African Special Economic Zones Lessons and Investments from China Bryan Robinson African Special Economic Zones Bryan Robinson African Special Economic Zones Lessons and Investments from China Bryan Robinson Nelson Mandela University Port Elizabeth, South Africa ISBN 978-981-16-8104-2 ISBN 978-981-16-8105-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. 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Cover image: Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) headquarters at the Chambishi Multi Facility Economic Zone, captured by the author This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore The journeymen and women Journey Back Journey Forward, Zambia, August 2011 Preface I am sitting on the train from Beijing South Railway Station to the Xiong’an New Area, a visionary new smart-city to ease the urban congestion of Beijing—not quite a Special Economic Zone… but I am curious as to the conceptualisation of a new city out of almost nothing. Watching the skyline change as the high-speed train hurtles ahead: High-rise residential blocks many of which are mini-residential cities in their own right; thousands of tree saplings, an indication of China’s policy to re-forest and greenify the concrete jungle; walkways and parks with citizens enjoying the open areas; and lots of cranes and hectic construction visible everywhere. Sometimes the railway-line intersects with a maze of high-speed and bullet-train railway lines and new highways. My t-shirt reads: ‘You can’t scare me—I was born in South Africa’. But you can impress me. And every time I visit China, I am very impressed by the sheer scale of the country’s development. This time my visit to China is to see for my own eyes, how the Special Economic Zones have helped transform the Chinese socio-economic landscape, and the lessons we as Africans can glean from this. My mind wanders back to a trip my family and I did in 2011. We called it ‘Journey Back Journey Forward’, as we re-enacted a trip my father did when he was 20 years old on a BSA Motorcycle. As a 76-year-old, this time he ‘led the pack’ of my brother, cousin, nephews, friends and myself, on his BMW 750 GS (which I now have as his better-half banned him riding when he reached 80 years of age). We travelled from Johannesburg vii viii PREFACE in South Africa, through Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, before re-tracing our trip back to South Africa. We experienced corrugated roads, potholes, poor signage, many policemen most of which were ‘on the take’, and generally poor infrastructure wherever we were. Of course, this wasn’t universal, but it was a significant concern. While the entrepreneurial spirit of small traders and service providers and a vibrant youthful population was noticeable, so was the lack of social development and poverty was rife. What I did notice though was an emerging Chinese presence. Chinese people; signboards in Chinese; Chinese traders selling Chinese goods, and most obvious were the Chinese construction companies building new roads, public buildings and other infrastructure. This was the beginning of my interest in the relationship between China and Africa, and a couple of years later, I partnered with Kobus Jonker to evaluate the affiliation which culminated in the book ‘China’s Impact on the African Renaissance—the Baobab Grows’. The journey hasn’t ended for me yet though, and as I sit on this train, I look forward to travelling to Special Economic Zones in China and in Africa, in order to critically evaluate the success factors of SEZs, the constraints to the success of the proliferation of these zones in Africa, how China can contribute to the fortune of these zones through lessons and investment, and the ultimate quest will as always be, how can and will these zones better the lives of Africans. I trust you will enjoy and learn from this journey with me. Port Elizabeth, South Africa Bryan Robinson Acknowledgements I believe the success of writing a book that covers such diverse and complex issues, requires the author to acknowledge their own limitation of knowledge and reach out to others who can guide them along the long journey to publication. This was certainly the case in writing this book and I am grateful to a great number of people who enthusiastically supported me along the way. My co-author of a book published on China’s engagement in Africa, entitled ‘China’s Impact on the African Renaissance—The Baobab Grows’, Prof. Kobus Jonker, not only taught me a great deal during the writing of that book, but has also been a mentor and friend to me over the years since I have been affiliated to Nelson Mandela University Business School. The number of times I have ‘popped’ into his office are too numerous to mention, yet he has always shown enthusiasm for my ideas and challenged my preconceptions. I owe a great deal of gratitude for his assistance and influence. For a book of this nature to be balanced in viewpoints, it was of course necessary to obtain a Chinese perspective on the issues raised, and to access Chinese initiated SEZs and visit and speak to Chinese investors in these zones. H.E. Ambassador Lin Songtian of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa has provided the opportunity to visit China and visit the city-sized SEZs in China, as well as opened numerous doors throughout Africa through the respective Chinese Embassies in those countries in which research was conducted. ix x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Mr. Zhengze Hu, support staff of the Embassy, assisted in liaising with the initial contact with the other Chinese Embassies in Africa to obtain access to their zones. These embassies have in turn gone out of their way to assist me in accessing information and to gain access to the respective Zones and companies. Other Chinese individuals who contributed to the success of the book include the following: Mr. Zhang Pengcheng of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federal Democratic of Ethiopia who kindly provided assistance in accessing some of the many SEZs in Ethiopia including the Eastern Industrial Park, where Ms Dong Lingpei provided insight and guided me through the Zone itself, introducing company representatives, and viewing the manufacturing facilities of some of the larger Chinese investors. In the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Wang Yichen of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China facilitated visits to both the Lekki Free Zone and the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, both of which are situated just outside the city of Lagos. My Denny Gao, Manager of Marketing of the Lekki Free Zone Development Company hosted me for the day, introducing me to the Managing Director of the Zone, Mr. Xigong Huang; Mr. Oyewole Adegoke the General Manager of Marketing; and Elvis Njoku, the Human Resources Officer, all of whom provided valuable insights into the operations of the Zone. Jesse Gao and Daniel Che, both Assistants to the General Manager of the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, hosted me for the day at the Zone. I was fortunate enough to have also met some investors in the zone who shared their thoughts with me, such as Mr. Leo of Hewang Packaging and Printing, and Mr. Xianli Zhang and Mr. Eric Xu (in a later follow-up VoiP call) of Green Power Utility. I was warmly welcomed when I visited the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone, a division of the Zambia China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ). Mr. Liao Zibin the Vice Chairman and General Manager of ZCCZ, Steven Lindunda, Zhenni Liu and Alan, all from the Zone, graciously entertained my many questions, and guided me through their impressive head office and the zone itself, where I also met some zone investors including Mr. Zhang from Pingan Auto and Mr. Liu of Sonomine Service Station. Special mention of Rosanna Ma is necessary. Apart from assisting with logistical arrangements for my field research trip to China, we spent much time in Beijing, and Rosanna went out of her way to investigate my areas of interest and share her findings and thoughts with me. This Chinese ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xi perspective helped provide a balanced view of the book. In the process, I feel I can now count Rosanna as one of my friends. Prof. Gerd Schwandner of the Anette & Gerd Schwandner Foundation for the Promotion of Science and Culture with an avid interest in SinoAfrican-German geopolitical issues, provided guidance and enthusiasm for the project. Graham Taylor of the Coega Development Corporation kindly shared his insights with me. Being involved from the inception of the Coega SEZ, he had a wealth of knowledge which he gladly imparted to me. This work is based on the research supported by the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences. Opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed is that of the author, and the NIHSS accepts no liability in this regard. Definition of Special Economic Zones At the outset, I would like to explain that I have taken a very broad approach to the definition of a Special Economic Zone. In actual fact, the definition has very few delimitations. Claude Baissac (2011) echoes the array of economic zones, explaining that the multiplicity of names and forms of zones are due to numerous factors, including (1) the need to differentiate among types of zones that display very real differences in form and function; (2) differences in economic terminology among countries; (3) zone promoters’ desire to differentiate their product from those of the competition; and (4) the consequences of multiple translations. Definitions vary across countries and institutions, and evolve continuously as new types of zones are developed and older types disappear or are adapted. Any attempt at a comprehensive definition of economic zones must be sufficiently broad to encompass the bewildering array of past, present, and future zones, and yet sufficiently precise to exclude those that do not display the essential structural features that make a zone a zone. To substantiate this broad approach, it is necessary to consider how vastly different Special Economic Zones are in the world. Some of China’s Zones are entire mega-cities, while in Africa, many are quite small. Yet the underlying premise is the same: These are geographic areas that have been demarcated for stimulating investment and economic development. By having such a wide definition, we can apply some of the lessons learnt in Chinese Special Economic Zones to the successful implementation of such zones in Africa. xiii Pillar 2: Government support Leadership support Pillar 6: Integration People Location Government policy Protocol 7: Protocol 8: Protocol 9: Modern International Addressing shortservice cooperation comings delivery Pillar 5: Protocol 6: Phased approach Pillar 4: Protocol 5: Favourable Investment Climate Pillar 3: Protocol 4: Innovation & learning Pillar 1: Protocol 2: Protocol 3: Ease of Preferential policies business African Model of Special Economic Zones Protocol 1: Phased approach Sustainable development Infrastructure Pillar 7: Protocol 10: Protocol 11: Protocol 12: Social Diversified Export system orientation industries xiv DEFINITION OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES DEFINITION OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES xv Therefore, zones include industrial parks, industrial clusters, industrial development zones, export processing zones, economic cooperation zones, economic processing zones, free-trade zones, free ports, foreign trade zones… the list goes on, and yes, Special Economic Zones. Ownership and the financing of the zones can differ significantly, some may be government owned, others privately owned, or something in between. Ownership may be domestic or foreign, or again, something in between. Some have significant government support, others experience the constraints of government bureaucracy, or even worse, government ineptitude and corruption. Some have management and customs offices in conjunction with the state, others offer little support in this regard. Some have superior infrastructure, some have very little—infrastructure may be provided by the state, but in many cases, infrastructure especially in Africa, is financed by the investors themselves. So please forgive me for such a wide interpretation, but it was necessary to overcome the smorgasbord of configurations of economic zones. Reference Baissac, C. 2011. Brief History of SEZs and Overview of Policy Debates. In T. Farole (Ed.), Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global Experience. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. © World Bank. [Online]. Accessed from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/996 871468008466349/pdf/600590PUB0ID181onomic09780821386385.pdf (accessed 23 April 2020). License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). (http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/). Contents Part I 1 2 Context Africa’s Economies 1.1 Africa: A Continent of Contrasts 1.2 The African Tree of Organic Growth 1.3 The State of African Economies and Economic Growth Prospects 1.4 Global, Regional and National Efforts to Stimulate Sustainable Economic Development in Africa 1.4.1 International and Regional Institutions for Development 1.4.2 National Development Finance Institutions 1.5 Foreign Direct Investment 1.6 What Is Needed to Shift Africa Towards Sustainable Development? References China’s Surge in Growth Facilitated by Special Economic Zones 2.1 Special Economic Zones: A Key Development Policy Instrument 2.2 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 2.3 Chapter I—The Initial Phase: 1978–1992 3 3 10 14 16 16 22 26 27 32 35 38 43 46 xvii xviii CONTENTS 2.4 Chapter II—Creating New Advantages, Making More Progress: 1992–2002 2.5 Chapter III—Braving a New Way with Scientific Development Outlook: 2002–2012 2.6 Zhuhai SEZ 2.7 Shantou Special Economic Zone 2.8 Conclusion References 3 The Chinese Special Economic Zone Model and China of the Future 3.1 The ‘Pillars’ of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 3.2 The ‘Protocols’ of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 3.3 The Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 3.4 Epilogue: The Future of Chinese Development 3.5 Xiong’an New Area 3.6 Belt and Road Initiative 3.7 Conclusion References 50 52 54 57 59 60 61 62 62 65 66 73 77 80 80 Part II The Emergence of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 4 China in Africa 4.1 China’s Intricate Relationship with Africa 4.1.1 Political and International Cooperation 4.1.2 Development Assistance 4.1.3 Humanitarian Support, Peacekeeping Efforts, Military Cooperation, and Law Enforcement 4.1.4 Education and Training 4.1.5 Science and Technology 4.1.6 Health 4.1.7 Environmental Issues 4.1.8 Cultural and Other Exchanges 4.1.9 Trade 4.1.10 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa 85 87 89 89 90 91 91 92 92 93 93 95 CONTENTS Natural Resources for China and Infrastructure for Africa 4.1.12 Chinese Loans, Debt-Traps and Debt Forgiveness 4.1.13 China’s Non-Intervention Policy and One-China Conditionality 4.1.14 Facts and Fallacies About the Impact of China on Africa 4.2 China’s Economic Policy in Africa 4.2.1 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 4.2.2 FOCAC Economic Cooperation with a Specific Focus on Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones 4.2.3 FOCAC: Other Strategic Areas of Cooperation 4.2.4 BRICS Plus 4.3 Conclusion References xix 4.1.11 5 The Emergence of Chinese Interest in Special Economic Zones in Africa 5.1 Special Economic Zones in Africa 5.1.1 Investment 5.1.2 Exports 5.1.3 Employment 5.2 Existing and Planned Special Economic Zones in Africa 5.3 Chinese Special Economic Zones: Policy on Global Investment 5.4 Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 5.5 Conclusion References 97 99 100 101 102 102 103 103 103 108 110 111 111 113 113 115 117 117 126 130 132 Part III Evaluating Special Economic Zones in Africa 6 Critical Issues for Chinese Investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa 6.1 Financial Motivation 6.1.1 Tax Incentives 137 139 140 xx CONTENTS 6.1.2 Duty Free Imports of Capital Equipment, Supplies and Raw Materials 6.1.3 Subsidised Utilities and Rental Rates 6.1.4 Financing and Preferential Interest Rates 6.2 Ease of Business 6.2.1 Ease of Business Initiatives 6.2.2 Permits and Licenses 6.2.3 Ability to Employ Foreign Nationals, Visas and Work Permits 6.3 Special Economic Zone Management and Infrastructure 6.3.1 Ownership and Management of Zones 6.3.2 Suitable Zone Infrastructure 6.3.3 In-house Customs Office 6.4 Location and Market Opportunities 6.4.1 Location Advantages and Disadvantages 6.4.2 Domestic Market 6.5 Human and Other Resources 6.5.1 Labour Productivity and Labour Cost and Labour Legislation 6.5.2 Access to Raw Material, Goods and Services, and Equipment 6.6 Ownership and Profits 6.6.1 No Restrictions on Foreign Ownership 6.6.2 Currency, Profits and Repatriation of Profits 6.7 Lifestyle 6.8 African Preferential Trade Arrangements 6.9 Chinese Policy Towards Africa 6.10 Reflection on the Pillars and Protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones References 7 Labour: Obstacles and Opportunities 7.1 The Scourge of Unemployment, Lack of Skills and Low Productivity in Africa 7.1.1 Unemployment in Africa 7.1.2 Skills Levels in Africa 7.1.3 Wage Rates 143 145 146 148 148 149 149 149 151 153 154 156 156 159 161 161 163 163 164 164 165 167 169 170 172 175 175 176 177 181 CONTENTS 7.2 7.3 7.4 Economics 101: The Labour Market The Decision: Employ Chinese or African Labour? Perspectives on Labour in Africa by Chinese Investors in Special Economic Zones 7.4.1 Wage Rates, Education and Skills, and Productivity 7.4.2 Labour Legislation and Unions 7.5 Case Study: South Africa’s Labour Environment and Job Creation in Its Special Economic Zones 7.5.1 South Africa: High Unemployment, Limited Skills, Low Productivity and High Inequality 7.5.2 Policies and Institutions Supporting Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones 7.5.3 Organised Labour and Politics—A Volatile Combination 7.5.4 Labour Legislation 7.5.5 Overview of Special Economic Zones in South Africa 7.5.6 Evaluation of the South African Special Economic Zones Against the Pillars and Protocols of China’s Model of Special Economic Zones References 8 The Social and Environmental Impact of Special Economic Zones in Africa 8.1 The Social Dimension of China in Africa 8.2 Evidence from Special Economic Zones 8.2.1 Enterprise Development 8.2.2 Local Communities and Urbanisation 8.2.3 Infrastructural Benefits 8.2.4 Access to Services and Facilities 8.2.5 Conflict with Local Communities 8.3 The Chinese Diaspora in Africa, Chinese Migration and Integration in local Communities 8.4 China’s Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation xxi 181 184 186 186 189 190 191 197 203 208 209 213 220 225 226 228 229 229 229 230 231 232 235 xxii CONTENTS 8.4.1 8.4.2 Paris Agreement China’s Policy Commitment to Mitigating Climate Change 8.4.3 China’s Water Scarcity and Water Pollution 8.5 Is China Shifting Environmental Risks to Emerging Economies? 8.5.1 China’s Declarations Towards Environmental Support in Africa 8.5.2 Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa and the Environment 8.6 Case Study: Ethiopia—An Environmental Perspective 8.6.1 Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Park 8.7 Pillars and Protocols References 9 African Governments’ Enabling (or Constraining) Influence on Special Economic Zone Investment by the Chinese 9.1 Political Leadership Commitment to Special Economic Zones 9.1.1 Ethiopia 9.1.2 Zambia 9.1.3 Nigeria 9.2 Political Stability, Security and Safety 9.3 Government Policy 9.3.1 Export Orientation 9.3.2 Import Restrictions 9.3.3 Currency Fluctuations 9.3.4 Policy Uncertainty 9.4 Corruption 9.5 Infrastructure: Promises Made; Promises Broken 9.5.1 Ethiopia 9.5.2 Zambia 9.5.3 Nigeria: Promises Broken 9.6 Inadequate Service Delivery 9.7 Ease of Business 9.7.1 Bureaucracy 236 237 239 241 242 245 247 251 256 256 261 262 262 263 264 265 266 266 268 268 268 269 271 271 274 274 275 281 283 CONTENTS 9.7.2 9.7.3 Customs Office Port Efficiency and Corruption: A Case of Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone 9.8 Case Study: Government Commitment to Infrastructure of SEZs in South Africa 9.9 Pillars and Protocols References xxiii 283 284 284 287 290 Part IV The African Model of Special Economic Zones 10 Towards Impactful Special Economic Zones in Africa 10.1 Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zone 10.1.1 From Ashes to Rejuvenation 10.1.2 Facilitating Investment Through a Business-Friendly Environment 10.1.3 The Kigali Special Economic Zone 10.1.4 Critical Success Factors of the Kigali Special Economic Zone—A Reflection of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 10.2 Mauritius: An Island of a Special Economic Zone 10.2.1 Sailing Ahead in Economic Development 10.2.2 Export Processing Zones 10.2.3 The Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone: Not Living up to Expectations 10.2.4 Mauritius of the Future 10.2.5 Key Learnings from Mauritius in Terms of the Pillars and Protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 10.3 The Lessons and Investments from China for Africa 10.3.1 Pillar 1: Leadership Support 10.3.2 Pillar 2: Government Support 10.3.3 Pillar 3: Government Policy 10.3.4 Pillar 4: Location 10.3.5 Pillar 5: People 10.3.6 Pillar 6: Integration 10.3.7 Pillar 7: Infrastructure 10.3.8 Protocol 1: Phased Approach 293 294 294 296 297 300 302 303 305 306 309 309 311 312 312 314 314 316 317 318 318 xxiv CONTENTS 10.3.9 10.3.10 10.3.11 10.3.12 Protocol 2: Ease of Business Protocol 3: Preferential Policies Protocol 4: Innovation and Learning Protocol 5: Favourable Investment Climate 10.3.13 Protocol 6: Modern Service Industry 10.3.14 Protocol 7: Environmental Consideration 10.3.15 Protocol 8: International Cooperation 10.3.16 Protocol 9: Address Shortcomings 10.3.17 Protocol 10: Social System 10.3.18 Protocol 11 and 12: Export Orientation and Diversifies Industries 10.4 The African Model of Special Economic Zones References Index 319 320 320 321 321 322 323 323 324 324 325 327 329 List of Figures Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 1.3 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5 Fig. 2.6 Fig. 2.7 Fig. 2.8 Fig. 2.9 Fig. 2.10 Fig. 2.11 Fig. 2.12 Population and poverty levels in Africa (World Bank 2019) The African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals (2015) GDP growth (annual %)—China (World Bank 2020) Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)—China (World Bank 2020) Location on the Special Economic Zones in China (Google Maps) KK100: Second tallest building in Shenzhen with 100 floors Shenzhen Municipal Government Shenzhen North Railway Station—extensive transport infrastructure connects the city with the rest of China and the world Colourful nightlife in Shenzhen Shenzhen Museum Seashore of high-rises: Zhuhai Yanlord Riverside Centre; Statue of the Fisher Girl Zhuhai Opera House in the design of an open pearl Gongbei Port—gateway to Macau and beyond Abandoned and decaying 10 11 28 39 40 41 45 46 47 48 49 55 55 56 57 xxv xxvi LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 2.13 Fig. 2.14 Fig. 2.15 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8 Fig. 3.9 Fig. 3.10 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Beautiful architecture with evidence of urban restoration efforts Port and railway station connecting Shantou to China and the rest of the world Various industrial parks are found in the Zone One of the original planning documents for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, dated 1986: ‘General Planning of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone’ The 7 Pillars of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones The 12 Pillars of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones The Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones The contribution of consumption, investment and net exports to GDP Growth (China Economic Update, World Bank 2019a: 11) Global Economic Prospects—Forecasts—China (World Bank Data 2020) The impact of the 3D’s on the production Frontiers 3D’s (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: XIX) The Baiyangdian Lake area with fields of the giant lotus flowers Typical streets of the Xiong’an area—Far from the high-rise city it is to become Typical streets of the Xiong’an New Area—Karaoke, a favourite pastime Xiong’an New Area—signs of what is to come Almost deserted new 3-lane city roads The Belt and Road Initiative (World Bank 2020) Nairobi and Mombasa Terminal New and modern trains—the ‘Madakara Express’ Trade between China and sub-Saharan Africa: Relative Trade Shares (Pigato and Wang 2015, source World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank) Trade between China and sub-Saharan Africa: Imports, exports, and trade balance (Pigato and Wang 2015, source World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank) Sub-Saharan Africa’s imports from China (Pigato and Tang 2015, source World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank) 58 58 58 62 63 64 65 67 67 72 74 75 75 76 76 77 79 79 94 95 96 LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 7.7 Fig. 7.8 Fig. 7.9 Fig. 7.10 Fig. 7.11 Chinese FDI Flows to SSA, 2003–2013 (Pigato and Tang 2015, sourced from UNCTAD 2014 and MOFCOM 2014) Chinese FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, by country in USD Millions (Pigato and Tang 2015, sourced from MOFCOM 2014) Chinese FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, by sector (%) (Pigato and Tang 2015, sourced from State Council of China, 2013) Number of firms operating in the Economic Zones, 2009 (Farole 2011) Ownership structure of SEZ Investments, 2009 (Farole 2011: 74) SEZ export growth trajectories by year of operation (Farole 2011) Population growth in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2020) One in four proportion of the world’s people in 2050 will be from sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2020) The pillars and protocols of the Chinese model of special economic zones that attract Chinese investment to African zones Labour supply in rural areas during urbanisation Labour supply and demand in urban areas Skills training and productivity Productivity and wage rates South Africa’s GDP growth (annual %) (The World Bank 2020) Trends in the number of work stoppages in South Africa, 2014–2018 (Department of Employment and Labour 2019: 2) Distribution of work stoppages by industry, 2014–2018 (Department of Employment and Labour 2019) Trends in working days lost in South Africa (Department of Employment and Labour 2019) South African Special Economic Zones (Map data: Google Maps, AfriGIS) Evaluation of Pillars 1, 2, and 3 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones: Leadership support, policital will, and government policy Evaluation of Pillar 4 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa xxvii 96 97 98 114 115 116 159 159 171 182 183 184 185 190 205 206 207 210 213 214 xxviii LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 7.12 Fig. 7.13 Fig. 7.14 Fig. 7.15 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 8.6 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 Fig. 9.10 Evaluation of Pillar 5 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa Evaluation of Pillar 6 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa Evaluation of Pillar 7 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa Evaluation of the protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in South Africa Road to Nigeria’s Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone The Sinozam Friendship Hospital Land encroachment in the Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone—crops planted by a local land-rights claimant Lekki Free Trade Zone restaurant with Chinese decorations Recreational facilities at Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone’s residential complex for Chinese employees Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (2015: 1) of greenhouse gas emission reduction The imposing entrance to Eastern Industrial Park Location of the Eastern Industrial Park (Google Earth) SSP pharmaceutical Huajian shoe factory Lida Textile—denim manufacturer The African SEZ pillars and protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa Corruption Perceptions Index 2020: sub-Saharan Africa Ethiopia’s Chinese built light-rail system in Addis Ababa The imposing new railway stations on the outskirts of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa Queues to board the modern carriages from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa The 3-lane highway between Addis Ababa and the Eastern Industrial Park Seemingly abandoned rail or road construction Truck weaving through the rutted roads Lekki-Free Zone Water Treatment Plant Percentage of firms experiencing electrical outages (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019: 19) Percentage of firms owning or sharing a generator (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019: 19) 215 218 219 220 230 231 232 234 234 249 252 253 254 254 255 256 270 272 272 273 273 275 275 276 277 277 LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 9.11 Fig. 9.12 Fig. 9.13 Fig. 9.14 Fig. 9.15 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. 9.16 9.17 9.18 9.19 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 10.11 10.12 10.13 10.14 10.15 10.16 10.17 10.18 10.19 10.20 10.21 10.22 10.23 10.24 Access to reliable electricity by firms (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019: 20) Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone Power Plant Lekki-Free Zone Power Plant The Zambia–China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Power Station What is measured in Doing Business (Doing Business 2020) Coega new access road system—waiting for investors Deepwater Port of Ngqhurha BAIC SA’s sprawling plant at the COEGA SEZ The African SEZ pillars and protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa Rwanda’s GDP from 1960 to 2020 (Word Bank 2021) Kigali Special Economic Zone China Star Construction in the Kigali Special Economic Zone Carnegie Mellon University Africa in the Kigali Special Economic Zone Pillar 1 of Leadership support Pillar 3 of supportive government policy Protocol 1 of a phased approach Protocol of ease of business Protocol 4 of innovation and learning Protocol 7 of environmental consideration Protocol 12 of diversified industries GDP Mauritius (The World Bank 2021) Pillar 3: Government Policy Pillar 4: Location Pillar 5: People Pillar 6: Integration Protocol 1: Phased approach Ease of business Protocol 12: Diversified industries Protocol 10: Social System African Arch 1: Peace, safety and security African Arch 2: Inter and Intra-African continental trade African Arch 3: African accountability The African Model of Special Economic Zones xxix 278 279 279 281 281 285 286 286 289 295 298 299 300 301 301 301 301 301 302 302 304 310 310 310 310 311 311 311 311 313 315 322 326 List of Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 1.6 Table 1.7 Table 1.8 Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 4.1 Country indicators The roots of the African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) The trunk of the African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) The leaves and fruit of the African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) The seven aspirations of Agenda 2063 (African Union 2020) Flagship projects of Agenda 2063 (African Union 2020) National development finance institutions Pre-conditions for Africa Nations’ sustainable development Specialised zones A summary of the 3D’s (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: 19–149) A summary of the Six Strategic Choices (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: 19–149) A summary of the 7 Areas of Structural and Institutional Reforms (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: 19–149) Excerpts from the Five Major Pillars of China and Africa’s strategic partnership (Xi 2017: 496–497) 5 12 12 13 23 24 26 29 43 68 69 70 86 xxxi xxxii LIST OF TABLES Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table Table Table Table Table 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 Table 5.8 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 Table 6.14 Table 6.15 Excerpts from the Ten Cooperation Programs of China with Africa (Xi 2017: 498–501) Fallacies and facts about the impact of China on Africa (Jonker and Robinson 2018: 277) Summary of the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021 (2018): Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones Summary of the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021 (2018): Areas of strategic cooperation Selected excerpts from the BRICS Summit Declaration, Brasilia 2019 (2020) Summary of key developments in the evolution of SEZs (Baissac 2011) Overview of African Zone Programs by Decade of Launch (Farole 2011; data from FIAS 2008) SEZ investment statistics (Farole 2011: 71) Employment contribution of SEZ (Farole 2011) Special Economic Zones in Africa Planned Special Economic Zones in Africa Objectives of China’s overseas economic zones (Bräutigam and Tang 2011a) Special Economic Zones officially supported by MOFCOM (Zeng 2016) China’s seven Special Economic Zones in Africa Tax holidays and allowances offered to investors Favourable customs duties and requirements VAT exemptions Duty free imports of capital equipment and raw materials Subsidised utilities and rentals Facilitating ease of business Permits and licenses Work visas, permits and quotas Infrastructure of Special Economic Zones In-house customs’ offices at Special Economic Zones Location advantages of selected Special Economic Zones Domestic market access incentives Special Economic Zones that allow for 100% foreign ownership Currency, profits and repatriation of profits by zones’ investors Pleasant lifestyle offered in countries and their zones 87 101 104 106 109 112 113 114 116 118 124 125 127 128 141 144 146 147 148 150 151 152 155 155 158 161 164 166 168 LIST OF TABLES Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Unemployment levels in sub-Saharan Africa Educational completion rates for sub-Saharan African countries Employment by industry in thousands (Stats SA (2) 2020) Characteristics of the South African labour market in 2017 Comparative analysis of SEZ wages per sector and municipal wages (Coega Industrial Development Zone: Zone Labour Agreement 2017 and Department of Labour South Africa 2017) Social Development Cooperation (FOCAC Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021) A summary of China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) Chinese water-related policies (Adapted from Key Water Policies, Chien 2019) Chinese industry and technology-related policies (Adapted from Key Policies: Industry and Technology, Chien 2019) FOCAC Energy and Natural Resources commitments (FOCAC Action Plan [2019–2021]) FOCAC Environmental and Climate Change commitments (FOCAC Action Plan [2019–2021]) 12 areas of business regulation (Doing Business 2020) Abridged top 10 reasons to invest at Coega (Coega Development Corporation 2021b) xxxiii 176 178 192 193 217 227 238 240 240 243 244 282 288 PART I Context CHAPTER 1 Africa’s Economies Africa. A continent blessed with rich and abundant natural resources and a vibrant and diverse population, yet most African countries are far behind in achieving their full potential, compromising Africans’ ability to live productive and happy lives. This chapter endeavours to provide a background to the rest of the book by addressing Africa’s potential in the context of the social challenges that many countries in Africa face; consider the role that economic development can play in facilitating a sustainable growth trajectory; the level of economic performance and progress in Africa; global, regional and national efforts to stimulate socio-economic development in Africa; and the current attractiveness of African countries in attracting investment. 1.1 Africa: A Continent of Contrasts Africa consists of 54 countries, or 56 countries if one includes the disputed Somaliland and Western Sahara. And many of these countries include an array of provinces or regions with their own languages and unique cultures. This uniqueness and diversity is an important variable whenever evaluating Africa in order to avoid generalisations. African countries are lagging behind the world when one considers most socio-economic indicators. A couple of indicators have been selected © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_1 3 4 B. ROBINSON for 10 countries in Africa, as well as the USA, Germany and China to provide a sense of the situation in Africa. The various indexes presented in Table 1.1 highlight how African countries rank below the USA and Germany and mostly below China. In terms of the Human Development index, Angola, the DRC, South Africa, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Egypt and Nigeria are all significantly below the USA, Germany and China. Mauritius and Algeria fare slightly better than China but are still much below that of the USA and Germany. Poverty remains a stubborn problem in Africa. A report on accelerating poverty reduction in Africa published by The World Bank (2019) highlights the fact that while the poverty rate may have reduced in Africa, due to population growth, the number of Africans living in poverty continues to grow (Fig. 1.1). In 1990, the poverty rate was 54%, and this has dropped to 41% in 2015, but the number of poor increased during this same period from 278 million to a worrying 413 million. The report suggests that if this trend continues, African poverty will account for 90% of global poverty in 2030. Poverty reduction in Africa is complicated by many factors—such as rural poverty with much of the population surviving on subsistence farming; fragile economies; conflict; inequality between men and women; and the slow decline of fertility rates raising population growth. The World Bank report further suggests a number of interventions that could mitigate the problem. For instance, ‘fertility-transition’ policies that provide family planning programmes and female education that improves their income opportunities. Another is better use of productive land for rural communities to access the agricultural value chain, again with government policy support. The challenge though is that public resources in many African countries are severely constrained, which makes it difficult to introduce sustainable poverty reduction programmes. The problem of poverty is exacerbated by inequality. South Africa, the most industrialised nation in Africa, has a terrible track record when it comes to inequality, with a Gini coefficient of 63% with 50.5% of income share held by the richest 10% of the population (United Nations Development Programme 2019). Referring to Table 1.1 once again, GDP growth in many African countries has been quite phenomenal thanks mostly to natural resource exploitation, but this new-found wealth has often landed in the pockets of the elite. At the other extreme, fragile states that are in negative growth, also exhibit significant inequality, for instance South 4 0.939 31.7 0.861 15 0.92 41.5 0.797 Human Development Index rank 2018 (out of 189 countries) (United Nations Development Programme 2019) Human Development Index Value 2018 (1 high/0 low) (United Nations Development Programme 2019) Gini Index (0 low inequality, 100 high inequality) (World Bank estimate) Inequalityadjusted Human Development Index Value 2018 (1 high/0 low) (United Nations Development Programme 2019) 0.636 38.6 0.758 85 Germany China USA Country indicators Indicator Table 1.1 0.574 42.7 0.574 149 113 63 0.316 0.463 42.1 0.459 0.705 179 0.337 35 0.47 173 0.382 43.7 0.536 157 0.688 38.5 0.796 66 0.264 46.3 0.413 186 Angola DRC South Ethiopia Rwanda Mauritius South Africa Sudan 0.492 31.8 0.7 116 Egypt 0.349 43 0.534 158 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES (continued) 0.604 27.6 0.759 82 Algeria Nigeria 1 5 20.7% 24.8% 82.93 0.3% 0% 15.2% 30.6% 327.17 0.6% 1.2% Income share held by poorest 40% 2018 (United Nations Development Programme 2019) Income share held by richest 10% 2018 (United Nations Development Programme 2019) Population in millions, 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Population growth annually, 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 per day, 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) 0.7% 0.5% 1392.73 29.4% 17% Germany China USA (continued) Indicator Table 1.1 30.1% 3.3% 30.81 32.3% 15% 50.5% 1.4% 76.6% 16.5% 3.2% 84.07 57.78 32% 15.5% 7.2% 30.8% 2.6% 109.22 31.4% 17.6% 55.5% 2.6% 12.3 35.6% 15.8% 0.5% 0.1% 1.27 29% 19.2% 42.7% 0.6% 10.98 33.2% 12.5% Angola DRC South Ethiopia Rwanda Mauritius South Africa Sudan 1.3% 2% 98.42 27.8% 21.9% Egypt 0.5% 2% 42.23 22.9% 53.5% 2.6% 195.87 32.7% 23.15% 15.1% Algeria Nigeria 6 B. ROBINSON 54,560 81 1.6 98% 63,690 79 1.8 99% GNI (Gross National Income) per capita, PPP (Purchasing Price Parity) International $, 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Life expectancy at birth, 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Fertility rate, total, 2018 (births per woman) (The World Bank Country Profile) School enrolment, secondary (% gross), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) N/A 1.7 76 18,170 Germany China USA Indicator 51% 5.6 60 6170 46% 6 60 900 105% 2.4 64 35% 4.4 66 13,250 2010 41% 4.1 68 2200 95% 1.4 75 26,080 11% 4.8 57 N/A Angola DRC South Ethiopia Rwanda Mauritius South Africa Sudan Algeria Nigeria 88% 3.4 72 42% 5.5 54 (continued) N/A 3 76 12,100 14,970 5710 Egypt 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 7 0.1% 0.4% Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15–49), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) GDP, US$ Billions, 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) GDP growth, 2018 (annual %) (The World Bank Country Profile) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) 2% 0.8% 20.4% 1% 1.5% 1.5% 27% 2.9% 2.4% 18% 41% 2.9% 6.6% 42% 34.8% 0.8% 44% 26% 30.1% 3.9% −2.1% 5.8% 27% 12.5% 6.8% 18% 1.7% −0.8% 16% 3.8% 14.22 1.3% 8.6% 9.51 2.5% 33% 17.7% 0.1% 1.5% Algeria Nigeria 35% 21.4% 40% 7.6% 1.4% 26% 10.2% 1.9% 250.89 173.76 397.27 0.1% Egypt −10.8% 5.3% 12.00 2.5% Angola DRC South Ethiopia Rwanda Mauritius South Africa Sudan 20,544.34 3947.62 13,608.15 105.75 47.23 368.29 84.36 N/A Germany China USA (continued) Indicator Table 1.1 8 B. ROBINSON USA 20% 19% 15.8% 47% 41% 0.5% Germany China 37% 34% −6.8% N/A 23% 29% 23% 8% −4.2% −4% 30% 30% −3.1% 34% 17% −1.9% 54% 41% N/A 29% 37% Angola DRC South Ethiopia Rwanda Mauritius South Africa Sudan −11% 29% 19% Egypt N/A 32% 26% N/A 18% 15% Algeria Nigeria Adapted from The World Bank Country Profiles (2020), Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2018), World Happiness Report 2019 (Helliwell et al. 2019); Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 2019) Exports of goods 12% and Services (% of GDP), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Imports of goods 15% and services (% of GDP), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) −5.2% Net lending (+)/Net borrowing (−) (% of GDP), 2018 (The World Bank Country Profile) Indicator 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 9 10 B. ROBINSON Fig. 1.1 Population and poverty levels in Africa (World Bank 2019) Sudan with GDP contraction of 10.8% has 33.2% of its wealth held by the 10% wealthiest of the population. Other indicators reflect the impact of these problems. Referring to Table 1.1 (The World Bank Country Profiles), life expectancy at birth in the USA, Germany and China are in the 76–81 range, while it is in the range of 54–60 for Angola, the DRC, South Sudan, and the lowest is 54 in Nigeria. Secondary school enrolment in the USA and Germany is just under 100%, but 35% in Ethiopia, 41% in Rwanda, 42% in Nigeria, and a dismal 11% in South Sudan. 1.2 The African Tree of Organic Growth How can African countries change this status-quo? In 2018, Professor Kobus Jonker and myself published a book entitled China’s Impact on the African Renaissance: The Baobab Grows (Jonker and Robinson 2018). The book explored a range of themes in evaluating China’s contribution to African Nations’ economic growth, social development and environmental sustainability—the so-called African Renaissance. The Baobab tree is synonymous with the African landscape. A beautiful tree seemingly planted upside down in often severe conditions, it lives for many hundreds of years and has become part of folk lore and serves as a resource for humans and animals alike. The analogy of the tree was a 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 11 constant theme throughout the book and one of the important contributions the book made was the proposed African Tree of Organic Growth Paradigm depicted in Fig. 1.2. Without getting into the complexities of economic growth versus inclusive growth versus organic growth, organic growth was defined as ‘pursuing a path of national well-being for all citizens through the effective development of core resources and critical assets of the country’ (Jonker and Robinson 2018). In other words, instead of adopting a ‘one shoe fits all’ approach to development in Africa, the African Tree of Organic Growth acknowledges that every country within Africa is fundamentally different, each with its own unique resources, assets and structures at a particular point in time— the roots of its organic growth. The roots could either be strong or be indicative of shortcomings and constraints to development. The roots detailed are the following (Table 1.2). The trunk of the African Tree of Organic Growth depicts the growth channels to produce wealth and capital. The trunk is a two-way channel of conducting and transforming the ‘water and nutrients’ available from the roots to produce the leaves and fruit. There is also the return flow between the leaves and fruit back towards the roots —the future Fig. 1.2 The African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) 12 B. ROBINSON Table 1.2 The roots of the African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) People resources: people, their education and their competencies Natural resources: minerals, oil, agricultural land, scenic beauty, etc. Other critical assets: Existing infrastructure such as transport, ICT, power, water and finance Location and geo-political importance: Access to markets and geopolitical influence Political structure: The continuum of political stability from strife, political opportunism and incompetence towards an enabling political environment that maintains law and order, protects human rights and enhances entrepreneurial activity Economic structure that determines how wealth is created, distributed and consumed within the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors Cultural and social structure—the rich cultural heritages and value systems found in Africa Table 1.3 The trunk of the African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) Economic growth and diversification Infrastructure Education and skills Governance and regulatory Markets Social and cultural resources, assets and structures. Organic growth in terms of this paradigm is therefore not linear, but rather depicts a multiplier effect. The trunk’s effectiveness is influenced by both the ‘indigenous’ roots of the particular country, but also by external factors, such as foreign direct investment, international trade, geo-political competition, global warming and a multitude of other factors. Some of these can be moderated by the country, others not. The trunk comprises the following growth channels (Table 1.3). The leaves and fruit are the outcomes of this organic growth process. This is much more than just economic growth outcomes such as GDP growth, but reflects the capital and wealth that is created that ultimately leads to improved well-being of the populace and contributes to stronger roots for further development. The leaves and fruit consist of the following capital and wealth outcomes (Table 1.4). 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 13 Table 1.4 The leaves and fruit of the African Tree of Organic Growth (Jonker and Robinson 2018) Social wealth where rights and duties are upheld, social indicators such as life expectancy is improved, and law and order are maintained Cultural wealth depicted by a strong cultural identity where diverse cultures and values are respected and celebrated, and freedom of expression supported Natural capital where environmental sustainability is prioritised, finite resources protected and efforts are made to mitigate climate change externalities Human capital is developed to improve knowledge and research, skills and competencies, and productivity Institutional capital is reflected through effective government and governance, institutional strength, and fairness and justice Produced capital outcomes of infrastructure, production capacity, and innovation and technology Financial capital of the availability of development finance; improved savings and investment and the partnering with international players Economic wealth that ensures employability, economic participation and indigenous entrepreneurship The African Tree of Organic Growth provides a valuable visual representation of the complexity of sustainable growth within African Nations. The book you are now reading focusses on the growth channels, specifically economic growth and diversification, yet the interrelatedness between the various features of the African Tree of Organic growth confirm that economic growth cannot be considered in isolation. Therefore, while economic growth and diversification with a particular consideration of special economic zones is the topic of the book, it is acknowledged that the failure and successes of these zones and investment levels in these zones is a function of the complex environment that the paradigm presents. For instance, indigenous labour may be plentiful in many countries in Africa, yet skills may be lacking. This will be a constraint on foreign companies wishing to invest and necessitate the payment of premium wages for scarce skills such as that in the technical and engineering domain or requiring the importation of skills and the resultant costs of using expatriates. Yet, these investors can contribute to skills transfer, thus providing an improved labour skill set for the future. Infrastructure is another good example—both a critical asset and a growth channel. The investment in infrastructure facilitated by China and other countries plays an important role in the success of special economic zones as it eases and reduces 14 B. ROBINSON the cost of transport and logistics or provides access to power and critical services. If not, Investors in zones may have to manage without or provide their own infrastructure, at a significant cost. These and other examples will be highlighted as the book progresses through the Chapters. 1.3 The State of African Economies and Economic Growth Prospects Africa’s economic growth on a continental level seems quite strong at an estimated 3.4% for 2019, above the World average of 3%, and that of advanced economies which average 1.7%. Yet economic growth in Africa has stagnated to some extent from the decade average of 5% (African Development Bank 2020b). Africa’s growth is mercurial in nature and particularly susceptible to outside shocks. Angola and other oil exporters were ‘hit’ when the oil price per barrel dropped from a high of $115 to less than $35 in 2016. These economies had failed to diversify their economies and their dependence of oil export revenues impacted them terribly. Angola, for instance, dropped from a GDP high of 8.542% at the beginning of the decade to −2.58 in 2016 (World Bank 2020). At the time of writing this book, the Coronavirus or Covid-19 was already been felt in Africa having a negative impact on most industries especially the retail, manufacturing and tourism industries. The strong growth of 3.4% on the continent also fails to reflect the poverty and inequality alluded to previously. It also fails to reflect how regional and country differences can be significant in terms of growth. East Africa’s estimated growth for 2019 was 5%; North Africa was 4.1%; West Africa 3.7%; Central Africa 3.2%; and Southern Africa only 0.7%. Country differences in 2019 GDPs were stark with South Sudan at 5.8%; Egypt 5.6%; Mauritania 6.7%; Ghana 7.1%; and on the other side of the spectrum, Zimbabwe −12.8%; the most diversified economy of South Africa at only 0.7%. The GDP growth levels, and fluctuations in these levels are complex and for 2019 were influenced by a number of factors, for instance, the collapse of Zimbabwe’s monetary system led to the distortion of their markets; inefficiencies and corruption in state-owned enterprises in South Africa; the Ebola outbreak taking its toll in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and oil production problems due to security issues in Libya (African Development Bank 2020b). 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 15 Inflation remains a concern, although there are indications that there is some improvement in lowering inflation due to the stabilizing of energy prices and falling food prices, with a reduction of Africa’s inflation by 2 percentage points, from 11.2% in 2018 to 9.2% in 2019. Again, country differences are prevalent: 32 countries in Africa reduced inflation levels and 22 countries experienced a rise in inflation (African Development Bank 2020b). With regards monetary policy, Central Banks in Africa have generally utilised interest rate reductions to manage domestic demand and encourage investment to stimulate growth. Examples of this approach include Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Botswana. In cases of severe inflation, interest rates have been a tool to reduce hyper-inflation, although the success of this approach is questionable: In 2019 Zimbabwe’s inflation was 200% and an increase on the interest rate of 2000 basis points was announced, similarly Sudan raised interest rates by 220 basis points to address their inflation of over 60% (African Development Bank 2020b). Deficit to GDP ratios have improved in Africa from a level of 5.9% in 2017 to 4.8% in 2019 mostly thanks to stable commodity prices and revenues for natural resource exporters. Non-exporting countries also showed some improvement thanks to fiscal policy that reduced large fiscal expansion; improved resource mobilization; or cut spending due to debt burdens. Revenue to GDP ratios in Africa remain lower than other low- and middle-income countries globally. This worrying reality is due to the lack of progress in implementing income tax reforms; failure to encourage business registration in the informal sector; and inability to introduce counter-cyclical policy instruments to mitigate volatility and external shocks (African Development Bank 2020b). Debt to GDP, as opposed to fiscal deficit, is rising. Over a 10-year period, debt-to-GDP climbed from 38 to 56%. One reason for this is greater access for African countries to international capital markets and bilateral creditors (for example China). From a positive perspective, this is the result of improved monetary credibility and greater investment in infrastructure to address the infrastructural bottlenecks experienced in much of Africa. There are country differences as usual and certain countries now have very high ratios of external debt to export levels, such as Ethiopia of more than 400% and Sudan, over 600%. Nearly 20 African countries are regarded as being in debt distress or at risk of debt distress (African Development Bank 2020b). 16 B. ROBINSON 1.4 Global, Regional and National Efforts to Stimulate Sustainable Economic Development in Africa Although much of Africa has not had satisfactory success in their economic growth trajectories, this has not always been a result of a lack of effort. There have been numerous international and national attempts to improve the economic growth prospects in Africa. These take various forms from development finance, aid, investment support and incentives, and just general advice. The rationale for Development Finance Institutions is summarised by Xu et al. (2019: 6) as the need to fix market failures; counter information asymmetries in addressing financial constraints; the failure to consider positive externalities; short termism that neglects finance for high-risk and long-term investment; and pro-cyclical lending where lending is restricted during recessionary periods when it is needed the most. Development Finance Institutions are tasked with countering these through ‘mission-oriented innovation that creates new technological opportunities and markets; incubating market institutions in lesser-developed economies with weaker institutions, such as corporate governance; fostering capital markets’. Xu et al.’s. mapping further considered the objectives of development finance institutions. It found that about half were general in nature, 9.03% was multi-sectoral, while just over 40% were focussed on a single-sector. Single sector objectives included trade 30.06%; SMEs and entrepreneurship 29.48%; agriculture and rural development 21.97%; housing 11.56%; and infrastructure 4.05%. The global, regional and national finance institutions are now investigated in more detail. 1.4.1 International and Regional Institutions for Development While there are numerous global and regional development finance institutions that provide a myriad of support services, the discussion will be limited to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD, the New Development Bank, and the African Development Bank mention is also made of the African Union and their Agenda 2063. 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 17 1.4.1.1 World Bank While the World Bank was established in 1944 during the Bretton Woods Conference, it only began introducing conditions on its loans in the 1980s. The rationale was that countries experiencing severe economic crises required more than just money, but that structural adjustments were also required—and so came about the structural adjustment programmes. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) are the loan providers of the World Bank Group (2019). The IBRD, a cooperative owned by 189 member countries, is the world’s largest development bank providing financial products and policy advice in an effort to improve policy and contribute to sustainable growth. The IDA focusses on some of the world’s poorest countries in an effort to reduce poverty. Programmes are geared towards boosting economic growth, reducing inequalities, and improving living conditions. The IDA claims to be the largest source of assistance for the world’s 76 poorest countries, providing loans at a zero or very low interest charge, allowing repayments over an extended period of 30–38 years, and sometimes providing 5–10-year grace periods. The IDA committed $22 billion for the year ended 30 June 2019, and since 1960 has committed $391 billion to 113 countries. The Top 10 recipients of loans for the year ended 2019 included eight African Countries: Ethiopia $2,61 billion; Kenya $1,06 billion; Côte d’Ivoire $1,05 billion; Mozambique $980 million; DRC $812 million; Burkina Faso $797; Niger $733 million; and Mali $599 million. The World Bank’s own evaluation of the success of conditionality suggests that social policy lending had a significant impact on the quality of social policies (Bogetić and Smets 2017). Whether the conditions were observed by countries receiving the loans is debatable, and the number of conditions have been decreasing over time. One of the reasons may be that there are more options for financing with limited conditionality for countries in distress or requiring significant investment to assist in development—such as that of China and ArabNations’ with their non-interference stance. Securing repayment for the loans in these cases takes place slightly differently, such as the ‘Angolamode’ swap of infrastructure for resources the Chinese have adopted. Diego Hernandez (2017) evaluated he decrease in conditionality and suggested that the proliferation of new donors was challenging conditionality. It also found that the conditions have varied sporadically and that the average conditions per project in African countries has decreased 18 B. ROBINSON from a high in the 1980s of 30–40 conditions towards 10 and less from the late 2000s. It is interesting to note that the conditions per country has varied quite significantly with the highest number of conditions (40 and more) in Algeria and the Republic of Congo to less than 10 in Sudan, Seychelles, Lesotho and Djibouti. Hernandez suggests a number of reasons for this discrepancy, including the timing of the loans (1980s and 1990) for Algeria and the Republic of Congo, and the value of the loans (2008– 2013 and of value of less than $20 million) for Djibouti, Lesotho and the Seychelles. 1.4.1.2 International Monetary Fund (IMF) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2020) is an organisation of 189 countries that seeks to further global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability and facilitate international trade, whilst reducing poverty, creating employment and supporting sustainable economic growth. While it does not fund specific projects, it does support a stable macroeconomic environment that would facilitate international trade and foreign direct investment—at the core of the organisation’s existence is the stabilisation of the international monetary system and includes all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that may impact global stability. While all IMF member countries can access the General Resources Account, the IMF does prioritise support for low-income countries through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), an interest free concession for such countries. This can take the form of an extended credit facility, a standby credit facility or a rapid credit facility in the case of urgent balance of payment problems. It also engages these countries through monitoring economic and financial policies; and capacity-building to increase domestic revenue, manage public finances and monetary policy, regulate the financial systems, and implement effective policies. In addition, it has a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust to assist with catastrophic or natural disasters. IMF lending arrangements through the PRGT as at 31 January 2020 were mostly for African countries. There are conditions attached to lending by the IMF. Countries must agree to a programme of economic policies before the lending takes place—these conditions aim to overcome the problems that led to the country seeking financial aid in the first place and safeguard repayment of the loan. Loans are usually paid out in instalments subject to adherence of policy commitments. 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 19 Policy commitments include prior actions taken before the loan to provide a framework for the intervention’s success; quantitative performance criteria that relate to macroeconomic variables such as minimum level of internal reserves, fiscal balances and ceilings on government borrowing; indicative targets to assess progress in meeting objectives; and structural benchmarks that could include improving financial sector operations and better public financial management. The IMF acknowledges the complexity in low income and transitional countries, and that the conditionality framework needs to adapt to multiple structural problems that inhibit economic stability and growth. 1.4.1.3 OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has its historical roots in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation that was established after World War II in 1948, initially financed by the US, to reconstruct countries devasted by the ravages of war. It grew into a global organisation with 36 member countries and 3 ‘key partner’ countries including South Africa, the only country from Africa. These countries account for 80% of world trade and investment (OECD 2019). The OECD primarily assists with informing policy and supporting and monitoring policy implementation, standard setting such as the OECD Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct, and multi-stakeholder global collaboration The OECD has regional initiatives in Africa that helps ‘facilitate policy benchmarking and the exchange of good practices between countries in a specific geographical area within and across regions; help(s) guide countries towards globally recognised standards and ambitious reform agendas to unlock greater prosperity and wellbeing for citizens’. The OECD Development Centre is a forum for policy dialogue with developing and emerging economies to develop policy that stimulates growth and improves living conditions. 1.4.1.4 New Development Bank (NDB) Referred to often as the BRICS bank, the New Development Bank (2020a) was conceptualised at the Fourth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit in 2012. The New Development Bank was established to mobilise financial resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS countries, as well as for other emerging and developing economies. 