers from their
nature and without an external mover, then it would be possible for the final
actuality,
which is the intelligibles, to be something produced from the
substance of their elements, as color and taste come to be. This opinion is
similar to the opinion of those who deny agent causes and those who allow
only material causes: these are those who speak of chance. Alexander has
greater nobility than to believe this, but the questions which were posed to
him regarding the material intellect forced him to this [position] JJ_
32. A VERROES. LCf)A { 395-6}: Taylor. tr .. 312: "Sed hoc quod dixit Alexander nichil
est. Hoc enim vere dicitur de omni preparatione, scilicet quod neque est corpus neque forma
hec in corpore. Quare igitur appropriavit Aristotcles hoc preparationi
que est in intellectu inter
alias preparationes,
si non intendebat demonstrare nobis substantiam preparati sed
substantiam preparationis'i Sed impossibile est dicere quod preparatio est substantia, cum hoc
quod dicimus quod subiectum istius preparationis neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Et
est illud quod conclusit demonstratio Aristotelis alia intcntio ab ea secundum quam dicitur
quod preparatio neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Et hoc manifestum est ex
demonstratione Aristotelis. Propositio enim dicens quod omne recipiens aliquid necesse est ut
in eo non existat in actu aliquid ex natura recepti manifesta est ex eo quod substantia preparati
et natura eius querit habere hoc predicatum secundum quod est preparatum. Preparatio enim
non est recipiens. sed esse preparationis a recipiente est sicut accidentis proprii. Et ideo. cum
fuerit receptio, non erit preparatio, et remanebit recipiens. Et hoc manifestum est et
intellcctum ahomnihus expositoribus ex demonstratione Aristotelis".
33. AVERROES, LCDA { 397-8 }: Taylor, tr., 314: "Et magis inopinabile de opinione
Alexandri est hoc quod dixit quod prime preparationes ad intellecta et ad alias postremas
perfectiones de anima sunt res facte a complexione, non virtutes facte a mot ore extrinseco
ut
est famosum ex opinione Aristotelis et omnium Peripateticorum. lsta enim opimo in
virtutihus anime comprehensivis.
si est secundum quod nos intelleximus. est falsa. A
substantia enim elementorum eta natura eorum non potest fieri virtus distinguens compre-
hensiva: quoniam, si esset possibile ut a natura eorum et sine extrinseco mot ore tierent tales
virtutes. tunc esset possibile
ut postrema pcrfectio. que est intellect a. esset aliquod fact urn a
~·t:
AQUINAS AI\:D 'THE ARABS'
149
Here A verroes (i) attacks Alexander's notion of the receptive material
intellect as "an apprehensive discerning power" which arises from a
mixture
of physical elements. A verroes later goes on to rail at length
(ii) against what he characterizes as
Alexander's impossible notion that
somehow the disposition for receptivity called the material intellect might
be a disposition somehow distinct from a subject such as a body or a power
of a body, saying of Alexander's account, "I am ashamed of this account
and
of this fantastic exposition" 34. Futhermore, according to Averroes,
(iii) given that a disposition must
be in a subject, one must reject "the
impossible results [reached] by Alexander, namely, that the subject
receiving the intelligible forms is a body made from the elements or a
power in a body" 35_ It is precisely on these three points that Aquinas refutes
the view of Alexander: (i) "no power caused by the commixture of
elements is able to know"; (ii) "a disposition is not [itself] receptive but
rather something which has been disposed [is receptive];" and (iii)
"what is
disposed by this disposition is a body or a power in a body, and in such a
way that what receives intelligible forms would be a body or a power in a
substantia eorum elementorum ut color et sapor fiunt. Et ista opinio est similis opinioni
negantium causas agentes et non
concedentium nisi causas materiales: et sunt illi qui dicunt
casum.
Sed Alexander est maioris nobilitatis quam ut credat hoc; sed questiones que
opponebanturei in intellectu materiali coegerunt ipsum ad hoc".
34.
AVER ROES, LCDA { 430-431 } : Taylor, tr., 344: "Dicere autem quod intellect us
material is est simi lis preparationi que est in tabula, non tabule secundum quod est preparata,
ut exponit Alexander hunc sermonem, falsum est. Preparatio enim est privatio aliqua, et
null am habet naturam propriam nisi propter naturam subiecti. et propter hoc fuit possibile ut
preparationes diversentur in unoquoque ente. 0 Alexander. reputas Aristotelem intendere
demonstrare nobis naturam preparationis tantum, non naturam preparati ( et non est natura
istius preparation
is propriaei, si fuerit possibile sine cognitione nature preparati), sed naturam
preparationis simpliciter. in quocunque sit? Ego autem verecundor ex hoc sermone et ex hac
mirabili expositione. Si enim Aristoteles intendebat demonstrare naturam preparationis que
est in intellectu per omnes sermones predictos in intellectu materiali, necesse est aut ut
intendat demonstrare per eos naturam preparationis simpliciter, aut naturam preparationis
proprie. Naturam autem preparationis proprie intellectui impossibile est demonstrari sine
natura subiecti,
cum preparatio propria unicuique subiecto currit cursu perfectionis et forme
ex eo: sed oportet necessaria per cognitionem nature preparationis scire naturam preparati.
Et
si intendebat per illos sermones demonstrare naturam preparationis simpliciter, tunc illud non
est proprium intellectui. et
omne hoc est perturbatio. Omnis enim preparatio, in eo quod est
preparatio, vere dicitur nichil esse in actu ex eis que recipit. ct quod est non passibile. et vere
dicituresse non corpus neque virtus in corpore".
35. Averroes, LCJ)A { 397}:
Taylor tr .. 313: "[ ... Jimpossihilia contingentia Alexandro.
scilicet quod subiectum recipiens form as intellectas est corpus factum ah elementis, aut virtus
in
corpore[ ... ]".