20 B. ROBINSON The New Development Bank (2020b) describes in its General Strategy: 2017–2021 how it intends to be ‘New’ in terms of relationships; projects and instruments; and approaches. With regards new projects and instruments, it confirms that the core operational strategy is towards financing sustainable infrastructural development: Physical infrastructure is a critical enabler of faster and inclusive economic growth, and sustainability criteria are essential to ensure this infrastructure safeguards the physical and social environment for current and future generations. NDB is helping to fill an important gap in the global development finance architecture, as financing for and technical expertise in sustainable infrastructure development is limited, despite growing demand The New Development Bank aims to cut-out unnecessary bureaucracy and provide ‘fast, flexible, and efficient’ project review and implementation oversight. Key areas of operation are clean energy; transport infrastructure; irrigation, water resource management and sanitation; sustainable urban development; and economic cooperation and integration among member countries. Financing is subject to standard risk and return criteria, rather than policy conditionality or similar country-type conditions—it states that the bank has introduced robust financial and risk management policies that encompasses prudent leveraging, a conservative level of loans as a ratio to equity, strong liquidity buffers, and a diversified and wellperforming portfolio. Projects will mostly be sovereign in nature or be under sovereign guarantee. Financing of projects in Africa have only transpired in South Africa. For instance, there was a loan in 2016 to beleaguered Eskom, South African State-Owned power company for $180 million for grid infrastructure to support renewable energy projects and the augmentation of the transmission network in Soweto, South Africa. Others loan in South African have been towards various transportation, renewable energy, water and sanitation, and environmental protection initiatives. However, with the focus on emerging economies, the so-called BRICS+ economies, it is likely that more financing with be made available outside of South Africa’s borders in the future. 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 21 1.4.1.5 African Development Bank The African Development Bank Group (2020a) is a regional develop finance institution, who’s objective is to pursue sustainable economic development and social progress within the African region, specifically the 54 regional member countries, by mobilising and allocating resources for investment while also providing policy and technical support. Nonregional members include countries from Europe, America and Asia, which allows the bank to access greater financial resources, in addition to accessing markets these non-regional member countries could offer. It has a long history having been established in 1963 in Sudan, and is now headquartered in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, and has offices in 25 regional member countries. It comprises the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Nigeria Trust Fund. It has a close relationship with the World Bank, and in 2019, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the New Development Bank to identify, prepare and co-finance projects when suitable. The African Development Bank finances projects in many sectors, but prioritises the agricultural, health, education, public utilities, transport and telecommunications industries and the private sector. It has also financed non-project interventions, such as structural adjustment loans, policy-based reforms, debt reduction programmes under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative that included the cancellation of $9 billion of loans and provided technical assistance and policy advice. Loans can either be Sovereign-Guaranteed Loans or Non-Sovereign-Guaranteed Loans. Based on country creditworthiness and GNI per capita, three categories are countries defined for the purposes of funding. 1. Not creditworthy: These are countries with a GNI per capita below an established threshold updated annually and are only eligible for concessional loans from the African Development Fund. 2. Blend countries: These are countries below the pre-determined GNI per capita but who are creditworthy. They are eligible for African Development Fund and African Development Bank resources. 3. Countries above the operational GNI level and creditworthy. These countries are eligible for African Development Bank funding only. 22 B. ROBINSON 1.4.1.6 African Union (AU) The African Union (2020) consists of 55 member states, African countries recognised by the African Union, with the following vision: ‘An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena’. Incidentally, the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was financed and built by the Chinese. The African Union, in its Agenda 2063, specifies 7 ‘aspirations’, each of which has a number of related goals. These are detailed in Table 1.5. In order to assist in the achievement of these aspirations, the African Union details a number of flagship projects. The flagship projects of Agenda 2063 (African Union 2020) are key programmes and initiatives of the African Union to accelerate Africa’s economic growth and development, while promoting arts and culture and securing peace on the continent. The projects are detailed in Table 1.6. While the African Union is not a financing institution such as other institutions discussed in this Chapter, it is clear that the African Union has a wide range of aspirations and intended projects to accomplish its vision and Agenda 2063, and these recognise and prioritise an enabling environment to encourage and support inclusive growth and sustainable development. Whether it has the capacity and support or political willpower of the member states to accomplish these is yet to be seen. 1.4.2 National Development Finance Institutions Most African countries have some form of development finance institutions that amongst other objectives prioritises economic growth. Examples of these are detailed in Table 1.7. 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 23 Table 1.5 The seven aspirations of Agenda 2063 (African Union 2020) Aspiration Goals Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 2. Well educated citizens and skills revolutions underpinned by science, technology and innovation 3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens 4. Transformed economies and jobs 5. Modern agriculture for increased proactivity and production 6. Blue/Ocean Economy for accelerated economic growth 7. Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities 1. United Africa (Federal/Confederate) 2. World class infrastructure criss-crosses Africa 3. Decolonisation 1. Democratic values, practices, universal principles for human rights, justice and rule of law entrenched 2. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 1. Peace security and stability is preserved 2. A stable and peaceful Africa 1. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent Aspiration 2: An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa Aspiration 5: An Africa with a strong cultural identity; common heritage, shared values and ethics Aspiration 6: An Africa, whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children Aspiration 7: Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner 1. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 2. Engaged and empowered youth and children 1. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence 2. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development 24 B. ROBINSON Table 1.6 Flagship projects of Agenda 2063 (African Union 2020) Project Details 1. Integrated high-speed train network: The project aims to connect all the African capital cities and commercial hubs in Africa through an African High-Speed Train Network to improve connectivity, reduce transport costs of transport and ease congestion of current and future transport networks The development of an African Commodities Strategy is seen as key to enabling African countries to add value, extract higher rents, integrate their global value chains, and promote vertical and horizontal diversification in commodities—thus transforming Africa from a raw materials supplier for the world to utilising its own resources to promote economic development In order to boost Africa’s trading position in the global economy, the AfCFTA aims to accelerate intra-Africa trade for sustainable development. It has some lofty ambitions, such as doubling intra-Africa trade and strengthening Africa voice in global trade negotiations This project aims to remove restrictions on African’s ability to travel, work and live within Africa ‘Silencing the Guns’ acknowledges the debilitating impact of wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflict and genocide on Africa, and the programme aims to address this through various interventions including the operationalisation of an African Human Security Index The Grand Inga Dam could generate 43,200 MW of power and move much of Africa towards reliable and affordable electricity access 2. African Commodities Strategy 3. African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 4. The African Passport and Free Movement of People 5. ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020 6. Implementation of the Grand Inga Dam Project (continued) 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 25 Table 1.6 (continued) Project Details 7. Single African Air-Transport Market (SAATM) THE SAATM would liberalise intra-African air transport through market access and traffic rights for scheduled and freight air services, thus improving connectivity and efficiencies The establishment of an Annual African Economic Forum would serve to bring together Africa’s political leadership, the private sector, academia, and civil society to discuss and debate how to accelerate economic transformation on the continent The African Continental Financial Institutions aims to establish organisations to mobilise resources and manage the African financial sector. These include the African Investment Bank, Pan African Stock Exchange, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Central Bank The project aims to promote transformative e-applications and services in Africa, including broad-band terrestrial infrastructure, cyber security, the bio and nanotechnology industries—thus transforming Africa into an e-Society The strategy aims to provide for Africa’s access to space technologies and products In order to improve access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa, the programme aims to develop relevant and high quality open, distance and eLearning resources to reach large numbers of students and professionals in multiple sites simultaneously Cyber security to ensure data protection and safety online The Museum project aims to create awareness about Africa’s vast, dynamic and diverse cultural artefacts and the influence Africa has had on various cultures of the world, therefore preserving and promoting the African cultural heritage 8. Annual African Economic Forum 9. African Financial Institutions 10. The Pan-African E-Network 11. Africa Outer Space Strategy 12. An African Virtual and E-University 13. Cyber Security 14. Great African Museum (continued) 26 B. ROBINSON Table 1.6 (continued) Project Details 15. Encyclopaedia Africana The Encyclopaedia African aims to provide an authentic history on Africa and African life Table 1.7 National development finance institutions Country English name Angola Botswana Côte D’Ivoire Djibouti Ethiopia Gabon Kenya Lesotho Mauritius Namibia Rwanda Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa The Development Bank of Angola Botswana Development Corporation Limited National Bank of Investment Development Fund of Djibouti Development Bank of Ethiopia The Development Bank of Gabon Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation Lesotho National Development Corporation Development Bank of Mauritius Development Bank of Namibia Development Bank of Rwanda Development Bank of Seychelles National Development Bank Ltd Somali Development and Reconstruction Bank Development Bank of Southern Africa Independent Development Trust Industrial Development Corporation National Development Corporation Uganda Development Bank Development Bank of Zambia Tanzania Uganda Zambia 1.5 Foreign Direct Investment While development finance can help stimulate growth and support sustainable development in Africa, Foreign Direct Investment reflects mostly private foreign investment in infrastructure projects and business investments. This is at the heart of economic development through global investment activities. 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 27 Financial inflows to Africa amounted to $205.7 billion in 2018. Remittances and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) comprised the bulk of this figure with FDI totalling $45.9 billion and remittances $82.8 billion. FDI had increased by 10.9% from 2017 levels, although remained below the high of $56.9 billion in 2015 (African Development Bank 2020b). EY (2018) produces a useful report commonly known as the African Attractiveness Report which provides some insights on FDI in Africa. For instance, the number of FDI projects against GDP growth showed a positive correlation, and that FDI in Africa since 2015 has struggled to maintain its previous highs even with the recent increases in FDI. The report also reflects on the increased competitiveness in attracting FDI from the various African regions, with Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Africa attracting similar levels of FDI. Investment varied between sectors, and the trend has been towards greater investment in infrastructure, manufacturing and renewables. Real Estate, Hospitality and Construction (RHD) has increased by 133%; Chemicals by 83%; Automotive, 42%; and Power and Utilities by 40%. On the downside, FDI in Consumer Products and Retail (CPR) has reduced by 14%; Financial Services by 16%; Transport and Logistics by 17%; Business Services by 33%; and Technology, Media and Telecommunications (TMT) have fallen by 43%. The source of FDI for 2017 showed that the biggest increase in the number of FDI projects was the US with a 43% increase and Western Europe by 17%, while emerging market investors decreased significantly, most probably due to their own slowing economic growth and weak commodity prices (EY 2018: 8). China’s FDI in Africa will be more thoroughly evaluated in Chapter 4. 1.6 What Is Needed to Shift Africa Towards Sustainable Development? In conclusion, what is needed to shift African countries from underperformance to levels of sustained economic growth that is inclusive in nature? To answer this, perhaps the United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals (2015) provide some guidelines on the objectives that should be top of mind: eradicating poverty and no hunger, health and well-being, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequality, sustainable cities and 28 B. ROBINSON communities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water and on land, peace justice and strong institutions, and partnership for the goals (Fig. 1.3). One of the mistakes make in evaluating the UNs’ Sustainable Development Goals is that they are sometimes viewed in isolation. This is not the within the spirit of the Goals, rather they need to be seen holistically as they are all closely woven together. As eluded to earlier when discussing the African Tree of Organic Growth, economic growth is the fuel for development, but for organic growth to occur, it requires peace, justice and strong institutions, it needs infrastructure innovation and a sound industrial sector, and an educated and healthy workforce. Such growth should not have negative impact on the environment and societal well-being, instead responsible production should ensure equality in the workplace and beyond, contribute to skills development and education and reduce inequalities, mitigate climate change, and have a positive social impact. Some pointers are provided on essential pre-conditions required to ensure that sustainable development is achieved in the challenging environment of African nations. These all require good policy, from planning to intervention, and governance. Table 1.8 has been developed Fig. 1.3 United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals (2015) Macroeconomic stability Structural transformation of relocating economic resources from low to high productivity activities Development Financing in Africa Sustain macroeconomic stability while improving public financial management Deepen structural reforms to diversify the continent’s productive base and unleash its growth potential African Economic Outlook 2020 Pre-conditions for Africa Nations’ sustainable development Structural transformation Policy Conditions Table 1.8 While there has been progress in policy-making for development, the impact is still unrealised EY Attractiveness Report (continued) Development states require the channelling or guiding market activity through effective government policies such as incentives, controls and mechanisms to ensure inclusive growth The organic growth paradigm is based on an economic framework that will encourage diversification in sectors in which the country enjoys a comparative advantage or can develop a comparative advantage African Tree of Organic Growth 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 29 The transformation into modern economies will be impossible without infrastructure Urgent need to mobilise the public sector, domestic resources, development finance, and private finance Infrastructure development Partnerships and financing Agriculture and sustainability About 55% of African work in agriculture and productivity levels are extremely low Ease of business Shared value in the supply chain Development Financing in Africa (continued) Conditions Table 1.8 African Economic Outlook 2020 Promoting shared value throughout the value chain to ensure skills transfer and local supply chains are developed Create a conducive environment for entrepreneurship Inadequate infrastructure and private investment should be overcome by diversifying the sources of finance and creating innovative financing solutions Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) can overcome some of the fiscal and trade deficits EY Attractiveness Report African Tree of Organic Growth 30 B. ROBINSON Invest in people’s health and education—link between education to growth and structural transformation Development Financing in Africa Expand social safety nets and increase their efficiency, Strengthen domestic capacity to cushion extreme weather events Address obstacles to labour mobility, within and across countries and industries African Economic Outlook 2020 Inter-regional trade is only at 18%. Free trade initiatives need to be realised EY Attractiveness Report The historical, social and cultural context is the central fibre of the development process African Tree of Organic Growth Adapted from ‘Development Financing in Africa’ by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2017; ‘African Economic Outlook 2020’ by the African Development Bank (2020b); the ‘EY’s Attractiveness Report, 2018’ and ‘The African Tree of Organic Growth’ (Jonker and Robinson 2018) External shocks Social safety nets People Regional integration Conditions 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 31 32 B. ROBINSON to highlight these pre-conditions based on insights from the following documents: ‘Development Financing in Africa’ by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; ‘African Economic Outlook 2020’ by the African Development Bank (2020b); the ‘EY’s Attractiveness Report, 2018’ and ‘The African Tree of Organic Growth’ (Jonker and Robinson 2018). Ensuring sustainable development for all African Nations is a huge challenge that faces the continent, but there can be no doubt that economic growth is central to this happening. Introducing Special Economic Zones have been a successful model for stimulating economic activity throughout the world, and the question which this book aims to answer, is whether they are able to do the same in Africa? References African Development Bank. 2020a. [Online]. Available from: https://www.afdb. org/en. Accessed 24 Feb 2020. African Development Bank. 2020b. African Economic Outlook 2020 [Online]. Available from: https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-out look-2020. Accessed 27 Feb 2020. African Union. 2020. Agenda 2063 [Online]. Available from: www.au.int. Accessed 19 Feb 2020. Bogetić, Ž., and L. Smets. 2017. Association of World Bank Lending with Social Development Policies and Institutions. © World Bank [Online]. Available from: https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/WorldBank PolicyLending.pdf. Accessed 17 Feb 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/ by/3.0/igo/. EY. 2018. EY’s Attractiveness Program. Africa. Turning Tides [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-africaattractiveness-survey-2018/$File/ey-africa-attractiveness-survey-2018.pdf. Accessed 2 Mar 2020. Helliwell, J., R. Layard, and J. Sachs. 2019. World Happiness Report 2019. New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network [Online]. Available from: https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2019/#read. Accessed 7 Jan 2020. Hernandez, D. 2017. Are “New” Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality? World Development 96: 529–549. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2020. © World Bank [Online]. Available from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/ibrd. Accessed 17 Feb 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. 1 AFRICA’S ECONOMIES 33 International Development Association. 2020. © World Bank [Online]. Available from: http://ida.worldbank.org/. Accessed 17 Feb 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons. org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. International Monetary Fund. 2020. [Online]. Available from https://www.imf. org/external/. Accessed 18 Feb 2020. Jonker, K., and B. Robinson. 2018. China’s Impact on the African Renaissance: The Baobab Grows. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. New Development Bank. 2020a. [Online]. Accessed from www.ndb.int. Accessed 19 Feb 2020. New Development Bank. 2020b. New Development Bank Strategy 2017–2021 [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 08/NDB-Strategy.pdf. Accessed 19 Feb 2020. OECD. 2019. Who We Are. [Online]. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/ about/. Accessed 5 Feb 2020. The United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals. 2015. United Nations [Online], September 25. Available from: https://www.un.org/sustainabled evelopment/news/communications-material/. Accessed 6 Jan 2020. The World Bank. 2019. Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa: In Five Charts. © World Bank [Online], October 9. Available from: https://openknowl edge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32354. Accessed 6 Jan 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). The World Bank. 2020. Country Profiles. © World Bank [Online]. Available from: https://data.worldbank.org/country. Accessed 7 Jan 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Transparency International. 2018. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 [Online]. Available from: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. Accessed 7 Jan 2020. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 by Transparency International is licensed under CC-BY-DE 4.0. United Nations Development Programme. 2019. Human Development Report 2019 [Online]. Accessed from: http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ files/hdr2019.pdf. Accessed 7 Jan 2020. Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2017. Development Financing in Africa [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.uneca.org/publications/dev elopment-financing-africa. Accessed 3 Mar 2020. Xu, J., X. Ren, and X. Wu. 2019. Mapping Development Finance Institutions Worldwide: Definitions, Rationales, and Varieties. Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking University. Accessed from: https://www.idfc.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2019/07/nse_development_financing_research_report_no-12.pdf. Accessed 26 Feb 2020. CHAPTER 2 China’s Surge in Growth Facilitated by Special Economic Zones This Chapter is dedicated to better understanding the context and emergence of Special Economic Zones in China; the opening-up of the Chinese economy and the pivotal role the Zones played during this period; and case studies will illustrate how the phenomenal growth trajectory of China was closely associated with the evolution of the zones. The history of Chinese civilisation dates to about 4000 BC, a leading civilisation that has spanned centuries. History depicts many dynasties with many emperors, terrible wars, colonial rule, trade routes, and a strong cultural and societal identity. It is beyond the scope, and certainly my expertise, to delve into this ancient history. Rather, let’s jump straight to 1912 when the last of the dynasties came to an end, and the Chinese Republic became the constitutional form of state with a President. Years followed with inner turmoil and conflict between the northern and southern regions of the country, conflict between different political and economic ideologies. Communism was for some time a topic of interest of a number of intellectuals and politicians, and in 1921 the Communist Party was established in Peking. Mao Tsetung mobilised millions under the ideology, while the Nationalists (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek, were staunchly anti-communist. The country also found itself a casualty in the global power chess-game, with Japan all but conquering the country. The situation for the country was dire, until an unexpected opportunity—the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atom Bombs in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_2 35 36 B. ROBINSON 1945 ‘neutralised’ Japan, and China found itself free to determine its own future fate. The Nationalist government took over the country’s administration after the war, but the communists were well organised and equipped thanks to arms surrendered by the Japanese and Soviet armies, and had their ranks increased by deserters from the Nationalist army. The ensuing Chinese Civil War resulted in most of mainland China being in control by the Communists, who established their capital in Peking. The Nationalist government eventually relocated to Taiwan, an area which is still in dispute regarding Chinese sovereignty, and the Communist Party of China came to power in 1949. Mainland China found much of its infrastructure and industry devastated after years of war and conflict. The transportation, communication and power systems were not well developed. The agricultural sector was faltering. The economy was on a poor footing with rampant inflation. This was the state of the nation that Mao inherited, and he soon began trying to change that. The immediate priority of government was to normalise the economy and get the necessary infrastructure up and running. The banking system was nationalised, and the People’s Bank of China established. Inflation was stabilised through a guaranteed currency value, unified monetary system, credit control and better management of government budgets. In order to stimulate the economy, state trading companies were established, state-owned enterprises further developed, and private companies were increasingly brought under state control. Landownership was fundamentally changed, with 45% of arable land expropriated from landlords and productive farmers and redistributed to farm families who previously had no land of their own. These farmers were encouraged to cooperate amongst themselves in so-called mutual aid teams. The efforts were reasonably successful, and the economy improved. In the 1950s China entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union for specialist civil and military products, and loan agreements were concluded to finance these. The focus was on heavy industry, especially military equipment to the detriment of consumer goods, and many factories were established up to the 1960s with the Soviet’s assistance. Their new-found military might was demonstrated in the Korean War and the invasion of Tibet. The first Five-Year Plan of 1953–1957 adopted the Soviet model of industrial growth and socialisation that included state ownership of 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 37 industry, collective agricultural units which eventually became producer cooperatives accounting for most of the country’s agricultural households, and centralised economic planning. By 1956, no private companies remained. Iron and steel manufacturing, machine manufacturing, electricity generation and the mining industry were prioritised and succeeded in generating significant improvements in industrial production and national growth. The Plan’s priority, which was developed with the assistance of the Soviets, was clear: maximise industrial development. A mistake that China made (and which Western and African economists and leaders have sometimes made since) is assuming that policies to quickly industrialise would automatically springboard massive economic growth—these policies mostly fail as they are one-sector focussed and do not contextualise development interventions to the country’s fundamentals. China certainly experienced this first-hand when Chairman Mao introduced the Great Leap Forward policy to drastically increase industrial output and address the ‘frustratingly’ slow growth of the agricultural sector. One aspect of the policy entailed turning the rural farming cooperatives into communes, many of which were required to produce iron in home-furnaces, smelting whatever they could, and producing mostly poor-quality products or unfinished iron and steel output. In 1958, 98% of the farm population were in these communes. The Great Leap Forward Policy was ill-conceived and unwieldy, and coupled with misallocation of resources and adverse weather, it eventually resulted in drastically reduced agricultural production. Estimates vary that between 25 and 45 million people died from famine as a result during the years 1958–1962. The industrial sector wasn’t spared, and industrial output is estimated to have fallen by nearly 38% in 1961. Policy priorities were reversed: first agriculture, then light industry, and finally, heavy industry. From 1961 to 1964, central commune administration was reduced, private plots were restored, and farmers were once again allowed to conduct farming for their own reward. Agricultural taxes were reduced, and prices raised for agricultural output. This coupled with improved farming techniques contributed to improved agricultural output to the extent that China could once again feed herself. The Cultural Revolution which occurred around 1966–1976, was political in nature, and put further strain on the economy. Political activity of students and workers disrupted production of industries and the mines, transport logistics of raw materials and goods were compromised in favour 38 B. ROBINSON of transporting the Chinese Red Guards, and factories were placed under the leadership of revolutionary committees which included the Chinese Liberation Army. Scientists, engineers and others were demoted or even jailed. Imports of foreign equipment was banned—which resulted in many years of stagnant technological advancement. Focussed on eliminating the cultural traditions in favour of radical social revolution, the Red Guard invaded homes, and books and art were destroyed. The educational sector collapsed, the political system was in turmoil, and the economy weakened and was embattled for a further decade. Slowly but surely, political stability was restored, and the economy began to slowly grow in the early 1970s. Communist Party of China Committees replaced revolutionary committees, and well-educated and skilled labour were once again employed. Universities re-opened, and there was some effort to open the county to the outside world, and foreign investment in certain industries was encouraged. Industrial output and agricultural production increased significantly. There was, however, a movement by the ‘Gang of Four’ who through their media strength, sowed seeds of uncertainty in the mid-1970s and created a power struggle and policy inaction. This countered economic advances made during the previous years. After the arrest of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of the country. Deng Xiaoping revitalised the Four Modernizations (modernising agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology) and introduced sweeping changes: Amongst others, foreign trade was to be increased; managers and economic decision makers would take precedent over party officials; workers would be incentivised; research and education was to be increased. A 10-year plan for the period of 1976–1985 period was developed that prioritised industry and agriculture. Key to the success of this plan was the establishment of Special Economic Zones. 2.1 Special Economic Zones: A Key Development Policy Instrument China embarked on its ambitious opening-up of the country and market reform in the late 1970s, and utilised Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters as key facilitators of growth. The results have been nothing less than spectacular. GDP growth has surged and averaged around 10% for decades, although growth has been slowing due to structural constraints, and the impact of the COVID-19 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 39 Fig. 2.1 GDP growth (annual %)—China (World Bank 2020) virus is still uncertain (Fig. 2.1). The export orientation of the Zones and their spectacular success is reflected in the growth of exports as a percentage of GDP from 4.556% in 1978 doubling to 11.02% in 1982 after just 4 years, reaching a high of 36.04% in 2006, before dropping to a strong level of 19.52% in 2018 (Fig. 2.2). Not only were the economic indicators strong, but the societal improvements were just as impressive: From a poverty rate of 88% in 1981, it was less than 1% in 2019 with the government planning to eradicate poverty by 2020—850 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty. The definition in this book of Special Economic Zones is wide as described in the book’s front pages, and refers to economic development zones promulgated as Special Economic Zones, as well as the Industrial Development Zones, Export Processing Zones, Industrial Parks, and a myriad of other formats, all of which are specific interventions or investments for economic growth. China has numerous of these types of economic zones and clusters, but the attention of this Chapter is mostly 40 B. ROBINSON Fig. 2.2 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)—China (World Bank 2020) dedicated to some of the seven designated Special Economic Zones in China: Shenzhen (case study); Zhuhai (case study); Shantou (case study); Xiamen; Hainan; Shanghai Pudong New Area and Tianjin New Area (Fig. 2.3). A publication by The World Bank entitled ‘Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China’ (2010), edited by Douglas Zeng, provides some valuable insights into the role of these zones and their contribution to China’s successful Opening Up strategy. This will serve as a brief introduction to the emergence Special Economic Zones, following which, three case studies are presented. Zeng explains that the Open-Door Policy in 1978 was essentially a social experiment to gauge the efficiency of market-oriented economic reform in a controlled manner—and within a delimited geographic area (the Zone in question). This is probably the most fundamental difference between Special Economic Zones in other regions of the world and China: the zones were a testing ground for the fundamental change to the country’s economic construct of a planned economy. 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 41 Fig. 2.3 Location on the Special Economic Zones in China (Google Maps) Deng Xiaoping inherited a country with a struggling economy with much of the population in dire straits with widespread poverty. He introduced the ‘Four Modernisations’ to stimulate China which focussed on the fields of agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology. He was also the chief architect of the Open-Door Policy. In 1979, the Central Government decided that Guangdong and Fujian provinces would lead the implementation of the Policy. The first four of the zones, namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen were designated in the latter half of 1980. Their objectives were to facilitate broad-based comprehensive economic development enjoying financial, investment and trade privileges. Zeng explains that they were deliberately established far from the capital city of Beijing to minimise risks and political interference; while also being located in coastal areas 42 B. ROBINSON that already had a long history of contact with the rest of the world, and that were close to the established commercial and industrial hubs of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. From the outset, they were encouraged to take a very different approach with open and innovative policies, that if proven successful, could be rolled out throughout the country. The success of the zones was almost immediate. By 1981, the four Special Economic Zones accounted for 59.8% of total FDI in China, mostly thanks to Shenzhen which contributed 50.6%. Hong Kong was helpful in providing much needed Foreign Direct Investment in many of the production centers of the Zones and other areas. The growth rates of China’s GDP between 1980 and 1984 grew at 10% per annum, buoyed by Shenzhen’s growth of 58% during this period, followed by Zhuhai at 32%, Xiamen at 13%, and Shantou at 9%. Between 1988 and 2006 the other large Special Economic Zones of the province of Hainan, Shanghai Pudong New Area and Tianjin Binhai New Area were initiated. Encouraged by the success of the Special Economic Zones and to support the opening of the economy, the government in 1984–1988 introduced smaller zones called ‘economic and technological development zones’, known better as industrial parks—14 of these zones were established in cities in the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Min Delta. The success of these supported the decision to create another 35 of these variants in 1992 that included inland regions, and since then the number has continued to grow. There were other variants to these zones with specific objectives. Some of these are detailed in Table 2.1. Another contributor to China’s economic growth worth mentioning is that of industrial clusters. These often emerge naturally, although in China, they have been given significant support. They are mostly labour intensive and found in the manufacturing sector, although this is changing, and more of these clusters are now found in the high-end of the value chain. Often, they are found within the large Special Economic Zones and are an important contributor to the Zones’ own success. In order to gain a better idea of the history, structure, and functioning of Chinese Special Economic Zones, three Zones in the country were visited during my research. These visits and resultant first-hand knowledge gained served as the foundation for the development of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones described in the next Chapter—this Model is referred to throughout the book as a benchmark against which various African Special Economic Zones are evaluated. The observations 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 43 Table 2.1 Specialised zones Zone category Details High-tech Industrial Development Zone (HIDZs) • These zones were used to implement the Torch Program initiated by the Ministry of Science and Technology in the late 1980s • Objective was to use the technological capacity and resources of research institutes, universities, and large and medium enterprises to develop new and high-tech products and to commercialise research and development • These were experimental zones to investigate free trade before China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation • Functions were export processing, foreign trade, and logistics and bonded warehousing • They function outside of China’s customs regulations and are eligible for tax refunds on exports, import duty exemption, and concessionary value-added tax • These zones were developed to support export-oriented industries and thus enhance foreign exchange earnings Free Trade Zones (FTZs) Export-Processing Zones (EPZs) Adapted from Zeng (2010: 10–12) are described in the following case studies of the Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou Special Economic Zones. 2.2 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Shenzhen today is a bustling city of over 13 million people, most of whom are migrants from other parts of China. Skyscrapers dominate the skyline—Shenzhen has 262 skyscrapers above 150 m which ranks it 3rd place in the World after Hong Kong and New York. Sometimes referred to as China’s Silicon Valley, it boasts about 14,000 high-tech companies including Huawei, Lenovo and Tencent, and is headquarters to numerous 44 B. ROBINSON multinational corporations. It is home to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the 8th largest stock exchange in the world. The position of the city is advantageous, being just 41 kilometres from Hong Kong, with easy access by rail, road, metro and ferry. It is part of the Pearl River Delta Metropolis which comprises other megacities such as Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Hong Kong and Macau, in total with an estimated 120 million people. The extensive and modern transport infrastructure allows for Shenzhen to easily trade with the rest of the world. The city’s economic contribution is 3rd after Shanghai and Beijing (Figs. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7). Visiting the city today, one finds it very difficult to believe that it was once a small fishing town that was transformed during the ‘Opening-up’ policy that started in 1978. In order to fully appreciate the history of the Zone, I visited the Shenzhen Museum. The following narrative on the evolution of the Zone is gleaned from observations and information from the museum (Fig. 2.8). Shenzhen, the predecessor of which was called Bao’an County, is in actual fact an ancient city with a history of over 7000 years of human development as a marine economy, 1700 years of urban history, and which served as a coastal defence for China over the past 600 years. Not only was it a fishing town, but its prime position in the Pearl River Delta allowed the city to play an important role in trade, situated along the ‘porcelain ware road’, and served as the gateway to Guangzhou. It also became embroiled in the conflicts of modern Chinese history due to its position: the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century; the anti-colonial fight against Britain’s occupation of Hong Kong; the Sanzhoutian Uprising; the farmer’s movement led by Bao’an County Organization of the Communist Party of China; the Guangdong-Hong Kong General Strike; the War of Resistance Against Japan, and China’s War of Liberation. In the 1950s, a ‘Mutual Aid Team’ and ‘Agricultural Cooperative’ were established to assist mobilising the so-called ‘peasants’—reservoirs and dams were built, lands were intensely cultivated, and bumper crops were yielded. Small volume trade was opened with Hong Kong, and gradually factories and tourist facilities began emerging. However, prior to the establishment of Shenzhen as a SEZ, Shenzhen citizens faced significant economic hardship. For instance, farmers’ wages in 1977 were 270 Yuan in Shenzhen, while in Hong Kong they were 6000 Yuan. Photographs 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 45 Fig. 2.4 KK100: Second tallest building in Shenzhen with 100 floors from the period indicate Shenzhen was a small-sized city at that stage, but things were about to change… In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee resolved to ‘Reform and Open up’ the Chinese economy, with Deng Xiaoping proposing Special Economic Zones as a principal method to do this. Xi Zhongxun, father of today’s President Xi Jinping, played a pivotal role during this period. After a turbulent history with 46 B. ROBINSON Fig. 2.5 Shenzhen Municipal Government the communist party and imprisonment during the Cultural Revolution, Xi emerged as an important supporter for economic liberalisation and encouraged Deng Xiaoping to allow the province of Guangdong to make their own decisions regarding foreign trade policy and foreign investment. In 1980, the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the 5th National Congress passed the “Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province”, leading to the establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which was soon to become known as the ‘The Miracle of China’. The history of the Zone is described in terms of ‘Chapters’ by the Shenzhen Museum and which are described below. 2.3 Chapter I---The Initial Phase: 1978–1992 Large-scale capital construction was a priority, focussed on developing urban infrastructure to facilitate a modern and efficient city zone. It tested the waters of market orientated reform and was industrial and 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 47 Fig. 2.6 Shenzhen North Railway Station—extensive transport infrastructure connects the city with the rest of China and the world export-focussed in nature. The ‘Opening-up’ allowed for the introduction of foreign equipment, technology and capital; it encouraged regional associations; and supported combinations of domestic and international collaboration. It promoted shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises and the financial system, and very early on established the stock exchange. Several nicknames and sayings exist today because of the sheer speed and magnitude of development of Shenzhen. The Miracle of China mentioned before was one of them, another name the city was called was City Rose Overnight. A nickname depicting the ‘force’ of development was the Trail-blazing Ox, when 20,000 construction engineers were deployed by the Central Military Commission to support the capital construction programme. Probably the most famous though internationally is Shenzhen Speed. The term was coined when the 50 floor Guomao 48 B. ROBINSON Fig. 2.7 Colourful nightlife in Shenzhen Building was built in the early 1980s in just 37 months and became the tallest building in China at the time. There were momentous cultural and societal changes during this period. Concepts such as all people ‘eat from the same pot’ were abolished, signifying a move towards a free market system. Market reform was incremental and was introduced through the ‘Four-Step Measures’ for price reform of Shenzhen: • Step 1: Gradually improving the price system and pricing structure mainly with market regulation. • Step 2: Further improving the price system mainly with relaxing price controls. • Step 3: With the guidance of value law, mainly tightening the indirect control on free price by control, market regulation and relaxing price controls. 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 49 Fig. 2.8 Shenzhen Museum • Step 4: Starting price reform from commodity price to noncommodity tolling areas. There were also other important changes to facilitate economic growth: The labour market was allowed to function more freely through the ‘Labor Contract System’. The complex bureaucracy of the time was improved through drastically simplifying municipal administration. Reforms were introduced for state-owned enterprises allowing for a shareholding system and private investment in these entities. The financial system was reformed. A domestic foreign exchange regulation centre was established. Foreign banks were allowed in the city while regional joint-stock banks were established. A nonferrous metals futures market began operating. Land-use rights were auctioned for the first time. The housing system was overhauled with a new property management system and people being allowed to purchase homes. 50 B. ROBINSON The strategic position of Shenzhen next to Hong Kong and ease of access to the domestic and international markets, lent Shenzhen towards a foreign-oriented structure of economic development. In order to achieve a key objective of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of developing an export-oriented economy, it encouraged investment and introduced bonded industrial zones, and supported exportorientated enterprises and ocean trade. Early in the history of the Zone, Shenzhen was able to attract foreign direct investment including a number of multinational enterprises. In addition, local Chinese business with the support of government were established to spur industrialisation, such as the Shenzhen Electronics Industrial Corporation, Great Wall Computer Co., Konka Group Corporation and the Union Textile of China (Group) Ltd. There was also an early indication of the Zone’s ambitions to enter the hi-tech arena, when the Chinese Academy of Sciences established the SSIPC hi-tech industrial park. 2.4 Chapter II---Creating New Advantages, Making More Progress: 1992–2002 In the early 1990s, Shenzhen was well on the way towards been a major economic powerhouse. The next decade saw a renewed dedication to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to increase competitiveness and complete the basic framework of the country’s socialist market economy. Further opening up of the country was prioritised through the ‘Introducing-in’ and ‘Going out’ policy throughout the country, much of which was led by the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. The high-tech industry was vigorously developed while industrial development and upgrading continued. In addition, the city’s administration and institutions were further strengthened and streamlined to support growth. The commercial sector and the trade circulation system experienced greater reform, as did the reform of state-owned enterprises. The land use system was improved, the technology market was advanced, an Assets and Equity Exchange market established, and the Venture Investment Market System was introduced. The framework of the socialist market economy, initiated by Shenzhen, were based on ‘Ten Systems’: 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 51 1. Ownership system taking public ownership as the principal part, diverse economic sectors for competing and developing in common. 2. Capital-linked supervision administration and operation system of state-owned assets. 3. Market oriented price system. 4. Market system based on commodity market and supported by production elements market. 5. Social security system of integrating common social aid with personal security system. 6. Social service supervision system taking agent organisation as the principal part. 7. National economy accounts system and enterprise accounting system meeting with the requirement of market economy. 8. Distribution system with labor-based distribution as principal part, efficiency in priority, and attending to equity at the same time. 9. Economy administration and regulation system of whole society with indirect means as principal part. 10. Legal system of meeting with the requirements of socialist market economy system of the special zone. The ‘10 Systems’ were holistic in approach, combining macroeconomic reforms while also improving the social security system, such as the Social Insurance Bureau, in an attempt to ensure the economic benefits also accrued to people in need. Businesses began fulfilling some social responsibilities through CSI activities and better employee engagement. The development and progress of the zone has always mirrored the political and legal transformation that was going on at the same time: “Constructing and developing socialist democratic politics is one of the key objectives of the construction of Shenzhen SEZ. Shenzhen combined the promotion of economic base reform with the promotion of superstructure reform, continued to strengthen the democratic and legal construction, and boosted political restructuring in a moderate manner. Shenzhen also promoted law-ruling throughout the city, which not only improved the Reform and Opening-up and the economic development, and also guaranteed the social stability and harmony”. Shenzhen Museum poster. 52 B. ROBINSON Chapter II also saw greater commitment to the quality and degree of service the Zone offered foreign investors with the introduction of a Foreign Investment Service Centre. Granting National Treatment to Foreign Investors was a policy to improve the lifestyle and services for foreign nationals in Shenzhen in order to enjoy some of the benefits that Chinese citizens were afforded. The strategy of ‘Going out to the Outside World’ was embraced by the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Diplomatic exchanges became the norm with China encouraging leaders from nations throughout the world to visit Shenzhen. Shenzhen also played a facilitating role in China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Chapter I had prioritised industrialisation and urbanisation to shift the local economy away from the traditional agricultural economy and trade and commercial economy. Chapter II took this to the next level and vigorously developed high and new technologies and advanced industry. To achieve this, the city took a global lead in developing these industries, for instance through the initiation of High-tech Industrial parks and the hosting of the World Conference on Science and Technology in 1985. There were numerous other areas of advancement in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: The zone emphasised the development of a modern service industry and the logistics industry was enlarged—the Yantian Port was one of the biggest projects of that time. An innovative financial industry was developed. The tourism sector received attention and today is an important tourism hub for the country. Urban administration was further fine-tuned to meet the needs of a burgeoning city including an advanced road and railway system to cope with the population growth. Rural areas were urbanised. 2.5 Chapter III---Braving a New Way with Scientific Development Outlook: 2002–2012 “Innovation is the root and the soul of Shenzhen. It is compulsory therefore to promote innovation for further development”. Shenzhen Museum poster. At this stage of the city’s development, the phenomenal growth had led to severe limitations of land, resources, population and environmental capacity. To address these constraints, a new development strategy 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 53 was required that optimised the city’s industry structure while further developing new and hi-tech industries. In 2008 Shenzhen became the national pilot city of innovation. Six strategic emerging industries were identified and prioritised: Bioindustry; internet; new energy; new material; cultural innovation; and new generation information technology. Its vision was to be an international innovation city with world influence. Shenzhen wanted to be a model ‘Eco-environment Friendly City’ or so-called ‘Model City of Ecological Garden in China’. From an environmental perspective, it focussed on being a low-carbon economy through energy-saving real-estate developments, supporting the introduction of zero-emission electric vehicles, and innovative methods of generating power, such as the garbage burning power plant in the Nanshan district. Urban planning was adjusted to improve land utilisation with important infrastructural projects in transport, communication, power, water and gas to improve service capabilities in a pollution-free and low carbon manner. The area of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was also increased from the original 417 km2 to 1991 km2 . Major infrastructural projects during this period included the China South Logistic Park; the new Stock Exchange; Shenzhen Hi-Tech Industrial Park; Dafen Cultural Industry Park; Futian Transport Hub; Yantian Port; and improving facilities at Futian Port. China has struggled with corruption, and there was a renewed effort to mitigate the problem through improving Communist Party conduct, upholding integrity and fighting corruption. Supervision over party conduct and government ethics was strengthened. The phase also built on previous advances in improving the well-being of its citizens through the initiative of ‘Promoting the Construction of a Harmonious Society’. In order to this, it focussed on strengthening social management, improving public service, promoting welfare, and generally ensuring that the success of the city was enjoyed and shared by the people of the society. This included the improvement of the social security system and provision of Medicare. Terms such as ‘Harmonious Shenzhen’ and ‘Safe Shenzhen’ were used to reflect the city’s commitment to a safe and enjoyable lifestyle. The ‘10 Concepts of Shenzhen’ epitomise the innovative, inclusive and values-driven philosophies of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: 54 B. ROBINSON 1. Time is money, efficiency is our lifeblood. 2. Empty words talk the talk, hard work walks the walk. 3. Dare to be the first. 4. Shenzhen: born in reform, driven by innovation. 5. May Shenzhen become a city where people love to read. 6. Encourage innovation, fear no failure. 7. Cultural access for all. 8. The pleasure of giving lingers on the giver. 9. Shenzhen: in step with the world. 10. When in Shenzhen, you are one of us. In Conclusion: The Shenzhen Museum boasted numerous pre- and post-Special Economic Zone photographs, and the change of the city’s landscape seems metamorphosized in 3–4 decades from an almost sleepy coastal fishing town to a modern city touching the sky. The approach adopted by the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone guided China through its economic transformation. The Zone’s approach will be evaluated and applied later in the next Chapter when the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones is presented. 2.6 Zhuhai SEZ Zhuhai is a beautiful city and a huge tourist destination, and a relatively successful Special Economic Zone (Figs. 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11). Zhuhai is in a prime position and is well connected through road, rail, water and air transport to the major cities of the Pearl River Delta Metropolis—it borders Macau to the South, and is within an hour’s reach from Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The engineering masterpiece of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge connects the city to Hong Kong. The Zhuhai Special Economic Zone was promulgated at the same time as Shenzhen and Shantou in 1980. A little border town of a mere 7 square kilometres expanded rapidly over the 40 years and now occupies 1724 square meters. GDP increased from 209 million Yuan to 291.5 billion Yuan in 2018 (Guangdong China 2019). The Zhuhai Special Economic Zone was initially intended to be a hitech research area to the exclusion of heavy industry. In reality, the Zone has mostly focussed on light industries, and has a thriving textile and electronics manufacturing sector. Other major industries include electronic 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 55 Fig. 2.9 Seashore of high-rises: Zhuhai Yanlord Riverside Centre; Statue of the Fisher Girl Fig. 2.10 Zhuhai Opera House in the design of an open pearl 56 B. ROBINSON Fig. 2.11 Gongbei Port—gateway to Macau and beyond information, biopharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, electrical appliances, precision machinery manufacturing and energy. With the electronics base, the Zone has recently prioritised a shift back towards hi-tech and highvalue industries. The Zone also boasts the only deep-water port that side of the Pearl River Delta and has thus become an important large-scale harbour industry zone. The Hengqin New Area is a pilot Free Trade Zone within the area that has attracted over 60,000 entities and has had some notable achievements such as having 370 institutional innovations recorded. The relatively lower wages of the area, good infrastructure, tax incentives, and probably the pleasant lifestyle the city offer, has contributed to significant investment by global companies, such as the many financial institutions that have found a home in the city, including Morgan Stanley, Bank of East Asia and Standard Chartered. It now boasts some 3000 foreign trade companies, and is home to 2055 hi-tech companies (Guangdong China 2019). The Zone has prioritised preserving the ecology and adheres to the concept of ‘Green Hills and Clear Waters are Gold and Silver Mountains’, and in 1998 won the Dubai International Award for Best Practice in Improving the Living Environment granted by the UN Center for Human Settlements. Zhuhai Special Economic Zone has also led the way in terms of social development. Some examples of this are the 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 57 following: In 1993 Zhuhai issued the first national social insurance regulation; in 2002 it established serious illness medical insurance for migrant workers; 2007 saw the introduction of free education for local primary and secondary school students; and in 2018 tickets for city bus routes were lowered to 1 Yuan (Guangdong China 2019). The Zhuhai Special Economic Zone seems to have found the balance between driving economic growth whilst ensuring the environment is protected and the well-being of its people is enhanced. 2.7 Shantou Special Economic Zone Not all the Special Economic Zones were as successful as envisaged. Shantou is one of those which has not achieved the level of development expected. Historically a fishing village and trade port, with the benefit of becoming a ‘treaty port’ in the nineteenth century, which allowed for trade with the world. Its position has always been advantageous being between Hong Kong and Taiwan. In actual fact many Chinese living outside of mainland China originate from the area—an attraction in itself to lure back Chinese wanting to invest in their homeland. It is a city of contrasts, derelict buildings and dirty alleys, revitalised historical centres, and new high-rises dominate the cityscape (Figs. 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15). The Shantou Special Economic Zone has all the infrastructure necessary to support its success and it is well located with port access and proximity to Shenzhen and other major cities in the region. So, the reason for its lacklustre performance is not immediately obvious. Fig. 2.12 Abandoned and decaying 58 B. ROBINSON Fig. 2.13 Beautiful architecture with evidence of urban restoration efforts Fig. 2.14 Port and railway station connecting Shantou to China and the rest of the world Fig. 2.15 Various industrial parks are found in the Zone 2 CHINA’S SURGE IN GROWTH FACILITATED … 59 Initially the Zone experienced rapid growth after the Shantou Special Economic Zone was designated in the 1980s, with investors attracted by incentives such as duty-free exports and reduced import taxes; relatively low wages; and excellent infrastructural resources. Much of the investment was from the Asian Pacific region. In the 1990s, the Chinese Government split the city into 3 cities of Shantou, Jieyang and Chaozhou, with Shantou Special Economic Zone being enlarged from the Eastern Suburbs to covering the entire city. The division of the city is one of the reasons advanced for the Shantou Economic Zone experiencing a downturn, as much of its manufacturing and agricultural capacity was lost through the division; limited fiscal resources were split too thinly; and the three cities were now in fierce competition to each other. Another is the Asian financial crisis of 1998— the Shantou economy was strongly linked to the Asian Pacific region which was their major source of foreign capital and the market for their exports. The economy even entered a contractionary period between 1998 and 2002. The city also had a problem with tax evasion and smuggling which was a deterrent to investment (Chai 2017). Bowen Chai (2017) makes a valuable observation as to why the Shantou Special Economic Zone’s trajectory changed its course for the negative after the splitting of the city into three: Chai suggests the Shantou-Jiyang-Chaozhou had a history of almost a thousand years with the same culture, history and economy—they were reliant on one another. The initial success of the Shantou Special Economic Zone was a function of the holistic contribution of the three regions, while the separation of the region into the three cities compromised this delicate balance. 2.8 Conclusion The preceding discussion and evaluation of the three Chinese Special Economic Zones provided the foundation for the depiction of a Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones that was adopted and that evolved over time. This will be the focus in the next Chapter as I construct the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones—the model is envisaged as a useful benchmark for the evaluation of Special Economic Zones in Africa conducted later in the book. 60 B. ROBINSON References Chai, B. 2017. The Research on the Stagnant Development of Shantou Special Economic Zone Under Reform and Opening-Up Policy. University of Pennsylvania Scholarly Commons. Accessed from: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/pap ers/1711/1711.08877.pdf. Accessed 10 Mar 2020. Guangdong China. 2019. Zhuhai Special Economic Zone Marks 39th Anniversary [Online], August 28. Accessed from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/reg ional/2019-08/27/content_37505873.htm. Accessed 4 Apr 2020. World Bank. 2020. China Country Overview. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview. Accessed 12 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Zeng, D. 2010. Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/294021468213279589/pdf/564470PUB0buil10Box349496B01PU BLIC1.pdf. Accessed 4 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ igo/. CHAPTER 3 The Chinese Special Economic Zone Model and China of the Future The photograph of the original planning document of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Fig. 3.1) provides just a glimpse of the incredible amount of planning that went into the development of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. In studying and visiting the various Zones in China, it became clear that not only was planning key to the zone, but that there were certain dynamic success factors that contributed to the rapid development of the Zone and the economic growth that was generated. These are complex, yet somehow simple if one redacts it to a visual representation of the model that seems to emerge when delving into the evolution of the zones—especially that of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. This I have attempted to do in the model below, where the pillars and processes that were adopted in the development of the Zones are illustrated. This chapter will unpack key learnings from the success of Special Economic Zones in the previous chapter and reformulate them into a ‘Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones’—a useful point of comparison against African Special Economic Zones. In addition, the Chapter will evaluate China of the future—a country that will soon be the biggest economy in the world and yield much influence over Africa’s propensity for socio-economic development. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_3 61 62 B. ROBINSON Fig. 3.1 One of the original planning documents for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, dated 1986: ‘General Planning of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone’ 3.1 The ‘Pillars’ of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones The 7-pillars are the foundation to China’s Special Economic Zones, without which, they pose a severe constraint to the propensity of these Zones to prosper. They are Leadership support, government support, government policy, location, people, an integrated approach, and last but certainly not least, infrastructure (Fig. 3.2). 3.2 The ‘Protocols’ of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones While the pillars need to be in place, the planning and establishment of the Zones need to follow certain protocols in the implementation of these zones. These are a phased approach, preferential policies, ease of business, innovation and learning, a favourable investment climate, modern service delivery, environmental consideration, international cooperation, address shortcomings, support the social system, and they usually have an export orientation and are diversified (Fig. 3.3). 3 • From Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping, Chinese Presidents have provided vociferous support and commitment • Support has filtered from top leadership down to middle and lower-levels of leadership Pillar 1: Leadership support Pillar 3: Government Policy THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … • Closely aligned to socio-economic policy • Clear objectives and long terms outlook • ‘Opening up’ market reform was implemented through the SEZs • The SEZs also informed future policy direction – dynamic in nature • Policy was tested in a controlled approach • Policy evolved • Willingness to experiment and make mistakes – thus informing future efforts Pillar 5: People Pillar 7: Infrastructure • Outcomes of SEZs economic and social • Social upliftment and wellbeing always a priority • Focus on a harmonious society Pillar 2: Government support Pillar 4: Location Pillar 6: Integration 63 • There has been immense commitment and participation by all tiers of government towards the Special Economic Zones • Position of the SEZs selected for access to domestic, regional and international markets • Geo-political significance an important consideration • The approach of the zones was integrated • The SEZ was carefully integrated with the cities of the SEZ • The SEZ was aligned to national objectives • Infrastructure was of paramount importance • Significant investment by government in transport, power, water and waste, and ICT infrastructure Fig. 3.2 The 7 Pillars of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 64 B. ROBINSON Protocol 1: Phased approach Protocol 3: Preferential Policies Protocol 5: Favourable investment climate Protocol 7: Environmental consideration Protocol 9: Addressing shortcomings Protocol 11: Export orientation • Phased approach developed as lessons were learnt and mistakes made • Successes benchmarked and applied to other emerging SEZs • A wide range of preferential policies were offered for both foreign and local investors • Internationally competitive • Multipronged approach • State Owned Enterprises played an important initial role • Domestic investment was through public, private, and public-private partnerships • FDI encouraged through incentives, service, infrastructure and market access • Foreigners were given ‘national treatment’ • Environmental issues were an important consideration as SEZs evolved • Better pollution control • Focus on low-carbon manufacturing and transport • Identify negative externalities • Mitigation of corruption • Addressing congestion and population growth through better use of space and resources • Adapt for better efficiencies • The SEZs mostly had a strong focus on exports Protocol 2: Ease of business Protocol 4: Innovation and learning • Reduced bureaucracy • Simplified local government administraƟon • ‘Pilot city of innovation’ • Industrialisation evolved over time from heavy industry to high-tech • Innovation a priority • Focus on strategic industries • ‘Smart-cities’ Protocol 6: Modern Service Industry Protocol 8: InternaƟonal cooperaƟon Protocol 10: Social System Protocol 12: Diversified industries • Development prioritised modern service industry • ‘Going out to the outside world’ • Developed internaƟonal cooperaƟon and goodwill • The social system was continually improved • Companies played a role in improving well-being through Corporate Social Investment and stakeholder engagement, especially around labour • SEZs were not exclusively focussed on industrialisaƟon • Incubated a wide range of related industries such as tourism Fig. 3.3 The 12 Pillars of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 65 3.3 The Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones The Pillars and Protocols serve to balance and secure the ultimate objectives of Special Economic Zones, namely sustainable development on a regional and national basis, as depicted in Fig. 3.4. A working paper commissioned by the World Bank Group by Douglas Zeng (2015) considered the major success factors for Chinese Special Economic Zones: Strong commitment and support of the government to pilot market-oriented economic reforms; land reforms that allowed for the allocation of land to be market based; investment incentives and institutional autonomy; attracting foreign direct investment; technology learning, innovation, upgrading and strong links to the domestic economy; innovative cultures; clear objectives, benchmarks, and competition; and location advantages. These success factors are reflected in the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones, therefore providing support for the conclusions drawn in the Model. In conclusion, it is worthwhile reflecting on an earlier work of Douglas Zeng (2010, xiv) who provides a summary of key experiences of China’s Special Economic Zones, much of which is encapsulated in the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones depicted above: … can best be summarized as gradualism with an experimental approach; a strong commitment; and the active, pragmatic facilitation of the state. Sustainable development Protocol 1: Phased approach Protocol 2: Protocol 3: Protocol 4: Ease of Preferential Innovation policies business & learning Protocol 5: Favourable Investment Climate Protocol 6: Phased approach Protocol 7: Protocol 8: Protocol 9: Modern International Addressing shortservice cooperation comings delivery Protocol 10: Protocol 11: Protocol 12: Social Export Diversified system orientation industries Pillar 1: Pillar 2: Pillar 3: Pillar 4: Pillar 5: Pillar 6: Pillar 7: Leadership support Government support Government policy Location People Integration Infrastructure Fig. 3.4 The Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones 66 B. ROBINSON Some of the specific lessons include the importance of strong commitment and pragmatism from the top leadership; preferential policies and broad institutional autonomy; staunch support and proactive participation of governments, especially in the areas of public good and externalities; public-private partnerships; foreign direct investment and investment from the Chinese diaspora; business value chains and social networks; and continuous technology learning and upgrading. The Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones serves as a useful benchmark against which to evaluate African Special Economic Zones. While it is acknowledged that there are important contextual differences that need to be taken into account when evaluating African Zones against this Model, the premise of this book is that there are lessons to be learnt from the Chinese Model, and that such a model can help identify the elements of success and failure of Special Economic Zones in Africa. 3.4 Epilogue: The Future of Chinese Development Before embarking on the evaluation of Africa’s Special Economic Zones, it would be of value to consider the outlook for China—as Africa’s biggest trading partner and significant investor in Africa’s Special Economic Zones, China’s future local and global economic aspirations will have a direct bearing on Africa’s Zones. The Chinese economy is slowing down. The World Bank’s China Economic Update of December 2019 describes the sluggish growth as a result of ‘cyclical headwinds and structural challenges’. The cyclical factors include a global economic slowdown; trade tensions especially between China and the USA; and tighter regulations of non-bank credit. Structural challenges include slower labour force growth; poor productivity increases; the outcomes of excessive borrowing; and the impact of environmental negligence. Figure 3.5 from the China Economic Update, based on the World Bank’s NBS figures indicates how the GDP Growth has been influenced by reduced domestic consumption; reduced gross capital formation due to weak investor confidence, trade policy uncertainty, and tight domestic financing; while net exports have strengthened due to significant reduction of imports—much attributed to the trade policy uncertainty. Figure 3.6 below indicates the World Bank forecasts of GDP growth dropping to 5.7% by 2022. 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 67 Fig. 3.5 The contribution of consumption, investment and net exports to GDP Growth (China Economic Update, World Bank 2019a: 11) Fig. 3.6 Global Economic Prospects—Forecasts—China (World Bank Data 2020) 68 B. ROBINSON The Chinese government has adopted the following policy measures to address this sluggish trend: Targeted and measured policy support in light of the structural and cyclical nature of the slowdown; increased fiscal support, including tax cuts and a higher limit on local government on-budget borrowing; easing the monetary policy stance; and the introduction some structural reforms (World Bank, China Economic Update 2019a: 23–25). Another World Bank publication sheds some light on how China could lay the path for the future: ‘Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth’, 2019. The report proposes the so-called “3+6+7” Reform Agenda: 3D’s; 6 Strategic Choices; and 7 Areas of Structural and Institutional Reforms: These are summarised in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. The 3D’s are also presented in visual form (Fig. 3.7), which is quite useful, as it illustrates how the production frontiers can be shifted outwards and allow for greater production making better use of domestic resources; global technologies; and through introducing new technologies. Table 3.1 A summary of the 3D’s (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: 19–149) 3D’s Summary 1. Removing distortions • Reduce distortions in the allocation of resources to maximise its potential production frontier • This requires that land, labour and financial resources be allocated competitively and efficiently to ensure their most productive use • Accelerate the diffusion of advanced technologies and innovations • This would allow China to extend its current production frontier to the global frontier • This will allow China to take advantage of the potential for growth by promoting technology diffusion; upgrading the capacity of workers to adopt and use new technologies; and facilitate access to global technologies and innovations • Fostering discovery of new innovation and technology • This will create new innovations and push out the global technology frontier The government would need to provide a market-supportive role to promote these 3D’s 2. Accelerating diffusion 3. Fostering Discovery Governance and institutional reforms 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 69 Table 3.2 A summary of the Six Strategic Choices (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: 19–149) 6 Strategic Choices Summary 1. Striking the right balance between the three drivers of growth 2. Reshaping industrial policies • While new technologies have been emphasised by Chinese policy, the third D, the country also needs to pay attention to the first two D’s, as these will produce immediate results and will remain the main driver for growth for some time • As China is at a more advance stage of development than when it ‘opened-up’, it needs a new approach to industrial policy • Industrial policy needs to focus on market failures and to be market conforming and enhancing • Industrial policies that leverage and promote market competition are of particular importance due to the country’s large state presence • The state needs to be less market interventionist and more market supportive and augmenting • While State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) are still important, fair competition between SOEs and non-SOEs would expose firms to competitive pressure and facilitate the selection of the most productive enterprises, whether State-owned or not • Trade tension have brought uncertainty and downside risk which could unravel global value chains • China should work with global partners to achieve mutually beneficial global economic relations 3. Adjusting the balance between the state and markets 4. Attaining mutually beneficial international trade and investment relations with global partners 5. Balancing supply-side reforms with demand-side reforms 6. Preparing for the future impact of technological changes • China should rely less on investments and more on consumption for growth, while maintaining robust aggregate demand • Consumption growth can be accelerated by encouraging lower household saving through reforms such as an improved social security system and more progressive tax rates • The ‘Hukou’ system of household registration should be reformed in order to integrate migrants into the urban population • Policy needs to prepare China’s current workforce for the impact of technology on the workplace, as while new employment opportunities may be created, others may be displaced or require new skills 70 B. ROBINSON Table 3.3 A summary of the 7 Areas of Structural and Institutional Reforms (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: 19–149) 7 Areas of Structural and Institutional Reforms Summary 1. Reshaping industrial policies and supporting market competition • Focus policies on improving factor markets, the broader business environment, and promote market competition • Targeted industrial policies need to be focussed on market failures, such as information asymmetry and externalities • Policy should target just a few strategic industries with extensive support • A market led corporate bankruptcy regime to ensure timely discontinuation of support for non-viable firms • Expand government-industry dialogue on policy for transparency and accountability • Open more sectors to private and foreign investment to promote greater competition • Reduce market restrictions and improve the business climate and local innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystems • SOE reforms to ensure fair competition which could include mixed-ownership initiatives 2. Promoting innovation and the digital economy 3. Building human capital • Increase the capacity of the competition regulatory agency • Although China has an extensive top-down innovation system, this should be complemented with a more bottom-up market orientated approach, such as R&D tax credits, innovation support programs, and global innovation partnerships • Greater protection of intellectual property rights through increasing fines and damages for infringement • Government support for patenting should be more stringent and quality driven • To promote digital innovations, China could facilitate the trade of flow of data through more open and less restrictive digital policies • Improve the quality of telecommunications technology to support digital services • To sustain productivity and innovation-driven growth, investments should be shifted from physical capital to human capital • Develop a new education sector for the future workforce • Address disparities in the educational system; ensure the poor and disadvantaged are afforded and encouraged to remain in school; develop a multi-tiered tertiary education system; promote curriculum and pedagogical reforms to promote creativity, cognitive and socioemotional skills; and strengthen technical and vocational training and lifelong learning systems (continued) 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 71 Table 3.3 (continued) 7 Areas of Structural and Institutional Reforms Summary 4. Allocating resources efficiently • Improve the allocative efficiency of finance, especially towards SMEs • Scale up regulatory and supervisory oversight in the fintech industry while still encouraging innovation • Address the significant debt accumulation in the financial system • Improve the allocative efficiency of labour • Access the underutilised labour in agriculture, increase female labour participation, and extend the working lives of the labour force • Reform the ‘hukou’ household registration system to promote labour mobility 5. Leveraging regional development and integration 6. Promoting international competitiveness and economic globalization • Consolidate the pension and social security system • Increase the pace and efficiency of urbanisation and facilitate the rural–urban migration of labour • Regionally coordinated development supported by reforms of the government performance appraisal system to incentivise coordination and collaboration • Find smarter ways to plan, utilise and manage infrastructural investment • Further reforms to promote an open global economy • Pursue preferential trade agreements to stimulate trade and foreign direct investment flows and integrate with global value chains • Provide leadership in developing international rules on foreign investment, cross-border mergers and acquisitions that both developed and developing economies could support • Further protect the rights and interests of foreign investors in China • Encourage the introduction of foreign technologies in China and prevent ‘forced’ technology transfers • Strengthen the linkages between domestic and foreign enterprises to enhance technology and managerial spill overs and global collaboration 7. Governing the next transformation • Improve China’s outward direct investment management system by adopting a more market-oriented approach • The belt and road initiative should include investment in ‘soft infrastructure’, including the adoption of international standards and rules of trade, foreign investment and environmental standards • Belt and road investment should be transparent and environmentally, socially and fiscally sustainable • Government reforms to ensure a more balanced relationship between the state and market • The market must play a more decisive role, while the state should play a more market-supportive role • Governance reforms to provide clear, fair and predictable regulations • Reform of the civil service management system to strengthen incentives to support markets and long-run productivity growth • Reshape and modernise its intergovernmental relations and strengthen its fiscal discipline • Improve the coverage, quality, and public accessibility of government related data 72 B. ROBINSON Fig. 3.7 The impact of the 3D’s on the production Frontiers 3D’s (World Bank, Innovative China: New Drivers for Growth 2019b: XIX) A critique of this publication lies in the one aspect that is perhaps underestimated in the 3D’s, namely the role of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in other countries. This provides the opportunity to fundamentally shift China’s local and global production frontier. Especially in the face of Chinese firms encountering oversupply of capacity in the face of an economic downturn domestically. The significant investment and potential for future investment by Chinese companies in Special Economic Zones is Africa is one example of that. Not only are Chinese companies investing in African financed Special Economic Zones, but Chinese investors, with the support of China’s government, have established and financed Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa. 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 73 Two case studies are presented that expand of two elements of the New Drivers for Growth available to China. Firstly, the Xiong’an New Area and the Belt and Road Initiative. 3.5 Xiong’an New Area The 3Ds have a great deal of emphasis on technology in order to shift the production frontier for China. The Xiong’an New Area provides an example of both the efforts to accelerate the diffusion of technology and to foster the discovery of technology. There has been a lot of ‘noise’ around the Xiong’an New Area, President Xi’s brainchild and which could be indicative of China’s future focus as it address the constraints of mega-cities and leads the way into the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It has not been designated a Special Economic Zone with the usual preferential benefits, but it is enjoying the country’s leadership and governmental support, and will be an interesting project to observe as it unfolds, as if it is successful, it could be the next Shenzhen and provide the blueprint for China’s future cities. Beijing is bursting at the seams and options are limited for authorities to increase the city in an effective manner. So, as happens often in China, an experiment is under way. Simply create a new city. But a better city—a smart city that is green, innovative, and one that is pleasant to live in. President Xi announced his vision for Xiong’an on the 1st of April 2017. It is estimated that RMB 4 trillion will be invested in building the city over the next two decades. It is intended to integrate the BeijingTianjin-Hebei area, with approximately RMB 600 billion earmarked for transport infrastructure alone, and which includes four high-speed train lines and two canals. This will reduce transit time to 20 minutes from Xiong’an to Beijing’s airport and 30 minutes to Beijing and Tianjin (Wong 2019). This New Area will grow through the influx of non-capital functions from Beijing, such as financial institutions, colleges, hospitals and certain public service departments. Universities will also be shifted to the area including the Peking University Guanghua School of Management and Renmin University of China. The innovation focus of the area is reflected in the fact that the Zhongguancun technology hub currently in Beijing will develop a science park in Xiong’an, and it is hoped that about 74 B. ROBINSON Fig. 3.8 The Baiyangdian Lake area with fields of the giant lotus flowers 500,000 scientists will migrate to Xiong’an from Beijing. Investments in hi-tech industries, such as biotechnology and new materials will be given priority, and there has already been an indication that leading companies in these fields will set up operations there, including Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (Wong 2019). It intends attracting 12 energy conservation and environmental protection companies to the area in its drive to be a leading Green city. The city itself aims to be powered by 100% clean power, some of which it will produce itself through natural gas and geothermal energy. Factories with high carbon emissions will be removed or restricted, and 5,200 companies in the area have already been shut down due to pollution violations (Wong 2019). When visiting China in 2019, I asked many locals about the Xiong’an New Area. Most people didn’t know about the planned city (although this may also have been thanks to my terrible pronunciation of Xiong’an). When I visited the New Area itself, about 130 km from Beijing, it comprised mostly small towns and rural areas. It is home to the country’s largest freshwater lake, the Baiyangdian Lake, a spectacular area of reed marshes and giant lotus flowers. This in itself promises to provide pleasant living for those who intend living there, although the marsh and mercurial weather is seen by some as a constraint to the area’s development. But already there were signs of what was to come. New (and currently deserted) roads, billboards advertising the new high-speed rail line, and signs of investors taking ‘first-mover’ advantage, with modern new commercial buildings spotted here and there. This sleepy area is going to metamorphosize very soon… (Figs. 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12). 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 75 Fig. 3.9 Typical streets of the Xiong’an area—Far from the high-rise city it is to become Fig. 3.10 Typical streets of the Xiong’an New Area—Karaoke, a favourite pastime 3.6 Belt and Road Initiative In terms of the 7 Areas of Structural and Institutional Reform, the New Drivers for Growth for an innovative China, mention was made of the Belt 76 B. ROBINSON Fig. 3.11 Xiong’an New Area—signs of what is to come Fig. 3.12 Almost deserted new 3-lane city roads 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 77 and Road Initiative (BRI). The Initiative is an ambitious vision of President Xi Jinping that was initiated in 2013. It is founded on, and intended to rekindle, the ancient Silk Road that connected China to the rest of the world. Today’s Belt and Road will similarly enhance the connectivity of China throughout the modern world, with a specific initial focus on Asia, Europe and Africa, that serves to improve trade and economic cooperation (Fig. 3.13). The initiative is the culmination of China’s Opening-Up and ‘Going-Out’ policies begun in the late 1970s. The Belt and Road Initiative describes global opportunities in five areas: Policy coordination that will support large-scale infrastructural development; building facilities to enable connectivity; facilitating crossborder investment and supply chain cooperation; financial integration that enhances monetary policy coordination and bilateral financial cooperation; and cultural exchange through promoting people to people interaction and cooperation. The plan also suggests that the initiative will further the development agenda of lesser developed economies and regions while promoting peace. The World Bank (2020) estimates that the cost of the Belt and Road Initiative spanning potentially 70 corridor countries is in the region of $575 billion. In doing so, travel times would be reduced by 12%, trade Fig. 3.13 The Belt and Road Initiative (World Bank 2020) 78 B. ROBINSON would be increased by between 2.7 and 9.7%, income would go up to 3.4%, and lift 7.6 million people from extreme poverty. The Belt and Road Initiative holds enormous potential in Africa to improve access to domestic, regional and international markets, especially through improved transport infrastructure. While Kenya is depicted as the point of entry of the Belt and Road in Africa in the above figure (Fig. 3.13), the initiative is certainly not limited to the country. For instance, the envisaged rail network in East Africa will link the Port of Mombasa in Kenya to the Capital of Nairobi, and then extends to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan—all of which are landlocked countries. Other significant regional railway networks that have been galvanised by China include the recently completed Djibouti to Addis Ababa railway, and the Lobito corridor that will link Lobito in Angola to the Copperbelt of Zambia. The potential of this network to improve transport times, cost and regional integration are enormous. For instance, the Chinese have already financed and built the Mombasa to Nairobi section, which they are currently still managing and maintaining—it is modern, comfortable, on-time, and already been used to transport people and goods efficiently. The Madakara Express passenger train replaces the infamous overnight ‘Lunatic Express’, and is only 5 hours in duration. The photographs below give a glimpse of this new infrastructure (Figs. 3.14 and 3.15). There are of course concerns: The accumulative debt burden for developing economies could be problematic, and governance risks especially around corruption, and environmental risks pose a problem. There are also concerns there could be negative societal externalities, such as forced removal of communities. The perception by many locals who I met were quite negative towards the new railway lines, and when travelling on the Addis Ababa to Djibouti railway line also built by the Chinese, locals threw rocks at the carriages and have been known to deliberately stop the train out of protest to the trains’ existence. The transport infrastructure that has resulted from the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as other mammoth infrastructural investments by the Chinese in Africa, will receive much attention in this book. Such investments have the propensity to alleviate the bottlenecks of infrastructural development found in many African countries, and by doing so, they facilitate the success of Special Economic Zones in Africa. 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … Fig. 3.14 Nairobi and Mombasa Terminal Fig. 3.15 New and modern trains—the ‘Madakara Express’ 79 80 B. ROBINSON 3.7 Conclusion The Chinese are not afraid of failing. They are afraid of not trying. Their innovative approach of trying, succeeding and failing, and learning, have led to the hugely successful application and replication of Special Economic Zones to facilitate sustainable development for China. ‘If it works, copy it’ as one of my Chinese colleagues explained. African countries can benefit not only from the investment by the Chinese in important infrastructural projects, investment in African Special Economic Zones, and Chinese investing in their own Special Economic Zones in Africa, but Africa has an enormous amount to learn from China’s model and adapting it to African nations’ specific contexts. There are of course many reciprocal benefits to China, notably, these investments hold the promise to shift the production possibilities frontier for the country as it embarks on its next stage of economic development in the face of an economic slowdown. It is in the interest of the Chinese for African Special Economic Zones to succeed. This chapter was important as it studied and presented China’s Model of Special Economic Zones, as a construct and benchmarking tool against which African Special Economic Zones are further evaluated in the Chapters that follow. References Wong, F. 2019. Xiong’an New Area: President Xi’s Dream City. China Briefing, 26 March. Accessed from: https://www.china-briefing.com/news/xiongannew-area-beijing-tianjin-hebei/. Accessed 20 Mar 2020. World Bank. 2019a. China Economic Update December 2019: Cyclical Risks and Structural Imperatives. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https:// www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/publication/china-economic-upd ate-december-2019. Accessed 31 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/lic enses/by/3.0/igo/. World Bank. 2019b. Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han dle/10986/32351. Accessed 31 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/lic enses/by/3.0/igo/. World Bank. 2020. Belt and Road Initiative. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/ 3 THE CHINESE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE MODEL … 81 brief/belt-and-road-initiative. Accessed 13 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons. org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. World Bank Data. 2020. GDP Growth and Exports of Goods and Services. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN&view=chart. Accessed 12 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http:// creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Zeng, D. 2010. Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/294021468213279589/pdf/564470PUB0buil10Box349496B01PU BLIC1.pdf. Accessed 4 Mar 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ igo/. Zeng, D. 2015. Global Experiences with Special Economic Zones: Focus on China and Africa. Policy Research Working Paper No. 7240. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank [Online]. https://openknowledge.worldb ank.org/handle/10986/21854. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. PART II The Emergence of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa CHAPTER 4 China in Africa Chinese President Xi Jinping’s book The Governance of China II (2017) depicts Xi’s vision for the future of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and the Chinese Dream’ to achieve a ‘Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects’. When first reading the book, I found it quite baffling that the term ‘moderately prosperous’ had been used. Used to the lofty, and unkept promises of many politicians, I would have expected the term ‘phenomenally prosperous’, or simply ‘wealthy’ society? Yet when reading the book, which is essentially Xi’s philosophy (the antecedent of which could be considered as Maoism), one begins to understand that this is one step, an important step, in China’s evolving development—the criterion of which is inclusive growth where everyone will achieve an rudimentary level of prosperity. Once achieved, the word ‘moderate’ will likely change to reflect the next level of prosperity. Integral to this vision, is China’s global goals. Two quotes serve as a useful introduction to the influence of China in Africa. The first describes the function of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) for China in the global economy which provides a hint of the role African Special Economic Zones may play in this regard; and the second, a quote on Xi’s view on Africa: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_4 85 86 B. ROBINSON Accelerating the implementation of the FTZ strategy is an objective requirement for adapting to the new trends of economic globalization. It is the option we must choose if we are to achieve deeper reform and build an open economic system, and it is an important measure in addressing foreign relations and implementing foreign strategies. (Xi 2017: 106) In conducting China’s relations with Africa, we apply the principles of sincerity, affinity, and good faith and uphold the values of the greater good and shared interests. We will work with our African friends to embrace a new era of mutually beneficial cooperation and common development. (Xi 2017: 496) Xi then proposes strengthening the ‘Five Pillars’ of the partnership between China and Africa (Table 4.1): Xi further details the implementation of Ten Cooperation Programs with Africa (Table 4.2): The Chapter will now detail the historical relationship between China and Africa, the current relationship the Continent and China have with specific reference to economic interaction between them, and the policy framework between China and Africa. The Chapter also serves as an introduction to Special Economic Zones in Africa, the investment of China in Special Economic Zones in the developing world, and finally, Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa. Table 4.1 Excerpts from the Five Major Pillars of China and Africa’s strategic partnership (Xi 2017: 496–497) Five Major Pillars of China and Africa’s strategic partnership 1. We should remain committed to political equality and mutual trust. China strongly believes that Africa belongs to the African people and that African affairs should be decided by the African people 2. We should remain committed to mutually beneficial economic cooperation… requires us to facilitate Africa’s development efforts and ultimately deliver common development through mutually beneficial cooperation 3. We should remain committed to mutually enriching cultural exchanges 4. We should remain committed to mutual assistance in security 5. We should remain committed to solidarity and coordination in international affairs 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 87 Table 4.2 Excerpts from the Ten Cooperation Programs of China with Africa (Xi 2017: 498–501) 10 Cooperation Programs of China with Africa 1. The China-Africa industrialization program: China will actively promote partnering in the fields of industrial complementarity and industrial capacity between China and Africa, and encourage more Chinese enterprises to make investment in Africa. China will build or upgrade a number of industrial parks in cooperation with Africa, send senior experts and advisors to Africa, and set up regional vocational education centers and schools with a view to enhancing Africa’s industrial capacity 2. The China-Africa agricultural modernization program 3. The China-Africa infrastructure program: We support Chinese enterprises in their active participation in Africa’s infrastructural development, particularly in sectors such as railways, roads, regional aviation, ports, electricity, and telecommunications, which will help enhance Africa’s capacity for sustainable development 4. The China-Africa financial program: It will encourage Chinese financial institutions to set up more branches in Africa, and increase its investment and financing cooperation with Africa in multiple ways so as to provide financial support and services for Africa’s industrialization 5. The China-Africa green development program: China will support Africa in bolstering its capacity for green, low-carbon and sustainable development… China-Africa cooperation will never be pursued at the expense of Africa’s eco-system and long-term interests 6. The China-Africa trade and investment facilitation program: China is ready to negotiate comprehensive free-trade agreements with countries and regional organizations in Africa covering trade in goods and services and investment cooperation… once concluded (these) will boost China’ s import of African products 7. The China-Africa poverty reduction program 8. The China-Africa public health program 9. The China-Africa cultural and people-to-people program 10. The China-Africa peace and security program 4.1 China’s Intricate Relationship with Africa China is geographically very far away from Africa, yet the first contact between them seems to date to over two millennia ago, when Chinese explorers ventured west and arrived at Likan, believed to be Alexandria of Egypt. This is disputed by some historians, although there are other suggestions that indirect trade of goods occurred around this period— Chinese silk worn by Queen Cleopatra of Egypt, and it is recorded that in 166 AD, the Han Emperor received gifts of elephant tusks and rhinoceros horn from the Roman Emperor of the time. During the Sung Dynasty 88 B. ROBINSON of 960–1279, advances were made in Chinese shipbuilding, and trade with Africa began in earnest, with remnants of Chinese coins and porcelain from the period found as far South as Zimbabwe. China’s Ming Dynasty saw this interaction increase and some ambassadors and envoys, such as those from Somalia and Egypt, travelled to China. Interaction, however, reduced over time and by the sixteenth century ship building and sea going trade was prohibited due to China’s internal conflicts, and European invasions and colonisations in Africa and Asia (Jinyuan 1984). The Ching dynasty had a closed-door policy regarding foreign relations, and for a long period there was little interaction between China and Africa. In the early 20th Century this started to change. Chinese labourers were recruited to work in the new-found gold mines of South Africa, and it is estimated that between 70,000 to 100,000 Chinese labourers worked on the mines between 1904 to 1907 and many descendants still live in the country. Apart from this, there was not much contact between China and Africa, much of which was under colonial rule. The Bandung Conference of Asian-African countries changed this, and in 1956 Egypt established diplomatic relations with China, and this trend in confirming diplomatic relations has grown over the years to include all African countries except for eSwatini due to their recognition of Taiwan, an issue discussed later in the chapter. In parallel, economic activity and investment between China and Africa have blossomed (Jinyuan 1984). Since the late 1990s the relationship between China and the African continent has truly exploded. In 2013, China became sub-Saharan Africa’s largest export and development partner. About a third of China’s energy imports come from Africa as China’s hunger for energy resources became acute with the massive growth experienced by the country. Large scale infrastructural projects, which will be detailed throughout this book, were undertaken with the assistance of Chinese Banks such as the People’s Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the Export–Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank). Thousands of Chinese enterprises are now operating in Africa. Diplomatic contacts, bilateral trade, and cooperation initiatives have grown including the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Association of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (Pigato and Tang 2015). Before embarking on a conversation on the economic cooperation between China and Africa, it is worthwhile addressing some of the other areas where China is contributing to Africa’s development, and to touch 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 89 on some areas of concern regarding the relationship between them. Reference is made to various FOCAC documents such as he FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021, news releases, and academic perspectives in the ensuing discussion. 4.1.1 Political and International Cooperation The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021 emphasized high level visits and dialogue; bi-lateral consultation and cooperation; and exchanges between legislatures, consultative bodies, political parties and local governments. In addition, China endeavoured to support the African Union and sub-regional organisations in Africa in their efforts to promote peace and stability, and further better integration of Africa such as through the African Continental Free Trade Agreement initiative. There are a number of examples of the collaboration between China and African Nations and their increasing role in World Affairs: China supported the lifting of international sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2020; China stated that it encouraged multilateralism and opposed international ‘bullying’ in South Africa in 2019; and China has spoken up at the United Nations for the international community to increase support for Somalia while safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and independence. The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) idealises the future of cooperation between China and Africa in the rapidly changing global environment: It is in line with the trend of the times and serves the interests of Chinese and African people to build a community with a shared future for mankind, an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys durable peace, universal security, and common prosperity, and a new type of international relations featuring mutual respect, equity, justice and win-win cooperation. 4.1.2 Development Assistance China often describes itself in similar development terms as Africa. Lessons learned from its success in alleviating poverty, it believes, can be successfully adapted and applied in Africa. Not only does China provide 90 B. ROBINSON financial assistance for social development, it also provides information and guidance founded on its own successes in development. The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) speaks of ‘Sharing the Poverty Reduction Experience’. The Plan includes an array of poverty alleviation projects to help Africa improve its rural public service; enhance skills to improve employability; improve the environment and living conditions in rural areas; and protect the health and well-being of women and children. As part of its varied educational interventions, China provides workshops and tertiary degrees on poverty reduction and development for African Countries, as well as conducts collaborative research projects on poverty reduction. 4.1.3 Humanitarian Support, Peacekeeping Efforts, Military Cooperation, and Law Enforcement China has a long history of providing humanitarian support after ‘Opening-up’. International peacekeeping efforts were bolstered in the 1980s and 1990 by China who sent 600 peacekeepers to Liberia; 218 peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of Congo; and China participated in numerous UN-sanctioned operations to promote stability (Alden 2005). China also donated $22 Million during this period to the UN Trust Fund for African Development and the UN Environment Programme. In 1999, China provided $200,000 to combat drought in the Horn of Africa. And there are many more examples of this over the years. China has been engaged in military support since the 1980s in the form of training, equipment provision, and the sales of arms. Examples in the 1990s of China’s military support include the provision of uniforms, training, and light equipment to Mozambique; the sale of fighter jets to Zimbabwe; the sale of helicopters to Angola and Mali; the sale of light arms to Namibia and Sierra Leone; the alleged sale of $1 Billion worth of arms to both sides of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war; arms to the Democratic Republic of Congo to defend it against Rwandan forces; provision of arms and ammunition and helicopters to Sudan; as well as the provision of Chinese firms’ contract workers with an estimated 4000 and 10,000 arms (Alden 2005). The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) describes FOCAC’s ChinaAfrica Peace and Security Plan. In it, China commits to increased defence and security assistance to Africa, and cooperation and strategic 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 91 support in social governance, public security, peacekeeping, cyber security, anti-piracy and counter terrorism. China also actively supports UN peacekeeping operations in Africa; supports capacity building for Africa’s own peacekeeping missions, such as the African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis; and provides military aid to the African Union. There are many examples of China’s direct involvement in this regard. In 2019, China supported both the UN Assistance Mission and the African Union Mission in Somalia. China has also encouraged countries to find their own solutions and resolve their own conflicts, for instance, in 2020, China advocated for political dialogue to end the Libyan crisis and cautioned against external military intervention and the use of weapons. The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) also discusses joint efforts against corruption, while promoting law enforcement and security. Law enforcement includes providing police equipment to some African countries and offering law enforcement training courses. 4.1.4 Education and Training The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) indicated some of the ongoing commitments of China to Africa’s continued improvement in education of its citizens. Not only does it cover primary, secondary, and tertiary educational support, but training and education also focusses on specific sectors and professions, for instance, training government administration professionals. It also committed to training 1000 ‘high-calibre’ Africans, and providing Africa with 50,000 government scholarships and 50,000 training opportunities for professionals in a range of disciplines. The ‘20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education’ continued implementation was emphasised, an initiative which encourages academic exchanges and cooperation. China has established a number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms at various African educational institutions, manned by Chinese teachers and volunteers. One objective of these Institutes is to encourage learning of the Chinese Language within Africa. 4.1.5 Science and Technology Science and technological know-how that the Chinese possess has been shared with their African counterparts to facilitate African capacity in 92 B. ROBINSON this regard, such as through the implementation of the Belt and Road Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan and the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Program 2.0. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is acknowledged in the Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) when it described the increasing role of artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and how quantum physics principles on computing will change the face of operating systems, cyber security, big data, block chains and other applications. China committed to applying its strength in these areas to support Africa. 4.1.6 Health China actively engages with African Nations in their efforts to improve and ensure responsive public health care systems. China supports various efforts in health control, prevention and treatment. More effective hospital management is encouraged in Africa with cooperation between respective professional and specialised health departments, and efforts have been made to train medical specialists, medical staff, public health workers and administrative personnel in African Countries. It works closely with African health programmes such as the African Center for Disease Control and Prevention; and China has established several ChinaAfrica Friendship Hospitals and provides a number of mobile medical services. China has helped build capacity in the production of essential medicines and contributed to technology transfer in pharmaceuticals. China supports anti-malarial efforts in Africa and is contributing towards the objective of eradicating AIDS, TB and Malaria by 2030. China has a history of assisting Africa during its health crises, such as during the Ebola outbreak and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic, where it supplied a wide-range of support, guidance and anti-epidemic supplies. 4.1.7 Environmental Issues China has certainly had its difficulties in managing pollution during its rapid industrialisation. Africa faces the same problem as it seeks to quickly grow and develop—Chinese policy seems committed to mitigating these environmental externalities. The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) details some of the ChinaAfrica Green Development Plan that aims for environmental protection 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 93 and mitigating climate change by improving Africa’s capacity for green, low-carbon and sustainable development. 50 Projects of exchanges and cooperation were prioritised that addressed climate change, oceans, desertification prevention and control, and wildlife protection. The widespread problem of poaching in Africa, products of which are often destined for the Chinese market, is an issue that China is trying to keep in check. It is doing so through supporting the various efforts within Africa to stop poaching and the illegal trade of wildlife, while domestically, stopping ivory processing and sale in China. 4.1.8 Cultural and Other Exchanges One of the characteristics of the Chinese and African Nations’ relationship has been the emphasis of respect and learning of cultural diversity, much of which has been achieved through ‘people-to-people exchanges’, cultural centres and cultural festivals. Included in these efforts, is a focus on press and media exchanges; academia exchanges, research collaborations, and ‘Think Tanks’. 4.1.9 Trade China-sub-Saharan Africa trade has grown by 26% per annum since 1995, reaching $170 Billion in 2013, and China accounts for about 24% of subSaharan Africa’s total trade from just 2.3% in 1995, although sub-Sahara Africa’s share in Chinese trade was only 3% in 2013. Figure 4.1 (Pigato and Tang 2015: 5). Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports to China have grown faster than its imports, generating a positive trade balance (Fig. 4.2). Exports are mainly in resources and agricultural commodities, such as oil, uranium, aluminium, zinc, phosphates, copper, nickel, gold, timber, rubber, coffee, cotton, cocoa, fish and cashew nuts. Imports from China are quite diversified although consumer goods represent the largest share (Fig. 4.3) (Pigato and Tang 2015). Africa with its large, but mostly poor population, has been an ideal market for low-value mass produced products from China. Chinese importing companies in Africa have prospered with a vast network of formal and informal trade throughout Africa. While this has led to 94 B. ROBINSON Fig. 4.1 Trade between China and sub-Saharan Africa: Relative Trade Shares (Pigato and Wang 2015, source World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank) consumers benefitting from a greater supply and variety of consumer goods at affordable prices, there have also been criticisms of poor quality of products and the crowding out of certain industries, such as the textile industry. Overtime there has been an increase in the presence of the Chinese in some of the labour intensive, mass-manufacturing industries, which have in turn contributed to both Africa’s and China’s trade volumes. There are many reasons for this. The cost of production, especially labour, is cheaper in many African countries due to the increase in wage levels in China. Chinese firms have also cleverly used the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the European Union’s Coutanou Agreement, to manufacture goods in Africa to export to United States and Europe at preferential rates and duties. 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 95 Fig. 4.2 Trade between China and sub-Saharan Africa: Imports, exports, and trade balance (Pigato and Wang 2015, source World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank) 4.1.10 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa Chinese investments on the African continent continues to be significant. Foreign Direct Investment in sub-Saharan Africa, as reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reached $3.1 Billion in 2013, which at that time was 7% of global investment in the region, just behind that of the US at 7.3% (Fig. 4.4). The total stock of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment was at $24 Billion. (Pigato and Tang 2015). Foreign Direct Investment by China in Africa is becoming more diversified, and encompasses all countries in Africa, although it does tend to be concentrated in resource rich countries, such as Zambia, Nigeria, Angola and Zimbabwe (Fig. 4.5) (Pigato and Tang 2015). 96 B. ROBINSON Fig. 4.3 Sub-Saharan Africa’s imports from China (Pigato and Tang 2015, source World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank) Fig. 4.4 Chinese FDI Flows to SSA, 2003–2013 (Pigato and Tang 2015, sourced from UNCTAD 2014 and MOFCOM 2014) 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 97 Fig. 4.5 Chinese FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, by country in USD Millions (Pigato and Tang 2015, sourced from MOFCOM 2014) Investments are quite diversified, although the extractive industry accounts for the bulk, and finance, construction and manufacturing account for about half of the investment (Fig. 4.6) (Pigato and Tang 2015). The level of Foreign Direct Investment by China in Africa continues to grow, and the emergence and continued operationalisation of Special Economic Zones is likely to support this trajectory and lead to a greater diversification in investments. 4.1.11 Natural Resources for China and Infrastructure for Africa As touched upon earlier, China’s rapid economic growth has required massive amounts of raw materials, especially energy and strategic metals and minerals. Africa, on the other hand, has these unexploited resources in abundance. This has led to increasingly significant investment by the Chinese in oil & gas and mining industries in Africa. The 1990s saw an increase in Chinese investment in natural resources in Africa. For example, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a state-owned oil company, has invested heavily in petroleum and natural 98 B. ROBINSON Fig. 4.6 Chinese FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, by sector (%) (Pigato and Tang 2015, sourced from State Council of China, 2013) gas in Sudan, Angola, Algeria and Gabon. In 1993, thanks to China’s strong relationship with the Front de Liberation Nationale government in Algeria, the government purchased numerous oil refineries in the country for $350 Million. CNPC purchased 40% of Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) in 1996 (Alden 2005). China continues to invest heavily in mining and the oil and gas industry for its own consumption, and for sale to the rest of the world. It has also utilised various ways of funding these initiatives, such as the so-called ‘Angola-Mode’ resources for infrastructure framework agreement. This was an innovative approach that allowed China to invest in mining activities, where the extracted resources were paid for in a barter type exercise with infrastructure development. With the Chinese EXIM bank providing the funding to Chinese Companies based on potential returns from these African resources, Chinese construction companies were able to invest in major infrastructure construction projects in Africa. The benefits were numerous: ‘Money’ never changed hands which limited corruption; Chinese firms were able to provide the expertise, labour, equipment and material in an efficient manner for construction in countries which often lacked the competence to manage these projects; the speed of implementation of these projects alleviated the bottlenecks of infrastructure in the countries with poor infrastructure after years of insufficient investment, 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 99 poor maintenance and conflict; and the countries did not need to raise finance and incur debt for their already fragile economies. There has been criticism though of China’s infrastructural investments in Africa. Professor Tang (2010) uses the terms ‘Locomotive’ versus ‘Bulldozer’ approaches in terms of the strategy applied by the Chinese and their African counterparts in infrastructural projects. Although not exclusively referring to the Angola Mode approach, his analysis considered the cases of Angola and the DRC: The Bulldozer approach was one where the speed of the project was of paramount importance—get the project done as expeditiously as possible! This approach was useful in alleviating bottlenecks, but due to the use of mostly Chinese labour, equipment and construction materials, it had very little other benefit, and sometimes had long term negative results. For example, the lack of maintenance and management, due to lack of capacity, led to almost immediate problems, delays and cancellations of the newly Chinese built Lobito Corridor Railway in Angola (Duarte et al. 2015). The locomotive approach takes longer but has greater socio-economic spin-offs. This approach encourages more use of local labour, SMMEs, and local materials, and thus should result in some skills transfer, enterprise development, sustainable employment and community development. A concern and criticism has been that China’s demand for African resources would lead to the so-called ‘resource curse’ which results in over-allocation of financial resources to mining activities and facilitating infrastructure for mining production, and does not contribute to broad economic development across sectors. There is evidence though that this is not the case. Alexis Habiyaremye (2015) found that the infrastructure for resources agreements do not result in resource dependence by African countries, if anything, his research suggests that the eradication of infrastructural constraints due to China’s approach contributed to improved export diversification. 4.1.12 Chinese Loans, Debt-Traps and Debt Forgiveness One of the criticisms against China is that the financing of large infrastructural projects in Africa is creating debt-traps for heavily indebted countries. China refutes this vehemently, suggesting that its approach is to improve the capacity of African countries to achieve financial independence and sustainability. 100 B. ROBINSON China has for some time provided concessionary loans, and in some cases, provided debt forgiveness for struggling African nations. For example, at the 2003 FOCAC Summit, China announced debt forgiveness towards 31 African countries totalling $1.27 Billion. The Beijing Action Plan (2018) of 2019–2021 confirmed Africa’s gratitude to China for exempting outstanding interest-free government debts owed by Africa’s Lesser Developed Nations which had matured at the end of 2015. 4.1.13 China’s Non-Intervention Policy and One-China Conditionality While Chapter 1 introduced the conditionality of international development financing by international bodies such as The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, China has historically been quite lenient in this regard, and has invested in countries with contentious political and economic dispensations. The Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021 (2018) makes its non-interference policy quite clear: In its investment and financing cooperation with Africa, China is committed to the principles of no political strings, mutual benefits and efficient development, supports Africa’s pursuit of diversified and sustainable development, and will make active efforts to help African countries improve debt sustainability and achieve internally-driven development and mutually-reinforcing economic and social development. China does have one condition which is a pre-condition to investment and support, and that is the acknowledgement of ‘One-China’—this requires countries to sever ties with Taiwan. In 2019, diplomatic relations resumed between China and the African island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe with the country agreeing to adhere to the one-China principle. The only country in Africa that still formally recognises Taiwan is eSwatini, the small southern African country. Some African countries have, however, retained trade and liaison offices with Taiwan due to Taiwan’s much longer trade relationship with Africa. 4 4.1.14 CHINA IN AFRICA 101 Facts and Fallacies About the Impact of China on Africa China’s impact on Africa has been, and continues to be, a contentious issue. Some viewpoints are positive, others negative, some based on fact, others on hype and fake news. Revisiting the book Kobus Jonker and Robinson (2018) authored, I’d like to recap our findings in this regard (Table 4.3). One aim of this book is to further the conversation regarding China’s impact on Africa, especially the socio-economic outcomes, by providing objective facts and analysis on Chinese policy, financing, and investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa. Table 4.3 Fallacies and facts about the impact of China on Africa (Jonker and Robinson 2018: 277) Assumption 1. Trade deficits with China impact negatively on Africa 2. China has a thirst for Africa’s natural resources and energy 3. China is using its infrastructure-for-resources framework agreements primarily to get easy and cheap access to resources 4. Chinese companies employ mainly their own nationals in projects in Africa 5. China want to ‘grab’ farmland in Africa to deal with its own food security concerns 6. China’s manufactured exports are crowding out opportunities for Africa’s diversification into manufacturing 7. China has a dubious human rights and environmental legacy that impacts negatively on Africa Fallacy Fact √ √ √ √ It is the overall trade deficit that is important China has a huge need for resources This is a by-product rather than the main aim This is only true for managers and technical staff who are scarce in most African countries Proved to be false propaganda with no substance √ √ Comment √ √ This is true for products like textiles and footwear, but seems to be limited for other products That is true although it seems that China is sensitive towards this and committed to change it 102 B. ROBINSON 4.2 China’s Economic Policy in Africa China’s policy towards Africa has evolved over time, but today two primary bodies determine the interaction between China and the African continent, namely the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and BRICS Plus (an acronym for the developing nations association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and ‘Plus’ indicating other developing nations). These bodies, and their relevant policies, are now unpacked to discern the economic blue-print that exists between China and Africa. 4.2.1 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) The relationship between China and African nations has grown significantly over time, and continues to grow. In 2000, the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing and was represented by 80 Chinese Ministers and 44 African countries, representatives from 17 regional and international organisations, as well as a variety of people from the business community. The Conference ‘chartered the direction for the development of a new, stable and long-term partnership featuring equality and mutual benefit between China and African countries’ (FOCAC 2020). The Conference passed the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development. FOCAC now comprises all but one African Nation, Eswatini, as a result of the country recognising Taiwan. This first Ministerial Conference was followed by the second Ministerial Conference in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia in 2003; the third Ministerial Conference was held in Beijing in 2006 with the addition of the first FOCAC Summit; the fourth Ministerial Conference was held in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt in 2009; the fifth Ministerial Conference was held in 2012 in Beijing; the sixth Ministerial Conference and second FOCAC Summit was held in 2015 in Johannesburg in South Africa; and the most recent third FOCAC Summit was held in 2018 in Beijing. Numerous incremental commitments were made to Africa, and various Action Plans were proposed, as these Conferences and Forums evolved. The outcomes of the FOCAC Forums and Ministerial Conferences provide a valuable insight into the policy direction and actual interventions of China in Africa. These will be described in the following two 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 103 sections where we unpack areas of economic cooperation and other areas of strategic cooperation. 4.2.2 FOCAC Economic Cooperation with a Specific Focus on Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones It is worthwhile re-capping some of the outcomes of the latest FOCAC summit, namely the Beijing Declaration and the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021, and they provide some understanding on policy objectives and practical implementation of policy towards Africa from an economic perspective. The Beijing Declaration was themed ‘China and Africa Toward an Even Stronger Community with a Shared Future through Win–Win Cooperation’ and committed to deepening the partnership between China and Africa. Insights from the 24-point declaration included an emphasis and commitment to the Belt and Road Initiative and improved cooperation in areas of trade, investment, financing and infrastructure— particular mention was made of enhancing Africa’s production capacity in the secondary and tertiary industries and improving economic and trade cooperation. The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021 is a considerable document, so once again, only points that are of relevance to industrialisation and special economic zones are unpacked in Table 4.4 (the numbering refers to the relevant Action Plan clause number): 4.2.3 FOCAC: Other Strategic Areas of Cooperation The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021 is again investigated to determine some other areas of strategic economic cooperation. These are summarised in Table 4.5 (the numbering refers to the relevant Action Plan clause number): 4.2.4 BRICS Plus BRICS was initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2006, and initially comprised the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, and the People’s Republic of China (BRIC). The motivation behind the association was to expand multilateral cooperation between these large, developing nations. 104 B. ROBINSON The first BRIC Summit was held in 2009 in Russia. The following extract from the joint statement following the Summit reflects the vision of the association: to promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way. The dialogue and cooperation of the BRIC countries is conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. (BRICS 2020) Table 4.4 Summary of the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021 (2018): Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021): Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones 1.4 China and Africa will take the Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity to strengthen multi-dimensional, wide ranging and in-depth cooperation for mutual benefits and common development and 1.5 includes China and Africa jointly building the Belt and Road 1.8 China will launch eight major initiatives including an industrial promotion initiative, an infrastructure connectivity initiative, a trade facilitation initiative, a green development initiative, a capacity building initiative, a health care initiative, a people-to-people exchange initiative and a peace and security initiative in close collaboration with African countries to support African countries in achieving independent and sustainable development at a faster pace 3.2 Economic Cooperation: Industry partnering and industrial capacity cooperation • The two sides will fully tap into China’s strengths in equipment and technology, draw on the complementarity of the industrial supply and development needs of the two sides, and promote the growth of real economies • China encourages policy-based financial institutions, developmental financial institutions, the China-Africa Development Fund, the China-Africa Fund for Industrial Cooperation and the Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs to scale up support for China-Africa industrial capacity cooperation to boost the industrialization of Africa • The two sides will advance industrial capacity cooperation along with the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative • China will step up support in the development of industries in Africa including processing and manufacturing and the development of special economic zones and industrial parks, and support Chinese private enterprises in setting up industrial parks in Africa and carrying out technology transfer , to help African countries build more diversified economies and stronger capabilities for self-driven development • African countries will continue to improve the legal framework and infrastructure, and provide efficient and results-oriented government services wherever possible to create a more enabling environment for attracting investment from Chinese enterprises and for industrial capacity cooperation (continued) 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 105 Table 4.4 (continued) FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021): Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones 3.7 Investment and economic cooperation • Africa appreciates China’s efforts in implementing the China-Africa industrialization plan, promoting industrial partnering and production capacity cooperation, building or upgrading industrial parks and other economic and trade cooperation zones, and providing effective and sustainable basic vocational training for African workforce to help Africa translate its population dividends into development strength. China will continue to support Africa’s efforts in advancing economic transformation, improving industrial competitiveness, and generating more jobs • China will encourage Chinese companies to increase investment in Africa, build and upgrade a number of economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa. China will encourage Chinese companies to make at least US$10 billion of investment in Africa in the next three years South Africa joined BRICS in 2010, and the association represented over 41% of the global population in 2015 and accounted for 23.2% of the world’s GDP in 2018 (BRICS 2020). Importantly, this grouping of countries signifies significant growth compared to industrialised countries: For the period 1981–2013 real GDP growth was 6.3% per annum for BRICS countries, compared to 2.4% for industrialised countries, although there are significant differences in growth between the BRICS countries, with 9.5% in China, 6.1% in India, 2.7% in Brazil, and 2.4% in South Africa (Nayyar 2016: 581). In addition to bilateral meetings and side-line meetings of the G20 and UN General Assemblies, Annual BRICS Summits are held: Brazil in 2010; China 2011; India 2012; South Africa 2013; Brazil 2014; Russia 2015; India 2016; China 2017; South Africa 2018; and Brazil 2019. China proposed BRICS Plus in 2017 to enhance cooperation between BRICS and various other developing nations in Africa and elsewhere. BRICS now has significant influence, has reached common agreement on a variety of financial and economic issues, and BRICS has campaigned for World Bank and IMF reforms. Importantly, from the African perspective, BRICS has expanded its external relations to include that of the African Union and eight of the African Integration Associations. The New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) was established in 2014, and the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement was entered into, both of which would serve to finance development within BRICS Plus. Various cooperation agreements 106 B. ROBINSON Table 4.5 Summary of the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021 (2018): Areas of strategic cooperation FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021): Other strategic areas of strategic economic cooperation 3.1. Economic cooperation: Agriculture, food security and food safety • China supports Africa’s agricultural modernization and will help Africa upgrade the industry and agricultural infrastructure, increase agricultural productivity and the value added of agro-products, improve Africa’s ability to ensure food security, invest in testing and adaptation of machines to African conditions, establish African dealerships capable of after-sale support and service, support township and village industries’ development, promote inclusive growth and shared prosperity and support Africa in achieving general food security by 2030 • China will provide assistance in terms of capacity building, technology transfer through the exchange of scientists and development of new research thrusts • Both sides will work together in the agro-industrial sector to increase the capacity of agri-entrepreneurs to export their products on the regional market and enhance skills of farmers at grass root level in modern farm management techniques 3.3 Economic Cooperation: Infrastructure development • The two sides will aim to pursue efficient and high-quality development, focus on the economic and social benefits of projects, step up mutually beneficial cooperation for the planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance and good governance of infrastructure projects and maintain the sustainability of the debt of relevant African countries. China supports Chinese enterprises in utilizing their advanced equipment and technology, and their expertise in standards and service to help African countries improve infrastructure and connectivity • The two sides will actively explore and advance cooperation in the application of new technologies including cloud computing, big data, and the mobile internet. China will support African countries in building “smart cities” and enhancing the role of ICT in safeguarding public security, counter terrorism and fighting crime and work with the African side to uphold information security 3.4 Energy and natural resources • Enhance policy dialogue and technological exchanges on energy and resources, coordinate each other’s energy and resource strategies, conduct joint research, and formulate energy development plans that are operable and based on local conditions. The two sides will work together for the establishment of a China-Africa Energy Cooperation Center in Africa to further advance energy exchanges and cooperation • The two sides encourage and support Chinese and African companies, while upholding the principle of mutual benefits, to work together in energy trade and the investment, development and operation of energy projects, carry out demonstration projects in green energy financing, and explore green and sustainable ways of energy cooperation. China will support the development of renewable energy, mainly solar energy in Africa as well as the use of battery storage and strengthening of the electricity grid (continued) 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 107 Table 4.5 (continued) FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021): Other strategic areas of strategic economic cooperation 3.5 Ocean economy • The two sides recognize the enormous potential of maritime economic cooperation and will work to promote blue economy cooperation for mutual benefits 3.6 Tourism • China welcomes more African countries to become destinations for Chinese tour groups. The two sides will roll out visa facilitation policies as appropriate and streamline customs procedures to enable easier traveling so that mutual tourist visits could steadily increase • The two sides encourage capacity building and training exchange programs for employees of the tourism industry and industry partners to improve quality of service 3.8 Trade • Implement the China-Africa trade and investment facilitation plan to promote trade connectivity in Africa by strengthening African countries’ customs and taxation law enforcement capabilities and upgrading customs and transportation facilities • China supports Africa in boosting its exports and has decided to increase imports, particularly non-resource products, from Africa, with a focus on value added agricultural produce and industrial products • China will continue to materialize its pledge of zero-tariff treatment for 97% of tax items from African LDCs having diplomatic relations with China • The Chinese side will continue to facilitate the opening of businesses by African countries in China and protect the legitimate rights and interests of companies in China invested by African countries 3.9 Finance • China will extend loans of concessional nature, export credit line and export credit insurance to African countries, make the loans reasonably more concessional, create new financing models and improve the terms and conditions of the credit to support China-Africa Belt and Road cooperation and industrial capacity cooperation, and the infrastructure construction, development of energy and resources, agriculture, manufacturing and the comprehensive development of the whole industrial chain of Africa. China will extend US$20 billion of credit lines and support the setting up of a US$10 billion special fund for development financing • China supports stronger cooperation between the policy banks, developmental financial institutions, commercial banks, multilateral financial institutions, equity investment funds and export credit insurance institutions of the two sides, and supports the establishment of China-Africa Developmental Financing Forum and China-Africa Financial Cooperation Consortium to provide more diversified financing packages for African countries 108 B. ROBINSON have been concluded, including cultural, youth, migration, industry, energy, peacekeeping, environment, and infectious diseases accords. The BRICS Summit Declaration (2019) following the BRICS Summit in Brasilia comprises 73 statements, and some of these provide valuable insight into the association’s objectives which could play an important role in both China and Africa’s sustainable development (Table 4.6, numbers as per the Declaration’s clauses): (EME: Emerging Market Economies; EMDC’s: Emerging Economies and Developing Countries). BRICS is a strategic focus for China and is a mechanism to further their policy towards Africa. In addition, it complements China growing influence in global affairs with BRICS providing the ‘clout’ in multilateralism and power relations with the United Nations, IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. And, according to President Xi of China, BRICS collaboration is important more now than ever before to balance all their countries’ interests and ensure economic growth in a challenging global environment: President Xi Jinping pointed out in his speech that there is a growing wave of protectionism and bullying by advanced countries (mainly the US) in their bid to reduce trade deficits with the Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) which include the BRICS. It is doing immense harm to global trade and is leading to shrinkage in investment flows which is bringing hardships to millions of people in the developing countries. BRICS has to cooperate in many areas to keep the growth of trade and investment from declining further and a beginning was made at the Summit – BRICS Summit, Brasilia, 2019. (Sengupta 2019) 4.3 Conclusion There can be no doubt that China is having a significant impact on Africa’s development trajectory. Be it through direct investment, cooperation programmes, strategic relationships, geopolitical partnerships, development assistance, and humanitarian support, bilateral relations are at an all time high. In addition, institutions and initiatives such as FOCAC and BRICS has introduced a multilateral approach between China and the Africa continent. While outside the ambit of this book, the Belt and Road Initiative (watch this space for a planned book on the Belt and Road Initiative from an African perspective) and the 2021 launch of the African 4 CHINA IN AFRICA 109 Table 4.6 Selected excerpts from the BRICS Summit Declaration, Brasilia 2019 (2020) BRICS Summit Declaration, Brasilia, 2019 6. We reiterate the urgent need to strengthen and reform the multilateral system, including the UN, the WTO, the IMF and other international organizations, which we will continue working to make more inclusive, democratic and representative, including through greater participation of emerging markets and developing countries in international decision-making 8. We express our commitment to sustainable development in its three dimensions—economic, social and environmental—in a balanced and integrated manner. All our citizens, in all parts of our respective territories, including remote areas, deserve to fully enjoy the benefits of sustainable development 23. We recall the importance of open markets, fair, just and non-discriminatory business and trade environments, structural reforms, effective and fair competition, promoting investment and innovation, as well as financing for infrastructure and development. We stress the need for greater participation of developing countries in global value chains. We will continue to cooperate within the G20 and advance the interests of EMEs and developing countries 26. We reiterate the fundamental importance of a rules-based, transparent, nondiscriminatory, open, free and inclusive international trade. We remain committed to preserving and strengthening the multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization at its center. It is critical that all WTO members avoid unilateral and protectionist measures, which run counter to the spirit and rules of the WTO 29. We will explore in appropriate fora ways to promote and facilitate investments in productive sectors, e-commerce, MSMEs, infrastructure and connectivity, which will help to promote economic growth, trade and job creation. In so doing, we will take into account national imperatives and policy frameworks, with the aim of enhancing transparent, effective and an investment-friendly business environment 32. We acknowledge the progress made by the New Development Bank towards expanding its membership. The expansion of the NDB membership in accordance with its Articles of Agreement will strengthen the Bank’s role as a global development finance institution and further contribute to the mobilization of resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other EMDC’s 38. We welcome the holding of the BRICS Business Forum and acknowledge the efforts of the BRICS Business Council (BBC) in promoting trade and investment among its members by fostering cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, manufacturing, energy, agribusiness, including biotechnology, financial services, regional aviation, alignment of technical standards, skills development and digital economy Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could have enormous ramifications for this relationship, and if correctly leveraged, Africa and China stand to gain much benefit in the coming decades. 110 B. ROBINSON References Alden, C. 2005. China in Africa. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 47: 147– 164. Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021). 2018. FOCAC 2018 Beijing Summit [Online]. Accessed from: https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hyqk_1/t15 94297.htm. Accessed 15 Apr 2020. BRICS. 2020. [Online]. Accessed from: http://infobrics.org/. Accessed 19 Apr 2020. BRICS Summit Declaration. 2019. [Online]. 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Third World Quarterly 37 (4): 575–591. Pigato, M., and W. Tang. 2015. China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21788. Accessed 20 Apr 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Sengupta, J. 2019. The Economic Agenda of BRICS. Observer Research Foundation [Online], 2 December. Accessed from: https://www.orfonline.org/res earch/the-economic-agenda-of-brics-58286/. Accessed 5 July 2021. Tang, X. 2010. Bulldozer or Locomotive? The Impact of Chinese Enterprises on the Local Employment in Angola and the DRC. Journal of Asian and African Studies 45 (3). Wang, Yi. 2020. FOCAC Top Stories: Rock-Solid China-Africa Friendship Will Not Be Affected by Isolated Incidents [Online], 15 April. Accessed from: https://www.focac.org/eng/ttxxsy/t1769827.htm. Accessed 15 Apr 2020. Xi, J. 2017. The Governance of China II . Beijing: Foreign Language Press Co. Ltd. CHAPTER 5 The Emergence of Chinese Interest in Special Economic Zones in Africa With the relationship between China and Africa having been detailed, it is appropriate to introduce the topic of Special Economic Zones in Africa, and China’s facilitating role in the investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa. The Chapter begins with detailing Special Economic Zones in Africa, then discusses Chinese policy towards Special Economic Zones globally, and then specifically hones in on Chinese owned and managed Special Economic Zones in Africa. Special Economic zones are not a Chinese ‘trademark’ and have been around globally for centuries, in various formats even before China’s ventures into Zones. Shannon, Ireland was the first modern Special Economic Zone. In the 1970s, countries in East Asia and Latin America experimented with Export Processing Zones to support labour intensive industries, and by 1986 there were 176 Export Processing Zones in 47 countries (Zeng 2016). This trend has continued to proliferate. The evolution of SEZ’s is portrayed by Baissac (2011) in Table 5.1. 5.1 Special Economic Zones in Africa Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones in Africa were initiated from as early as the 1970s in Liberia, Mauritius and Senegal. Operational Special Economic Zones only emerged in Africa in the late 1990s, most of which were Export Processing Zones. Some were the result © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_5 111 112 B. ROBINSON Table 5.1 Summary of key developments in the evolution of SEZs (Baissac 2011) Period Format of Special Economic Zone Ownership structure Antiquity and middle ages • First free port—Phoenicia • Delos—circa 150 BC • Hanseatic League and charter cities—thirteenth to seventeenth centuries • Colonial charter companies and trading posts—seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries • Free port islands—mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries • Free trade zones—since early 1900s • Pioneering manufacturing zones—1920s to 1940s • Operation Bootstrap—1948 • Shannon Free Zone—1958 • Maquiladora—1965 • La Romana Free Zone—1969 • Chinese Special Economic Zones—1978 • Subic Bay—1992 • DISZ, JinFei, Lekki—2010+ “Public” zones Colonial era Modern era Private, then public Public Private zones PPPs of African countries or investors (such as the Chinese) taking advantage of the US Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). Since then, they have proliferated with varying degrees of success—Table 5.2 provides an overview of Special Economic Zones initiated per decade. Historic success of Special Economic Zones in Africa has been limited. Zones in Mauritius, Kenya, Madagascar and Ghana are considered relatively successful, while others, such as Nigeria, Senegal, Malawi, Namibia and Mali, less so. Thomas Farole investigated some African Zones, and although cautioning that it was sometimes difficult to make direct comparisons between them due to the context and structure of the Zones and sometimes lack of relevant data, the investigation does provide some insight into African zones from a quantitative perspective. 5 Table 5.2 Overview of African Zone Programs by Decade of Launch (Farole 2011; data from FIAS 2008) THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 113 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Liberia Senegal Mauritius Djibouti Togo Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea Ghana Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Rwanda Seychelles Sudan Uganda Zimbabwe Gabon Gambia Mali South Africa Zambia Eritrea Mauritania Tanzania 5.1.1 Investment In terms of investment, while the African zones do attract foreign direct investment, figures trail far behind what other developing nations’ zones, such as Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam have been able to achieve. However, as a percentage of African countries’ FDI, the zones do contribute to some level of investment. Table 5.3 details these differences (the single units refer to single unit factories that are deemed to be Special Economic Zones benefitting from the various incentives, but that operate throughout Ghana and Kenya). The number of companies investing is also much lower, with a seemingly preference by firms for ‘single unit’ options (Fig. 5.1). Ownership structure was similar between African and other developing nations analysed, with the majority being foreign owned, although Senegal and Tanzania were predominantly locally controlled (Fig. 5.2). 5.1.2 Exports Some African Special Economic Zones have been quite successful in increasing and sustaining the level of exports. Ghana is one example, and while much is attributable to cocoa products which are processed in these zones for the export market, other products for the export market 114 B. ROBINSON Table 5.3 SEZ investment statistics (Farole 2011: 71) Country Total SEZ FDI Stock (2008) ($m) SEZ FDI per capita (2000–2008) ($) SEZ FDI as % of total national FDI (2000–2008) Bangladesh Dominican Republic Vietnam Ghana (Tema) Ghana (single units) Kenya (EPZs) Kenya (single units) Nigeria Tanzania 1435 2611 6 141 30 18 36,760 68 2806 325 3 120 100 48 162 155 6 20 N/A 210 <1 5 <1 18 Fig. 5.1 Number of firms operating in the Economic Zones, 2009 (Farole 2011) have shown good results, such as prefabricated housing and plastic household goods produced in the Tema Zone. Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Senegal performed less well. As the African Zones were more recent developments, it could be argued that investment and export growth 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 115 Fig. 5.2 Ownership structure of SEZ Investments, 2009 (Farole 2011: 74) could increase as they grow, however, when one compares the time frame against Zones in China and other developing nations, African Zones do not seem to be experiencing the exponential growth seen elsewhere (Fig. 5.3). 5.1.3 Employment The African Special Economic Zones were not a major contributor to employment levels in the countries under analysis and were far below the levels of other developing countries if one considers Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Lesotho is the exception—this is likely the result of the small size of the country and relative size of the Zone. The employment contribution of the various Special Economic Zones is depicted in Table 5.4. Thomas Farole’s work serves as a useful introduction to Special Economic Zones in Africa for this book—Farole’s analysis depicted above suggests that African Zones are not achieving what they could and should be achieving in Africa in terms of attracting investment, diversifying and 116 B. ROBINSON Fig. 5.3 SEZ export growth trajectories by year of operation (Farole 2011) Table 5.4 Employment contribution of SEZ (Farole 2011) Country Bangladesh Dominican Republic Honduras Vietnam Ghana (Tema) Ghana (single units) Kenya (EPZs) Kenya (single units) Lesotho Nigeria (Calabar) (est.) Nigeria (Onne, oil & gas) Tanzania SEZ employment (2008) 218,299 124,517 130,000 1,172,000 2025 26,534 15,127 15,551 45,130 1156 20,000 7500 SEZ employment as % of national industrial sector employment 3% 30% 30% 19% 3.5% 15% >80% <1% N/A 2.5% 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 117 growing exports for countries, and contributing to job creation and other socio-economic factors. Farole’s analysis will be revisited later in the book against my analysis of African and Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa. 5.2 Existing and Planned Special Economic Zones in Africa Newman and Page (2017) provide a comprehensive list of Special Economic Zones in Africa with their particular focus, as well as list planned Special Economic Zones for some time in the future. For ease of reference these are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. 5.3 Chinese Special Economic Zones: Policy on Global Investment There are two categories of Chinese investment in Special Economic Zones for the purpose of this book: 1. Investment by Chinese firms in Special Economic Zones that have been established by African governments, private investors, or other forms of investment. The criteria is that the Special Economic Zone has not been established by Chinese investments or financing. 2. Special Economic Zones that have been established by Chinese investors in Africa, often with the support of Chinese government policy and financing support. These may be wholly Chinese owned or some variation of public–private partnership, but it is predominantly a Chinese investment initiative. This section will consider the latter. In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government began emphasizing a ‘going out’ or ‘going global’ approach. This entailed finding and developing new markets for Chinese goods and services, developing Chinese brands, and increasing China’s own Foreign Direct Investment in other countries. As early as 1999 China began venturing into Special Economic Zones overseas: China entered into an agreement with Egypt to assist with the development of an industrial area in the Suez economic area; the Chinese appliance firm Haier built a 46-hectare industrial park in South 118 B. ROBINSON Table 5.5 Special Economic Zones in Africa Country Zone name and year of inception Activities and industries Angola Luanda-Bengo ZEE: 2009 Benin Free Processing Zone of Benin 7 industrial reservations, 6 agricultural reservations, 8 mining reservations Biotechnology, IT & communications Cameroon Cote d’Ivoire Industrial Free Zones: 1990 Free Zone Village of IT and Biotechnology: 2008 Malaku SEZ: 2012 Democratic Republic of Congo Djibouti Eritrea Djibouti Free Zone: 2004 DAM Commercial Free Zone: 2013 Massawa free Zone: 2006 Gabon Nkok SEZ: 2010 The Gambia Mandji Tax-Free Zone: 2014 Export Processing Zones: 2010 July 22 Business Park: 2005 Ghana Kenya Tema EPZ Ashanti Technology Park ICT Cyber Village Sekondi EPZ Shama EPZ 52 EPZs in total Athi River EPZ Sameer Industrial Park EPZ: 1990 Agribusiness, building materials, packaging, metallurgical transformation Construction materials, agro-processing, batteries Timber activities, chemicals, agro-industry, construction materials, metallurgy Oil & gas Garments, diapers & tissue manufacturing Textiles & garments Mineral processing Petrochemical activities Textile & apparels, business process outsourcing, IT enabled services Garments, cotton yarn, pharmaceuticals, gemstones, computers, food processing, tanning products, electrical goods, construction & lease of industrial buildings Garments & Apparel, Agro-processing, call centre, relief supplies, gemstones, macadamia (continued) 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 119 Table 5.5 (continued) Country Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Zone name and year of inception Activities and industries Kipevu Zone: 1996; Balaji EPZ: 2001, Mazeras Kenya EPZ: 2002, Pwani Industrial Park EPZ: 2000, Ammar EPZ: 1993, Mvita Industrial Park EPZ: 2004 Free Zones: 2008 EPZ: 1995 Mauritius Free Port: 1992 Sameer Industrial Park: 1990 All Zones specialise in garments Nacala SEZ: 2007 Mocuba SEZ & IFZ Garments & apparel, agro-processing, call centre, relief supplies, gemstones, macadamia, warehousing, storage, breaking bulk, ship building, repair and maintenance, storage, maintenance and repair of containers, export and re-export oriented airport and seaport based activities, labelling, packing and repackaging, light assembly and minor processing, quality control and inspection services, sorting, grading, cleaning and mixing, freight forwarding services, seafood hub Textiles & confection, leather & tannery, construction, production of construction materials, cement and iron, ceramics industry, assembly of machines and production lines Commercial agriculture, aquaculture and agro-processing, mineral processing, lumber industry, livestock and dairy products, manufacturing, textile industry (continued) 120 B. ROBINSON Table 5.5 (continued) Country Namibia Zone name and year of inception Activities and industries Beluluane IFZ: 1998 Companies servicing MOZAL, light manufacturing and production, heavy manufacturing, downstream aluminium conversion and processing, service industries, packaging and labelling, manufacturing primarily for export, training providers, industrial linkage companies, professional services, stockpiling raw materials, forwarding manufactured goods, value-adding industries Manga-Mungassa SEZ: 2012 Crusse & Jamali Integrate Tourism Development Zone: 2013 EPZs: 1996 Walvis bay EPZ Nigeria Calabar FTZ: 1992 Kano FTZ: 1998 Tinapa Free Zone: 2004 Snake Island IFZ: 2005 Maigatari Border Free Zone: 2000 Ladol Logistics Free Zone: 2006 Airline Services EPZ: 2003 ALSCON EPZ: 2004 Tourism & Entertainment Minerals beneficiation, diamond cutting and polishing operations Textile and garment industries, manufacturing plastic pallets and products, automotive parts, fishing related accessories, diamond cutting and polishing Manufacturing, oil & gas, logistic services Manufacturing, logistics services, warehousing Manufacturing, trade, tourism and resort Steel fabrication, oil & gas, seaport Manufacturing & warehousing Oil & gas fabrication, oil and gas vessels, logistics Food processing and packaging Manufacturing (continued) 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 121 Table 5.5 (continued) Country Zone name and year of inception Activities and industries Sebore Farms EPZ: 2001 Manufacturing, oil & gas, petrochemical Manufacturing Manufacturing, logistics Science & technology Ogun-Guangdong FTZ: 2008 Lekki Free Zone: 2008 Abuja Tech Village Free Zone: 2007 Free Zone: 2006 Lagos FTZ: 2002 Olokola FTZ: 2004 Living Spring Free Zone: 2006 Rwanda Brass LNG Free Zone: 2007 Kigali SEZ: 2011 Senegal Dakar Integrated SEZ: 2007 Sierra Leone First Step: 2012 South Africa Coega IDZ: 1999 East London IDZ: 2003 Saldanha Bay IDZ: 2013 Science & technology Manufacturing, oil & gas, petrochemical Oil & gas, manufacturing Manufacturing, warehousing, trading Liquefied natural gas Heavy & light manufacturing industries, large scale users, industrial plants, commercial wholesalers, chemical, pharmacy and plastics, warehousing, tourism and service industry, ICT logistics Industrial, offices, tourist resorts, commerce & services Agricultural goods, apparel manufacturing, mineral resources, marine resources, export processing Agro-processing, automotive, business process outsourcing, chemicals, energy, logistics, manufacturing, metals, textiles Automotive, agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, ICT & BPO, renewable energy, logistics, aqua-culture, general manufacturing Oil & gas, marine engineering (continued) 122 B. ROBINSON Table 5.5 (continued) Country Zone name and year of inception Activities and industries Richards Bay IDZ Agro-processing, metals beneficiation Aerospace and aviation linked manufacturing, agriculture and agro-processing, electronics manufacturing and assembly, medical and pharmaceutical production and distribution, clothing and textiles 41% industrial, 15% commercial, 44% service Industrial investment and assembly industries, supporting services, logistic centres and distribution services, food industries trade centres, light transformational industries, packing and packaging requirement industry, petrochemicals and plastic products industry, financial and consultancy services Textiles & garments, agro-processing, leather processing and manufacture of leather products, fish processing, wood products, agricultural & agro-industrial, industrial, tourism, commercial forestry, ICT, banking & financial centre Food industry and agro-industry and horticulture, wood industry, metallic engineering industry and plastic industry, clothing industry, synthetic hairs, leathercraft, pharmaceutic industry, cosmetic industry, textile, light engineering products and electronics, jewellery, diamonds polishing, building materials industry, stationery Dube Trade Port IDZ: 2014 Sudan Suakin Free Zone: 2000 Alijaily Free Zone: 2009 Tanzania EPZs and SEZs (2002) Millennium Business Park; Hifadhi EPZ; Kisongo EPZ; Kamal Industrial Estate EPZ; BWM SEZ; Global Industrial Park Togo EPZs: 1989 Uganda Free Zones: 2014 Nakaseke SEZ: 2015 Agribusiness products (continued) 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 123 Table 5.5 (continued) Country Zone name and year of inception Activities and industries Zambia Chambishi MFEZ: 2007 Copper smelting, manufacture of household appliances, manufacture of bars, wires, electric cables and motor parts, agro-processing Light manufacturing activities, provision of services such as conference facilities and hotel accommodation Lusaka East MFEZ: 2009 Lusaka South MFEZ: 2012 Sub-Saharan Gemstone Exchange Industrial Park Roma Industrial Park: 2011 Zimbabwe EPZs: 1996 Warehousing & storage, light industry, oil refinery, residential, gemstone processing Light industries, retail parks, office park, warehousing Mining, agro-processing Source Adapted from Newman and Page (2017: 7–14). This content is reproduced with special permission of UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, the original publisher of the referenced research work: Industrial clusters: The case for Special Economic Zones in Africa, WIER Working Paper, No. 2017/15: https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2017/239-7 Carolina in the US. This was followed by some other notable investments: Fujian Huaqiao Company built an industrial and trade zone in Cuba in 2000; Haier and a Pakistani company, Panapak Electronics, built a industrial park in Lahore in 2001; a Chinese company began an industrial zone in Chambishi in Zambia in 2003; a $300 Million trade center designed to host 4000 Chinese companies was constructed by the China Middle East Investment and Trade Promotion Centre and Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone in 2004; and a Chinese trade and industrial park was initiated in South Carolina by the Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone Investment Company and the United States Pacific Development Company in 2004 (Bräutigam and Tang 2011a). In 2006 the Chinese government announced the establishment of 50 overseas economic and trade cooperation zones as a key element to China implementing their ‘going out’ policy, as detailed in their 11th five-year plan. The approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, was experimental and gradual. 124 B. ROBINSON Table 5.6 Planned Special Economic Zones in Africa Country Zone details Angola New legislation was passed in 2015 that established rules for the creation and functioning of SEZs Four foreign trade zones are in the planning process Several SEZs are planned over the coming years. They include Kinshasa-Inga-Matadi-Banana; Ilebo-Tshikapa-Kananga-Mbuji; Mayi Kolwezi-Likasi-Lubumbashi-Sakania; Uvira-Bukavu-Goma-Beni-Bunia; and Kisangani-Bumba-Mbandaka A number of new SEZs are planned over the coming years. They include: Khor Ambado Free Zone; Jabanas Free Zone; UKAB Holdings Free Zone; Fabtec Industries Free Zone; and the Djibouti Free Trade Zone SEZs are planned for Franceville, Port Gentil and Nyoni SEZs have been approved for Mombasa, Lami, and Kisumu, and some EPZs are to be converted into SEZs as part of Kenya Vision 2030 A special tax and custom regime is being created for the Zambesi Valley until 2025 A number of Zones are in the process of been developed. Some new Zones planned include the Ossiomo FTZ; Enugu Power & Industrial Development Free Zone; Warri Industrial Business Park; Kogi Free Zone; Baklang Free Zone; Madewell & Textile INC Free Zone; Sahara Offshore Logistics Base Free Zone and various Airport Free Zones SEZ in progress and envisioned include Mthata; Harrismith; Johannesburg; Tubaste; Musina; Nkomazi; Upington; Bojanala; and Atlantis Free Trade Zone in progress in Kosti The Bagamoyo SEZ and Kigoma SEZ are planned Under development is the Lumwana MFEZ which will include the manufacture of explosives, agro-processing, horticulture fisheries, and hotel accommodation Congo DRC Djibouti Gabon Kenya Mozambique Nigeria South Africa Sudan Tanzania Zambia Source Adapted from Newman and Page (2017: 17–18). This content is reproduced with special permission of UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, the original publisher of the referenced research work: Industrial clusters: The case for Special Economic Zones in Africa, WIER Working Paper, No. 2017/15: https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2017/239-7 The objectives of the overseas economic zones were as follows (Table 5.7). These Zones have different models based on the mix of objectives they intend meeting. For instance, they can be industrial parks, export zones, or science and technology parks; they can focus on the domestic, regional or international market for their goods. 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 125 Table 5.7 Objectives of China’s overseas economic zones (Bräutigam and Tang 2011a) Objectives of the Chinese overseas zones 1. Increase demand for Chinese-made machinery and equipment and provide after-sales support 2. By producing in overseas countries such as in certain African countries, China would avoid trade barriers and be afforded the opportunity (such as AGOA) to export these goods to Europe and North America 3. It would help boost China’s own domestic restructuring and move up the value chain at home 4. Create economies of scale for overseas investment and support small and medium enterprises to venture overseas in ‘groups’ 5. Transfer China’s success in Special Economic Zones to other developing countries to help recipient countries in their own development whilst benefitting China A critical aspect is that the developers must have a profit motive as this was viewed as an important contributing factor to Zones’ success, and the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) emphasized that projects should be market driven. Companies are expected to take the lead, while the Chinese government plays a supportive role with generous financial and non-financial incentives (Zeng 2016). MOFCOM utilises a competitive tender process for Zone projects, with winning bids receiving a range of incentives, including RMB200 Million in grants and up to RMB2 Billion in long-term loans. Chinese companies investing in the zone are also incentivised to do so. The MOFCOM’s Special Fund for Economic and Technological Cooperation allows investors to receive up to 100% rebate on the interest paid on Chinese bank loans. MOFCOM had already invested $700 million in the construction of 16 Special Economic Zones outside of China, with about 200 companies operating in these Zones with the support of an investment of $2.5 billion. These incentives reduce the risk of investment and are performance based with benchmarking evaluations taking place every 1–2 years. The China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) is an additional development finance instrument that is available to investors in African Zones (Zeng 2016). 126 B. ROBINSON Investment by Chinese companies in Special Economic Zones are not limited to MOFCOM approved Special Economic Zones, and many Chinese companies have invested in other zones throughout the world. The Special Economic Zones supported by MOFCOM internationally in 2016 are listed in Table 5.8. 5.4 Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa The China-African Development Fund (CADF) and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) are the primary facilitators of Chinese Zones’ authorisation and finance for Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa. In addition, the China-African Development Bank, established by the China Development Bank, was launched at the FOCAC 2006 Summit with $5 Billion initial capital. The role of the Bank was to support investment by Chinese companies, Sino-Africa joint ventures, or African companies. China has approved seven Special Economic Zones in Africa, five of which will be analysed in case studies later in the book (Table 5.9). Deborah Bräutigam and Xiaoyang Tang (2011b) describe the roles of the different parties to these zones: 1. The Chinese government: The Chinese government provided material and networking support for the Zone developers, and as mentioned before, had access to RMB 200–300 Million in grants and RMB 2 Billion in loans, and developers could apply for subsidies of 30% of preconstruction and implementation costs through the MOFCOM Trade and Economic Cooperation Development Fund. Chinese firms were also eligible for reimbursement of up to half of their moving expenses; export and income tax rebates or deduction on Chinese material used in construction; and easier access to foreign exchange. Subsidies were performance based and only accessible after costs were incurred. The China Africa Development Bank invested in the Nigeria Lekki, Mauritius and Egyptian Zones. Some provincial and municipal governments in China provided additional funds for the initial zones. FOCAC has also announced various funding instruments to assist Chinese and African companies 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 127 Table 5.8 Special Economic Zones officially supported by MOFCOM (Zeng 2016) Region Country Zone Tender year Status Africa Zambia • Chambishi Nonferrous Metal Mining • Group Industrial Park • Lusaka sub-zone • Lekki FTZ • Ogun-Guangdong Zone • Eastern Industrial Park • JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone • Jiangling Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone • Tianjin TEDA Suez Zone • China-Vietnam (ShenzhenHaiphong) • Economic and Trade cooperation Zone • Longjiang Industrial Park • Thai-Chinese Rayong IZ • Sihanoukville SEZ 2006 Operational 2007 2006 Operational Operational 2007 Operational 2006 Operational 2007 Not implemented 2007 Operational 2007 2007 Under construction Operational 2006 Operational 2006 • China-Indonesia Economic Trade Zone • Korea-China Industrial Park • Haier-Ruba IZ 2007 Under construction Under construction Nigeria Ethiopia Mauritius Algeria Egypt East Asia Vietnam Thailand Cambodia Indonesia South Asia Republic of Korea Pakistan 2007 2006 Delayed due to funding Operational (continued) 128 B. ROBINSON Table 5.8 (continued) Region Country Zone Tender year Status Latin America Venezuela • Venezuela-China Science Technology Industry Zone • Mexico and China (Ningbo) Geely Industrial and Trade Cooperation Zone • Ussuriysk Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone • Tomsk Timber Industry and Trade Cooperation Zone • St. Petersburg Baltic Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone 2007 Not implemented 2007 Not implemented due to land access issues 2006 2007 2006 Operational Operational Dropped Mexico Eastern Europe Russia Table 5.9 China’s seven Special Economic Zones in Africa China’s seven Special Economic Zones in Africa Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone / Chambishi Multi-facility Economic Zone Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Park Mauritius Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Nigeria Lekki Free Trade Zone Nigeria Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone Algeria-China Jiangling Free Trade Zone investing in the Zones. The Chinese government did not get much involved in the design or operation of the Zones. Chinese embassies also encourage Chinese companies to invest in the zones. The government has been known to intervene on rare occasions when problems are encountered with the Zones, but generally, China has had a ‘hands-off’ approach towards African policies towards the Zones. 2. Chinese developers The developers of the Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa have been both state-owned and private enterprises from China. As 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 129 mentioned before, business models varied significantly. Some used existing natural resources to expand processing capacity such as the Zambia Chambishi Zone on the Copperbelt. Others used the Zone as a springboard to enter new markets, such as the Jiangling Automobile Group which planned to build a vehicle assembly industrial park in Algeria, the Mauritius Jinfei Zone was to leverage the Zones location to become a hub of Sino-Africa trade and services, and the zones in Nigeria and Egypt were strategic investments to capitalise on the large regional markets they offered. 3. African governments African governments regulate the Zone’s activities and provide (or “fail to provide”) incentives for their development. Incentives include tax holidays, waivers on import tariffs for raw materials and inputs, and sometimes, even introduce restrictions on strike activity. Chinese companies producing in the Zones may also be able to obtain host countries’ certificates of origin. For example, Chinese companies in Egypt can obtain Egyptian Certificates of Origin that allow them to take advantage of various international trade agreements. The host government is supposed to provide infrastructure outside the Zone, such as port, road and rail infrastructure, and power and water, although, as this book will detail, this doesn’t always materialise. There are sometimes bilateral coordination committees that include representatives of both countries’ governments which operate at a strategic policy level. African governments have various investment agencies that also promote the Zones. Although African stakeholders do sometimes have some form of partnership with the zone, most do not play a direct role, the exception of which is the Lekki Zone where Nigerians are on the Zone’s board of directors and management team. Some African countries have specific economic policies that include investment in Special Economic Zones developed independently from Chinese initiated Zones in Africa, although these incentivised Chinese investment in the country. Douglas Zeng (2016) notes several features of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa: Companies that were successful in the MOFCOM competitive tender selection process were usually companies that already had a presence in the host countries; the models of the Zones ranged from fully Chinese-owned companies such as those in Ethiopia and Mauritius 130 B. ROBINSON to joint ventures with host governments found in Nigeria and Zambia; Chinese Zone developers established consortiums with multiple Chinese investors often with the participation of provincial SOEs from China; Chinese investment were for on-site infrastructure within the zone, with the host country being responsible for off-site infrastructure; and the Zones involved high-level political support from Chinese and the host country’s government. Referring to other studies such as those of the World Bank, Zeng identifies other similarities: Zones were in close proximity to the economic capitals such as Lagos in Nigeria, Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, and Port Louis in Mauritius; near key infrastructural assets, for instance APAPA Port, Lagos airport and Lekki Port in Nigeria, the Ethiopian Zone on the main highway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, and in Mauritius near the Free Port; all the Zones were mixed-use Zones; the first phase was usually around 100 hectares; and the Zone ownership was dominated by consortiums of 3–6 Chinese Business Partners. There are other Special Economic Zones that were initiated by Chinese investors that were outside the ambit of MOFCOM’s support. These include the Guoji Industry and Trade Zone in Sierra Leone; the Nigeria Lishi-CSI Industrial Park; the Linyi Industrial Park in Guinea; China Daheng Textile Industrial Park in Botswana; and the Shandong Xinguang Textile Industrial Park in South Africa. This Chapter served as an introduction of China’s relationship with Africa and the economic ties that have developed during its ‘Going—out’ policy, with specific reference to Special Economic Zones being made in this regard. Both indigenous African Special Economic Zones and Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa will be the subject of analysis for the rest of the book. 5.5 Conclusion The day of writing this conclusion, the trade-war between China and the US had seemed to be in the distant past after simmering down, only to be re-ignited during tensions around the COVID-19 pandemic. Having originated in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 the epidemic in the country was contained through swift action by the Chinese authorities within a short period of two months, and by early March 2020, the cumulative total of cases were 82,295, and new cases on the 14th of April were at 46. At the beginning of March 2020, the US had 75 cases, but by the end of March it had reached 189,967 confirmed cases, almost double 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 131 that of China, and by 14 April 2020, the figure had reached 613,886 cases and was continuing to rise at an alarming, though decreasing rate (Worldometer.info 2020). The US President, Donald Trump’s mercurial nature and indecision regarding the virus at this stage was quite clear, and the search for scapegoats for the problem became paramount. While having been advised of its severity by US authorities, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) declaring the disease a public health emergency on the 30th of January 2020, President Trump referred to it initially as a virus similar to influenza that was under control, and only declared a national emergency of the 13th of March 2020. The President made reference to the ‘Wuhan Virus’ or ‘Chinese virus’ and has questioned the veracity of the figures of the Chinese. This has been much to the ire of the Chinese, as could be expected, as it was clearly laying the blame of a terrible situation at the feet of China. Another institution blamed was the WHO authority, which President Trump accused of being ‘wrong about a number of things’ and ‘China-centric’, and on the 14th of April 2020, the president cut-off funding for the organisation. In stark contrast, the relationship between China and Africa and many nations throughout the world, has been bolstered by the support China has given to their fight for survival against the Coronavirus. On the 13th of April, Wang Yi, the Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister make a phone call to the Chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat. The conversation was as follows: As comprehensive strategic and cooperative partners, China and Africa must fight it together through closer coordination and cooperation. China will always remember the solidarity and support from the AU and African countries at the height of its battle against the outbreak, with explicit opposition to certain country’s attempts to politicize the outbreak and label the virus. It speaks volumes of our brotherly ties and solidarity in times of adversity and the strength of China-Africa strategic cooperation. China is ready to provide more medical supplies if needed by Africa. China is also willing to share experience on outbreak response with African brothers and send medical expert teams there. We will support Africa’s purchase of medical supplies in China and deepen cooperation in public health. China will stand firmly with Africa and fight together with our African brothers and sisters until the virus is completely defeated across the African continent. (Wang Yi, 2020) 132 B. ROBINSON This Chapter has demonstrated the strength of China’s historic and current relationship with Africa that continues to grow as the global geo-political landscape rapidly changes. Chinese investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa, strongly supported by Chinese policy toward Africa, is an opportunity for African Nations to derive significant socioeconomic benefit going forward. The next few chapters will consider whether African Nations are doing so. References Baissac, C. 2011. Brief History of SEZs and Overview of Policy Debates. In Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global Experience, ed. T. Farole. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. © World Bank. [Online]. Accessed from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/996 871468008466349/pdf/600590PUB0ID181onomic09780821386385.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Bräutigam, D., and X. Tang. 2011a. Chinese Investments in Special Economic Zones in Africa. In Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions, ed. T. Farole and G. Akinci, 69–100. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. © World Bank. [Online]. Accessed from: http://owa.baku8km.khazar.org/bitstream/20.500.12323/2799/1/ special%20economic%20zones.pdf#page=93. Accessed 22 Apr 2020. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Bräutigam, D., and X. Tang. 2011b. African Shenzhen: China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies 49 (1): 27–54. Farole, T. 2011. Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global Experience. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. © World Bank. [Online]. Accessed from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/ 10986/2268. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/996871468008466349/pdf/600590PUB0ID181onomic097 80821386385.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2020. Newman, C., and J. Page. 2017. Industrial Clusters: The Case for Special Economic Zones in Africa, WIER Working Paper, No. 2017/15, ISBN 978-92-9256-239-7, The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki. https://doi. 5 THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INTEREST … 133 org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2017/239-7. Available from: http://hdl.han dle.net/10419/161577. Wang Yi. 15 April 2020. FOCAC Top Stories: Rock-solid China-Africa Friendship Will Not Be Affected by Isolated Incidents. [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.focac.org/eng/ttxxsy/t1769827.htm. Accessed 15 Apr 2020. Worldometer.info. 2020. Coronavirus. [Online]. Accessed from: https://www. worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/china/. Accessed 15 Apr 2020. Zeng, D. 2016. Global Experiences of Special Economic Zones with Focus on China and Africa: Policy Insights. Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy 7 (3): 1650018. PART III Evaluating Special Economic Zones in Africa CHAPTER 6 Critical Issues for Chinese Investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa Special economic zones in Africa will not be successful unless they are competitive in the global arena. To illustrate this, some economic theory will be useful. Firstly, let’s review concepts of international business, such as mercantilism and the theories of absolute and comparative advantage. Mercantilism, dating back to the sixteenth century postulates that countries should export more than it imports, thus maintaining a trade surplus. This was regarded as creating wealth for a country, while a deficit was seen as reducing wealth. This view is certainly still held by some politicians in recent times, with politicians such as the US pastPresident Donald Trump holding neo-mercantilist views which equated trade surpluses with economic and political power, a view that motivated the mutually devastating trade war with China. Absolute advantage suggests that productive resources should be applied in the production of goods for which a country has an absolute advantage, and trade in goods (import) where it doesn’t have a competitive advantage. So, as China has developed and become more technically savvy while experiencing higher wages, they would have an absolute advantage over let’s say Senegal, in the production of mobile phones. Senegal on the other hand has lower wages and better productive capacity to produce labour intensive goods, such as kitchen utensils. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_6 137 138 B. ROBINSON Instead of trying to produce technologically advanced goods, which it would only be able to provide in small quantities and at a high price due to the scarcity of those skills, Senegal should specialise in labour intensive mass produced goods, such as these kitchen utensils. The countries can then trade—exporting goods in which they have an absolute advantage, and importing goods in which they don’t. The net effect is that both countries benefit from such specialisation, and it increases access for both countries to these products. Thus, there is a greater net gain for both countries trading, than trying to produce both types of goods themselves. The theory of comparative advantage takes it one step further and argues that countries should maximise production of goods in which it is most efficient, and import other goods, even if these goods are produced less efficiently than they can produce. Taking the same example above, consider the situation where China can also produce the kitchen utensils more efficiently than Senegal. China could still maximise production of mobile phones to the exclusion of producing kitchen utensils if they have a comparative advantage. They may be more efficient in producing these mobile phones than kitchen utensils. In this case it would still make sense for China to import the kitchen utensils from Senegal as it has a comparative advantage of being more efficient in producing mobile phones than kitchen utensils. Once again, both countries benefit more from the trade than without. The reason for reverting to economic theory is useful in that it illustrates that Chinese companies will only invest in Special Economic Zones if there is a comparative advantage in doing so, either for supplying the host country with products, or to produce competitively priced export goods. Failing which, there is little incentive for them to invest in African Nations. As China has become technologically astute, they have developed a comparative advantage of producing technologically advanced products in China where they have the skills. They may still be able to produce textiles more efficiently than some African Nations, but their comparative advantage in advanced technologies precludes more investment in products that do not require skilled labour. We therefore see the influx of Chinese investors in lesser developed countries, where while the efficiency of production may be lower, input costs may provide these Chinese companies with an absolute advantage in producing certain categories of products. It still makes sense to produce 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 139 there due to this advantage, access to the local market, and trade opportunities with more developed nations. These companies are competitive due to the very nature of globalisation. The following section is a meta-analysis of what African countries offer in terms of Special Economic Zones to lure investors, including Chinese investors. The data has been obtained from various internet sources which are detailed in the reference list at the end of the Chapter. The list is relatively comprehensive, but is limited to those countries which publish information on the various incentives and advantages that their countries offer investors in their Special Economic Zones. It is also limited to English versions of the information, so there may be some bias towards English official-language countries. In addition, observations are made and discussions with investors from the various Special Economic Zones are shared, to provide some deeper insights into these issues. This is aimed to emphasize the weighting Chinese investors may place on these issues in their investment decision. The Chapter has the following structure: It explores some of the tax incentives, tax exemptions, subsidies and preferential financing facilities offered by host countries; the ease of doing business; the management and infrastructure provided; the location of the zone and the market opportunities it offers; the human and other resources that are available; foreign ownership limitations, repatriation of profits and currency issues; lifestyle available for Chinese expatriates; global financial initiatives; and China’s policy towards the host country and to Africa. 6.1 Financial Motivation Countries have concocted a range of financial incentives to stimulate interest in their Special Economic Zones, and zones have themselves introduced their own packages of incentives to compete with the multitude of zones throughout the world. In analysing the incentives, some broad categories of incentives emerged, namely tax incentives such as tax holidays and allowances, reduced or free customs duties and protocols, and VAT exemptions; duty free imports of capital equipment, supplies and raw materials; subsidized utilities and rental rates; and the provision of financing often at preferential rates. 140 B. ROBINSON 6.1.1 Tax Incentives An investor from the Ogun-Guangdong Zone in Nigeria explained how Nigeria, and the Zone itself, offered the best incentives (and service) of all the countries and zones visited in Africa, confirming the importance of financial and other incentives in the investment decision. This was reiterated when speaking to investors in the Chambishi Multi Facility Economic Zone in Zambia, where tax incentives were the main driver of investment. The problem is when these incentives change over time. One of the concerns voiced in Zambia at the Chambishi Multi Facility Zone was policy uncertainty by the host government. While there were a lot of incentives that encouraged the initial spurt of investment, this had changed, with profits previously exempt and zero-rated VAT, now subject to tax. Some investors were bitter, suggesting that there were no incentives anymore. The meta-analysis on tax incentives offered to investors by the zones included in the study are divided into tax holidays and allowances; customs duties and customs requirements; and VAT exemptions. Please note that some of the incentives covered an array of these, while others were scant in detail, but the analysis does provide a glimpse into the nature of these incentives, 6.1.1.1 Tax Holidays and Allowances Tax holidays and allowances ranged from a couple of years, to perpetuity. A sliding scale was often applied, with tax rates gradually increasing from zero percent, upwards until reaching the national tax rate—see Mozambique SEZs. They sometimes applied to all taxes, or were categorised into corporate taxes, personal income taxes and property taxes. Sometimes industry classifications were included, with different sectors attracting different incentives. Depreciation allowances on capital investment, capital gains tax benefits, and tax-free dividends were some of the other incentives available. Table 6.1 provides some more detail in this regard. 6.1.1.2 Customs Duties and Requirements Customs duties and requirements were sometimes limited to duty free imports of capital equipment, supplies and raw material (Sect. 6.2.2 will go into more detail in this regard), but others were more comprehensive 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 141 Table 6.1 Tax holidays and allowances offered to investors Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones Ten-year tax holiday on all taxes. From then on, a flat tax rate of 15% on corporate profits for perpetuity Exemption of corporate and income tax 0% Corporate Income Tax and 0% property tax 100% exemption from payment of income tax on profits for 10 years which will not exceed 15% thereafter 10% corporate tax for the first 10 years after the start of operations; 15% for the following 10 years; and 30% from then on. Investment deductions are allowed from between 100–150% for construction and machinery purchases Income tax is exempt during the first 5 years, and 10% after that for processing and intensive production. 2 years tax exemption for service sector companies, followed by a 10% income tax rate. 15 years tax exemption for other companies, followed by a tax rate of 10% Exemption of corporate tax. 100% allowance on buildings, plant and machinery. 25% export allowance on revenue for non-traditional exports. No taxes on gains from the sale of shares held for more than a year. Carry forward of loss for up to 7 years Zero percent corporate tax The incentive scheme differs for SEZ developers, investors and service enterprise. For developers, a 5-year tax exemptions is granted, with a 50% reduction for the following 5 years, and 25% after than. Businesses investing in the zone qualify for a 3-year exemption, and 50% for the following 5 years Djibouti Free Zone Gabon NKOK SEZ Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Kenya SEZs Madagascar Free Zone Malawi Export Processing Zones Mauritius Freeport Mozambique SEZs (continued) 142 B. ROBINSON Table 6.1 (continued) Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment Namibia Export Processing Zones (The EPZs have been accused of being a tax haven and the Namibian Government is introducing new SEZ legislation to counter the misuse of the incentives) Exempt from corporate income tax All companies and individuals operating in these zones are allowed a full tax holiday from Federal, State and Local Governments 100% capital allowance on qualifying building and plant equipment expenditure An exemption from the flat rate minimum tax on companies. 15% corporation tax. Exemption from income tax Tax holiday for 3 years. Accelerated depreciation of 40% on plant and equipment the first year and loss carry forward opportunities Corporate tax rate reduced to 15%. Special allowance for expenditure on buildings at a rate of 10% per annum. Youth employment tax benefits Business tax exemptions and complete exemption from personal income tax for foreigners 10-year Corporate Tax holiday and 25% tax rate for the subsequent 10 years. 100% investment deduction on capital expenditure within 20 years. 10 year withholding tax holiday on dividends for non-residents No tax during the first 10-year’s of operation, 15% thereafter. Tax exemption on dividends during the first 10 years for non-Togolese shareholders. Payroll tax at the reduced rate of 2% 10-year Income tax exemption for zone developers and operators subject to minimum investment amounts. Exemption from tax on plant and machinery used in the Free Zones for 5 years upon disposal Nigerian Export Processing Zones Senegal Special Economic Zone Sierra Leone South Africa Sudan Free Zones Tanzania Free Economic Zones Togo Export Free Zone Uganda Free Zones (continued) 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 143 Table 6.1 (continued) Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zones Zero percent tax rate on profits for a period of 5 years; 50% of profits taxed from years 6–8; and 75% of profits taxed for years 9–10. Zero percent tax rate for dividends for 5 years. Investments of more the US$500,000 are allowed accelerated depreciation on capital equipment and machinery for five years offering a range of benefits such as reduced port handling charges (Mauritius), exemption of customs duties for export (Sudan free zones), and exemption of licences, authorisations and quota restrictions (Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones). Some of the incentives are described in Table 6.2. 6.1.1.3 VAT Exemptions Vat exemptions have the dual impact of potentially reducing the cost of supplies, while making prices cheaper/profits larger when goods on sold. VAT exemptions varied from being blanket exemptions, exemptions of VAT on imports, or exemptions of VAT on the purchase of goods from the local market (South Africa). Table 6.3 lists some of the VAT exemptions offered. 6.1.2 Duty Free Imports of Capital Equipment, Supplies and Raw Materials Duty free imports of capital equipment, supplies and raw material was an important aspect for Chinese investors, especially in light of some of these items not been available in the country. There was sometimes a problem though—bribery and corruption: ‘Due to corruption, duties are sometimes higher’ one person told me at the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Nigeria. This is also an important consideration, as bribery and corruption significantly increases the cost of doing business in some African countries—this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. There may be some duplication in this analysis with the other tax incentives and allowances mentioned before, but Table 6.4 is provided 144 B. ROBINSON Table 6.2 Favourable customs duties and requirements Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones Exemptions from licenses, authorisations and quota restrictions regarding imports and exports; and exemption from all price and margin controls. The zones are export orientated, generally requiring 80% of production to be exported, and production for the local market would be subject to customs duties and taxes Exemption from custom duties on the import of equipment and machinery for industries 100% exemption from payment of direct and indirect duties and levies on all imports for production and exports from free zones Raw materials, inputs, materials and equipment intended for free zones are exempt from customs duties and import taxes Exemption of duties on capital equipment and raw material. Exemption of Excise tax on the purchase of raw materials made in Malawi Exemption from customs duties on all goods imported into the Freeport zones In addition, reduced port handling charges are offered on all goods destined for re-export Exempt from duties on machinery, equipment and raw materials imported into Namibia for manufacturing purposes Duty free, tax free on import of raw materials for goods destined for re-export Import duty exemption of raw materials for manufacturers Exemption of duties and taxes subject to certain provisions The import duty for raw material, plants and machinery is 5% Gabon NKOK SEZ Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Madagascar Malawi Export Processing Zone Mauritius Freeport Namibian Export Processing Zones Nigerian Export Processing Zones Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zone Senegal Special Economic Zones Sierra Leone (continued) 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 145 Table 6.2 (continued) Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment South Africa Goods imported into the customs-controlled area of a Special Economic Zone are exempt for import customs, excise duties and economic restrictions while being stored or undergoing manufacturing Goods imported and exported to non-local areas are exempt from customs duties Duty and stamp duty exemption on raw materials, machinery, equipment and other inputs. Duty free export of goods produced Exemptions from taxes and duties on all imported inputs that are for the exclusive use in the development and production output of the business enterprise Investments over US$500,000 pay zero percent import duty on capital equipment and machinery for five years Sudan Free Zones Tanzania Free Economic Zones Uganda Free Zones Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zones to emphasize the importance placed by Chinese investors on the cost of importing capital, supplies, and raw material when these may be scarce in certain African Nations. Incentives ranged from duty free imports of equipment and machinery (Gabon NKOK SEZ) to duty free imports on factors of production which would include supplies and raw materials (Togo Export Free Zone and Uganda Free Zone). 6.1.3 Subsidised Utilities and Rental Rates Subsidised utilities and rentals are another way of encouraging investment, although it didn’t seem that they were offered by many zones within the analysis, or they were not promoted to any significant extent, with only the Nigerian Export Processing Zone and the Togo Export Free Zone making mention of such an incentive (Table 6.5). 146 B. ROBINSON Table 6.3 VAT exemptions Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment Gabon NKOK SEZ Kenya SEZs Exemption from VAT The supply of goods or taxable services are perpetually VAT exempt. Investors in SEZs are also exempt from stamp duty and excise duty Imports are not subject to VAT. Sales made into the local market is subject to ordinary rates of 20% Exemption of VAT Exemption on VAT for machinery, equipment and raw material imported into Namibia for manufacturing purposes Subject to certain conditions, exemption are allowed on VAT for the manufacturing and mining sector Exemption of VAT on goods and services acquired from the local market or imported VAT exemption on raw material, machinery, equipment and other inputs Supplies to developers are zero rated, and foreign supplies are exempt from reverse VAT charges Madagascar Free Zone Malawi Export Processing Zone Namibian Export Processing Zones Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zones South Africa Tanzania Free Economic Zones Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zones 6.1.4 Financing and Preferential Interest Rates Financing and preferential interest rates did not receive much attention in the marketing of most of the Special Economic Zones. Gabon NKOK Special Economic Zones was an exception, and it was mentioned that easy access to loans was offered for manufacturers. This is not to say that preferential financing would not be available. Chinese firms would have access to its own development financing institutions such as the Export–Import Bank of China, and host countries would have a range of commercial financial institutions, as well as development finance institutions, to encourage investment by local and international companies considering investment in their country. 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 147 Table 6.4 Duty free imports of capital equipment and raw materials Country and/or zone Duty free imports of capital equipment and raw materials Gabon NKOK SEZ Exemption from custom duty on import of equipment and machinery for industries 100% exemption from payment of direct and indirect duties and levies on all imports for production Raw materials, inputs, materials and equipment intended for free zones are exempt from customs duties and import taxes Exemption of duty on capital equipment and raw materials Exemption from customs duties on all goods imported into the Freeport Zones Exemption for duties and VAT on machinery, equipment and raw material imported into Namibia for manufacturing purposes Duty free and tax free for imports of raw materials for goods destined for re-export Manufacturers may import raw materials and industrial output at a reduced rate Exemption of duties and taxes with conditions Import duty for raw materials, plant and machinery is 5% Goods imported are exempt from import customs, excise duties and economic restrictions while stored or being manufactured Goods imported are exempt from customs duties Duty and VAT Exemption in raw material, machinery, equipment and other inputs Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Madagascar Free Zones Malawi Export Processing Zone Mauritius Freeport Namibian Export Processing Zone Nigerian Export Processing Zones Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zone Senegal SEZs Sierra Leone South Africa Sudan Free Zones Tanzania Free Economic Zones (continued) 148 B. ROBINSON Table 6.4 (continued) Country and/or zone Duty free imports of capital equipment and raw materials Togo Export Free Zone Exemption from all duties and taxes on import of raw material as well as machinery and plant equipment Exemption from duties on imported inputs for the exclusive use of the development of the business, and for production output of the business enterprise Zero percent import duty rate on capital equipment and machinery Uganda Free Zones Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zone Table 6.5 Subsidised utilities and rentals Country and/or zone Incentive to attract investment Nigerian Export Processing zones Rent free land at construction stage, thereafter, rent becomes payable Preferential tariffs on utility services of electricity, water and telephone Togo Export Free Zone 6.2 Ease of Business Bureaucratic red tape stifles entrepreneurship. Many African countries are infamous for introducing administrative hurdles that make opening a company, obtaining the requisite permits and licences, and simply operating a company, almost impossible to achieve. While financial incentives may sweeten the investment decision, the ability to efficiently open and operate a business in the host country is also of critical importance. 6.2.1 Ease of Business Initiatives ‘One-stop shops’ have been established by governments or introduced by special economic zones. They can offer a range of services to new and established businesses. For new businesses they can assist with registering businesses, obtaining licenses, and applying for environmental permissions. For example, the Kenya SEZs one stop shop service assists with 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 149 these and other services such as assisting with the application of labour regulations, the application for work permits, guiding investors with import and export logistics, assisting with utility connections, and registration with tax authorities. They can also include a customs office which will be detailed later in the chapter. Table 6.6 describes some of the ease of business initiatives available to Chinese investors. 6.2.2 Permits and Licenses The efficient granting of permits and licenses requires special attention, as these can be a stumbling block to initial investment if not in place. Some special economic zones guarantee or provide added-value services to assist in this regard. Cameron’s Industrial Free Zone provides an undertaking to issue licenses to operate within 30 days of application, while Gabon NKOK Sez offers the an impressive 24-hour turnaround for registering a new company, and 7 days for the provision of various certificates—these and other initiatives are detailed in Table 6.7. 6.2.3 Ability to Employ Foreign Nationals, Visas and Work Permits One of the challenges facing Chinese investors, and which is detailed in this and other chapters, is their need to use Chinese labour when the skills are not available in the host country. Visa restrictions, work permits, and localisation quotas can be onerous and may make it difficult to operate in certain African countries. Other countries on the continent have realised this, and have introduced favourable requirements that allow companies to bring in expatriate labour. For instance, Ghana offers no restrictions of work or resident permits for zone investors and employees, while Nigeria waives it expatriate quotas for companies operating in the zones—see Table 6.8 for more detail. 6.3 Special Economic Zone Management and Infrastructure Well-managed zones with appropriate infrastructure holds the promise of providing a conducive business environment in which to operate. This section explores the ownership and operational management of these zones, the infrastructure in place for investors, and specific attention is paid to having an in-house customs office within the zone. 150 B. ROBINSON Table 6.6 Facilitating ease of business Country and/or zone Ease of business initiatives Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones The National Office for Industrial Free Zones operates as a one-stop shop and aims to expedite investment approvals and respond to investors’ needs Gabon’s Special Economic Zone facilitates approvals, company registration etc. and aims to build a business-friendly ecosystem Minimal customs formalities Gabon NKOK SEZ Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Kenya SEZs Malawi Export Processing Zones Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zone Senegal Special Economic Zones South Africa Togo Export Free Zone Uganda Free Zone Zimbabwe Export Processing Zones One-stop shop service to assist new companies with regards to labour regulations, work permits, import–export logistics, applications for utility connections, and registration with tax authorities etc. The Malawi Investment and Trade Centre (MITC) acts as a one-stop shop to assist investors and exporters Streamlined government red tape Streamlined business systems in the country including company registration within 24 hours One-stop investor service. The commercial service (Coega SEZ) provides business analyst services. Simplified business start-up and license requirements Modern government systems to reduce bureaucracy, increase transparency and lower administrative costs. Single-window system for customs administration and paperless trade processes to boost cross-border and international trade One-stop center for reducing red tape One-stop shop investment centre to facilitate investment, permits and accessing incentives 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 151 Table 6.7 Permits and licenses Country and/or zone Permits and licenses Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones The National Office for Industrial Free Zones is responsible for the granting of licenses, permits and other authorisations to businesses and zone developers and operators. It undertakes to issue licenses to operate within 30 days of a request. In conjunction with the country’s Investment Promotion Center, it assists businesses throughout the formation and establishment process Investment and industry related approvals are centralised. 24-hour turnaround for the registration of a company; 7 days for the issue of exemption certificates; 7 days for obtaining technical approval, GSEZ entry authorisation and certificate of compliance No importing licensing requirements Gabon NKOK SEZ Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Kenya SEZs Nigerian Export Processing Zones Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zone South Africa Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zones 6.3.1 One License requirement with rapid project approval Waiver on all import and export licenses One stop registration and licensing No license fees in the customs and control area Free facilitation for application of immigration permits, secondary licenses, land acquisition and utilities Ownership and Management of Zones Well-managed zones are critical for investors for a number of reasons. Good management contributed to improved information dissemination to investors, allowing for more accurate risk assessment and calculation of their potential return on investment. It supported financial security in that funds invested were well utilised. Promises made by zone operators were more likely to be fulfilled. Infrastructure and services to businesses would in all probability be more efficient. The ‘best-service’ received from the zone’s operators in the Ogun-Guangdong Zone, was the deciding factor for one investor who had considered a number of countries and zones before investing in the zone. 152 B. ROBINSON Table 6.8 Work visas, permits and quotas Country and/or zone Work visas, permits and quotas Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones Djibouti Free Zone Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) ‘Liberal’ expatriate work visas Flexibility to employ foreign nationals No restrictions on the issuance of work and residence permits to free zone investors and employees Work permits are available to 20% of full-time employees The One-Stop Service Centre assists with the facilitation of Business Residence Permits and Temporary Employment Permits for investors An example of restrictive quotas where foreigners cannot exceed the quota of between 5 and 10% of foreign employees Waiver on all expatriate quotas for companies operating in the zones Kenya SEZs Malawi Export Processing Zones Mozambique SEZs Nigerian Export Processing Zones Chinese owned and managed Special Economic Zones in Africa had a definite advantage in attracting Chinese investors. The culture of doing business and relationship between investors in China often resulted in strong investment relationships in African zones. In all of the Chinese Zones visited in Africa the majority of investors were Chinese nationals. A good example of how this relationship facilitated investment was found in the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Nigeria. The name itself, Guangdong, refers to the partnership between the Province of Guangdong in China and the State of Ogun in Nigeria. This would immediately be reassuring to a Chinese investor, knowing that the Special Economic Zone is supported by government policy and formal ties between the states. One investor in the zone spoke of how their investment came about due to a personal relationship with a Chinese national with a stake in the Zone. This individual convinced the investor of the potential of doing business in Nigeria, and the advantages of this Chinese operated zone. The investor was convinced and is now one of the oldest companies operating in the zone, and when speaking to him, he confirmed that it was a good decision in the long run. Chinese operated zones visited all had a strong Chinese cultural influence, and some visited just after Chinese New Year, sported an array of 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 153 festival decorations. Canteens catered to Chinese tastes, with many traditional Chinese delicacies imported for their kitchens. Accommodation was often provided for Chinese nationals, either at the factories or in Chinese hostels within the Zones. The Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zone had a ‘hotel’ just outside the Zone exclusively for their staff and guests— I had the opportunity to stay there for an evening and enjoyed the warm hospitality of this tight community, where I witnessed the sprawling grounds where food was grown for the community, a large swimming pool was available for exercise and an escape from the sweltering heat, and a communal hall was equipped for favourite sports from home. Investors and Chinese zone operators generally had a very good relationship, and in the close confines of the zone, friendships blossomed, and social activities were common. A marathon in the Chambishi Multi Facility Economic zone had been organised by an investor—some healthy competition amongst residents. 6.3.2 Suitable Zone Infrastructure Special Economic Zone infrastructure varies considerably, but the more comprehensive zones provided modern facilities financed either by the host government or the Zone owners and operators. Roads, railways, and port facilities provided the logistical infrastructure, while water and electricity was provided from national water boards and the power grid, or as often in the case of Chinese owned zones, borehole water and power plants within the zones ensured these essential services were available on a reliable basis. The cost of these services, such as power, was expensive though. In Nigeria, gas pipelines had to be laid and the compressed natural gas was expensive. It also had limited capacity and some of the bigger companies in the Special Economic Zones generated their own power. That said, the reliability of power more than justified the cost, and investors seemed resigned to the fact that they would have to pay a premium for electricity provision. Some zones that generated their own power, still struggled delivering reliable power. For instance, the OgunGuangdong Free Trade Zone’s pipeline gas wasn’t always stable, and they had to rely on the backup of diesel power, which was cost-exorbitant. Security was another area of concern, and many Zones had gone to lengths to secure the perimeter of the property with a sizeable private security or state security force. 154 B. ROBINSON Logistical infrastructure to and from the zones vary from outstanding (Ethiopia and South Africa) to poor (Nigeria), often a function of governments’ commitment to investing in these zone, a subject for a later chapter. Special economic zones often provided investors with various options in terms of their individual infrastructural requirements. The Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia allowed investors to buy the land; buy the warehouse (subject to the government’s 99-year lease to the Chinese Zone operators); or rent a warehouse. Warehouses and buildings provided by the Zone would either be standardised units, or could be built to investors’ specific requirements. This flexibility provided investors with options suitable to their individual financial investment preferences. Lekki Free Trade Zone in Nigeria offers investors standard factories which can be leased from the operators; factories could be built to the investors’ requirements and leased from the operators; or investors could build their own facilities on a 50-year lease. While a bit off the topic, sometimes problems crept in on facility costs. An interesting example was provided in the Chambishi Multi facility Economic Zone. As investors poured capital into buildings and infrastructure of their premises, the value of the property naturally increased, which in turn, attracted higher property rates and taxes. Chinese investors couldn’t fathom the rationality of this approach that they felt disincentivised investment. The meta-analysis provided insight into what some of the other special economic zones were providing investors in terms of infrastructure— Table 6.9. 6.3.3 In-house Customs Office Speaking to the Zone’s operators at the Eastern Industrial Park, it was emphasised that an in-house customs office was crucial. It allowed companies to import containers with little bureaucracy and which were inspected once only, avoiding time consuming multiple phases of importation. The customs office in the Zone was termed ‘small’, but it had 20 staff including inspectors, supervisors and administrative staff. Not all Zones have such in-house customs offices. The Lekki Free Trade Zone was the only Zone in Nigeria to have one. Some other countries and zones that provided some form of an in-house customs office are listed in Table 6.10. 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 155 Table 6.9 Infrastructure of Special Economic Zones Country and/or zone Infrastructure Djibouti International Free Trade Zones Advanced facilities are provided including high-speed telecommunications, power and water supplies, and road infrastructure Modern infrastructure. Reliable electricity and water at a subsidized tariff Comparatively well-developed infrastructure with internal road networks, electricity and water supplies, internal and external communications, as well as sea and airport facilities Modern zone with excellent infrastructure. Warehouses for dry goods, cold storage rooms, processing centers, offices and an international exhibition centre Option to lease industrial and business sites and factory shells World class infrastructure. Extensive portfolio of land, buildings, equipment and bulk infrastructure A range of facilities available including warehouses, commercial offices, business park, retail outlets and residential units Gabon NKOK SEZ Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Mauritius Freeport Namibian Export Processing Zones South Africa Sudan Free Zones Table 6.10 In-house customs’ offices at Special Economic Zones Country and/or zone In-house customs office Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones The National Office for Industrial Free Zones operates as a one-stop shop’ to facilitate customs procedures. It provides streamlined, on-site inspection procedures and immediate transfer of goods and services to and from the port of embarkation or debarkation All zones have an onsite customs office for customs documentation and clearance Customs unit provides simplified customs procedures On site custom inspection of goods in lieu of off-port inspection On Site customs inspection Kenya SEZs South Africa Tanzania Free Economic Zones Uganda Free Zone 156 B. ROBINSON 6.4 Location and Market Opportunities It makes sense that investors in Special Economic Zones want to be well positioned geographically—this could be from the perspective of being close to transport infrastructure to enable logistics, near requisite raw materials for production or mining activities, close to industrial hubs to ensure an efficient supply chain, or to have access to the domestic and regional market. These and other considerations are discussed below. 6.4.1 Location Advantages and Disadvantages The Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Park is situated just outside the capital, Addis Ababa. This poses advantages and disadvantages from a location perspective. Being far from the Port of Djibouti, even with the new Chinese built railway, makes it costly and time consuming to ship goods for export. But it is in the heart of Ethiopia, a huge potential domestic market for goods produced in the zone. However, as will be detailed shortly, the export orientation of the government is making production for the local market increasingly difficult. In selecting a location, Chinese zone operators in Nigeria had to consider accessibility. The Lekki Free Trade Zone is positioned strategically on two major water bodies—a deep sea port and a navigable lagoon. This allowed for the transport of supplies and goods by water and to avoid the gridlock of road transport in Lagos. This has the potential to have unanticipated positive consequences for the area—people were migrating to the surrounding areas of Lekki and ‘decentralised congestion of Lagos… forcing people to migrate to this area… this is going to change the face of Lagos and Nigeria’ was the view of one of the Zone’s operators. Investors also mentioned the importance of the Zone being within close proximity of other industrial hubs. This served to strengthen their supply chain and provide a market for certain industrial goods produced within the Special Economic Zone. It also provided opportunities for horizontal and vertical diversification—a packaging company in Nigeria diversifying into pulp production; a fuel retailer opening up more outlets in the region. The important of proximity to supportive industries is evident with many Special Economic Zones throughout Africa being positioned close to major cities and industrial areas. 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 157 The problem with poor accessibility was well illustrated in the OgunGuangdong Free Trade Zone. Even though the Ogun State had promised to improve access routes, this had not happened. The result was that the roads were in a terrible state of affairs, and coupled to corruption along the route, the cost of transporting materials and products was skyrocketing in addition to transport times being radically increased. There is no doubt that this would serve as a major deterrent to investment there in the future. The Chambishi Multi Facility Economic Zone in Zambia was very different on this point. The zone had a state railway line running through the zone. It also had good roads linking the zone to the various logistical routes. This was critical as the Zone is ‘deep’ in Africa which necessitates the transport of goods overland for 1000s of kilometres to Dar es Salam, Beira or Walvis Bay. New roads were evident—a Zambian project, but built by the Chinese. Even the airport was being re-built, with current flights to the nodes of Johannesburg and Addis Ababa providing easy access to expatriates from China and other African nations. Location is generally also considered from the perspective of a local work force and stable social and political environment. Once again, Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone serves as an example of a problematic location. The Zone’s operators inadvertently found themselves in the midst of community problems with local strife with the local kings disputing each others legitimacy, land claims by community members, and locals plating crops within the Zone and then demanding remuneration for the crops. It was a messy state of affairs, and the regional government was doing little to help alleviate the problem. Location is of course critical with mining related activities. The Chambishi Multi Facility Economic Zone is in the heart of the copper belt of Zambia. The ‘supply chain is complete’ it was explained—the Special Economic Zones naturally attracted suppliers for the mining sector. Safety in general was an important consideration. The OgunGuangdong Free Trade Zone had been moved from its initial intended location due to a violent attack on Chinese nationals during their preliminary investigations. Zambian investors mentioned that the safety of the country was certainly an attraction—violent attacks were scarce with only theft being a problem in the country. Table 6.11 provides some insights into the location advantages promoted by Special Economic Zones. 158 B. ROBINSON Table 6.11 Location advantages of selected Special Economic Zones Country and/or zone Location advantages Djibouti International Free Trade Zones Djibouti is a centre of global trade routes and on two of the three busiest shipping routes globally. With the new railway line linking Djibouti to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, the zone also has access to the East and Central African markets Ghana is centrally located and a good access point to West Africa. Accra in Ghana serves as the Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Areas (AfCFTA) Inter-regional trade hub with good transport facilities such as the US$3.6 billion SGR railway line linking Mombasa to Nairobi Companies can apply for EPZ status if they produce exclusively for export. The location can be anywhere of their choosing Freeport has direct access to modern port facilities. Value added logistics services are also provided including containers yards and maintenance facilities Businesses are free to establish themselves anywhere in the country The SEZs are strategically positioned at commercial and logistics hubs allowing for access to the South African and Southern African market, while also some being strategically located at international ports or airports for global access The Red Sea Free Zone is well positioned on the Red Sea coast with access to the regional and global market Export opportunities in the COMESA market of 19 member countries Zones such as the Chambishi MFEZ are situated in the heart of the copper-belt Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Kenya SEZs Malawi Export Processing Zone Mauritius Freeport Namibian Export Processing Zones South Africa Sudan Free Zones Uganda Free Zones Zambia Multi Facility Economic Zones 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 6.4.2 159 Domestic Market Africa is an exploding continent in terms of population growth (Fig. 6.1), with Africans expected to be one in every four person on the globe by 2050 (Fig. 6.2). The domestic market, and more importantly, access to the domestic market, is one of the most decisive drivers of Chinese investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa. Fig. 6.1 Population growth in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2020) Fig. 6.2 One in four proportion of the world’s people in 2050 will be from sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2020) 160 B. ROBINSON Nigeria, has the biggest population in Africa with over 200 million people, and is expected to double that, if not more, by 2050. Investors in Nigeria’s zones emphasized the lucrative domestic market, and regional market. Like South African being the springboard to the Southern African market, Nigeria offered an opportunity to capitalise on the Western Africa and Central African market. This was confirmed by all investors spoken to, who also emphasised the positive economic impact of producing in Nigeria for the Nigerian market—it is better than importing; products are much cheaper; and job creation is bolstered. But it wasn’t all smooth sailing in accessing the domestic market of Nigeria by Chinese investors. Contradictory policy and regulations resulted in the situation where some companies were disallowed to sell on the domestic market. ‘The first two years we were doing nothing’ explained one investor, as they weren’t allowed to sell to the local market until regulations were amended. The investor spoke of two companies that he was aware of that had closed as a result of this problem. As touched upon earlier, production for the export market for certain industries, such as the textile industry, is difficult for inland zones due to transport costs. The domestic market, on the other hand, holds enormous potential. The Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia is well positioned to produce for the domestic market, and a denim factory visited was reaping the rewards of an unsaturated market for clothing in the country. The zone had approximately 30 textile companies, many small, family owned, businesses. Their investment decision was based purely on the large domestic market. Government has however, begun placing pressure on Zones to produce exclusively for export. It was mentioned by one investor that there were 15 Industrial Parks in Ethiopia, but not all were successful. One of the prevalent problems they experienced was their initial commitment to produce for the export market, but it was cost-prohibitive to do so, and factories simply had no competitive advantage. The 2nd phase of the Eastern Industrial Park proviso was that investors were expected to produce 100% for the export market. This was expected to be a major deterrent to further investment by Chinese companies. Some Special Economic Zones actively encouraged investment for the purposes of selling to the domestic market. This would make sense for 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 161 Table 6.12 Domestic market access incentives Country and/or zone Access to the domestic market incentives Djibouti Free Zone Possibility provided to sell to the local market 30% of annual production of goods may be sold to the local market 50% of re-export value to the local market Export into the customs territory is allowed for any product or goods manufactured, assembled, or pre-packaged in the zone with certain exceptions 20% of turnover is allowed for sale to the local market, subject to payment of all taxes Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Mauritius Freeport Nigerian Export Processing Zones Tanzania Free Economic Zone countries that embark on a import-substitution strategy, preferring local production, even if that was the result of foreign direct investment in the country. The benefits of job creation and other socio-economic benefits would also weigh heavily in favour of this approach for many African countries. Some of these domestic market incentives are depicted in Table 6.12. 6.5 Human and Other Resources Resources available to Chinese investors in the host country’s Special Economic Zones was another important consideration. Human resources and access to raw materials, supplies and equipment are contemplated below. 6.5.1 Labour Productivity and Labour Cost and Labour Legislation Labour is a key determinant of investment and will be covered extensively in Chapter 7. Suffice it at this stage to say that labour cost, labour skills, and labour legislation are critical questions in the investment decision: 162 B. ROBINSON • • • • • • • Are the wages competitive? Are the skills needed available? What training will need to be provided and at what cost? What are the productivity levels in the country? How stable is the labour force? What is the nature of labour legislation in the country? What is the level of trade union activity and are labour disputes common? • Will Chinese skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled labour be needed? • What will the cost be to employ Chinese labour in the host country? • How can the language barriers be resolved? The nature of these attributes would determine scale and type of investment. A simple example of this was in the Lekki Free Trade Zone— while Nigerians are generally well educated, critical skills were lacking in the technology sector. This resulted in many Chinese companies being assembly plants rather than original goods manufacturing facilities. Another example is the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone—the zone had access to relatively cheaper labour than Lagos, and was an important differentiator between the two Nigerian zones. Zambians were considered as well educated with the propensity to benefit from skills training. The Sino-Zam Vocational College of Science and Technology had been established, with skills training specifically oriented towards the mining sector—the zones positioning within the copper-belt region made these skills critical to investors. Gabon NKOK SEZ promoted the fact that it had ‘relaxed and flexible’ labour legislation, and Ghana highlighted their competitive minimum daily wage. South Africa, known for its restrictive labour legislation, were at pains to point out the various incentives that were in place for youth employment and skills development, and Coega SEZ provided recruitment facilities and apprenticeship training centres to help support investors with critical skills provision. 6 6.5.2 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 163 Access to Raw Material, Goods and Services, and Equipment Investors would logically want to source raw materials, goods and services, and capital equipment from the local market. These local sources would intuitively be cheaper and quicker to obtain. This also supported the local SMME sector. The Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia was a good example of this where wood was sourced locally for the furniture factory; and sand and stone materials for the cement factory. The Gabon NKOK SEZ also benefitted from the regular supply of quality wood for manufacturers. This was not always feasible though, as quality of the supplies may be poor, or simply not be available. For instance, in the cement factory in Ethiopia, the quality of material was problematic. Pipes, tools and electric parts were specifically mentioned as being in short supply. Even low-end goods that would be assumed as been easy to produce, were unavailable, such as packing materials. Investors would have to go to much effort to obtain the most basic of materials or equipment, often necessitating the importation of such goods. A similar example was given by the Ogun-Guangdong zone operator in Nigeria. With ceramics and packaging companies in the zone, about 95% of the raw materials needed could be sourced from companies nearby— although the quality was different necessitating a change in their technical specifications. In actual fact, cheap raw materials was one of the benefits for investors in the zone, in addition to relatively cheap land and labour. Yet this wasn’t the case for all investors—the fridge assembly plant was dependant on imports—‘no-one in Nigeria is producing compressors’. 6.6 Ownership and Profits Various African nations have introduced ownership quota restrictions for foreign investors. While countries may justify it from the perspective of empowering local entrepreneurs, and there is certainly the argument that foreign companies can benefit from local market knowledge and expertise, many foreign investors are reluctant to relinquish some of their shareholding. South Africa’s Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment policy is one example of a policy that while aimed to redress the inequality and poverty within the country, may also disincentivise investment in the country by foreign owned companies. 164 B. ROBINSON Table 6.13 Special Economic Zones that allow for 100% foreign ownership Country and/or zone Foreign ownership Djibouti Free Zone 100% foreign ownership permitted 100% foreign ownership allowed No restriction on ownership for FDI 100% foreign ownership allowed 100% foreign ownership of investment 100% foreign ownership right 100% foreign ownership allowed Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Malawi Export Processing Zone Mauritius Freeport Nigerian EPZs Sudan Free Zones Tanzania Free Economic Zones 6.6.1 No Restrictions on Foreign Ownership Knowing the importance to investors to retain full ownership, some Special Economic Zones in Africa are promoting exactly that, with 100% foreign ownership permitted—Table 6.13. 6.6.2 Currency, Profits and Repatriation of Profits An unstable currency is problematic for investors and a significant risk factor. If goods produced in the Zones are to be exported and US Dollars to be earned, a depreciating host country currency makes it more lucrative provided production costs remain in the local currency denomination. But the other side of the coin, is the repatriation of profits. As the local currency depreciates, the value of profits in the local currency also depreciates. These issues need to be carefully considered by investors. And many Africa countries suffer from severe fluctuations and sometimes long-term depreciation of their currency. The Zambian Kwacha was mentioned by Chinese investors—its instability made it difficult to plan. Poor monetary policy and inflation can also wreak havoc on a currency. Zimbabwe is an example of runaway inflation, where at one time the largest banknote was Zimbabwean One Hundred Trillion Dollars, that quickly deteriorated to being worth nothing. If you visit Victoria Falls in 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 165 Zambia and Zimbabwe, tourists can buy these (they are often counterfeits as the original notes are in such demand) for a couple of US$—their value now is as a collectable souvenir. Another aspect is the restriction of currency exchange and the repatriation of profits. Ethiopia is a good example of a country grappling with currency problems. Dollar accounts may, without the authorisation of investors, be converted to the Ethiopian Birr. This makes it difficult to import critical supplies and equipment, and can be a problem when trying to repatriate profits. Investors need to be assured that their return on investment can be channelled back to them when necessary. Some countries and Zones authorities have provided security in this regard—see Table 6.14, as well as introduced other guarantees regarding profits and their repatriation. Djibouti, Cameroon and most of the countries listed in Table 6.14 offer free repatriation of capital and profits, providing surety to the investor that they can exit their investment and retain their profits. Other incentives regard the ability to hold foreign currency accounts, and thus not be at risk of local currency fluctuations (Mauritius Freeport and Namibian Export Processing Zone). 6.7 Lifestyle Lifestyle offered by the host country isn’t high on the list of priorities as can be evidenced by some Special Economic Zones being situated in some of the most inhospitable regions of the African continent. At the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, the Chinese spoke of the sacrifices they had made in coming to the country; how they had to leave their partners in China; the difficulty of supporting their families in China when so far away. ‘We are here to work’ was a common refrain. One investor expressed the culture shock of moving to Nigeria, and the difficulties experienced in communicating (he couldn’t speak English) and managing his staff. Chinese operators made some effort to provide a homely environment in these zones for Chinese residents. Speaking to Chinese expatriates living in the Lekki Free Trade Zone, they described the boredom of living in the area. The Zone had what they term a ‘camp’, which provided a clinic with free facilities, and kitchens for Chinese and Nigerians working within the zone, but apart from that, there wasn’t much to do. This was about to change with the investment of a shopping centre within the zone that would have restaurants and other lifestyle facilities for the 166 B. ROBINSON Table 6.14 Currency, profits and repatriation of profits by zones’ investors Country and/or zone Currency, profits and repatriation of profits Cameroon’s Industrial Free Zones Investors are allowed to hold foreign exchange accounts in the domestic banking system and are exempted from restrictions on the purchase and sale of foreign export exchange, and exempted from all currency export taxes. They have the right to transfer abroad all funds earned and invested in Cameroon No currency restrictions and free repatriation of capital and profits permitted 100% repatriation of capital and profits. Fixed parity between Gabon currency and the Euro Total exemption from payment of withholding taxes from dividends arising out of free zone investments Investors are permitted to operate foreign currency accounts with banks in Ghana There are no conditions or restrictions on repatriation of dividends or net profit; payments for foreign loan servicing; payments of fees and charges for technology transfer agreements and remittance of proceeds from sale of any interest in a free zone investment No restriction on remittance of foreign investment funds Free repatriation of profits Access to offshore banking facilities Investors are allowed to hold foreign currency accounts and repatriate their capital and profits Free transferability of capital, profits and dividends by foreign investors Full freedom to transfer capital and profits. Free foreign exchange Djibouti Free Zone Gabon NKOK SEZ Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Malawi Export Processing Zones Mauritius Freeport Namibian Export Processing Zone Nigerian Export Procession Zones Sudan Free Zones (continued) 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 167 Table 6.14 (continued) Country and/or zone Currency, profits and repatriation of profits Tanzania Free Economic Zone 100% retention of all profits. Free repatriation of profit Freedom to transfer capital and possibility of holding foreign currency bank accounts Unrestricted remittance of profit after tax Togo Export Free Zone Uganda Free Zones Chinese—with 90% of companies being Chinese owned, this was likely to be a popular social centre for Chinese residents in the zone. What also naturally occurred was that the investment by Chinese zone operators and various businesses, led to an influx of investment catering to the Chinese expatriates—restaurants and guest houses in the surrounding area. Some investors spoke of the pleasant lifestyle in the zone and the country. The Eastern Industrial Park for one was considered by investors as temperate in climate and people were friendly, making the stay for Chinese nationals pleasant. This positive perspective was shared in Zambia—‘Business is good, Zambia is good’ was the view of one of the investors in the Chambishi Multi Facility Zone. He was tired of the citylife in China, and preferred the pace, the landscape and climate of Zambia. He had a family business, and the family lived on the property within the zone—it was a happy lifestyle and he often invited family from China to come visit and tour the country’s many natural delights. Some countries and zones emphasised the lifestyle that was on offer in an effort to attract investment (Table 6.15) by the Chinese and others. 6.8 African Preferential Trade Arrangements There are a number of global initiatives that influenced investment by Chinese in Special Economic Zones in Africa. Just a brief mention of some that could encourage Chinese investors to set up shop in Special Economic Zones in Africa, in order to export goods to lucrative markets under incentives and trade preferences offered by these other countries and regions to African countries and regions. 168 B. ROBINSON Table 6.15 Pleasant lifestyle offered in countries and their zones Country and/or zone Pleasant lifestyle Gabon NKOK SEZ SEZ conceptualised to offer a combined Work-Life-Play environment Political stability, personal safety and hospitable people The idyllic island lifestyle is on offer with luxurious residential estates South African offers a modern lifestyle with numerous tourist attractions Ghana (Tema Export Processing Zone and others) Mauritius Freeport South Africa The United States enacted the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 as an intervention to support development in subSaharan Africa by providing duty-free enhanced access to US markets. The list of Africa countries that are AGOA Beneficiaries is significant: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comores, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger. Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia (2021). The benefits cover over 6000 products that can be exported to the US (www.agoa.info provides the full list in their FAQ section). Reading through the list, some products stand out, such as footwear and textiles. Some Chinese investors have taken advantage of the Act to set up production facilities in Africa and export to the US. A prime example is the Huajian Shoe Factory in the Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia. Economic Partnership Agreements (2021) exist between the European Union and the African trade blocs of the East African Community, the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community. These agreements aim to remove trade barriers, with the long-term vision of a continent-to-continent free trade agreement between the European Union and Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It is in effect a duty-free, quota-free agreement providing preferential market access to the EU for African goods. In a 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 169 similar way to AGOA, it could similarly encourage Chinese investment in Africa in order to access the European market. The Generalized System of Preferences of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2021) aims to enable trade for developing nations. The preferences allow for duty-free and quotafree market access for lesser-developed countries’ exports. Countries that provide these preferences are Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the US. Again, this could provide Chinese investors in Africa opportunities to capitalise from their host countries preferential status. 6.9 Chinese Policy Towards Africa African host countries’ approach towards Special Economic Zones creates an enabling or constraining environment in which the zones operate—this will be evaluated in detail in Chapter 9. But it is worthwhile considering for a moment, the impact of Chinese policy towards Africa in general, and Special Economic Zones specifically, in encouraging Chinese investment. Sitting in the lounge of a successful entrepreneur’s home in the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade zone, I asked what made the gentleman invest. Via an interpreter (one of the Zone’s management team), he was emphatic in his response: It was Chinese Policy. A loyalist of the Communist Party of China, he was motivated to invest in Africa by China’s opening-up policy; he spoke of the One Belt One Road Policy; and the relationship China had with Nigeria. He was an astute business person, and his loyalty was tempered with an understanding that this policy would support his business venture. He also voiced a strong commitment to socio-economic development in Nigeria, with the hope that ‘Nigerians will be rich in their future… hopes to transmit skills to Nigerians, and for them to open (their own) factory in the future’. He wasn’t the only one to have invested due to Chinese patriotism and policy—numerous investors reflected on China’s opening-up policy and bilateral relations as a key determinant to their investment. Chinese multilateral policy towards Africa and bilateral policy towards certain African countries freed up financial resources for investment. The development finance institutions of the Export–Import Bank of China, 170 B. ROBINSON the China Development Bank and the Agricultural bank have after all provided financing for Special Economic Zones and Zones’ investors, while also partnering with the African Development Bank, which in turn, also facilitated financing. An example of this is in Zambia. The Zambian government had for many years had a positive relationship with China, and while the government initially supported the establishment of Special Economic Zones in the country, it lacked the finances and expertise to develop such zones. The Chinese government helped indirectly. The Chinese owned and managed Special Economic Zones in the country was a result of amongst other funding sources, the Export–Import Bank of China. There was also a sense of patriotism by the Chinese Zones operators, and they explained that China’s policy support made them believe that their investment was safe, and protected from host country ‘issues’. The Chinese government’s positive attention to Nigeria encouraged the establishment of the Lekki Free Trade Zone and facilitated investors putting their money on the table. A packaging company employee in the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone explained how the initial investment was motivated by the business owner visiting the region on other business, but coming from Guangdong Province in China, he thought it may be a good idea to invest in the Zone representing his province. The Eastern Industrial Park operators mentioned the value of representatives from both the Chinese and Ethiopian Government visiting the Zone. This was good ‘propaganda’/public relations for the zone, and indicated a commitment by the Chinese government to the zone. 6.10 Reflection on the Pillars and Protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones It would appear that each country and Special Economic Zone in Africa has adopted different attributes of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in terms of critical issues attracting investment by Chinese investors (some Pillars and Protocols are not included and they are not applicable). A summary of these are provided in Fig. 6.3. 6 • The Chinese and African political leadership support gave some assurance to Chinese investors • The perceived leadership support assisted in the marketing of Chinese zones in Africa Pillar 1: Leadership support Pillar 4: Location • Position of the SEZs was mostly selected for logistical access to international markets • Export policy reduced some zones access to domestic market • Other factors included access to mining, human and other resources Pillar 7: Infrastructure Protocol 2: Ease of business Protocol 5: Favourable investment climate Protocol 11: Export orientation CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … Pillar 2: Government support Pillar 5: People • Government support was either extensive providing a suitable incentive base, ease of business, and good infrastructure or, • Government support was lacking, and promises were broken • Zone investors preferred employing host country labour and made an effort to train labour • When skills were not available, Chines labour was brought into the host country 171 • Government policy ranged from clear SEZ legislation and socio-economic strategy Pillar 3: around SEZs, to lack of SEZ policy Government • Policy uncertainty was a Policy major problem for some investors Pillar 6: Integration • There was a lack of integration with cities and industries, although the preference for zones to be close to industrial areas, suggests some level of supply chain integration occurred • Infrastructure was provided either by the state or the SEZ operators • Infrastructure was generally very good • Utilities and services were sometimes provided by the SEZ due to governments’ inability to provide • The state in certain instances, reneged on promises to provide infrastructure • Some countries introduced a wide range of initiatives to facilitate ease of business • In-house one-stop shops and customs office were effective • Bureaucratic red-tape was generally a constraint to effective business • Various investment incentives were provided • Some countries and zones provided access to the domestic market, others disincentivised or disallowed such activity • Certain countries and zones provided assurance of foreign ownership, currency exchanges, and repatriation of profits • The SEZs mostly had a strong focus on exports • This was a potential constraint to investment for investors wishing to capitalise of the domestic African market Protocol 3: Preferential Policies Protocol 6: Modern Service Industry Protocol 12: Diversified industries • A wide range of financial incentives were offered for both foreign and local investors • These varied significantly between SEZs • Often SEZs had to invest in their own utilities and services which were expensive • Other SEZs operated within a modern service industry provided by the state Protocol 4: Innovation and learning Protocol 8: International cooperation • Investments in SEZs were generally low-skilled / semiskilled industries • While some SEZs had training centres or colleges to boost skills for SEZ investors, these were in the minority • China has driven international cooperation and encouraged the establishment of SEZs in Africa • SEZs ranged from being quite diversified to being industry focussed • Some SEZs through the incentives offered or their position, attracted particular industries Fig. 6.3 The pillars and protocols of the Chinese model of special economic zones that attract Chinese investment to African zones 172 B. ROBINSON References African Growth and Opportunity Act. 2021. AGOA.info. [Online]. Accessed from https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html. Economic Partnerships. 2021. European Commission. [Online]. Accessed from https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/eco nomic-partnerships/. Generalized System of Preferences. 2021. UNCTAD. [Online]. Accessed from: https://unctad.org/topic/trade-agreements/generalized-system-of-pre ferences. World Bank. 2020. Population Estimates and Projections. © World Bank. [Online]. Accessed from: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/popula tion-estimates-and-projections. Assessed 7 July 2021). License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). (http://creative-commons. org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/). Country and Zone Information References Cameroon: The National Office for Industrial Free Zones, Cameroon. Accessed from: http://www.winne.com/cameroon/to01.html. Djibouti: Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority. Accessed from: https://dpfza. gov.dj/facilities/Free-trade-area/djibouti-international-free-trade-zone. Gabon: NKOK SEZ. Gabon Special Economic Zones. Accessed from: https:// www.gsez.com/nkok-sez.php. Ghana: Ghana Free Zones Authority. Accessed from: https://gfzb.gov.gh/. Kenya: KenInvest. Accessed from: http://www.invest.go.ke/special-economiczones/. Madagascar: World Bank. 2020. Benchmarking Madagascar’s Free Zone Competitiveness. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://ope nknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33972 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. Mauritius: Mauritius Trade Easy. Accessed from: http://www.mauritiustrade. mu/en/trading-with-mauritius/mauritius-freeport. Mozambique: APIEX. Accessed from: http://invest.apiex.gov.mz/invest/our-ass istance/apiex/. Namibia: Consulate General of the Republic of Namibia. Accessed from: https:// namibiaconsulate.co.za/?page_id=165. Nigeria: Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission. Accessed from: https:// www.nipc.gov.ng/compendium/6-special-economic-zones/. Rwanda: Rwanda Development Board. Accessed from: https://rdb.rw/. Senegal: Senegal Ministry of Investment Promotion. Accessed from: https:// www.economie.gouv.sn/en/invest-senegal/economic-new-areas. 6 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT … 173 Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Investment & Export Promotions Agency. Accessed from: https://sliepa.org/investment/why-sierra-leone/investmentincentives/. South Africa: The South African Revenue Services. Accessed from: http://www. thedtic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/SEZ_Tax.pdf and https://www.coega. co.za/files/2020/Top_10-Reasons_to_Invest_at_Coega.pdf. Sudan: Sudanese Free Zones & Markets Co. Accessed from: https://www.sud anfreezone.com/en/areas/red-sea-free-zone/. Tanzania: Tanzania Revenue Authority and the United Republic of Tanzania Export Processing Zones Authority. Accessed from: https://www.tra.go. tz/index.php/103-tax-incentives/170-what-are-tax-incentives-under-the-zan zibar-investment-promotion-and-protection-act-2004 and https://www.epza. go.tz/. Togo: Togo Embassy in London, the Export Free Zone. Accessed from: https:// togoembassylondon.com/invest-in-togo/epz/. Uganda: Uganda Free Zones Authority. Accessed from: https://freezones. go.ug/. Zambia: Zambia Development Agency. Accessed from: https://www.zda. org.zm/ and https://www.zambiaembassy.org/page/incentives-for-investors. Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Investment Authority. Accessed from: https://investzim. com/education-2/. CHAPTER 7 Labour: Obstacles and Opportunities There are two underlying themes to this chapter, namely the impact of wage levels , productivity and labour legislation on attracting investment in African Special Economic Zones and their appeal from a Chinese investors perspective, and the opportunity that investment has on localised job creation and skills transfer in African countries. The chapter considers the state of employment, skills and productivity in Africa, detours into a discussion on labour economics, returning to the choice by Chinese investors of employing home or host country employees. It then reflects on some of the field research conducted in Ethiopian, Zambian, and Nigerian Special Economic Zones. Finally, a case study is presented on South Africa’s labour environment and the Coega Special Economic Zone with reflections on the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones. 7.1 The Scourge of Unemployment, Lack of Skills and Low Productivity in Africa Most African nations grapple with unemployment and a lack of relevant skills for a diversified and modern economy, which in turn contributes to low productivity. One of the key development objectives of Special Economic Zones is to counteract this problem by encouraging investors that employ local labour and invest in upgrading their skills set. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_7 175 176 B. ROBINSON So, how big is this problem? This section serves to highlight the employment problem in Africa while the case study on South Africa and the Coega Special Economic Zone later in this Chapter will provide some more in-depth analysis from a country perspective. 7.1.1 Unemployment in Africa Unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa is at 6.6%, which compares favourably to the world average at 6.5%. Yet, if individual countries are reviewed in Africa in terms of unemployment levels, stark differences between African unemployment levels are noted. Table 7.1 categorises Table 7.1 Unemployment levels in sub-Saharan Africa Unemployment less than 5% % Unemployment between 5 and 10% Benin Burundi Cameroon 2.5 Angola 0.8 Burkina Faso 3.6 Comoros Central African 4.3 Equatorial Republic Guinea Chad 2.3 Eritrea DRC Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Liberia Madagascar Mozambique Niger Rwanda Sierra Leone Tanzania Togo Uganda 4.5 3.5 2.8 4.5 4.3 3.2 3 3.3 1.9 3.4 0.7 1.4 4.6 2.2 4 2.4 The Gambia Malawi Mali Mauritius Nigeria Senegal Zimbabwe % Unemployment above 10–20% 7.7 Botswana 5 Cabo Verde 8.4 Republic of Congo 9.2 Mauritania 7.4 Sao Tome and Principe 9.6 Somalia 6 South Sudan 7.5 Sudan 7.1 Zambia 9 7.1 5.7 % Unemployment more than 20% % 17.7 Eswatini 13.4 Gabon 10.3 Lesotho 23.4 20.5 24.6 10.7 Namibia 20.4 13.9 South Africa 28.7 13.1 12.7 17.7 12.2 Source Adapted from The World Bank Unemployment Levels (2021b) 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 177 African countries in terms of unemployment levels at less than 5%, between 5 and 10%, above 10% and below 20%, and above 20%. It indicates that 21 countries have less than 5% unemployment which can be considered fair in terms of levels in developed nations such as Germany (4.3%), the United Kingdom (4.3%) and the Unites States (8.3%). 12 countries range between 5 and 10%, but concerningly, 9 countries are in the range above 10% and below 20%, and 5 countries breach the 20% unemployment level, with South Africa the highest at 28.7%. These figures probably do not reflect the full impact of the Coronavirus pandemic on unemployment (these unemployment figures are from The World Bank’s database dated 2020) (those countries without available data are excluded from the list). 7.1.2 Skills Levels in Africa Skills levels are difficult to determine in each country, but the percentage of the population acquiring primary, secondary and tertiary education are useful indicators of the level of education in the country, and it is likely that skills available would be related to the level of education within the country. Table 7.2 provides an overview of African countries’ level of education benchmarked against the world average, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. This data does not indicate the quality of the education provided, or the criteria for having achieved the level of education—these may differ significantly between countries and standards expected internationally. In addition, some of the data us quite dated, for instance, Zimbabwe’s latest available primary level of education statistic is from 2013. Reflecting on these World Bank Statistics it immediately becomes clear that sub-Saharan Africa is lagging behind the rest of the world on educational levels, and that the discrepancy becomes more acute as the level of education received increases from primary to secondary level, and the low proportion of the population that enrol for tertiary education. The result: Only 65% of adults (aged 15 and above) are literate in sub-Sahara Africa, and a very low proportion of the population ever have the opportunity to gain tertiary education. This significantly impacts the employability of labour for certain categories of work requiring functional literacy skills, and in most cases limits the skills transfer that can take place. 178 B. ROBINSON Table 7.2 Educational completion rates for sub-Saharan African countries Level of education Benchmarks Percentage categorisation of education African countries Primary education World (89.5%) Germany (101%) United Kingdom (101%) United States (100%) Less than 50% Angola (46%) Central African Republic (41%) Chad (41%) Equatorial Guinea (41%) South Sudan (27%) Benin (64%) Burkina Faso (65%) Burundi (59%) Cameroon (65%) Comoros (77%) DRC (70%) Republic of Congo (72%) Cote d’Ivoire (79%) Eritrea (60%) Ethiopia (54%) Gabon (71%) The Gambia (79%) Guinea (60%) Guinea-Bissau (65%) Liberia (61%) Madagascar (63%) Mali (50%) Mauritania (73%) Mozambique (55%) Niger (62%) Nigeria (74%) Senegal (61%) Sudan (62%) Tanzania (68%) Uganda (53%) 50–79% (continued) 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 179 Table 7.2 (continued) Level of education Lower secondary education Benchmarks World 76.1% (Africa 44.3%) Germany 83.7% United Kingdom 101% United States 103% Percentage categorisation of education African countries Above 80% Botswana (101%) Cabo Verde (87%) Eswatini (94%) Ghana (94%) Kenya (100%) Lesotho (86%) Malawi (80%) Mauritius (99%) Namibia (94%) Rwanda (97%) Sao Tome and Principe (84%) Seychelles (99%) Sierra Leone (83%) South Africa (90%) Togo (87%) Zambia (80%) Zimbabwe (98%) Angola (20%) Benin (45%) Burkina Faso (41%) Burundi (30%) Cameroon (47%) Central African Republic (10%) Chad (15%) Comoros (48%) Equatorial Guinea (24%) Ethiopia (30%) Gabon (22%) Guinea (35%) Guinea-Bissau (37%) Lesotho (47%) Liberia (44%) Madagascar (36%) Malawi (22%) Mali (30%) Mauritania (46%) Mozambique (24%) Niger (18%) Nigeria (47%) Rwanda (43%) Senegal (37%) South Sudan (18%) Tanzania (30%) Uganda (26%) Less than 50% (continued) 180 B. ROBINSON Table 7.2 (continued) Level of education Benchmarks Percentage categorisation of education African countries 50–79% Cabo Verde (68%) DRC (50%) Republic of Congo (50%) Cote d’Ivoire (53%) Eritrea (51%) Eswatini (54%) The Gambia (56%) Ghana (78%) Kenya (79%) Namibia (77%) Sao Tome and Principe (74%) Sierra Leone (72%) Sudan (58%) Togo (50%) Zambia (55%) Zimbabwe (71%) Botswana (98%) Mauritius (89%) Seychelles (110%) South Africa (80%) Angola (9%) Burkina Faso (7%) Burundi (4%) Chad (3%) DRC (7%) Cote d’Ivoire (9%) Eritrea (3%) Madagascar (5%) Mali (6%) Mauritania (6%) Mozambique (6%) Niger (4%) Rwanda (6%) Tanzania (3%) Benin (13%) Cameroon (14%) Republic of Congo (13%) Ghana (17%) Kenya (11%) Lesotho (10%) Sao Tome and Principe (13%) Senegal (13%) Sudan (16.9%) Zimbabwe (10%) 80% and above Gross enrolment ratio for tertiary education (for countries with data available 2015–2019) Germany 70% UK 61% USA 88% China 54% Sub-Saharan Africa 9% Less than 10% 10–20% (continued) 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 181 Table 7.2 (continued) Level of education Benchmarks Percentage categorisation of education African countries More than 20% Botswana (25%) Mauritius (41%) Namibia (23%) South Africa (24%) Source Adapted from The World Bank’s data on completion rates and tertiary education enrolment rates (2021a) 7.1.3 Wage Rates Wage rates are also much lower in Africa than most developed nations. If one considers the same benchmarked countries in the previous analysis, the United States has an annual national minimum wage of US$15,080; and the United Kingdom US$22,597. A snapshot of some African countries highlight the significant difference between the benchmarked countries, and between the African countries themselves, with the following minimum wage rates detailed: Swaziland US$848; Tanzania US$1593; Sudan US$1100; Nigeria US$1543; Lesotho US$664 (Minimum-Wag e.org—Minimum wage rates calculated in International Dollars). Wage rates for highly skilled positions, such as engineers and other professionals, are not readily available in Africa. It can be fairly assumed that the lack of professionals in some African countries would result in a premium being paid for such skills in these countries for local employees, or that such skills are sourced from other countries. These lower wage rates for unskilled labour should incentivise investment in Africa in industries requiring low-level, manual labour skills, yet act as a barrier to investment in industries requiring specialist skills that may be unavailable in the country, or require expatriate labour which would be significantly more expensive. 7.2 Economics 101: The Labour Market Reducing unemployment means creating employment. No rocket-science here. But how to generate sustainable employment remains a huge challenge in the development context. Perhaps revisiting our Economics 101 under-graduate module provides an understanding of the fundamentals 182 B. ROBINSON in this regard. My attempts at graphs are terribly simplified, which would have probably resulted in the failure of Economics 101 but are illustrated in such a manner to simplify the concepts. Creating economic activity, economic growth, does not imply that employment will be created. In Africa there are many examples of this where astounding GDP growth has created little employment and should shocks be experienced such as the collapse of the oil price that many African nations are dependent on for revenue, economic growth plummets in tandem. To ensure economic growth generates employment, certain structural changes are sometimes prerequisites. Simply put, there may be a need for a different type of economic activity, and there may be a need for a shift in the locality of this economic activity. For instance, shifting workers from subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture; from agriculture into manufacturing and services; from rural to urban areas; from informal employment to wage employment in larger companies; from low-productivity into high-productivity industries. This is a dynamic process where workers move voluntarily from one to the other—from an activity of high supply to one of high demand, thus reducing supply where there is too much of it. For instance, supply of labour in rural areas is reduced when urbanisation occurs, making it more feasible to shift rural dwellers from subsistence agriculture to small scale commercial farming (Fig. 7.1). Fig. 7.1 Labour supply in rural areas during urbanisation 100 Labour supply in rural areas 0 MigraƟon of labour from rural to urban areas 100 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES Urban labour supply 1000 Fig. 7.2 Labour supply and demand in urban areas 183 Labour demand and 500 supply in urban areas Urban labour demand 100 0 900 New labour entrants from rural areas The are many underlying assumptions and conditions to this happening, such as workers being mobile, the cost of mobility, constant working conditions and constant wages. There are some serious shortcomings to the above example: will the reduction in supply of labour naturally lead to economically sustainable farming activity, will there be employment opportunities in urban areas, or will rapid urbanisation create an oversupply of labour in cities—an all too frequent experience in many African cities (Fig. 7.2)? For these types of structural changes to occur, there are other important contributors to the process of change in labour markets—namely skills have got to be enhanced or different skills learnt for the new job requirements, and productivity has to increase with the acquisition of these skills. Labour must learn how to use new equipment and produce new goods, become more technically astute, and work within changing management regimes. One of the inhibitors to structural change, especially around technical and supervisory positions, is lack of education, especially numeracy and language competencies. These take many years to develop and are normally the function of suitable primary and secondary education. This has to happen quickly to support the incremental migration of the workforce geographically and sectorally. 184 B. ROBINSON 7.3 The Decision: Employ Chinese or African Labour? In some of the Special Economic Zones visited, management of the zones highlighted a natural outcome of skills development that left investors feeling frustrated. In the Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia, the vast majority of new employees were unskilled. Manufacturers would invest time, effort and cost in training them—there was an opportunity cost of supervisory employees training others rather than being productive themselves. At the end of the training, these employees were semi-skilled, and their productivity greatly improved (Fig. 7.3). This semi-skilled labour was in great demand by companies in the Special Economic Zones. Even if the companies were operating in different sectors, semi-skilled labour was relatively transferable between companies. A culture of ‘poaching’ semi-skilled labour began occurring—a classic free-rider problem with the firm ‘poaching’ the employee benefitting from the initial firm’s investment without any of their own investment. This was achieved through offering higher wages than the company that provided the training was paying—a natural accurence illustrated in Fig. 7.4. There was little hesitation from the employees, who would quickly opt for moving to companies that paid more. Competition for semi-skilled labour became rife and wages rapidly increased. This led to much disenchantment by the Chinese companies who had initially invested in the training, and they became hesitant to invest in training more unskilled labour. A classic ‘Catch 22’. The Zone operators were 1000 units Fig. 7.3 Skills training and productivity ProducƟvity in Units 0 $100 Cost of training 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 185 1000 units Fig. 7.4 Productivity and wage rates ProducƟvity in Units due to training 0 $100 Wage rates as producƟvity improved considering ways to manage the situation through introducing wage ceilings or restricting movement between the companies, although these were preliminary in nature. While the wage levels hadn’t risen enough for the following conjecture, it is worthwhile thinking about the competitive environment being a disincentive to training unskilled local employees in the long run: As wages rise, firms may be tempted to source labour from outside the immediate Zone’s community in other regions and countries, perhaps even to the extent of employing Chinese labour. Doing this would diminish the benefits of both skills transfer and job creation for local communities. At this point it is worthwhile turning this conjecture around—how does the investment in skills of local labour, and the resultant increase in wages, impact the substitution effect of replacing Chinese employees with local employees? This is an important question as often the accusation is made that Chinese companies prefer to employ Chinese labour due to their skills and low wages, the result of which is that there is no incentive to train and employ local labour except in unskilled positions. Professor Xiaoyang Tang (Tang 2010) who has been referred to before in this book, provides a valuable insight in this regard. Tang argues that there is indeed an incentive to bring Chinese workers to work in Chinese companies in Africa when there are no skills available. But and this is an important BUT, there is also a weighty argument for Chinese firms to do this only during the initial stages of investment. It makes sense for Chinese 186 B. ROBINSON companies to train unskilled labour in order for them to upskill themselves into semi-skilled and skilled positions. As skills improve, so does productivity, until a point is reached where the local worker contributes as much as the Chinese worker does to the profit, hopefully even more. By employing the semi-skilled or skilled local African worker, the Chinese company no longer needs to fork out all the costs of relocating and housing the Chinese worker (also noting that wages in China continue to rise). So even though the local worker may not be at the same productivity level, the profitability is the same or more. Tang therefore makes a strong case that Chinese companies will prefer to localise their labour in Africa in time, and he provides some examples of how this has happened in especially the DRC. Whether this argument holds true for highly skilled, technical and managerial staff is questionable. The costs to educate, sometimes through tertiary education, may be too much of a barrier due to the time and cost the Chinese firm would incur. While there may be a few individuals who possess the expertise needed, this is often in short supply and very expensive in Africa, in which case Chinese companies may still wish to bring such skilled workers from China. 7.4 Perspectives on Labour in Africa by Chinese Investors in Special Economic Zones While the economics behind employing local versus Chinese labour has been explained, at this point it is worthwhile reflecting of the perspectives of Chinese investors on labour in Africa. 7.4.1 Wage Rates, Education and Skills, and Productivity As wage rates have been rising rapidly in China as development has taken place, it makes sense for certain Chinese labour-intensive Chinese businesses to shift production to countries with cheaper labour and employ local labour. In the Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia, a simple example was given of a certain category of worker earning 5000 Chinese Yuan, but in Ethiopia, it would be less than 500 Chinese Yuan. This was similar in Nigeria and Zambia with a significant difference in wage levels of unskilled and semi-skilled labour between Nigerians, Zambians and Chinese. Even graduates, such as those in Zambia, earned a relatively low 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 187 salary—in this case US$200 was the example given. This made it affordable for a ceramic factory in Ogun-Guangdong zone to employ 2000 workers for their labour intensive, but relatively lower-skilled, factory. Interestingly, the decision to invest in Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone rather than the Lekki Free Trade Zone, both in Nigeria, was motivated by the relatively cheaper wages in the Ogun state, which was more rural that the Lekki Free Trade Zone. Wages did tend to be higher in the Zones than surrounding areas, regionally or nationally. In the Chambishi Multi Facility Zone, labour negotiations resulted in wages being above the minimum wage. Investors in the Eastern Industrial Park, who aimed to attract efficient Ethiopian staff and to retain their staff, offered the financial incentive of higher wages. The higher wage rate was justified due to the individuals’ contribution to productivity—a reflection of the economics detailed previously. As mentioned before, many companies provided extensive training, and as skills improved, so did the wages of these Ethiopian employees in an effort by companies within the Zone to retain their semi-skilled employees. This was especially necessary as companies that did not train employees often ‘poached’ semi-skilled employees by offering better wages—a bone of contention in the Zone. In the Eastern Industrial Park, new companies would recruit staff through either the Zone’s labour office, or simply go to the main gate. Most of these new employees were unskilled labour and they fulfilled unskilled labour requirements for companies. Providing some form of training assisted in filling the gap for semi-skilled labour requirements. For higher skilled employees, recruitment was via the colleges. However, the problem that the zones investors experienced, was that most of these new recruits had no practical skills—this was different to their experience in China where students would normally spend a year gaining practical experience through some kind of apprenticeship before entering the workforce. This is turn pushed up wages for skilled workers and they were in short supply. A pharmaceutical company representative in the Eastern Industrial Park explained that they wanted to train local people to replace the Chinese, but that this was difficult to achieve when it came to specialised skills they required. In Nigeria, the sense was that Nigerians were in general well educated, and a good source of labour for the Zones’ requirements. Yet, investors in the Special Economic Zones visited still found there to be a lack of specialised skills. This restricted the type of industries that were suitable 188 B. ROBINSON for the zone, and as mentioned previously, most companies tended to be assembly type production facilities, rather than high-tech type companies. And this reduces the opportunity for this important aspect of skills transfer. On the other hand, the view of Chinese investors in Zambia was that the general population was educated enough to benefit from advanced skills training. The Lekki Free Trade Zone were considering the establishment of a training institute to address this skills shortage in their current facilities and thus contribute to skills development, and in turn, encourage more advanced technological industries to invest in the zone. The Chambishi Multi Facility Economic Zone had established the Sino-Zam Vocational College of Science and Technology which supported the development of technical skills in the mining sector. Some companies were addressing the shortage of skills and the lack of suitable training facilities in Nigeria with sending staff to China to acquire the requisite skills. There was also an ulterior motive—it was an opportunity for Nigerians to learn Chinese and address some of the language barriers experienced in managing the businesses. This could perhaps even reduce the culture shock sometimes experienced by Chinese investors thanks to better communication between the Chinese and the Nigerian work force. It is a generally held misconception that Chinese companies in Africa just want to employ Chinese, and this discussion hopefully illustrated the opposite. ‘It just doesn’t make sense to employ Chinese… salaries are 2–3 times higher for Chinese labour, plus the Visa, plus the tickets and accommodation… localisation is very important’ explained one investor from the Ogun-Guangdong zone in Nigeria. The quality of Chinese labour that would be prepared to work in Nigeria was a problem mentioned by another investor: ‘difficult to get good Chinese staff to come to Nigeria… family hears about bombs in Nigeria… many of the [Chinese] staff are not good enough’, besides, he believed that Nigerians could sometimes do a better job, citing a Nigerian machine operator that was better than his Chinese counterpart. A different investor in the same zone employed only 9 Chinese, but 300 Nigerians, some of which were in management positions. Employing locals in executive positions also occurred, such as was found in the zone operating companies in Nigeria and Zambia. Most investors did confirm, however, that Chinese employees were often employed in critical positions although the long-term view was that they needed to change this. These examples confirm Chinese Zone investors 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 189 often prefer employing local labour and upskilling them when possible, rather than employing Chinese labour. 7.4.2 Labour Legislation and Unions Labour legislation, labour standards, unionisation and volatility were all deemed more restrictive and pronounced in the Zones and the respective countries, than what was perceived to be the case in China. ‘We lost three cases recently in court’, one investor recalled. ‘Can’t dismiss easily—we have to have three witnesses; we have to have CCTV’ as he explained the steps necessary and onus of proof to dismiss an employee for misconduct and ‘even with proof, can’t fire’. He described the one case as way of example. An employee had stolen a forklift, and in the process, broke his arm. He then proceeded to sue the investor and won the case. Labour legislation and the influence this had on productivity was sometimes difficult for Chinese investors to understand. ‘They do everything to follow Nigeria law… no one in China only works 8-hours, in Nigeria they can only work 8-hours… in China, not about hours, about how much you produce’ complained one investor. Another investor in Nigeria concurred saying that the Nigerians thought and worked differently to the Chinese, and Chinese managers often pushed them to work hard and fast, which ‘led to lots of arguments’. Unions were discouraged or disallowed in many cases. While freedom of association and union membership was mostly allowed or protected by the host country, Zone operators sometimes refused to abide to these regulations or allow requests for trade union activity within the zone. One requirement in a Zone visited was government’s stipulation that the zone has an office for a labour union representative. This was flat-out refused by the operators. When trade unions were present in Zones, they did influence wages through wage negotiations, although the degree of influence was limited. The Chambishi Multi-Facility Zone explained that even with the increase in wages of between 6 and 7% per annum, the Zambian Kwacha was losing value in real terms due to inflation, and thus didn’t impact their operating costs to any significant level. Strikes were not much of an issue in the Zones I visited. The Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Park was the only one who had experienced a short wild-cat strike that seemed to have been stoked by misinformation. 190 B. ROBINSON 7.5 Case Study: South Africa’s Labour Environment and Job Creation in Its Special Economic Zones South Africa is Africa’s most industrialised nation yet continues to grapple with poor economic growth (Fig. 7.5) with real GDP only growing at an estimated 0.7% in 2019. The country’s global competitiveness ranking has declined sharply to 67 of 140 countries in 2018 from a previous ranking of 47 two years prior, mainly due to skills shortages, health sector challenges, weak domestic product competition, and limited information and communication technology adoption. The budget is under pressure with a high public sector wage bill, high costs of bailing-out state-owned enterprises, and various costly social programmes (African Development Bank 2020). South Africa’s sovereign credit rating has been downgraded to junk status by various global rating agencies in 2019 and 2020: S&P Global Ratings is at BB− the third tier of non-investment grade; Moody’s is at sub-investment grade Ba1 with a negative outlook; and Fitch at BB+− a result of which South African bonds were excluded from the Fig. 7.5 South Africa’s GDP growth (annual %) (The World Bank 2020) 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 191 FTSE World Government Bond Index. Business confidence has been negative for over a decade reflecting a pessimistic view towards investment in the face of unsatisfactory economic conditions (Industrial Policy Action Plan 2018). The South African government has initiated a wide range of interventions to address these problems, a key one of which is the initiation of numerous Special Economic Zones in the country. Yet the Zones have failed to make much of an impact for the country. This case study will provide an overview of South Africa’s socioeconomic position, the introduction and implementation of Special Economic Zones as a strategic economic policy, and then critically analyse the country’s labour legislation and costs and the current impact and potential future impact this has on investments in South Africa’s flagship Special Economic Zone—the Coega Special Economic Zone. 7.5.1 South Africa: High Unemployment, Limited Skills, Low Productivity and High Inequality The Conversation (www.theconversation.com) is a valuable web-resource for those interested in media accounts of Africa, and well worth subscribing to. One recent article written by Melinda Du Toit (2020) depicts the plight of those unemployed in South Africa based on research while working on community projects in Orange Farm and Boipatong, both of which are characterised by extreme poverty and unemployment. The various participants describe unemployment as follows: “a huge garbage heap filled with bad things”, “life is over”, “danger and death”, “a man-made grave”, “a monster”, and “a black heart full of sorrow and pain; the heart is broken, angry, sore and sad”. Employment levels in South Africa are extremely low, and while government over the years has continually emphasised the need to create and sustain employment, policies have had limited impact. The problem is exacerbated by a population that continues to increase and unemployment is the burden of the younger generation. Statistics from Stats SA ((2) 2020) indicates very little change yearon-year between 2018 and 2019, and from a manufacturing perspective, jobs were actually contracting (Table 7.3). In terms of full-time employees over the same period, there was a decrease of employment of 0.2% overall, 192 B. ROBINSON Table 7.3 Employment by industry in thousands (Stats SA (2) 2020) Industry Mining Manufacturing Electricity Construction Trade Transport Business services Community services Total Dec 2018 Sept 2018 Dec 2019 Q/Q change Q/Q change % Y/Y change Y/Y change % 453 1233 62 611 2280 498 2347 463 1213 61 592 2267 497 2336 448 1209 61 575 2306 495 2348 −15 −4 0 −17 39 −2 12 −3.2 −0.3 0 −2.9 1.7 −0.4 0.5 −5 −24 −1 −36 26 −3 1 −1.1 −1.9 −1.6 −5.9 1.1 −0.6 0 2711 2768 2771 3 0.1 60 2.2 10,195 10,197 10,213 16 0.2 18 0.2 with manufacturing having declined by −1.6%. Part-time employees in the manufacturing sector declined by −6.2%. Unemployment for quarter 4 of 2019 was at a dismal level of 29.1%. The composition of the population and workforce is worthwhile evaluating for a better understanding of the situation and the disparities and inequities in unemployment and skills (Table 7.4). The sectors that employ the largest share of workers is the Community, Social and Personal Services Sector (22.3%) followed by Wholesale and Retail Trade Sector (20.1%) and the Financial Intermediation, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Sector (14.9%). The manufacturing sector, instead of leading the way in generating employment lagged behind, in actual fact, people employed in the manufacturing sector declined by 3.1% (56,809 workers) for the period 2010 to 2017! (Department of Higher Education and Training 2019). There was an increase in elementary occupations (386,000), and service and sales workers (155,000), and craft and related trade works (114,000). Yet employment of technicians (−82,000), clerks (−11,000) and skilled agricultural workers (−8000) all decreased for this period. This suggests a move towards a service orientated economy on the one hand, and a low-skilled workers economy on the other. In terms of educational levels, there was an increase in the employment of high-skilled workers in managerial positions from 29.2% in 2010 to 42.2% in 2017 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 193 Table 7.4 Characteristics of the South African labour market in 2017 Population demographics Race: 80.8% Black; 8.6% Coloureds; 8% Whites; 2.6% Indians/Asians Age: Two-thirds of the population under the age of 35 years with one-third aged younger than 15 years Education 20 years and older: 13.9% had some post-school education or tertiary qualification 20 years and older: 43.6% had grade 12 20 years and older: 13.7% regarded as illiterate 53.8% of those employed held Matriculation certificates (grade 12) 21.3% of those employed had tertiary education Proportion of the employed with higher education qualifications increased by 24.5% from 1.2 million in 2010 to about 1.5 million in 2017 About 2 million workers only had primary/lower education Educational enrolments Enrolments in Higher Educational Institutions increased by 9.3% from 892,936 in 2010 to 975,837 in 2016 The share of these enrolments in Technical and Vocational Educational and Training (TVET) college enrolments increased by 13.4 percentage points from 28.6% in 2010 to 42% in 2016 Enrolments in Science, Engineering and Technology increased from 28.1% in 2010 to 30.3% in 2016, while humanities increased from 40.6 to 42.6%; the share of enrolments for Business, Economics and Management decreased from 31.2 to 27.1% Enrolments in the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) increased with the total number of learnership registrations increasing by 105.7% from 49,309 in 2010 to 101,447 in 2016 Skills programme registrations increased by 105.8% from 63,659 in 2010 to 131,017 in 2016 Artisanal programmes enrolments tripled from 9316 in 2010 to 30,817 in 2016 Completion rates for learnerships increased from 69% in 2010 to 57% in 2016 Completion rate for artisanal learning programmes improved by 32 percentage points from 37% in 2010 to 69% in 2016 Unemployment amongst the various population race groups 75% of the working age population are black 90% of unemployed persons are black 21.8% of coloureds were unemployed 10.1% of Indians/Asians were unemployed 7.1% of whites were unemployed (continued) 194 B. ROBINSON Table 7.4 (continued) Youth (15–24 and 25–34 years of age) unemployment 3.2 Million (31.1%) of 10.3 million young people aged between 15 and 24 were unemployed and not in some form of educational or training facility (Not in employment, education and training (NEET)) This was an increase of 1.4 percentage points from the previous year (both periods were quarter 4) Share of unemployed people aged 15–24 years decreased by 5 percentage points from 69.1% in 2010 to 64.1% in 2017 The share of unemployed aged 25–34 years was reasonably constant at 37.9% 64.4% of unemployed youth with less than a matriculation certificate were young people aged 15–19 years, 62.6% aged 30–34, 57% aged 25–29 years, and 53.7% aged 30–34 years of age Unemployed youth with tertiary education was 46.3% aged between 20 and 25 years, 43% aged 25–29 years Of those employed, 57.5% had matriculation (Grade 12) certificates, 19.3% had tertiary education qualifications Of those employed, 59.9% of those aged 15–19 years had less than a matriculation certificate, followed by 42.9% aged 20–24 years of age, 41.1% aged 25–29 years, and 42.6% aged 30–34 years Gender 51% of the population are females Gender disparities remain predominant 44% of employed were female NEET rates for females was higher than that of males, with 33.3% compared to their male counterparts with 26.2% (2017 quarter 4) Qualification mismatch About 32% share of workers are mismatched by their field field-of-study Period of unemployment In the 4th quarter of 2018, 6.1 million South Africans were unemployed, of these 4.4 million were unemployed for a year or longer Proportion of long-term employment increased by 9.3% from 61.8% in 2008 to 71.1% in 2018 (4th quarters) Migration of labour The issuance of work permits to foreign labour had declined from 28,266 permits in 2013 to 17,969 permits in 2015 In 2015 most temporary residence permits were given to nationals from Nigeria (13.8%), Zimbabwe (13.1%), India (9.5%), Bangladesh (6.8%) and Pakistan (6.8%) Permits may not reflect the reality of immigrants who live and work in the country illegally or otherwise Source Adapted from the Skills Supply and Demand in South Africa Report (Department of Higher Education and Training 2019) 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 195 and professional positions from 61.2% in 2010 to 87.5% in 2017. Technicians and associated professionals with a high level of education increased from 31.2% in 2010 to 45% in 2017. This indicated strong demand for well-educated employees in positions requiring managerial, professional and technical/engineering skills (Department of Higher Education and Training 2019). There seemed to be some level of a skills mismatch and shortages of certain critical skills profiles and knowledge: There was a shortage of professionals, although there was an indication of an oversupply of managers in the industrial sector. There was a shortage of employees in certain industrial sectors: safety and security; agricultural; and mining sector (Department of Higher Education and Training 2019). In terms of skills profile, shortages existed in complex problem and solving skills; social skills; active learning; reading comprehension; learning strategies; and writing. Knowledge shortages were strongest for computers and electronics; administration and management; and clerical knowledge. While shortages existed, they were less critical for more technical and manual skills. The report concluded that 32% of workers in South Africa are mismatched by field of study (Department of Higher Education and Training 2019). These ‘characteristics’ are concerning. It is clear that there is huge amount of the youth who are unemployed; women are more likely to be unemployed; blacks find it more difficult to find employment; and many of those with tertiary education still struggle for employment. While there had been commendable improvements in qualifications and enrolments in job related qualifications, these haven’t made a significant impact on employment levels. This raises two concerns: the relevance and quality of the qualifications may not be suitable for jobs that are available; and/or there simply aren’t enough jobs being created to absorb those with qualifications. While government has tried to incentivise youth employment, such as the introduction of the Employment Tax Incentive Act which reduces the cost of hiring young people, this has had limited success. Youth unemployment is aggravated by the mismatch between skills supplied and skills demanded. While South Africa has numerous colleges and universities, many of these are churning out graduates without skills required in the workplace. Marumo and Sebolaaneng (2019) highlight the trap this poses for youth who cannot find employment after completing their higher education, and that the longer they stay unemployed, the 196 B. ROBINSON more disengaged they become with the job market. Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) colleges are seen as a solution to providing skills for employment. Currently there are about 50 such colleges operating from 364 campuses throughout the country, but students (and their parents) still seem to be biased towards the more prestigious universities than colleges. Marumo and Sebolaaneng recommend that there needs to be closer ties between higher education and secondary schools to provide career guidance for scholars that will assist them in finding work after graduating. It was also recommended that TVET colleges and universities shift from a theoretical focus toward providing practical skills that are relevant and immediately applicable to the job market. South Africa has also experienced the so-called ‘Brain-Drain’ of critical skills. South Africans with sought after skills often succumb to the attractiveness of employment outside of the country. Higher wages, better social security benefits and safety in the face of violent crime in South Africa is one side of the coin. The other is the perception that South Africa does not offer employment opportunities and job security in the face of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) policies of the country to address historic racial inequalities—this will receive attention later in the chapter. An initial report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown (Stats SA 2020) indicated that 8.1% of respondents who had been employed had lost their jobs and 1.4% became unemployed in approximately the first month of the lockdown. Those who had lost their jobs indicated that this was the result of their place of work closing down. The percentage of participants who reported that they earned no income rose from 5.2 to 15.4% by the sixth week of the lockdown. South Africa is regarded as a country with one of the most severe lockdowns, and at the time of writing this Chapter, few concessions had been made. The long terms effects of the lockdown and the COVID-19 cost to the economy is likely to be extensive even in the face of numerous stimulus packages offered by the South African Government. It is likely that jobs will be obliterated during this period. Productivity in South Africa is a problem. The benefits of a productive work-force are quite obvious and have direct benefits for the economy: there is a strong correlation between national productivity and levels of unemployment, crime, poverty, education and living standards; the more productive an economy, the more competitive it will be globally 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 197 which in turn reduces unemployment; and productivity is an indicator for lucrative investment opportunities and attracts funds for new jobcreation enterprises and the reorganisation of individuals within the workforce (Productivity SA 2020). Productivity SA confirm that while capital productivity grew to 1.3% in 2018 from 0.7 in 2017, labour was not performing nearly as well, where labour productivity declined further from the low of 0.4% in 2017. 7.5.2 Policies and Institutions Supporting Industrialisation and Special Economic Zones South Africa has always acknowledged the importance of industrial development to facilitate growth and development. This section details some of the recent policies towards industrialisation and SEZs. 7.5.2.1 Pre-2010 Policy Zimmerman (2010: 35–64) provides a useful overview of post-Apartheid economic policy from 1994 to 2010. The end of Apartheid and the dawn of democracy in South Africa heralded a new era of promise for South Africa, yet the country required significant economic growth in order to finance the eradication of prevalent social inequalities and problems the country faced. The period up to 2010 recorded a number of policy interventions such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP); the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Programme of 1996; Inflation Targeting Initiatives; the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003; and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA). Industrial policies included the Industrial Development Zone Regulations of 2000 which allowed for the establishment and operation of the first Zones; the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) of 2007; and the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) 2007 and IPAP II in 2010. The first Industrial Development Zone Regulations were followed by the Industrial Development Zone Programme Guidelines in 2008 to provide more detail for Zone operators. Most of these policy interventions had a disappointing impact on job creation, the reduction on inequality, and GDP growth. As Zimmerman explains, the policies were “at times at odds with one another or (did) not allow for coordinated efforts”. Special attention is now given to the Industrial Development Zone Policy introduced in 2008. 198 B. ROBINSON 7.5.2.2 Industrial Development Zones The Industrial Development Zone Programme was established by the Department of Trade and Industry through promulgations in terms of the Manufacturing Development Act. The Manufacturing Development Board took responsibility for managing applications and recommending approval, issuing grant operator permits and regulating activities of IDZ operators and tenants. The key objectives and rationale of the IDZ Programme was as follows (Industrial Development Zone [IDZ] Programme Guidelines [2008: 5– 6]): • Position South African-based manufacturing industries to meet the challenges of globalisation, • Attract advanced foreign production and technology methods in order to gain experience in global manufacturing and production networks through attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), • Develop linkages between local and international-based industries, • Provide world class infrastructure and proximity to international ports to offer low cost and efficient logistics services, and • Provide services to facilitate overcoming administrative hurdles for investors securing permits required for their operations. The characteristics of an IDZ were listed as being a customs controlled area with dedicated South African Revenue Services (SARS) officials to support customs and VAT requirements; an industries and services area within the borders of the IDZ, and world class infrastructure linked to an international port of entry. The customs controlled area would streamline customs administration while providing the following benefits: duty rebates and VAT exemption on imports of production-related raw materials, including machinery and assets, to be used in production with the aim of exporting the finished goods; and VAT suspension under specific conditions for supplies procured in South Africa (the IDZ Programme Industrial Development Zone [IDZ] Programme Guidelines [2008: 6]). The criteria for the designation of an IDZ were as follows (8–10): 1. The Zone will facilitate the creation of an industrial complex having strategic economic advantage. 2. Provide the location for the establishment of strategic investments. 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 199 3. Enable the exploitation of resource-intensive industries. 4. Take advantage of existing industrial capacity, promote integration with local industry and increase value-added production. 5. Create employment and other economic and social benefits in the region in which it is located; and 6. Be consistent with any applicable national policies and law, as determined by appropriate environmental, economic and technical analyses. Even though the Industrial Development Zone Programme’s objectives were commendable, it became clear very quickly that they were not living up to their envisaged potential. Between 2002 and 2010 only 40 investors had operationalised in the three functioning IDZs with a combined investment of R11.8 Billion after the government had invested R5.5 Billion. Job creation was subdued with only 2800 jobs created in the then Coega IDZ, 1400 jobs in the East London IDZ, and 300 jobs in the Richards Bay IDZ (Nel and Rogerson 2013). A number of shortcomings of the IDZ Programme were identified by Nel and Rogerson (2013: 208): 1. The absence of special incentives for zones investors making them unattractive to local and international investors. 2. The lack of a unique value proposition in the existing IDZ programme. 3. The absence of clear guidance such as a comprehensive policy framework and strategic planning. 4. Weak governance arrangement and poor coordination of government agencies. 5. The emphasis in Zone planning on infrastructure whilst ignoring other critical support such as marketing, skills, or logistics. 6. The exclusive reliance on government ownership, management and funding with no private sector involvement. Zimmerman (2010: 100) suggested that the policy environment needed a fundamental re-think that included the following action: 200 B. ROBINSON • Re-evaluate the objectives of the IDZ programme and alter these if necessary; • Prepare an overview of the products and government offerings which are relevant and complementary to the IDZ Programme; • Remove or adapt the products or incentives which are no longer appropriate, or are at odds with the new IDZ Objectives; • Prepare a central repository of all IDZ related legislation, incentives, information, operating procedures and zone specific details; • Design and implement a mechanism that allows the private sector to more actively participate in the IDZ programme; • Establish a set of measurement or performance standards and metrics which can be used to gauge the process and performance of the South African IDZs; • Provide mechanisms for Local and Provincial government to be more actively involved in the marketing and operation of the IDZs, in order to coordinate their respective efforts and present a unified and coherent product. It was eventually acknowledged by the South African government that the Industrial Development Zones had not lived up to their expectation, mainly due to poor governance; insufficient incentives; poor stakeholder coordination; and lack of integrated planning. The programme was reviewed, and this led ultimately to the initiation of a new act—the Special Economic Zones Act of 2014. 7.5.2.3 Special Economic Zones Act The Special Economic Zones Act was promulgated in 2014 and served to take the initiative of the Industrial Development Zones to the next level. The Act was introduced as the country was trying to fulfil its electoral promises of mass job creation by President Jacob Zuma, with Special Economic Zones envisaged as one of the key drivers of industrialisation to accomplish this objective. The Act was formulated within the policy context of the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF), The Department of Trade and Industry’s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), the National Development Plan (NDP), and the Economic Development Department’s 2010 New Growth Path (NGP). The purpose of Special Economic Zones in terms of the Act were the following: 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 201 4. (1) A Special Economic Zone is an economic development tool to promote national economic growth and export by using support measures in order to attract targeted foreign and domestic investments and technology. (2) The purpose of establishing Special Economic Zones includes – (a) facilitating the creation of an industrial complex, having strategic national economic advantage for targeted investments and industries in the manufacturing sector and tradable services; (b) developing infrastructure required to support the development of targeted industrial activities; (c) attracting foreign and domestic direct investment; (d) providing the location for the establishment of targeted investments; (e) enabling the beneficiation of mineral and natural resources; (f) taking advantage of existing industrial and technological capacity, promoting integration with local industry and increasing value-added production; (g) promoting regional development; (h) creating decent work and other economic and social benefits in the region in which it is located, including the broadening of economic participation by promoting small, micro and medium enterprises and co-operatives, and promoting skills and technology transfer; and (i) the generation of new and innovative economic activities. (3) For the purpose of this section – (a) “regional development” means linkages to, or integration with, the host province’s growth strategies, local economic development of the host municipality and any other relevant cross-provincial economic initiatives; and (b) “targeted investment” includes investments in support of government’s economic and industrial development policies. The Special Economic Zones Act of 2014 also allows for different categories of Special Economic Zones including a free port; a free trade zone; an industrial development zone; and a sector development zone. 202 B. ROBINSON The performance of the Special Economic Zones has been moderate. An advertorial promoting investment in South African Special Economic Zones (South African Special Economic Zones Programme 2019), indicates that investments have steadily grown, with the growth between the first quarter of 2018–2019 and 2019–2020 of investors increasing from 110 to 122, and the investment value sitting at R19 Billion, while jobs for this period have increased from 13,466 to 15,737. Non-operational investors were estimated to be 61 with an investment value of R33.64 billion. These policies detailed have failed to generate the expect social and economic return envisaged and South Africa finds itself in a similar situation to that of a decade ago. Poor leadership under President Jacob Zuma and incompetent governance and corruption have also weighed heavily on the country’s ability to achieve socio-economic growth. So, what does the future hold? Some reflection on policy towards industrialisation and Special Economic Zones is useful at this juncture. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) 2018/19–2020/21 lists the key constraints to industrial policy as lack of policy coherence and programme alignment; concentration of ownership and control; high private sector input costs; security of electricity supply; high port tariffs; transport and logistics constraints; customs irregularities; and the structure of the economy is ill-suited to creating employment at appropriate skills levels. The IPAP then continues to describe ‘transversal’ focus areas for the period 2018/19–2020/21. These include a focus on public procurement; developmental trade policy, innovation and technology; industrial financing; and probably most importantly, Special Economic Zones. The IPAP specifically refers to China’s successful leveraging of Special Economic Zones to accomplish the manufacturing capacity it now has which has enabled it to be a highly-competitive net exporter of valueadded goods, and in the process, generated immense employment. There are scant specifics in the IPAP, which simply refers to the current work packages being centred on the designation of new SEZs; compliance with legislation; investment promotion and marketing; infrastructure development; institutional development; capacity development and stakeholder management. The key action programmes listed are the designation of Special Economic Zones; institutional and capacity development; and developing a marketing plan for special economic zones. In terms of institutional and capacity development, the IPAP mentions a five-year 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 203 agreement that has been entered into with China which will provide a forum for Chinese officials to share their experience on Zones in order to equip policy-makers, development practitioners and operators with the planning, technical, managerial and operational know-how. This could be a valuable intervention—learning about, and hopefully applying, some of the critical success factors embedded in the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones. There is a concern though for South Africa’s future efforts to industrialise. The term ‘radical economic transformation’ has become populist rhetoric by many a politician, and citizens disheartened by years of poor governance and deteriorating well-being have latched onto the term in the hope that the policy will provide a quick-fix to the country’s woes. The Industrial Policy Action Plan 2018/19–2020/21 refers precisely to this term, and without admitting the contribution poor governance has had on industrialisation, it suggest that the critical constraint to the IPAP programme over the previous 10 years has been a lack of transformation and hence stipulates the objective of “transforming the racially skewed ownership, management and employment profile of the economy”: Defined as radical economic transformation, the key thrust of this economic reorientation is to start tackling the long-standing structural fault-lines in the economy head-on – systematically eliminating race-based economic ownership and control and finding effective instruments to attach South Africa’s catastrophic problems of unemployment, poverty and inequality – which not only constitute a scourge on society but also act as a critical barrier to growth. (2018: 6) Without negating the absolute imperative to remove racial inequalities and resultant structural inefficiencies, I argue in the next section, that policies in their current format and legislation and political paralysis are hampering the success of Special Economic Zones and discouraging investment—thus detracting from the success of industrial policies and their ultimate contribution to social well-being in South Africa. 7.5.3 Organised Labour and Politics—A Volatile Combination The origin of South African trade unions date to as far back as the early 1900s as they grew in tandem with the emerging mining sector. From early on, unions also played an important role in the country’s popular 204 B. ROBINSON resistance against racial segregation, job reservation and Apartheid. Since then, unions have continued to wield huge influence over the labour market, and politics in general. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) of today comprises an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)—COSATU therefore had a very direct impact on policy on employment and organised labour. While COSATU is firmly entrenched in political leadership, other trade unions continue to vie for power, and many have their own political agenda. For instance, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political party grew quickly after the Marikana platinum mine massacre of 2012 in which 17 people were killed by the South African Security Forces—the party’s leader, Julius Malema, condemned the ANC and COSATU affiliated National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) for the event. COSATU experienced severe reputational damage and many workers changed alliances to the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). This union is now the largest union of the trade union federation National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). The country has a number of trade unions catering for different industries, and in 2016 the Department of Labour listed 187 registered trade unions. Strike action in the country is common and growing. Figure 7.6 reflects how the number of work stoppages have increased from 88 in 2014 to 165 in 2018. Figure 7.7 depicts the work stoppages per industry, where it is noted that manufacturing has the second highest number of work stoppages. The number of working days lost between 2015 and 2018 continues to increase from 903,921 in 2015 to 1 158,945 in 2018—Fig. 7.8 (the high number in 2014 was an outlier year due to particular long-term strike action in the mining industry). Many workers in the South African labour environment do not identify with COSATU and other large unions. COSATU comprises mostly (92%) permanent workers with fulltime contracts with two-thirds having skilled, supervisory, or professional positions, and thus is an “increasingly privileged segment of the workforce” (Paret and Runciman 2016). COSATU has also been accused of wide-scale corruption, damaging its legitimacy. Marginalised workers in temporary or casual forms of employment do not belong to unions. 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 205 Fig. 7.6 Trends in the number of work stoppages in South Africa, 2014–2018 (Department of Employment and Labour 2019: 2) This has contributed to a volatile labour situation in the country. Worker resistance “from below” has increased rapidly with collective action beyond unions or existing institutional frameworks. Between 2012 and 2014 about half of the strikes that occurred were ‘unprotected’ as they occurred outside of the procedures of the country’s Labour Relations Act. Non-unionised strike action increased from 16,396 working days lost between 2005 and 2008 to 116,255 days lost between 2009 and 2012 (Paret and Runciman 2016). Unions as well as marginalised workers remain important political agents today in democratic South Africa, and protests driven by union forces are not uncommon, not just for labour related issues, but for wider political ideals. In addition, communities have begun showing their frustration at the snails-pace of social development in the country with unpredictable protests. 7.5.3.1 A Restless Nation Sometimes closely related to labour and labour union activism, sometimes not, is the problem of community unrest in South Africa. Marcel Paret and Carin Runciman’s (2016) investigation of popular resistance in South Africa found that since 2009 a ‘protest wave’ has emerged, and a peak was reached in 2012 when there was on average one protest per 206 B. ROBINSON Fig. 7.7 Distribution of work stoppages by industry, 2014–2018 (Department of Employment and Labour 2019) day. They attribute some of the action to organised resistance against the governing ANC—organisations such as the Concerned Citizens Group, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Anti-Privatisation Forum, Landless People’s Movement, many of which adopted class-based political ideologies. Another study of the frequency of community protests (Alexander et al. 2018) use much stronger terminology—they describe the volatility as ‘turmoil’ and ‘rebellion’. They further explain that this definition is broader than service delivery protest which is popularly used to depict the inability of government to provide certain essential services, social services and infrastructure for a multitude of reasons. The definition excludes ‘labour-related’ and ‘crime-related’ unrest—labour related unrest has been dealt with to some extent in the previous section, while ‘crimerelated’ unrest is more ominous in nature where criminality is veiled 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 207 Fig. 7.8 Trends in working days lost in South Africa (Department of Employment and Labour 2019) behind these protest activities. They also distinguish between ‘order’ versus ‘disorder’ and ‘peaceful’ versus ‘violent’ protests, acknowledging that peaceful protests can sometimes be disorderly. Orderly protests are tolerated and often negotiated prior to the event. Violent protests are on the other hand evidenced by damage to property and injury to persons. Their findings suggest that there is a disquieting trend of a higher number of disruptive and violent community protests than orderly protests. The unsettling labour and community situation in South Africa and many other African countries is a major concern for potential foreign investors. Small scale disruptions could lead to work stoppages, violent protests could lead to damage of assets and products and even cause harm and death to investors and employees. For instance, Chinese employees have on a number of occasions borne the brunt of unrest and been harmed in violent clashes, and in some situations, lives have even been lost. 208 B. ROBINSON 7.5.4 Labour Legislation Post-Apartheid labour legislation was developed through a consultative process by the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC): The labour Relations Act of 1995 (LRA); the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA); The Employment Equity Act of 1998 (EEA); and the Skills Development Act of 1999 (SDA) are the result. At the heart of these laws was the objective of supporting South Africa as it reintegrated with the global economy after years of sanctions, and to address the country’s labour market inequalities and high unemployment. A rocky path followed with years of painful negotiations and revisions. The current legislation is severely criticised for being excessively restrictive on business, and as a result, impacts negatively on the propensity of job creation. South Africa ranks at 101 out of 141 in terms of the burden of government regulation in terms of The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. The Report details labour market competitiveness on a number of criteria, and South Africa scores poorly on most criteria, especially in the area of hiring and firing practices; cooperation in labour-employer relations; flexibility in wage determination; active labour market policies; and the ease of hiring foreign labour. The right to strike is protected in both the South African Constitution section 23 (2) (c) and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 section 64 (1). The right to strike is a fundamental feature of employees’ rights in a democracy, just as is the freedom of association, the freedom to join and organise trade unions, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of speech. The right to strike is an important element of collective bargaining, the threat of which encourages discourse between employers, their associations and employees and their unions. It is a valuable tool in correcting the power imbalance between employees and employers. So, while there is not a problem with the provisions on the right to strike in the Act, the problem arises when there are ‘illegal’ strikes, when violence occurs, or when damages are incurred. The Act does deal with unprotected strikes which do not follow certain procedures and where there is misconduct. In this case the employer can obtain an interdict against the employees and claim compensation for the loss suffered— they can also dismiss the employees involved. Trade unions are obliged to take reasonable steps to persuade employees not to engage in unlawful action or could find themselves liable. Therefore the Labour Relations 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 209 Act does seem to take a proactive stance in regard to mitigating violence described in previous sections, although this does not seem to be having the effect it should have, and violent labour protests are still a problem in South Africa even with legislative protection—Mthembu suggests the labour court needs additional powers to sanction and terminate violent strike action (Mthembu 2018). Policies, legislation and the labour market in South Africa seems to be constantly at odds as described in this section, and there are increasingly calls for labour market reform to encourage large-scale investment to facilitate job creation in the country. Until then, the current status quo in the country is likely to continue dampening job creation efforts in the country and weighs heavily on the ability of Special Economic Zones to attract investment. 7.5.5 Overview of Special Economic Zones in South Africa We now turn our attention to Special Economic Zones and consider their success and contribution to development priorities including job creation and skills transfer. South Africa has a number of Special Economic Zones, sometimes categorised in terms of their primary area of economic growth, such as trade or industrial development, with different regional development priorities. Their geographic location is depicted on Fig. 7.9. Richards Bay is strategically located near the Mozambican border, within easy access to the rest of East Africa, and is relatively close to the economic hub of Johannesburg. An excellent position for the purposebuilt Richards Bay IDZ. The zone has been earmarked for mineral storage and beneficiation, and general industrial development for export orientated growth. The East London IDZ, located in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality comprising the cities of East London, King William’s Town, and Bhisho the Eastern Cape provincial Capital, boasts good infrastructure, and a river port. The area has a high-level of unemployment, especially in the neighbouring rural areas of the ‘Wild Coast’, thus in need of job creation interventions. The IDZ is principally a specialist industrial park focussing on the automotive, agro-processing and aqua culture industries. Coega IDZ, Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth) East London IDZ Fig. 7.9 South African Special Economic Zones (Map data: Google Maps, AfriGIS) Saldanha Bay IDZ MaluƟ-A-Phofung SEZ, Harrismith OR Tambo SEZ, Johannesburg Musina / Makhado SEZ, Musina Dube TradePort, Durban Richards Bay IDZ 210 B. ROBINSON 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 211 Saldanha Bay IDZ is relatively new having been established in 2013 with a focus on oil and gas exploration and production industries operating in sub-Saharan Africa. It aims to attract engineering, logistical, repairs and maintenance, and fabrication industries, and is well situated just two hours from the city of Cape Town in the Western Cape. The Zone has 12 signed leases with a combined investment value of over R3 Billion (South African Special Economic Zones 2019). The Atlantis Special Economic Zone was a City of Cape Town initiative to create a ‘greentech’ manufacturing hub and seeks to capitalise on the city’s existing renewable energy and green technology sector. The Dube TradePort in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal was established as a catalyst for global trade as a portal between the province and the world. Its facilities include King Shaka International Airport, a cargo terminal, warehousing, offices, retail sector, hotels and agricultural area. It is conveniently located between the two biggest seaports in Southern African, namely Durban and Richards Bay, and is linked with South Africa through an extensive road and rail network. It has 35 operational investors with a value of R1.8 Billion and has created 3331 direct jobs. It has a pipeline of 36 investments with a value of R10.2 Billion. One of the more significant investors is MaraPhone which is expected to create 1500 jobs during a five-year period. The Dube TradeZone and Dube AgriZone are areas designated as industrial development zones, with the TradeZone focusing on manufacturing and value-addition in the automotive, electronics and fashion industries (South African Special Economic Zones 2019). The new Maloti-A Phofung Special Economic Zone is situated in the Province of the Free State, positioned halfway between the Port of Durban and the economic hub of Johannesburg and the Gauteng Province. It is a base for exporters facilitating logistics solutions for freight to and from the port. It is earmarked for general manufacturing and agro-processing as the province has a strong agricultural sector. The OR Tambo Industrial Development Zone is still in the development stage. Situated near the OR Tambo International Airport, it is envisaged to support growth of the beneficiation of precious metals and minerals and is export-oriented. The Musina/Makhado Special Economic Zone in the Limpopo Province currently comprises two locations, one of which focusses on the industrial cluster of light industry and agro-processing, the other on metallurgical and mineral beneficiation. A third cluster is planned for the 212 B. ROBINSON petrochemical industry. The position is strategically on the route between South Africa and Zimbabwe and offers proximity and access to the South African Development Community (SADC). The Coega Special Economic Zone is the largest of South Africa’s Special Economic Zones and will be evaluated in more detail below. The Zone is the flagship Special Economic Zone in South Africa, and in the financial year of 2018/2019 had 45 operational investors with a combined investment value of R11,579 billion (South African Special Economic Zones Programme 2019). It is based in one of the poorest provinces of the country with high unemployment rates, yet with the well-established infrastructure of neighbouring city of Port Elizabeth, the SEZ position is well situated regionally to potentially address this unemployment concern. The Coega Special Economic Zone (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality) and the East London IDZ (Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality) are considered key stakeholders of the Eastern Cape Province’s Department of Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Their role is encapsulated in the Eastern Cape Provincial Industrial Development Strategy of 2012. Sectors for development, many of which are in the Coega Special Economic Zone and East London IDZs, that have been earmarked by the Department include the chemical and petrochemical sector, capital goods sector, energy, green industry and carbon projects, a tooling cluster, and a strong automotive sector focus due to the existing auto-makers of Volkswagen and Mercedes Benz being situated in the province. The Coega Special Economic Zone has been successful in attracting some flagship investors from China, such as FAW and BAIC. Chinese investment has seen the endorsement by Chinese political figures. Former Ambassador Lin Songtian of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa visited the Coega Special Economic Zone in Port Elizbeth and the East London Industrial Development Zone, as well as the Premier of the Eastern Cape and Mayor of Port Elizabeth, on the 18th to 19th of September 2017. At the Coega Zone, he visited the production facilities of China’s FAW Group and BAIC Motors, and committed the Chinese Embassy to actively promoting Chinese investment in the zones (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa 2017). The Ambassador’s visit followed that of Former Vice President Li Yuanchao, the Vice President of the People’s Republic of China in 2016. 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 213 We can now turn our attention to an evaluation of the South African labour environment, and consider how the Special Economic Zones, with specific reference to the Coega Special Economic Zone, fares against the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones. 7.5.6 Evaluation of the South African Special Economic Zones Against the Pillars and Protocols of China’s Model of Special Economic Zones This evaluation considers both the external environment which is outside the direct control of South African Special Economic Zone operators and investors’ control and mostly a function of government intervention and support, and the Pillars and Protocols that the operators and investors are able to influence. It is not limited to the labour market, which has been the primary focus of the chapter, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of South African Zones (Fig. 7.10). There is dichotomy in these pillars of leadership support, government support and government policy (Fig. 7.10). One the one hand, the South African government has enacted legislation governing Zones and government policy has promoted the establishment of Special Economic Zones though billions of Rands worth of investment. The political will is there and there seems to be a good understanding of the contribution these Zones could have on socio-economic development. Fig. 7.10 Evaluation of Pillars 1, 2, and 3 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones: Leadership support, policital will, and government policy 214 B. ROBINSON On the other hand, planning of these zones was sometimes haphazard, and policies were not implemented in a coordinated manner. The lack of incentives provided for zone investors was a significant shortcoming, while the political might of trade unions within the government created a labour environment that constrained investment (Fig. 7.11). Position, position, position (Fig. 7.11). All the Zones in South Africa are positioned strategically. The Coega Special Economic Zone is situated in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, home to the 5th largest city in South Africa, Port Elizabeth, an industrial orientated city. That in itself provides investment opportunities. It is home to two ports, the Port of Port Elizabeth and the new deep-sea Port of Ngqura which is situated in the Zone itself. It has good connections to road and rail infrastructure linking the city to the rest of South Africa, and its two ports and city airport provide easy access to international markets. It is also a beautiful city with all the modern conveniences, which provide an enjoyable lifestyle for those relocating to the city as a result of investment in the Zone. Proximity to existing industrial nodes has also been considered in the location of zones. Graham Taylor of Coega Development Corporation, in his article ‘SEZs—Carpe Diem for Industrial Development’, suggests that success of SEZ programmes are a function of enabling investors Fig. 7.11 Evaluation of Pillar 4 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 215 to ‘pluck’ (as in Carpe Diem’s ‘to pluck the day’ meaning) opportunities for industrial development in geographic areas, rather than them attempting to capitalise on short-term windows of incentives provided by government in ‘fluid policy environments’ (2012: 119). Taylor mentions two such locality opportunities in existing industries for Coega investors: Automotive, agro-processing and logistics. Coega is perfectly situated in the country’s automotive heartland and lends itself to investments in this sector. Volkswagen Group South Africa was established in Uitenhage, an industrial town in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in 1946 and is today Germany’s largest investment in South Africa. It is also home to the manufacturer IZUZU and there are approximately 150 vehicle component manufacturers in the province. It made perfect sense for the Chinese automaker BAIC to therefore invest in the Zone. Daimler Chrysler is situated nearby in the Buffalo City Municipality in the same province of the Eastern Cape. In addition, the Eastern Cape Province had a strong agricultural sector, hence agro-processing opportunities are rife and investments in the Zone in this sector have begun to materialise (Fig. 7.12). This Chapter has been dedicated to ‘people’ (Fig. 7.12) from the perspective of the labour market. It has described how the South African Fig. 7.12 Evaluation of Pillar 5 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa 216 B. ROBINSON labour market offers a surplus of labour, including many young jobseekers. However skills, especially critical skills are often lacking. Productivity issues have been highlighted and the volatility of the labour market and communities being an issue of concern. Labour legislation makes it difficult to hire and fire, while strong and politically aligned trade unions push up wages. With regards Special Economic Zones, Bernstein (2014: 33) confirms that they offer an opportunity for attracting foreign investment, contributing to economic growth and creating employment, yet this hasn’t happened to the extent it could have done in South Africa. For Special Economic Zones to be successful in South Africa, Bernstein advocates that the focus should be on low-skilled industries and promoting flexible employment relationships. As had been found in other Special Economic Zones visited in Africa, wage levels tend to be higher in the zones that outside the zone as a result of training and skills transfer. The same applies in South African Special Economic Zones, but in the Coega Special Economic Zone for example, the reason is very different. The Zone is government owned and the operators set wage rates for different categories of workers that are higher than outside the zone. The Zone Labour Agreement that stipulates these wages has been motivated from the perspective of creating a stable business environment, mostly free of community protest action and labour unrest—labour stability comes at a price: Higher labour costs. The assumption is that an SEZ should incentivise investment, and one of the important considerations for investors is the cost of labour—if the cost of labour is higher outside the SEZ, it would act as a disincentive to investment. In the South African context, it seems as though there is a problem in this regard, as labour is sometimes significantly more expensive inside the SEZ than outside. A comparative analysis was conducted on three of the many categories of SEZ wages per sector and national wages and detailed in Table 7.5. It confirms the substantial differences between wage rates of the zone and the minimum wages of the country. The importance of integration (Fig. 7.13) is critical for Special Economic Zones’ success: Connections must be drawn between the dots of disparate development initiatives with the view to stimulating agglomerative economies. When viewed in isolation, dots do not make a developmental picture, but when R44.50 R44.50 × 9 h per day × 22 days = R8811.00 Task Grade D (Kitchen supervisor, driver, security officer Grade B) Task Grade E (Senior clerk, chef, security officer Grade A) Task Grade A (Watchman, security officer Grade E, general assistant) Service providers SEZ rate (from 1 Sept 2017) Entry rate: R25.02 Zone rate: R26.94 Calculating the monthly wages at 22 days per month at the Zone rate: R26.94 × 9 h per day × 22 days = R5334.12 R37.76 R37.76 × 9 h per day × 22 days = R7476.48 Type of occupational task Industry sector Minimum wage as per Department of Labour for Security Officer Grade B: R4668.00 Minimum wage as per Department of Labour for Security Officer Grade A: R5209.00 Minimum wage as per Department of Labour for Security Officer Grade E: R4102.00 Department of Labour Minimum wages (from 1 Sept 2017) Table 7.5 Comparative analysis of SEZ wages per sector and municipal wages (Coega Industrial Development Zone: Zone Labour Agreement 2017 and Department of Labour South Africa 2017) 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 217 218 B. ROBINSON Fig. 7.13 Evaluation of Pillar 6 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa viewed in an integrated manner, strong, long-term growth prospects can be realised. (Taylor 2011) One area in which integration is essential is logistics—Zones must be integrated into the logistics network of the country. As mentioned before, most zones in South Africa are strategically positioned and linked to ports and the national road and rail network. It has to be mentioned though that the road and rail network in Africa has deteriorated significantly over the past couple of decades due to poor maintenance and investment. The Special Economic Zones Act of 2014 described earlier makes specific reference to integrating the zone with the host province’s growth strategies, as well as integration with the local economic development of the host municipality. It also requires that investments be aligned to the national governments economic and industrial development policies. Has this happened in the case of Coega? Perhaps not to the extent it should have done. 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 219 April (2016) investigated South African Special Economic Zones and contends that for the South African government to achieve their SEZ vision, there needs to be a necessary step of “good governance interoperability”—this entails a range of flexible and accessible linkages between different government departments within the localities of municipalities. These linkages enable investors in the zone to operate efficiently with streamlined local government processes and support. In evaluating the Coega Special Economic Zone amongst others, April found that these linkages were lacking, and recommended the implementation of aspects of the ‘One-stop Shop’ models for reducing bureaucratic red-tape to improve efficiencies within local government. The South African government has invested in some of the best infrastructure (Fig. 7.14) found in Africa to support their Special economic zones. These are detailed in Chapter 9. Critical services are also prioritised and generally utilities and services are modern and efficient. Fig. 7.14 Evaluation of Pillar 7 of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa 220 B. ROBINSON Fig. 7.15 Evaluation of the protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in South Africa South Africa has, however, been grappling with power supply issues since 2009, and ‘loadshedding’ has been introduced on numerous occasions to protect the integrity of the countries power grid. This is a major concern for investors that require uninterrupted power supply—one casualty was the loss of anchor tenant Rio Tinto who abandoned their plans to construct an aluminium smelter in Coega (Fig. 7.15). References African Development Bank. 2020. African Economic Outlook 2020 [Online]. Available from https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-out look-2020. Accessed 27 Feb 2020. 7 LABOUR: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 221 Alexander, P., C. Runciman, T. Ngwane, B. Moloto, K. Mokgele, and N. Van Staden Frequency and Turmoil: South African Community Protests 2005– 2007. SA Crime Quarterly, 63. April, Y. 2016. Assessing Preconditions for Effective Special Economic Zones from a South African Local Governance Perspective. Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives 1 (2): 59–75. Bernstein, A. 2014. South Africa’s Key Challenges: Tough Decisions and New Directions. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 652: 20–47. Department of Employment and Labour. 2019. Industrial Action Report 2018 [Online]. Accessed from: http://www.labour.gov.za/DocumentCenter/Rep orts/Annual%20Reports/Industrial%20Action%20Annual%20Report/2018/ Industrial%20Action%20Report%202018.pdf. Accessed 31 May 2020. 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The Department of Trade and Industry. Pretoria. Industrial Policy Action Plan. 2010. 2010/11–2012/13 Industrial Policy Action Plan. Department of Trade and Industry. Accessed from: http://pmg-ass ets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/questions/Q1569Annexure.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2020. Industrial Policy Action Plan 2018/19–2020/21. 2018. The Department of Trade and Industry. Accessed from: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201805/industrial-policy-action-plan.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2020. Marumo, P., and M. Sebolaaneng. 2019. Assessing the State of Youth Unemployment in South Africa: A Discussion and Examination of the Structural Problems Responsible for Unsustainable Youth Development in Africa. Gender & Behaviour 17 (3): 13477–13485. 222 B. ROBINSON Minimum-Wage.org. 2021. International [Annual] Minimum Wage Rates 2021 [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.minimum-wage.org/international. Mthembu, N. 2018. 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License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons. org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. The World Bank Group. 2021b. Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modelled ILO Estimate)—Sub-Saharan Africa. © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS? locations=ZG. Accessed 13 July 2021. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/ 3.0/igo/. Zimmerman, D. 2010. The Role of Industrial Development Zones in South Africa’s Industrial Development and Capacity (Unpublished Master’s research report). University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. CHAPTER 8 The Social and Environmental Impact of Special Economic Zones in Africa Economic development due to China’s investment in African Special Economic Zones inherently has the potential to contribute to societal development. Poverty reduction and improved living standards are promoted by more wealth in the economy, provided this economic growth is inclusive. Economic growth also has the propensity to initially contribute to environmental degradation before regulatory standards are effectively managed and technology is adopted that manages these negative externalities. These issues are explored in this Chapter. The social contribution of China to Africa in general, and the Special Economic Zones visited during the research field visits in particular, with a special section exploring the Chinese perspective of living in these zones, are investigated. It then considers China’s own attempts to reduce environmental damage through strict regulatory intervention, and its successes in this regard. China– African policy is contemplated to determine the commitment China and Africa have towards environmental issues in Africa and muses whether Chinese home country policies have led to a shift of polluting industries to Africa. The case study of Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Park in presented to derive some contextual insights on this debate. The chapter concludes with considering the pillars and protocols that Special Economic Zones in Africa possess as benchmarked against the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_8 225 226 B. ROBINSON 8.1 The Social Dimension of China in Africa The book authored by Kobus Jonker and I entitled ‘China’s Impact on the Africa Renaissance—The Baobab Grows’ (2018) emphasised the contribution China has had and will continue to have on Africa’s organic growth trajectory. While this dynamic has direct implications for building human, natural, institutional, production and financial capital and the resultant economic wealth that may accrue to African nations, social and cultural wealth can also be generated. And social wealth is sorely needed in Africa. All African countries are experiencing high levels of poverty, sometimes even food scarcity; poor living standards; comparatively low longevity; many countries are engaged in active warfare, internal conflict, or still suffering from the ravages of wars from decades before; remnants of colonialization linger; human rights are trampled upon; lack of health and educational opportunities prevail; high unemployment levels; and economic inequality persists. These all have a profound impact on the well-being of ordinary African citizens. China in its relationships with developing economies often emphasises the fact that China itself is a developing economy and has had to grapple with the problems of poverty, food scarcity, poor living standards and the like as it embarked on efforts towards their ‘moderately prosperous society’. China’s successes are often perceived as being replicable, so not only can China provide direct interventions for societal upliftment, but it can also share its experience in the hope of shortening the learning curve for African Nations. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation’s (FOCAC) Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021 provides useful insights into China and Africa’s reciprocal undertakings regarding social development in Africa. Some of these are summarised in Table 8.1. There are a number of examples of direct humanitarian efforts of China in Africa. The Ebola epidemics in West Africa saw a range of medical interventions that contained the spread; provided health facilities; provided health care; trained medical staff and saved numerous lives. Humanitarian aid during the displacement of people due to conflict and food scarcity is another example—consider the support China provided for refugees from Somalia living in Kenya. More recently, China’s assistance to Africa during the COVID-19 pandemic is noteworthy. While the coronavirus pandemic may have 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 227 Table 8.1 Social Development Cooperation (FOCAC Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021) 4.1.1 China will enhance assistance to African countries, LDCs in particular, to deepen South–South cooperation and promote common development 4.1.2 The African side applauds China’s efforts in helping African countries reduce poverty, improve people’s livelihood and implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development under the Assistance Fund for South–South Cooperation. China will share more of its development practices with Africa, support cooperation with Africa on economic and social development planning, and continue its support through the Fund to African countries for achieving the SDGs and Agenda 2063 of the African Union 4.1.4 China will extend US$15 billion of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans to Africa. For those of Africa’s least developed countries, heavily indebted and poor countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing countries that have diplomatic relations with China, the debt they have incurred in the form of interest-free Chinese government loans due to mature by the end of 2018 will be exempted 4.2 This section provides a range of cooperation undertakings to improve medical health and public access to public health 4.3 The Action Plan provides details of China’s support for improving access to quality education and skills transfer. This includes a range of scholarships and exchange programmes and the roll out of Confucius Institutes in Africa 4.4 This section relates to the sharing of China’s Poverty Reduction Experience—some details are as follows: 4.4.1 The African side appreciates China’s active efforts in implementing the China–Africa poverty reduction plan, the “Happy Life” and other poverty alleviation projects to help Africa improve rural public service, enhance skills training for better employment, improve the environment and living conditions of rural communities, and protect the health and well-being of African women and children. The African side appreciates China’s exemption of outstanding interest-free government debts owed by African LDCs maturing by the end of 2015 4.4.2 China will continue to support the poverty reduction efforts of Africa to deliver a better and happier life to African people 4.4.4 China will continue to organize workshops on poverty reduction policies and practices tailored to the needs of African countries, offer degree education on poverty reduction and development for African countries, and help train specialized personnel from Africa. China will continue to create new models of training to maximize the effect and put in place a China–Africa poverty reduction training and exchange network originated in Wuhan, China, the relatively quick response by Chinese authorities and the severe lockdown restrictions they imposed in the country, cushioned the population from what could have been a devastating spread of the virus in the early stages of transmission when effective treatments were less known. China then turned its attention to the international community. Past US President Donald Trump went as far as accusing China for the 228 B. ROBINSON spread of the virus and calling it the ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘kung flu’. China counteracted, affirming its support of the World Health Organisation, accused by the USA and others of bias towards China. China adopted the knick-named ‘masked diplomacy’, initially providing personal protective equipment (PPE) to 18 countries in Africa mostly in West Africa; sent medical teams to support health services in Ethiopia and Algeria; while also providing technical and medical advice on treating COVID-19 in Mozambique. Private Chinese individuals contributed as well, with the much-publicised donations of medical equipment and supplies to Africa’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. African countries burdened by economic troubles were also supported—debt service suspension agreements were reached with 12 African countries and waivers were provided on matured interest-free loans for 15 African countries. An ‘Extraordinary China–Africa Summit on Solidarity Against COVID-19’ was held in June 2020, with representatives from China, the African Union, and various African leaders. The Summit was focussed on addressing the threats the pandemic posed on the health and economic welfare of African countries with various undertakings by China to support mitigating the damaging effects of the various lockdown interventions and lives lost to COVID-19. It made the commitment that should China develop a vaccine against the coronavirus, it would make this available to developing countries. It is not all rosy though. There have been criticisms against Chinese investors in Africa. The mining sector is one area that has received negative publicity in this regard: accusations of evictions and displacement of communities; damage to communal land; lack of community engagement; and exploitation of workers and harmful working conditions. 8.2 Evidence from Special Economic Zones The social impact of foreign investment is not always that easy to discern. While the number of jobs that may have been created would be recorded, and estimations made of how many people in households may derive benefit from this employment revenue, other benefits for society are more subtle in nature. Chapter 7 considered the importance of job creation as a result of the Chinese investment in Special Economic Zones, while this section provides insights from observations and discussions on other aspects of societal benefits as a result of such Chinese investments. 8 8.2.1 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 229 Enterprise Development From an enterprise development perspective and resulting social benefits thereof, the zones were found to have sourced most of the raw materials required in their production from local suppliers, thus stimulating the establishment of small, medium and larger enterprises. For example, the Eastern Industrial Park sourced wood for furniture production, and sand and stone for cement production. Unfortunately, there were limitations to local procurement, with investors finding it difficult to source many basic manufactured products such as pipes, tools, electrical parts and packaging materials necessitating some importation of goods. The industrialisation of the zone supported other smaller industries, some of which are within the zone, but many others are from companies nearby. This contributes to an eco-system of industrial growth for the region, not just for the zone itself. In time, perhaps, this eco-system would grow resulting in import substitution with local companies producing a wider range of goods and services for the zone’s investors. 8.2.2 Local Communities and Urbanisation Speaking to a representative of the Ethiopian zone, I was told how the local community benefited from the migration of employees and business visitors to the area, with restaurants, bars, guest houses and hotels mushrooming in the area, creating a vibrant and diversified urban town alongside the zone. A similar positive occurrence happened at the Lekki Free Trade Zone, and not only was there a positive impact on job creation for local communities, but the migration of people to the area ‘decentralised the congestion of Lagos’ and was going to ‘change the face of Lagos and Nigeria’ according to one investor. 8.2.3 Infrastructural Benefits Infrastructural investment by Special Economic Zones investors provided the essential infrastructure necessary for the functioning of the zones, but which had direct benefits to the local communities as well. For instance, building access roads to the zones were agreed to by the Nigerian state governments, but these didn’t always materialise, resulting in the zones’ investors having to upgrade roads at their own cost to ensure efficient logistics. This improved transport facilities for local communities as well. 230 B. ROBINSON Fig. 8.1 Road to Nigeria’s Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone Figure 8.1 illustrates how poorly maintained the roads are to the OgunGuangdong Free Trade Zone—the Zones investors confirmed that they will be partly rebuilding this road which will be invaluable to the local community’s access to the city of Lagos. 8.2.4 Access to Services and Facilities Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Park provided a 1-Stop service for investors that included a bank and police station. Employees working in the zone thus benefited from access to these facilities as well as the added safety and security that the police presence and 300 security guards (at the time of visiting the Zone) offered for investors and those working there. This security is important noting that security issues have in the past been faced by the zone, such as anti-government protests. Other zones visited in Nigeria and Zambia had a similar security component to their zones. These interventions contributed to safety and security in the areas in which they situated, directly benefitting local communities. The Lekki Free Zone had its own clinic with health services provided for free to all employees. The Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone went one step further, sponsoring an entire hospital, Sinozam Friendship Hospital, to support the zone’s employees, but which provided advanced medical services for the towns in the copper belt region (Fig. 8.2). Zones 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 231 Fig. 8.2 The Sinozam Friendship Hospital often provided other benefits to employees, such as meals and transport within the zone. 8.2.5 Conflict with Local Communities There was some degree of conflict with local communities, mostly as a result of land rights and ownership concerns of these communities. Local settlements within the Nigerian Free Trade zones were pointed out to me as we travelled through and alongside the two zones visited. The Nigerian Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone had experienced particular problems of land encroachment by communities, often in the form of locals plating crops, resulting in only 50% of the envisaged zone having been allocated. Small protests, such as people lying in the road obstructing traffic within the zone, and disputes over ‘our family land’ were problematic, compounded by disputes amongst the ‘5-kings’ who didn’t recognise the others. Poor land surveying and record-keeping had also led to the 232 B. ROBINSON Fig. 8.3 Land encroachment in the Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone— crops planted by a local land-rights claimant ‘overlapping’ of land due to incorrect coordinates. State governments was either unwilling or unable to assist the zone in addressing these problems, instead telling the zone’s investors to simply ‘take the land’. In Zambia’s Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone, ‘compensating’ the locals was sometimes resorted to in order to have the locals vacate the lands on which they had recently planted crops (Fig. 8.3). 8.3 The Chinese Diaspora in Africa, Chinese Migration and Integration in local Communities Chinese migrant labour is not new in Africa. For example, during the Gold rush in South Africa, over 60,000 unskilled Chinese labourers came to South Africa to address the shortage of manpower on the mines. One can still find latter generations of Chinese throughout the country. But the current level of Chinese working and living in Africa, and Africans 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 233 in China, attests to the significant interest China has developed in the continent since the 1990s. It is suggested that more than half a million Africans now live and work in China, and guestimates of China in Africa is around one to two million people. The Chinese in Africa range in occupation from traders and small retailers, to corporate investors, and labour in Chinese companies. Many live and work in the various Special Economic Zones operated by the Chinese. Chinese investors and their employees have adapted remarkably quickly to the countries in which they have chosen to locate their enterprises. Language is quickly learned, local customs are understood and adopted, and the nuances of conducting business are assumed. There is also a reciprocal learning and appreciation process that takes place. While Confucius Institutes and exchange programmes throughout Africa are driven by China’s government and various bilateral and FOCAC agreements, what happens in the Special Economic Zones may be on a smaller scale, but they are just as valuable in improving cultural understanding and acceptance. Travelling to Nigeria just after the Chinese New Year, the various companies in the zones had gone out of their way to decorate their entrances and offices with Chinese ornaments and new years celebrations (Fig. 8.4). More than that though, some Chinese companies encourage employees and their families to celebrate with them, and in some cases, Chines investors attended local festivities, thus contributing to a better appreciation of their respective fascinating cultures and traditions. It is not always that easy though with many living in the zones describing the ‘culture-shock’ of moving to Africa. A Chinese investor said the following: ‘When Chinese come work in Africa, we sacrifice a lot. My wife has to stay in China; family very important to our life… I’m the only child—I have to support my parents; I can’t bring them here’. While all the zones had Chinese restaurants, there is little entertainment. While some of the Zones may have sporting facilities, or the residential compounds provide sports and recreational facilities—Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone residential village has walkways, a dam with thatched social area, a large swimming pool, and huge hall for sports and social events (Fig. 8.5)—there is little else available. The Chinese seldom venture into the neighbouring cities, and if so, it is primarily for supplies or business purposes, certainly not for socialising. Spending 6– 10 months in Africa, only returning to China for a month, if difficult for 234 B. ROBINSON Fig. 8.4 Lekki Free Trade Zone restaurant with Chinese decorations Fig. 8.5 Recreational facilities at Chambishi multi-facility Economic Zone’s residential complex for Chinese employees 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 235 most Chinese working within the zones. Not all Chinese investors and workers were negative though. Speaking to an investor of a small service company, he declared Zambia as being good: ‘business is good, tired of city life in China’, preferring the friendly people, landscape, climate and more laid-back Zambian pace of life. In actual fact, he had encouraged family to come visit and tour Zambia. When I posed the question of what the biggest difference was between China and Nigeria, one interesting response was that in China people are of the ‘same tribe, same language’, but in Africa, there are just so many tribes, cultures, traditions and religions. One example provided by a ceramic factory owner at Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Nigeria was the difficulty of operating 24 hours, with the Christian component of the workforce unwilling to work Sundays and those of the Islam faith adhering to Friday prayers. Once the investor understood these differences, he adapted the work schedules to alternate between Christian and Muslim employees to allow them to participate in their respective religious activities. Language is also an obvious problem—most of the Chinese engineers and operators were unable to speak any English. The work ethic differed as well, with one Chinese investor explaining that ‘the way they think and work: totally different… Chinese work hard and fast, push Nigerians to do the same, leads to lots of arguments’. Having considered the social aspect of these Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa, attention is now directed towards the environmental impact of these zones. 8.4 China’s Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation There is a common perception that there has to be a trade-off between economic growth and the environment: As economies grow rapidly due to industrialisation there is an expectation that pollution will proliferate. Economists have even adapted the Kuznets Curve, a graphical depiction of the growth of inequality as economies grow, to a representation of pollution and waste similarly increasing as economies grow. This pollution epidemic then flattens out, and eventually decreases due to increased environmental sensitivity by communities and regulatory interventions to protect the environment. China, it seems had followed this route as it embarked on its own miraculous economic growth trajectory, achieving the not-so-welcome 236 B. ROBINSON global achievement of emitting the greatest level of greenhouse gases, and is now home to some of the world’s most polluted cities. One such region is the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region with an annual average fine particulate matter (PM2.5) concentration of 93 µg per cubic meter (µg/m3 ) in 2014, far exceeding the national PM2.5 standard of 35 (µg/m3 ) and the World Health Organization (WHO) PM2.5 standard of 10 (µg/m3 ) (World Bank 2018). Policies for economic growth, even policies for improving the lifestyles of people, have sometimes failed in the past to adequately address pollution effects. For instance, an analysis on the Huai River Policy that aimed to provide indoor heat did not include pollution abatement equipment and the authors suggest this led to a “staggering loss” of 2.5 billion life years in Northern China (Chen et al. 2013: 12941). China has for some time acknowledged the problem and seems intent on addressing it. 8.4.1 Paris Agreement The Paris Agreement of 2015, which came into effect on the 4th of November 2016 (Paris Agreement 2015), is an outcome of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, a global intervention that aimed to address the threat of climate change. It made special mention of developing countries that were particularly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change and considered the funding and technology transfer needed to address the special needs of least developed economies. Articles of the convention mentioned some specific targets, such as ensuring global temperatures were less than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and limiting temperature increases to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Parties to the Convention were required to set their own specific national targets (National Determined Contributions [NDCs]) in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, a commitment to supporting developing countries in the implementation of their targets was detailed, which included Article 9 that specified an obligation of developed country parties to the Convention providing financial resources to assist developing countries in mitigating greenhouse gas emission, and for other countries to voluntarily provide such support; Article 10 detailed cooperative support for technology development and transfer; and Article 11 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 237 addressed capacity development in developing countries, especially those least developed countries most susceptible to climate change. The implication of the above is that parties to the convention, both developed and developing countries have a global responsibility to reduce not only their own greenhouse gas emissions, but also support other countries, especially developing and least developed countries in mitigating their own greenhouse gas emissions. There are two obligations for China to consider in this regard related to their relationship to African countries: 1. China should set its own target of mitigating its own greenhouse gas emissions 2. China should support developing and least developed countries, such as is the case in many African countries, in achieving their targets through financial assistance, technology transfer and capacity development. This would also imply, at the very least, that China’s footprint in Africa, through its developmental support and foreign direct investment, is responsible in terms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. 8.4.2 China’s Policy Commitment to Mitigating Climate Change The seems to be echoed in China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) submission (2015). The submission highlights the fact that China itself, is also a developing country going through rapid industrialisation and urbanisation as it attempts to achieve economic development, eliminate poverty and improve the well-being of its citizens, while at the same time it seeks to protect the environment and mitigate climate change. It goes further to describe this responsibility from a national and global perspective: To act on climate change in terms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing climate resilience, is not only driven by China’s domestic needs for sustainable development in ensuring its economic security, energy security, ecological security, food security as well as the safety of people’s life and property and to achieve sustainable development, but also driven by its sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance, to forge 238 B. ROBINSON a community of shared destiny for humankind and to promote common development for all human beings. The submission then details specific actions that China has embarked upon, or intends to embark upon, to combat climate change. These actions are detailed in Table 8.2. Table 8.2 A summary of China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) In 2009, China committed to the 2020 goal of lowering carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40–45% from the 2005 level; increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 15%; and increase forested area by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters compared to the 2005 levels China has implemented the following plans: The National Program on Climate Change; the Work Plan for Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period; the Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for the 12th Five Year Plan Period; the 12th Five Year Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction; the 2014–2015 Action Plan for Energy Conservation, Emission Reduction and Low-Carbon Development; and the National Plan on Climate Change (2014–2020) By 2014 China achieved the following: Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP was 33.8% lower than 2005 levels; the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption was 11.2%; forested area and forest stock volume increased by 21.6 million hectares and 2.188 billion cubic meters compared to the 2005 levels; the installed capacity of hydro power was 300 gigawatts (2.57 times that of 2005); the installed capacity of on-grid wind power was 95.81 gigawatts (90 times that of 2005); the installed capacity of solar power was 28.05 gigawatts (400 times that of 2005); and the installed capacity of nuclear power was 19.88 gigawatts (2.9 times that of 2005) By 2030, China’s intends to achieve the following: Achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and making a concerted effort to peak early; to lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60–65% from the 2005 level; to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to about 20%; and increase the forest stock volume by about 4.5 billion cubic meters from the 2005 level The submission also details the following intended policies and measures to combat climate change: Implement proactive national strategies on climate change; improve regional strategies on climate change; build a low-carbon energy system; build an energy efficient and low-carbon industrial system; control emissions from the building and transportation sectors; increasing carbon sinks; promote a low-carbon ‘way of life’; enhancing climate resilience; innovating a low-carbon development growth pattern; supporting science and technology improvements around climate change; providing financial and policy support; promoting a carbon emission trading market; improving statistical and accounting systems for Greenhouse gas emissions; stakeholder participation; and promoting international cooperation on climate change 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 239 The business community has responded positively towards the environmental policies considering the profitability of some of the initiatives. The Pearl River Tower in the Guangzhou municipality is a zero carbon emission building, and urban planners have developed low-carbon districts and zones, such as the Lile Island in Hainan Province; the Shouan township in Chengdu; the Yujiabao financial district in Tianji; the Wangjiadun Green Central Business District in Wuhan; and a number of townships in Huizhou in Guangdong Province (Li et al. 2013: 534). 8.4.3 China’s Water Scarcity and Water Pollution While air pollution can be considered as probably the most dangerous of pollutants due to the negative impact on Climate Change, there are many forms of pollution that can have an enormous negative impact on earth’s resources and the quality of peoples’ lives, such as water, soil, noise and light pollution. Water and soil pollution are particular outcomes of industrialisation which compromises access to safe drinking water and water available for agricultural purposes, while soil pollution from industrial waste negatively impacts land use and contributes to erosion, deforestation and desertification. China is a water-scarce country, and the added effect of industrialisation on water and soil pollution has exacerbated the problem. Coupled to a high population and rapid urbanisation, and land and agricultural usage patterns, water pollution is a serious problem and it is estimated that a third of China’s lakes and rivers are polluted to such an extent that they are not suitable for human use. This has many unfortunate outcomes. One of which is that China’s ability to feed its huge populations is compromised, the other is the health risks that are associated with such pollution—the relationship between water pollution and waterborne diseases has been well documented, and recent research points towards a correlation between water pollution due to industrialisation in China, and instances of digestive cancers (Ebenstein 2012: 200). President Xi has been a key motivator for a balanced approach to development that incorporates an ecological awareness and focus in creating a ‘Beautiful China’ and describes “Clear waters and green mountains” as invaluable assets (Xi 2017: 426). China’s water-related policies are extensive. Table 8.3 describes policies directed at improving water quality in cities. 240 B. ROBINSON Table 8.3 Chinese water-related policies (Adapted from Key Water Policies, Chien 2019) Policy Objective Implementation Plan for the War on Urban Black and Smelly Water Body Control Reduce the water cleaning rate to over 90% for cities by the end of 2020 Special Action Plan for the Environmental Protection of National Drinking Water Sources Cities are to complete a campaign for environmental protection by 2019 Opinions on Innovation and Improvement of the Price Mechanism for Promoting Green Development Improve pricing mechanisms on urban water supply Assessment Standards for National Water-saving Cities Requirements to qualify as a water-saving city Table 8.4 Chinese industry and technology-related policies (Adapted from Key Policies: Industry and Technology, Chien 2019) Policy Objective Three-year Action Plan for Resolutely Winning the War on Pollution Prevention and Control of Industry and Communication Industry Water use to be improved to prevent pollution Notice on Promoting Financial Support for Industrial Green Development in Country-level Regions Support of innovative green development Notice on Issuing the Appraisal Indicator System of Clean Production for 14 Sectors Revision and consolidation of indicator systems for cleaner production Action Plan for the Pollution Prevention and Control of Waste Lead-acid Batteries Specific intervention to promote green development of the lead-acid industry Policy is also directed towards industry and technology. Table 8.4 describes some of the key policies in this regard: With the drive to cleaning up its act, is China’s policy inadvertently contributing to environmental damage elsewhere? 8 8.5 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 241 Is China Shifting Environmental Risks to Emerging Economies? There has been much debate around China’s environmental impact in Africa, from mining in environmentally sensitive areas, depletion of natural resources, dams and other large-scale infrastructural projects’ impact, and evaluations of the negative externalities of Chinese financing models, such as the Angola-mode type framework agreements. The discussion in this book, however, is limited to the context of industrialisation through Special Economic Zones, and as such, this environmental debate centres around these zones. Many African countries, indeed, many developing nations throughout the world, are desperately trying to ensure sustainable economic growth through industrialisation and export growth. Thus, many are keen on attracting Chinese investments to their shores. The question arises as to whether they would compromise environmental security for the sake of economic development, and even if this may not be their intention, do they have the governance structures in place to protect the environment? The motivation for Chinese investors to consider Africa is complex and varied, and include factors such as ‘cheap’ labour, attractive incentives, lucrative markets, and potentially, a less environmentally regulated environment—the ‘flying geese syndrome’. The greater the focus of China on achieving its ‘Beautiful China’ objective through its environmental policies, the greater the propensity for polluting industries to find ‘friendlier’ regulatory environments. Coupled to recent pollution enforcement efforts in China, such as 40% of China’s factories being shut down after inspection by environmental bureau officials, and 80,000 factories being fined and criminal offences laid (Nace 2017), many factory owners don’t consider there to be many options available to them, except to move production elsewhere. Sometimes this has been termed ‘outsourcing pollution’. Mike O’Sullivan (2017) describes how China has changed from itself being an ‘outsourced’ pollution recipient during the country’s high levels of production of goods destined for USA and Western Europe markets and estimates that this resulted in 110,000 premature deaths in China. As China becomes a consuming nation, the pattern continues, but the outsourcing of pollution now occurs between China and newer industrialised economies where manufacturing takes place. Another term used is ‘exporting pollution’—Dexter Roberts (2014) uses the term in explaining 242 B. ROBINSON how Hebie Province are embarking on plans to move 20 million tons of steel and 30 million tons of cement production to Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and other parts of Asia. Other manufacturing concerns have similarly moved to Africa, and some quickly raised environmental eyebrows. The China–Africa Overseas Leather Products SC tannery was closed within 40 days of beginning operations in Ethiopia due to pollution complaints; the Jeronimo Group Industries & Trading PLC, a subsidiary of the Chinese glove-maker Phiss, was accused of dumping waste into rivers in Somaliland (Shinn 2016: 40). While it is clear that China is taking a positive environmental stance in its home country, what is the Chinese environmental position in Africa as this shift of industry continues to the continent? 8.5.1 China’s Declarations Towards Environmental Support in Africa The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a useful source for information on China’s policies and commitments to Africa. One of the outcomes of the 2018 FOCAC summit held in Beijing is the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Action Plan (2019–2021). The Action Plan details an array of joint commitments between China and African countries including diplomatic and cultural exchanges, economic cooperation, infrastructure development, social development, and peace and security cooperation. From an environmental perspective, the Action Plan has two areas worth detailing: (1) Energy and Natural Resources in terms of infrastructural development. (2) Environmental Protection and Tackling Climate Change as an element of Social Development Cooperation. The Energy and Natural Resources aspect of cooperation are detailed in Table 8.5. It details various exchanges between China and Africa including technological, the establishment of various centres to facilitate these exchanges, and general support for the improvement of Africa’s energy sector through infrastructural investment. Various sections have been highlighted to illustrate that the cooperation will focus mostly on renewable energy provision that supports sustainable development and the environment. In addition to cleaner energy and sustainable use of natural resources, the Action Plan often refers to environmental issues throughout the document, for instance, in terms of the ocean economy and the plans for 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 243 Table 8.5 FOCAC Energy and Natural Resources commitments (FOCAC Action Plan [2019–2021]) China and Africa will enhance policy dialogue and technological exchanges on energy and resources, coordinate each other’s energy and resource strategies, conduct joint research, and formulate energy development plans that are operable and based on local conditions. The two sides will work together for the establishment of a China–Africa Energy Cooperation Center in Africa to further advance energy exchanges and cooperation The two sides encourage and support Chinese and African companies, while upholding the principle of mutual benefits, to work together in energy trade and the investment, development and operation of energy projects, carry out demonstration projects in green energy financing, and explore green and sustainable ways of energy cooperation. China will support the development of renewable energy, mainly solar energy in Africa as well as the use of battery storage and strengthening of the electricity grid The Chinese side supports Africa’s capacity-building in the energy sector, and will provide professional training for personnel from competent authorities, research institutions and key companies of relevant countries to improve Africa’s capabilities in developing and managing their own energy systems The Chinese side will, on the basis of respecting the will of African countries, explore third-party cooperation with Africa in the energy sector, where each side can leverage their strengths, provide policy recommendation for Africa’s energy development, and work for progress of relevant projects The two sides will actively consider the joint establishment of a China–Africa Geoscience Cooperation Center for joint research on national resources sustainability and environment, in order to gain greater ability for the sustainable development and utilization of national resources by the respective countries coastal and marine economic zones, emphasis is made that such development and cooperation should promote “sustainable approaches that are environmentally, socially and economically effective”. Table 8.6 specifically refers to environmental protection and the mitigation of climate change detailed in the Action Plan. The commitments are far reaching, and include a strategic approach through the China–Africa Green Development Plan, to practical interventions around issues such as mitigating the risks of climate change; pollution control; smart cities; low-carbon development; forest management; combating desertification; protecting wildlife including specific efforts to combat illegal trade in wildlife; and supporting disaster management when environmental disasters occur (highlighted). 244 B. ROBINSON Table 8.6 FOCAC Environmental (FOCAC Action Plan [2019–2021]) and Climate Change commitments The African side appreciates China’s efforts in actively implementing the China–Africa green development plan to improve Africa’s capacity for green, low-carbon and sustainable development, and also China’s efforts in implementing projects on clean energy, wildlife protection, environment-friendly agriculture and smart cities, and China’s support in Africa’s endeavor toward green, low-carbon and sustainable development China has decided to undertake 50 projects for green development and ecological and environmental protection in Africa to expand exchanges and cooperation with Africa on climate change, ocean, desertification prevention and control, and wildlife protection. China will also work with Africa to raise public awareness of environmental protection The two sides will work together to set up a China–Africa environmental cooperation center, and deepen environment cooperation through more policy dialogue and joint research on environmental issues and stepping up exchanges and cooperation on the environment industry and technical information sharing, among others. China will continue to implement the China–Africa Green Envoys Program to strengthen Africa’s human capacity for environmental management, pollution prevention and control, and green development, and continue to enhance capacity-building and promote the green development of Africa The two sides will promote cooperation on sustainable forest management, and conduct practical cooperation in the trial, demonstration and extension of programs between Chinese and African governments and research institutes to achieve sustainability in forest management and contribute to global ecological governance The two sides will work together to build a China–Africa Bamboo Center and actively support Africa’s capacity-building in the sustainable management of bamboo and rattan resources, the innovative development of bamboo and rattan industries, the development of their products and poverty alleviation, and relevant industrial policy and standardization. The two sides will work to carry out international bamboo and rattan demonstration projects and improve Africa’s ability to utilize rattan and bamboo resources in a sustainable manner and to modernize the industry China will support Africa in its capacity-building for the prevention and treatment of desertification. China welcomes African countries to use its model and technology of desertification treatment in light of their real needs and apply it locally through demonstration projects (continued) 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 245 Table 8.6 (continued) The African side highly appreciates Chinese government’s support for Africa’s efforts to protect wildlife resources and crack down on poaching and illegal trade in wildlife, and its own initiative to stop domestic commercial ivory processing and sale. The two sides will enhance cooperation in the protection of wildlife, and better communicate and consult each others’ positions on inter-governmental agreements, international conventions and other multilateral occasions. China will continue to collaborate with African countries on improvement in capabilities for wildlife protection, provide ecological protection training opportunities and explore cooperation on demonstration projects, combat illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products, and incentivize those who have made outstanding contribution in anti-poaching and combating the illegal trade of wildlife China will continue to provide Fengyun meteorological satellite data, products and necessary technical support for African countries, and to provide meteorological and remote-sensing application equipment, education and training support for African countries, in order to contribute to the implementation of the integrated African Strategy on Meteorology (Weather and Climate Services), and to better equip African countries for disaster prevention and mitigation as well as climate change response China will deepen pragmatic cooperation with African countries under the framework of Climate Change South-South Cooperation, and help African countries strengthen climate change adaption capabilities through providing assistance in kind and capacity-building training to jointly meet the challenge posed by climate change The two sides will improve the multi-tiered dialogue mechanism on disaster prevention, mitigation and relief, and expand exchanges over risk monitoring and evaluation of drought, application of anti-drought technology, community-level drought resistance capabilities, emergency response, and post-disaster reconstruction China will hold regular workshops and training sessions on disaster risk management, application of disaster relief and mitigation technologies, and public awareness campaigns for disaster management teams, technical professionals and communities from Africa. China will, depending on the situation, send experts to local communities to guide and organize such training and capacity-building activities In times of disaster emergency, China will provide quick mapping service using space technology upon the request of African countries 8.5.2 Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa and the Environment A couple of examples have previously been detailed of Chinese companies having been accused of contributing to environmental degradation in Africa, but what is less clear is the extent to which investments in Special Economic Zones have had an environmental impact. Does the structure of Zones with their more regulated environment and the move towards 246 B. ROBINSON more socially responsible investment, reduce negative environmental externalities? Unfortunately, data and information regarding the environmental impact of these zones is scant, and mostly revolves around strategic documents and requirements for environmental impact assessments. Bräutigam and Tang (2011) mention the following available information in that regard: The Chambishi Multi-facility Economic Zone’s master plan requires an environmental appraisal and certification by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) 14,000 standards; and construction in the Mauritius’ Junfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone was subject to environmental impact assessments and certification from Mauritian authorities, which often resulted in delays. The question remains as to whether these types of requirements and regulations have any real impact. There is, of course, a responsibility on the African side to find a balance between economic stimulus and infrastructural development outcomes, and crafting appropriate Special Economic Zone policy that provides effective legal and regulatory mechanisms to protect the environment. Not doing so will waste the lesson learned from China where many SEZs faced serious environmental challenges (Zeng 2016). These regulatory interventions would need to be capacitated to ensure effective implementation, such as an adequate budget and interagency coordination. Enforcement is critical to ensure standards are met. Farole (2011) suggests that at national policy level, Special Economic Zones provide an opportunity to experiment with policy innovations to improve upon environmental compliance issues. Farole also suggests that most national SEZ programs struggle to provide effective capacity and authority to the regulators to monitor and enforce environmental compliance in the zones. This creates the opportunity for abuse of the system and negative externalities—this is a particular concern as these zones have the potential for significant negative environmental impact—reference to the problem of wastewater in Lesotho is made. Other examples of environmental problems as a result of the Chinese Special Economic Zones are difficult to find: Farmers complained of a variety of crops being damaged as a result of acid rain from the Chambishi Copper Smelter, which was subsequently ordered to shut down by the Zambia Environmental Agency in 2013, only to be re-opened once remedial rehabilitation and operational procedure were introduced to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions (António and Ma 2015). 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 247 This preliminary overview suggests that Chinese investments in African special economic zones may have had a lesser detrimental effect on the environment than investments outside of the zones such of those Chinese investments in the resource sectors of oil, mining and forestry sectors, most of which are inherently environmentally sensitive; or other investments in infrastructure, such as dams and road and rail, also with significant potential negative environmental impact. Whether this is due to the nature of the industries in the zones or a more effective regulatory environment on zone activities remains unclear. The commitment to responsible environmental agency and compliance by the zone management and investors could play an important role. There may also be a greater degree of alignment between their activities and that of policies back home in China or their respective provinces. Conditions of financing, such as China’s Exim Bank’s guidelines on social and environmental impact and the bank’s monitoring of compliance, could similarly have an impact on Chinese firm’s environmental orientation—non-compliance may result in loans being retracted. There are examples of an environmentally responsible commitment by Chinese investors in Africa special economic zones: The Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone carried out a comprehensive impact assessment to ensure compliance with Zambian environmental laws and regulations (United Nations Development Programme 2015). And of course, the investments in these zones in sectors such as renewable energy, may also have long term positive environmental impact. Shinn (2016), while debating China’s environmental impact in Africa, does acknowledge that “in all fairness, if a Chinese investment has no notable negative environmental impact, it rarely receives attention, and good practices are usually ignored by environmental groups and the media.” To contextualise these issues, a case study of Ethiopia is provided in the section which follows. 8.6 Case Study: Ethiopia---An Environmental Perspective A World Bank study (2010) on the effects of climate change on Ethiopia highlights the fact that the country is heavily dependent on rainfed agriculture, and that its geographical location and topography makes the country highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change. The country 248 B. ROBINSON has for decades suffered from mercurial rainfall—the country has experienced numerous severe droughts and floods. Global warming promises to exacerbate the problem. The study considered various scenarios of climate change impact, with their Dry2 scenario resulting in a reduction of annual rainfall over 2045–2055 of 10–25% in the central highlands and 0–10% in the south, and 25% in the North of the country. The potential impact of this vulnerability is concerning—47% of Ethiopian GDP is a function of agriculture; the damage to the road transport system from flooding could disrupt supply chains; and the ability of dams to provided hydropower and irrigation may be compromised. The study estimates that under a Dry2 scenario, GDP losses could be between 6 and 10%. Ethiopia is also a party and has indicated its intention to limit the country’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 to 145 MtCO2 or lower, which equates to a 255 MtCO2 reduction from the ‘business-as usual’ scenario (expected trajectory of emissions without intervention) in 2030—a 64% reduction (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 2015). This sectoral reduction is illustrated in Fig. 8.6. Ethiopia has developed the Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (CRGE) to assist in achieving the ambitious target, and the strategy is integrated into the Second Growth and Transformation Plan. There is a proviso though: “Ethiopia’s INDC is contingent upon an ambitious multilateral agreement being reached among Parties that enables Ethiopia to get international support and that stimulates investments” (2015: 1). The Chinese government and Chinese investors have introduced a number of initiatives to assist Ethiopia in combatting climate change: In 2020, China provided Ethiopia with a microsatellite to assist the country in researching the effects of climate change by monitoring droughts, floods, water resources and forestry; Chinese funded and built wind farms (Adama I and II) for cleaner energy production; and Chinese and other funders financed the contentious Gibe III dam to generate much-needed hydroelectric power for Ethiopia and the region—while hydroelectric power is low-carbon by its very nature, concerns have been raised regarding the negative impact this may have on communities downstream and the environmental damage caused by such large scale dams. As has been previously suggested, Ethiopia is a water scarce country, which makes it particularly susceptible to climate change. These limited 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 249 Fig. 8.6 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (2015: 1) of greenhouse gas emission reduction resources are further pushed to the limits by urbanisation and industrial development. Ethiopia has 12 river basins, two of which are dry, eight are water deficit basins and only two are water surplus basins. The Awash river basin stretches from the west of Addis Ababa to the Djibouti border— about 1250 km in length. It is the most utilised water basin, and the most polluted. This basin and its various reservoirs supply Addis Ababa and a variety of large cities with domestic water—this would include water for industries such as those in the Eastern Industrial Park. Water demand continues to grow thanks to urbanisation and population growth, while supply decreases due to increased use and natural causes. Water wastage is commonplace as water is subsidised and provided at no or low cost to the consumer, and there is little effort made to conserve water. The basin also provides water for irrigation purposes in agricultural areas—irrigation inefficiency and mismanagement of water resources in this sector is also problematic. Water pollution from industry has also been flagged: 250 B. ROBINSON toxic metals from tanneries; quantity of waste-water from the sugarcane industry with a high pollutant concentration etc. (Adeba et al. 2015). Water scarcity also has also contributed to land disputes, especially when property rights are insecure (Di Falco et al. 2019). Air pollution is another area of concern. Indoor air pollution and the resultant health risks posed is a result of approximately 95% of households utilising biomass fuels—wood, dung, charcoal, and crop residues—for energy needs at home (Sanbata et al. 2014). While there has been a number of studies on indoor air pollution, outdoor air pollution including studies on the impact on industrialisation, are limited on Ethiopia (Tefera et al. 2016). What has been found is that up to two-thirds of outdoor pollutants are geological materials—the dusty streets in Addis Ababa attests to the problem—while carbon monoxide levels were found to have higher concentrations during peak morning and afternoon traffic congestion. Ethiopia does have regulatory policy in place regarding pollution. Some of the policy on climate change has been addressed, but what about water scarcity and pollution? The country’s constitution, article 92/1 required the government to endeavour to ensure that all Ethiopians live in a clean and healthy environment. This provides Ethiopians with the right to a clean and healthy environment and a duty on the government to ensure this that is the case. The country also introduced the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia and the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1997). The numerous environmental policy objectives include preventing the pollution of land, air and water in the most cost-effective way. The policy recognises the trade-offs that may need to be made between economic growth and environmental protection: “When a compromise between short-term economic growth and long-term environmental protection is necessary, then development activities shall minimize degrading and polluting impacts on ecological and life support systems. When working out a compromise, it is better to err on the side of caution to the extent possible as rehabilitating a degraded environment is very expensive and bringing back a species that has gone extinct is impossible”. It also addresses water resources, requiring the protection of water resources including a provision to recycle waste-water. Specific mention is made of industrial waste and pollution and adhering “to the precautionary principle of minimizing and where possible preventing discharges of substances, biological materials or their fragments from industrial plants”. The policy continues to provide 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 251 much more detail in this regard. In addition, standards have been set for air quality, an Environmental Protection Authority has been established, and various other policy initiatives have been made. Whether this policy has been effectively implemented, and whether the regulatory bodies have been established or capacitated to monitor and enforce the various policies, is questionable. Tefera et al. (2016) suggests that “the progress achieved so far in adopting wastewater treatment facilities seems to lag behind the target period. In addition, there is an inadequate supply of air treatment plants in the industrial sectors that emit pollutant to the environment”. Yale University’s Environmental Performance Index 2020 (Wendling et al. 2020) ranks Ethiopia 134th of 180 countries. Various sub-indexes are also provided and Ethiopia ranks as follows: Air quality 90th; Heavy metals 166th; Climate Change 166th; Pollution Emissions 166th; Waste Management and Water Resources, one of the pool of countries with a score of 0. These rankings suggest that the country is struggling to improve environmental standards in the country. 8.6.1 Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Park Once on the outskirts of frenetic Addis Ababa, travelling to Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Park (EIP) is seamless along a modern 3-lane highway, with much evidence of Chinese investment in the form of industry along the route (Fig. 8.7). Arriving early in the morning at the change of shift, it becomes immediately apparent that thousands of Ethiopians are employed at the Zone. Working shifts over 24 hours, the zone never sleeps as approximately 15,000 Ethiopians and 1500–2000 Chinese provide the manpower for the 96 companies in the zone (at the time of my visit in 2019). The second phase of development is expected to ramp up this number to 100,000 Ethiopian employees (Fig. 8.8). Eastern Industrial Park has been successful in attracting investors (Figs. 8.9, 8.10, 8.11) encouraged by its superior reliable services and infrastructure, as well as abundant low-cost labour; political stability; security; large market; weather—“Djibouti is too hot”—; and “people are friendly”. The 96 companies are mostly Chinese owned, although increasingly, other foreign companies are starting to invest. The industries they represent are varied including technologically advanced pharmaceutical companies such as SSP; textile industries producing clothing for the local Ethiopian market such as denim company Lida Textile; and the flagship 252 B. ROBINSON Fig. 8.7 The imposing entrance to Eastern Industrial Park investment of Huajian Shoe Factory with brands such as GUESS, Calvin Klein and others. The Zone aims to provide what was termed ‘1-stop service’ for investors—a bank, police station, investment office, and a customs office are all found in the zone. The reduces bureaucracy and facilitates transactions. As with many Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa, the Zone is almost entirely self-sufficient. It has its own substation, its own wells, and own sewerage system. It is difficult to determine the exact water usage of the Eastern Industrial Zone and the impact this may have on the water basin, and the same applies for the impact the Zone has on water and air pollution. it would, however, be difficult to deny that some of the industries would require significant water resources for production, and that there would be potential resultant pollutants. A study by Dadi et al. (2017) did find that large concentrations of biological oxygen demand (BOD), chemical oxygen demand (COD), total suspended solids, and pH were prevalent in textile industries in the region—these were above the discharge limit set by the Environmental Protection Agency. A study at Kombolcha, where the Chinese built Kombolcha Industrial Park is situated, found tanneries (Cr) and steel processing (ZN) effluents discharged into rivers exceeding 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 253 Fig. 8.8 Location of the Eastern Industrial Park (Google Earth) the Ethiopian emission guidelines. While Pb effluents were high from the tannery, these did not exceed the guidelines (Zinabu et al. 2018). 30 of the companies that have invested in the Zone are textile companies. They are mostly small companies, some family owned. Their investment has been galvanised by the more than 110 million population in Ethiopia—a lucrative market for their products (the logistical costs of transport makes exporting prohibitive). The dying process of denims (one of the factories visited) requires a lot of water, and the wastewater is discharged. The standards for the quality of the discharged water is low from a regulatory perspective: “water must not be coloured”. The onus of responsibility therefore rests on the textile factory owner. 254 B. ROBINSON Fig. 8.9 SSP pharmaceutical Fig. 8.10 Huajian shoe factory Similarly, the air pollution controls by the Ethiopian authorities are lax for companies operating in the Zone: “no black smoke”. And there was no discernible black smoke, but there was certainly smoke. Whether pollutants would be within an acceptable range is unclear. 8 THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT … 255 Fig. 8.11 Lida Textile—denim manufacturer The Chinese investors that I spoke to acknowledged that many Chinese printing and textile companies shifted their production to countries such as Ethiopia due to the increased environmental regulation in China, and poor regulation and/or enforcement in other developing economies. Management of the Zone suggested that industries in the Eastern Industrial Zone were unlikely to introduce environmental controls voluntarily in light of an ineffective environmental regulatory environment, although they could be influenced by home country requirements—an example was made of European companies operating in the Zone that were required to comply with their home country’s or global environmental standards. As indicated earlier in the chapter, it does seem that there has been less evidence of environmental degradation within Special Economic Zones than outside of these zones. In the case of the Eastern Industrial Zone, this may be a function of a well-managed zone and some regulatory oversight of the zones environmental impact by Ethiopian authorities. This could be further improved in a number of ways: Ethiopian environmental standards need to be enhanced especially around monitoring environmental impact and enforcement of regulations; Chinese Zone management being more proactive in reducing negative environmental impact; and for Chinese policy to inculcate better environmental stewardship by Chinese firms in other countries when faced with 256 B. ROBINSON Pillar 5: People Protocol 7: Environmental consideration • Enterprise development • Local community development and urbanisation • Infrastructural benefits • Access to services and facilities • Conflict with local communities Pillar 6: Integration • Fewer cases of environmental damage within SEZs than outside • Poor policing of environmental standards • Reliance on firms to selfregulate environmental issues • Integration with neighbouring cities • Positive migration and urbanisation • Integration with local communities • Relatively small scale Protocol 10: Social System • Infrastructure has positive spin-offs for local communities • Failure of government to Infrastructure meet their infrastructural obligations Pillar 7: • The social system was continually improved • Companies played a role in improving well-being • Engagement and integration between Chinese and local communities Fig. 8.12 The African SEZ pillars and protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa a weak environmental regulatory framework—‘walk-the-talk’ regarding their commitment to global environmental issues. 8.7 Pillars and Protocols The Special Economic Zones fulfilled the pillars and protocols of the Chinese SEZ model in the following ways with regards social and environmental issues (with reservations in italics) (Fig. 8.12). 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CHAPTER 9 African Governments’ Enabling (or Constraining) Influence on Special Economic Zone Investment by the Chinese China’s government policy towards Africa is an important stimulus for Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Africa. Yes, China’s positive orientation towards a country frees up financial and other resources to support investment and protect investments from threats such as nationalisation of foreign assets, but more than that, often there is a sense of patriotism by Chinese investors who wish to support Chinese policy, such as the ongoing ‘go-out’ (sic) and ‘One Belt One Road’ policy. The influential provincial governments in China often enter into reciprocal association agreements with cities and states in other countries, and these also engendered investors to invest in particular projects. This happened to some extent with investors from Guangdong province supporting the OgunGuangdong Free Trade Zone in Nigeria, where personal relationships amongst Chinese colleagues from the province facilitated knowledge of investment opportunities in the Nigerian state. So, while Chinese government policy goes a long way in encouraging investment in African SEZs, when speaking to Chinese investors in African Special Economic Zones, there was a common perception that African governments’ political structure and development policy was sometimes a concern and hindered Chinese in investing more in Africa. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_9 261 262 B. ROBINSON While this chapter will not address issues such as government policy towards the environment or labour issues which have been covered in other Chapters, it will highlight particular areas of interest that were identified when speaking to zone operators and investors: these include political leadership commitment to Special Economic Zones; political stability, security and safety; government policy; corruption; infrastructure; service delivery; and ease of business. A case study on South African SEZ’s infrastructure is also provided, before concluding with an evaluation of the pillars and protocols benchmarked against the Chinese model of Special Economic Zones. 9.1 Political Leadership Commitment to Special Economic Zones The political leadership commitment, by the Chinese and their African counterparts, was evident in the early stages of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa. This was often supported by bilateral coordination committees with official representatives from the countries, which operated at a strategic policy level (Bräutigam and Tang 2011). Host country support in Africa for Special Economic Zones, however, varies considerably—some governments go the extra mile, others do not provide any support, and then the problematic mercurial nature of policy or commitments not being met in some nations. Political leadership plays a pivotal role in this regard. Some examples of these differences are provided in my observations and insights gained from discussions with zones’ operators and investors, as well as some literature from other sources. 9.1.1 Ethiopia The general sentiment in the Eastern Industrial Park was reasonably positive towards the Ethiopian, and China’s, government support for Zones in the country. The level of support was evidenced by the fact that the Eastern Industrial Park had been visited on a number of occasions by high-ranking Chinese and Ethiopian Government officials, and this produced good publicity for the Zone in China which encouraged further investment, thus supporting the Zone’s operator’s marketing efforts. 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 263 In its early days, the Eastern Industrial Park was regarded by government as an industrial park with no significant incentives or support for the Zone’s Chinese investors and operators. This resulted in the investors facing bureaucracies, inefficiencies, high costs for transport, and currency shortages. Ethiopian legislation also precluded the operators from sub-leasing land to investors in the zone. Fei and Liao (2020) describe how a sudden shift in government attitude and policy changed the status quo, and they provide a number of examples of the positive nature of these changes: Special Economic Zones were identified in development plans as a key strategy for promoting agriculturally based, manufacturing-driven and export-oriented industrialisation; it supported SEZ development by the federal government or through public–private partnerships; provisions on government control of Special Economic Zones were removed; implementation strategies focussed on creating an enabling environment for Zones; and a wide range of policies were enacted to attract investors from tax exemptions to logistical support. 9.1.2 Zambia The Zambian Government, visibly supported by the Zambian President, with the help of the Chinese Government and Chinese Financial Institutions, encouraged and facilitated the Chinese owned Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. This has however changed thanks to the change of governments over time. The zone operators spoke of the difficulty this created: There was a perceived lack of understanding by officials of what Special Economic Zones’ objectives were and what policy instruments were necessary for them to be successful—“some haven’t even heard of a Zone before”. This led to a lack of support for the Zone’s activities, and incentives for investing, being reduced. According to the Zone’s operators, government had unrealistic expectations of the Special Economic Zone. “They want investment, but don’t know how it works to attract investment”. One example that was provided as a disincentive to invest, was property tax, where the more they invested in property, the more tax they paid. 264 B. ROBINSON One investor in a fuel company mentioned the lack of engagement by government with them and other industrial players. He complained that the government kept increasing the fuel price without any consultation, or even notification, explaining how he often found out about the price increase, after the fact, though social media. The disclosure by government of the bulk purchase price of fuel was also a bone of contention, as this made profit margins known to the general public, which led to resistance by consumers who didn’t understand the higher cost being charged at retail level. 9.1.3 Nigeria The differences in political willpower are clear between Nigeria, Ethiopia and Zambia. There are also differences between regional government support, such as the differences in Federal State support in Nigeria. Two Special Economic Zones were visited in Nigeria, one in Lagos State where Lekki Free Trade Zone is situated, the other in Ogun State where the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone is home. The Lagos State leadership have driven the establishment of the Lekki Free Trade Zone, and while there are certainly shortcomings, the zone operators do commend the State Government for their support. The Lagos State Government recognised the need for diversifying the economy, industrialising, and adopting an export orientated development approach. Lagos State was ready to embark on a path of internationalisation and the Chinese Government realised that this signified an opportune time to reach out and support investment in the region. The Zone also has a significant Nigerian ownership stake, with 40% of the zone’s ownership being in Nigerian hands, with Nigerians sitting in important leadership positions. There was some mention of certain obligations being unmet, resulting in the downscaling of the initial project scope. It seems the Chinese investors and government waited to ensure their investment was met with Lagos Government commitment to certain infrastructural investments. The Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone receives much less support than their counterparts in Lagos State, where broken promises, poor to non-existent service delivery, and lack of engagement, characterise the relationship between the Ogun State government and the Zone’s operators—“they (government) just don’t put the effort in” was a comment 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 265 from one of the Zone operator’s employees. Another investor stated that “85% of tax income for the state comes from this industrial area (the Zone and surrounding industrial area), but the state does nothing”. Even though the state government hadn’t lived up to their commitments, they were “already ready to collect dividends” from the Zone’s investors. The issues of friction with communities mentioned in the previous chapter, and the unwillingness of the State Government to intervene, is another example of the perceived lack of support the Zone operators experience. 9.2 Political Stability, Security and Safety Initially this section was going to be subdivided into political stability and security and safety, but their interrelationship for Special Economic Zones is relevant—political instability, state security and the safety of people and property in zones are closely associated. Unfortunately, most African Nations are in some form of political flux or another. Take for example, West Africa. A World Bank Group report commissioned on the stability and security of West Africa (Marc et al. 2015) found that most armed conflicts since independence had been intrastate conflicts and included five large civil wars. While the trend of large-scale civil wars seems to be dissipating and political stabilisation improving, there are still major threats that compromise the security of these nations: election related violence; longstanding ethno-national conflict, drug trafficking, maritime piracy, and extremism. These problems are exacerbated by a number of factors, such as the large and growing population of youth, and migration. The major investments in Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa have been in countries that are relatively peaceful and with stable political systems. These were often mentioned by zones’ management and their investors as being a critical deciding factor in Chinese investment in Africa. Not that the zones visited had been without their fair share of problems: At the Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia there had been antigovernment protests, resulting in Chinese investors having been hurt. The government provides federal guards for the zone, but to ensure the safety and security at the zone, the operators employ about 300 of their own guards. 266 B. ROBINSON This was a common theme at all the Chinese operated zones in Africa—A strong security presence of government and private security personnel. In Nigeria, security was, and remains, a particular concern. The OgunGuangdong Free Trade Zone’s initial investment was going to be in Imo State, but during one of their exploratory visits to the State, some of the Chinese contingent were hijacked. This resulted in the eventual change of the Zone’s site to Ogun State. Even there, security is a constant concern—I was escorted to the zone with an armed Special Protection Unit (SPU) soldier to ensure my personal safety. Hijackings remain a constant problem in Nigeria, and often Chinese expatriates are targeted. Hijackers normally demand ransom, or the kidnappings are fuelled by fundamentalist religious groups—one of the worst atrocities was in 2014 when Boko Haram kidnapped 276 female students from the town of Chibok, and while some escaped or were freed over time, some still remain missing. Sometimes the cost for state security personnel and soldiers were also borne by the Zone’s operators, as was the case at the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone. While they had 180 security guards, 18 conventional police and 6 SPU’s, management at the Zone indicated that this simply wasn’t enough, and that they would probably have to double the number. 9.3 Government Policy Industrial policy with a specific focus on Special Economic Zones as an instrument of such policy, is a key driver of the adoption and success of Special Economic Zones by African Nations. Previous chapters 5 and 6 describe the policies that attract foreign investment and that are key success factors for Special Economic Zones, however, at this stage, it is necessary to highlight how policies are sometimes dichotomous in nature resulting in conflicting incentives and disincentives for investment. Some of these that were of major concern to Chinese operated Special Economic Zones in Africa are detailed below. 9.3.1 Export Orientation The export orientation of the Ethiopian government in the face of foreign reserve constraints, was a serious problem for existing zone operators and a deterrent to new zones been established. 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 267 The Ethiopian government required some zones and their investors to produce solely for export, and many companies had promised and agreed to do just that. Yet sometimes this just wasn’t feasible, for instance, the logistical costs of transporting manufactured goods from land-locked Ethiopia through the Port of Djibouti, made the end product price non-competitive in the global market for some goods. The policy also negated the economic rationale of importsubstitution—namely the production of goods locally that were previously imported, thus reducing the need for importing, which would in turn contribute to stabilising Ethiopia’s foreign reserve position. For instance, much of the textile manufacturing that was evident in the Eastern Industrial Park was almost entirely for the local Ethiopian market, which resulted in the country not needing to import these goods. This in addition to the obvious job creation and skills transfer that could also be an outcome of such industries. The policy also fails to recognise that industrial investment in Ethiopia could be motivated by the sheer size of the domestic 110 million plus population/market. The second, much larger, phase of the Eastern Industrial Park, was subject to much stricter export requirements which could deter the investment the zone hoped to attract. Another point worth making, is that the foreign currency problem makes it difficult for zone investors to access foreign currency in order to import raw materials and other goods necessary for production. Dollar accounts by investors may involuntarily be changed to Ethiopian Birr. Some companies have even closed as a result. It also restricts the ability to repatriate profits, thus de-incentivising investment—who would choose to invest when the fruits of the investment cannot be harvested? There didn’t seem to be such pressure on Nigerian SEZs to produce for export, with investors viewing this as advantageous. Many invested due to the sheer size of the Nigerian market, and their view was that them producing for the local market was better than having these consumer goods imported from elsewhere in the world. They also suggested that local production resulted in wider products ranges and cheaper products for the Nigerian consumer—“previously had to import ceramic tiles and was expensive, now a lot cheaper”. And of course, job creation was an important outcome, with this ceramic manufacturer directly employing 2000 workers. 268 B. ROBINSON 9.3.2 Import Restrictions Trade barriers do, however, exist in Nigeria which frustrate the ability of Chinese investors to run their operations efficiently, or enjoy the benefits of tax incentives provided to the Zones. A packaging company described the policy confusion they had experienced: Importing raw materials (pulp) was duty free, but after production into a carton box, they weren’t able to sell the product. The reason for this is that it is illegal to import a carton box. The fact that the raw materials had been imported resulted in the end product, the carton box, being deemed an import. So, they couldn’t sell the product. This resulted in the company been unable to operate for the first two years of their existence. They had managed to eventually ‘change’ the system in order for them to be allowed to sell the product. While they could carry themselves during that period, they provided two examples of Chinese companies who had eventually disinvested from the country because of this policy. 9.3.3 Currency Fluctuations Currency is included as a policy item as countries do manipulate exchange rates and often use foreign exchange reserves to prevent currency depreciation. A weak currency is normally regarded as good for exporters who earn more in local currency terms and bad for importers who have to pay more for goods in local currency terms. Since 2013, most African countries have lost 20% of their currency value, making it more and more expensive to import goods. Currency volatility has resulted in costs of cross-border transactions increasing significantly and contributed to liquidity shortages alluded to earlier (Nizard 2018). While not always under the control of government, the issue of currency fluctuations was a major concern for investors in Zambia’s Zone. The Zambian Kwacha’s mercurial exchange rate made it difficult for financial planning. 9.3.4 Policy Uncertainty Policy uncertainty was another concern raised by Chinese investors which made it difficult to plan their operations and investments—“same-day policy will change”. 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 269 A simple example was given. The ‘green-card’ renewal (working-visa) increased unexpectedly from US$1000 to US$2000. This was a tremendous increase in costs for some companies who employ Chinese nationals in Nigerian firms. A similar issue was experienced by the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. While the government provided a number of incentives to lure investment, these have changed. There was a perception that there were effectively no incentives available to the investors. 9.4 Corruption It is a well-known that African Nations all struggle with corruption. Considering the Corruption Perception Index of 2020 published by Transparency International, it becomes evident the seriousness of the problem. Sub-Saharan Africa scores the worst among the world’s regions with an average of 32 (100 being corruption free and 0 being completely corrupt). The Corruption Perception Index Map illustrates the degree of corruption in shades of yellow to red, red being significantly more corrupt that yellow—the African continent stands out with the darker shades of red. Figure 9.1 indicates the least and most corrupt countries in Africa in terms of the index. The Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019: Citizen’s Views and Experiences of Corruption provides even greater detail on the problem. The survey is extensive, covering 35 African countries with 47,000 participants. The findings are disturbing: 55% believed corruption had increased in the previous 12 months while 23% thought it had decreased; 59% believed their government were doing a poor job of tackling corruption and 34% thought their government was making progress in dealing with corruption; a quarter of participants who had utilised a public service in the preceding 12 months had had to pay a bribe which equates to approximately 130 million people, with the percentage being as high as 80% for participants in the Democratic Republic of Congo; while 67% of participants were fearful of retaliation if they reported corruption. Corruption is hindering Africa’s economic, political and social development. It is a major barrier to economic growth, good governance and basic freedoms, such as freedom of speech or citizens’ right to hold governments to account. (Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019) 270 B. ROBINSON Fig. 9.1 Corruption Perceptions Index 2020: sub-Saharan Africa While there is a view and some empirical research (Quazi et al. 2014) supporting the hypothesis that corruption increases Foreign Direct Investment in Africa—the so-called ‘helping hand’ of corruption facilitating commerce when institutional capital is lacking, there is also much evidence to refute this view. The ‘grabbing hand’ of corruption can be a huge unknown variable for investors and does detract from investors willingness to invest in Africa. The countries in which initial Chinese Special Economic Zones were situated were mostly those with ‘reasonable’ levels of perceived corruption: Mauritius is one of the best scores at 53; Ethiopia at 38; Egypt and Zambia at 33; and Nigeria at a lower 25. While Nigeria was low, it is still a far cry off from the bottom-rung score of 12 for South Sudan and Somalia. There are concerns that some of these countries are heading down the slippery slope of corruption, such as Zambia dropping five points of the Corruption Perceptions Index since 2013. 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 271 And those Chinese that have invested in Special Economic Zones do experience this ‘grabbing hand’ of corruption. The Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone had been severely impacted by corruption. As one of the Zone’s managers quipped, the zones may be “duty-free, but due to corruption, the duties are sometimes higher”. More detail of how this has had costly ramifications on Zones’ investors are detailed later in this chapter. 9.5 Infrastructure: Promises Made; Promises Broken The road and rail infrastructural differences between African Nations varies significantly, sometimes necessitating much investment in infrastructure for Zones to be feasible and efficient. The question is, who will foot the bill? Bräutigam and Tang (2011) describe how the infrastructure outside of the Zones’ perimeters are normally the host country’s responsibility, and the internal infrastructure, the responsibility of the Zone’s investors. This is not always the case though, for example, in Mauritius, the host government and the Jinfei consortium shared some of the external infrastructural costs. In Egypt, the government undertook to reimburse 30% of the cost of the Zone’s internal infrastructural investment. Some countries, such as South Africa, have reasonable infrastructure, and have in many cases invested in the zones’ internal infrastructure. The countries’ governments of the countries visited for the purposes of writing this book will be evaluated in terms of their commitment and carry-through on promises made in providing suitable infrastructure for the Zones. 9.5.1 Ethiopia Ethiopia’s government has embraced China’s willingness to invest in major infrastructural projects, resulting in some of the following major transport investment: the Addis Ababa modern light rail urban commuter ‘tram’ system; an extensive road network of urban and national roads; and the important Addis Ababa to Djibouti railway line that serves to connect land-locked Ethiopia to the world (Figs. 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4). 272 B. ROBINSON Fig. 9.2 Ethiopia’s Chinese built light-rail system in Addis Ababa Fig. 9.3 The imposing new railway stations on the outskirts of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa While these projects improve the efficiency of the city of Addis Ababa and support the logistics of importing and exporting, the road infrastructure has also directly linked the city to the Eastern Industrial Park (Fig. 9.5). 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 273 Fig. 9.4 Queues to board the modern carriages from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa Fig. 9.5 The 3-lane highway between Addis Ababa and the Eastern Industrial Park 274 B. ROBINSON 9.5.2 Zambia Zambia has reasonably good roads (the Chinese have contributed to the building of much of the more recent road infrastructure) and a railway line traverses the zones, thus connecting the Zone to essential routes to transport goods and materials. In the zone itself, no infrastructure was provided by the Zambian government, with the zone operators having to build all the roads and ensure their own water, sewerage and power provision. 9.5.3 Nigeria: Promises Broken Nigeria’s government, in this case the federal states, scored poorly in terms of delivering on their commitment to provide access road transport to the zone, and certainly no infrastructure was provided within the zone. While travelling by motor vehicle to the Lekki Free Zone in Lagos state is along rutted and congested roads, these were still manageable, and it was about a 2-hour journey to travel the 70 kilometres to reach the zone. This wasn’t the case when travelling the 65 kilometres to the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Ogun State. A journey of 3 hours to reach the zone, and 5 hours to return. The road weaved through chaotic urban scenes, eventually disintegrating into gravel roads in a terrible state. The fact that trucks would have to use these roads to transport goods between the Zone and the city of Lagos and its port, seemed improbable. Yet they did, with one truck wreckage identifying the risks of daily transport on these roads. There was evidence of roadworks—a concrete bridge structure that seemed abandoned, and then closer to the zone, the road suddenly improved. I was later to learn that these roads were been built by the Chinese Zone operators themselves out of sheer necessity due to the inaction of the Ogun State—a promise broken (Figs. 9.6 and 9.7). 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 275 Fig. 9.6 Seemingly abandoned rail or road construction Fig. 9.7 Truck weaving through the rutted roads 9.6 Inadequate Service Delivery In Special Economic Zones in China, on a scale second to none, the government has invested in infrastructure and service delivery capacity. The zones are exceptionally well planned, and everything needed to enable the zones’ success are generally provided. Most African zones don’t receive that level of infrastructural investment and service delivery. There are exceptions, such as the case study of South African Zones that follows, where the state has invested significantly in infrastructure. 276 B. ROBINSON This lack in investment and service provision results in many zone operators in Africa having to invest in basic services simply to be able to operate—roads, power, water, waste are the most important, and expensive of these (Fig. 9.8). The unreliability of electricity provision is ubiquitous with Africa for those lucky enough to have electricity—only 43% of Africans have access to electricity (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019). Companies operating in Africa struggle with poor reliability of power provision. Figures 9.9 and 9.10 provides a stark comparison of African companies versus other in the world when it comes to electrical outages and the necessity for independent power generation through the use of generators. Country differences are stark with business access to electricity in many African countries having less than 30% access reliability—many of these are in countries where Chinese Special Economic Zones operate such as Ethiopia, Zambia and Nigeria (Fig. 9.11). This has had a negative impact on Africa’s Special Economic Zones’ attractiveness to investors: South Africa’s Eskom, a state-owned enterprise mismanaged and crippled by corruption for many years, is grappling to re-build the once superior electricity supplier for the country and some of its neighbours. Loadshedding is the new reality. This has led to the Fig. 9.8 Lekki-Free Zone Water Treatment Plant 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 277 Fig. 9.9 Percentage of firms experiencing electrical outages (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019: 19) Fig. 9.10 Percentage of firms owning or sharing a generator (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019: 19) loss of investment such as the cancellation of Rio Tinto Alcan’s proposed US$2.7 billion smelter investment in the Coega Special Economic Zone, which held the promise of securing over 1000 jobs. 278 B. ROBINSON Fig. 9.11 Access to reliable electricity by firms (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019: 20) These power limitations has resulted in many of the Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa investing in their own power provision (Figs. 9.12 and 9.13). The cost of producing the power and the cost to investors is sometimes higher than the cost of purchasing from the national power grid, but the premium price paid for access to reliable electricity is for many a logical compromise. Consider a kiln that requires 24-hour operation: a power shutdown would have a number of costly 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … Fig. 9.12 Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone Power Plant Fig. 9.13 Lekki-Free Zone Power Plant 279 280 B. ROBINSON outcomes such as damage the product and result in labour hours lost; and the resultant loss of orders due to unreliability of production. Independent power provision provides the Chinese Zones in Africa with an enormous competitive advantage for attracting investment. In Ogun State, it was estimated that the government’s National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), now replaced by the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), was only able to provide about 3–4 hours of power per day—the Zone is therefore one of the few location options for a company wishing to invest in the state. Even having their own power plant wasn’t without its challenges. At the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, a gas pipeline fed the gas to the powerplant. However, the quality of the gas was sometimes substandard, and the reliability of supply of the gas was often erratic—“One month every year, no gas”—or the pressure too low. Terrorist attacks on the supply gas lines were one reason. The manager at the Power Plant mused on another—while Nigeria has vast petroleum resources, the government didn’t supply these to its own people, preferring to export these natural resources. The gas supply problem resulted in the Power Plant having to have a backup of diesel power generation, which was more expensive. Some companies in the Zone had opted to invest in their own power generation to secure their supply. This relatively more expensive supply detracted from the Zones global competitiveness for FDI from Chinese and other investors. Zambia’s local power provision by the state-owned Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation was also unable to keep with demand, resulting in 12–15 hours of loadshedding per day. The Chinese investors in the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone have invested US$27 million in building a sub-station to provide power for its investors. Interestingly, the power station is connected to the national grid and there is an undertaking by the Zambian government to pay this amount back (Fig. 9.14). 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 281 Fig. 9.14 The Zambia–China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Power Station 9.7 Ease of Business Red tape stifles the entrepreneurial spirit—difficulties in opening a company; outdated and burdensome regulations; inefficient state departments; fees, penalties and paperwork—all make business operations slow, inefficient and costly. The World Bank Group publishes an annual global report on the ease of doing business. ‘Doing Business’ according to their report refers to the ease of opening a business; getting a suitable location; accessing finance; dealing with day-to-day operations; and operating in a secure business environment—these are depicted in Fig. 9.15. Fig. 9.15 What is measured in Doing Business (Doing Business 2020) 282 B. ROBINSON Table 9.1 12 areas of business regulation (Doing Business 2020) Indicator set What is measured Starting a business Procedures, time, cost, and paid-in minimum capital to start a limited company for men and women Procedures, time, and cost to complete all formalities to build a warehouse and the quality control and safety mechanisms in the construction permitting system Procedures, time, and cost to get connected to the electrical grid; the reliability of the electricity supply; and the transparency of tariffs Procedures, time, and cost to transfer a property and the quality of the land administration system for men and women Movable collateral laws and credit information systems Minority shareholders’ rights in related-party transactions and in corporate governance Payments, time, and total tax and contribution rate for a firm to comply with all tax regulations as well as postfiling processes Time and cost to export the product of comparative advantage and to import auto parts Time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and the quality of judicial processes for men and women Time, cost, outcome, and recovery rate for a commercial insolvency and the strength of the legal framework for insolvency Flexibility in employment regulation Procedure and time to participate in and win a works contract through public procurement and the public procurement regulatory framework Dealing with construction permits Getting electricity Registering property Getting credit Protecting minority investors Paying taxes Trading across borders Enforcing contracts Resolving insolvency Employing workers Contracting with the government Their Doing Business 2020 report does not paint a good picture for Africa. Only two African countries score in the Top 50 rankings out of 190 countries in the survey—Mauritius (13) and Rwanda (38). Other notable countries were South Africa at an ‘average’ of (84) and Zambia at (85), but many Africa countries found themselves towards the end of the list: Nigeria (131), Ethiopia (159) and the usual culprits right at the bottom of the list, Eritrea (189) and Somalia (190). 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 283 If one considers Table 9.1, regulatory complexity, and its complementary inefficiency, is a key detractor to doing business. Simply registering a business, accessing electricity, obtaining permits, being able to trade across borders, employment regulations etc., when easy bolsters business, when difficult, becomes burdensome and a deterrent to foreign direct investment (Doing Business 2020). Three issues faced by zone operators and investors in respect of ease of business are highlighted below: the high level of bureaucracy; the value of an internal Special Economic Zone customs office; and an example of the impact of an inefficient and corrupt logistical environment on cross border trade. 9.7.1 Bureaucracy Bureaucracy was burdensome to most people at the zones. In Ethiopia a zone operator described the frustration of having to go into Addis Ababa four times to meet a government employee, and each time, he was a no-show—‘It takes patience’. An investor said that nobody wants to finish on time—no “tension”—when referring to an example of it taking 2 months to have a fixed telephone line installed by the state-owned telecommunications company. 9.7.2 Customs Office The Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Park had an efficient 1-stop service that included banks, police station, investment office, and customs office. The customs office was regarded as essential for the Zone’s efficiency. The customs office would allow containers to be directly imported without the necessity of going through multiple phases of import, and significantly reduced bureaucracy. The customs office includes over 20 Ethiopian customs inspectors, supervisors and administrative clerks to manage the responsibilities of trade by the Zone. Nigeria followed a similar route with the Lekki Free Zone, which sports a functional customs processing division with an electronic customs platform, although this wasn’t the case for the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone. 284 9.7.3 B. ROBINSON Port Efficiency and Corruption: A Case of Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone While this could probably have come under the heading of infrastructure, service delivery, or corruption; the port efficiency, or lack thereof, was a critical issue for the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone and posed a significant risk to the sustainability of the Zone. The Zone relied on importing critical materials and equipment, much of which was unobtainable in Nigeria, and which had to be imported from China. It can take three months to get a container through the port! It was described to me as a traffic jam in the port: “When container arrives, you have to send a truck. But the queue to get in and out, then you have to return the container and go through the same queues”. This has resulted in the transport fees of containers increasingly fourfold in the year prior to my visit. In addition, terminal and shipping charges had been increased as well. And then the corruption further exacerbates the problem. For instance, bribes are requested by the clearance agency. One investor called it the Xfactor: “You don’t expect it, but it happens”. He then continued to relay a recent experience: With an armed police escort from the Port of Lagos to the Zone, the truck driver was stopped (referring to it as the ‘illegal toll’) and asked on five occasions to pay a bribe. There are of course, some good examples of where government has made a commendable effort to enable successful Special Economic Zones and improve the ease of doing business in Africa. The following case study is one of those, detailing the South African government’s commitment to providing world class infrastructure in its Special Economic Zones. 9.8 Case Study: Government Commitment to Infrastructure of SEZs in South Africa South Africa’s transport infrastructure is amongst the best in Africa with an extensive rail and railroad network, although there has been a gradual decline in the quality of rail transport, resulting in greater reliance on more expensive road transport for the transport of goods. Port infrastructure is also good with a number of deep-sea terminals, where a number of special economic zones has been established. In addition, the government has invested tremendously in providing these zones with superior infrastructure. The Coega Special Economic 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 285 Zone in Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is one example, where the government has built access highways and access roads, as well as invested in the deep-water Port of Ngqhurha with various port facilities including container shipping infrastructure. The Port itself was the result of an investment of R10 billion (Coega Development Corporation 2021a) (Figs. 9.16 and 9.17). The Coega Development Company that operates this Special Economic Zone is wholly owned by the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, the province in which the zone is situated, a province considered to be one of the poorest in South Africa. The position of this zone and the East London Industrial development zone is indicative of national, regional and local governments’ desire to leverage the zones to facilitate a diversified economy that engenders socio-economic development. The Coega Special Economic Zone is considered the most successful of the South African Zones in terms of attracting investment and job creation. With the metropolitan area already sporting Volkswagen South Africa’s manufacturing plant, the zone has always sought to attract other automotive manufacturing companies and has been relatively successful in doing so. FAW and Isuzu and supporting industries have set up shop Fig. 9.16 Coega new access road system—waiting for investors 286 B. ROBINSON Fig. 9.17 Deepwater Port of Ngqhurha in the zone, but the most significant of such automotive investors is the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co., Ltd., branded as its acronym, BAIC. BAIC is a Chinese state-owned enterprise which invested in the region of ZAR 11 Billion (US$770 million [ZAR1 = $0.07]) in BAIC South Africa. The South African Industrial Development Corporation, a state development finance institution, owns 35% of the project (Fig. 9.18). Fig. 9.18 BAIC SA’s sprawling plant at the COEGA SEZ 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 287 BAIC SA’s plant is a Completely Knocked Down (CKD) Assembly Plant which includes an assembly plant, body shop, painting workshop, assembly of composed parts, car body interior decoration, testing, paint repair, and after sales service. The first phase of capacity is 50,000 vehicles, and the second phase, 100,000 vehicles (Coega Development Corporation 2021a). The socio-economic impact promises to be impressive. According to BAIC (Coega Development Corporation 2021a), direct jobs created is in the region of 1500, while the economy-wide job creation is estimated at 10,600 jobs. The economy-wide GDP impact in the province due to construction is estimated at R945.1 million (US$66 million [ZAR1 = $0.07]). So, why did BAIC select the Coega Special Economic Zone? A number of reasons are apparent. The South African market is one of these with 40% of vehicle output earmarked for this market. The South African base will also be a springboard into the rest of Africa, with 60% of production intended for export to other African Nations. It was also motivated by bilateral relations between the two countries, and is attributed as being an outcome of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit of 2015 held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and since then the investment has received visible support by the Chinese and South African Governments. Another likely reason for the BAIC investment though, was that the Coega Development Zone offered the best infrastructure necessary in Africa for such a plant to be efficient and competitive with access to local and international markets. Coega details some of their infrastructural competitiveness for attracting investment in their ‘Top 10 Reasons to Invest at Coega’ (Coega Development Corporation 2021b). Some of these are presented in Table 9.2. This chapter has illustrated both the enabling and disenabling impact of government, its leadership, and policy interventions on Chinese investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa. 9.9 Pillars and Protocols The pillars and protocols relevant to government evidenced in African SEZs have been benchmarked against those found in the Chinese SEZ model in Fig. 9.19. 288 B. ROBINSON Table 9.2 Abridged top 10 reasons to invest at Coega (Coega Development Corporation 2021b) Reason to invest Detail World class infrastructure All infrastructure is in place including roads, bulk water and sewer networks, telecommunications sleeve networks, electrical substations (HV and MV), and overhead power lines (although, noting the power limitations discussed earlier) • The zone is strategically positioned on the main Southern Hemisphere east–west shipping routes • It is served by two ports with exceptional container capacity and is the hub of container traffic served by the world’s top shipping lines; and has superior container, vehicle, breakbulk and bulk terminals • It is complemented by direct road and rail links to the rest of South and Southern Africa (noting, again, the constraints of the poor rail infrastructure within the region) • ICT Solutions for supply chain management, budgeting, procurement and financial management • Customs Control Areas (CCA) in the Logistics and Automotive Zones • In-house expertise in delivering infrastructural projects of all sizes within budget and on time • Full human relations support including recruitment, training and managing labour relations • Assistance with visa applications, work and study permits, applications for municipal services • Assistance with applying and optimising the benefits of incentives • Facilitation of environmental approvals and license requirements for project development • Customs services to assist with all South Africa Revenue Services (SARS) Customs Registrations and permit processes in preparation for approval of facility for operational phases • The Zones ‘Package of Plans’ approach allows statutory approvals for Site Development Plans and Building Plans to take place with 10 days • Systems are in place to assist investors with skills development • Advanced system for registering work-seeker and competency-based recruitment functionality • Apprenticeship training centre Other reasons to invest are also detailed, such as the range of incentives, robust governance to mitigate corruption, and the environmental attributes and lifestyle offered in the beautiful Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal area and its cities Regional and international logistics World class support systems One-Stop Investor Services Centre Skills development Other • Poor provision of services • Unreliable power provision • Results in zone operators to invest in basic service infrastructure • Contributes to increased costs • IntegraƟon of the zones with ciƟes and infrastructure was someƟme lacking • Lack of integraƟon between local, regional and naƟonal government Export orientaƟon Protocol 11: • The SEZs mostly had a strong focus on exports • Excessive focus on exports problemaƟc: • DiĸculƟes in imporƟng • Reduced importsubsƟtuƟon manufacturing • Most Chinese SEZs in Africa provide their own internal infrastructure • External infrastructure not Pillar 7: always provided, or obligaƟons not met by Infrastructure government • ExcepƟons, such as South Africa, which invests in SEZ infrastructure Government support Pillar 2: • Government support varies from significant to minimal, and tends to change over Ɵme and due to leadership changes • Diīerences in support can vary between naƟonal, regional and local level • PoliƟcal stability influences investment in SEZs Diversified industries Protocol 12: Ease of business Protocol 2: Government Policy Pillar 3: • Some degree of diversificaƟon • Tended to be focussed on the manufacturing sector and not the service industry • BureaucraƟc • Ineĸcient government administraƟon • Service delivery ineĸciency • CorrupƟon • SEZ policy driven by industrial policy • Policy uncertainty • ConflicƟng incenƟves and disincenƟves • Export orientaƟon limiƟng FDI • Import restricƟons • Currency fluctuaƟons problemaƟc • CorrupƟon not eīecƟvely addressed Fig. 9.19 The African SEZ pillars and protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones in Africa Modern Service Industry Protocol 6: IntegraƟon Pillar 6: Leadership support Pillar 1: • PoliƟcal leadership support varies significantly between countries • Support deteriorates, or improves, over Ɵme • Support can fluctuate with change of leadership 9 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ ENABLING (OR CONSTRAINING) … 289 290 B. ROBINSON References Blimpo, M., and M. Cosgrove-Davies. 2019. Electricity Access in SubSaharan Africa: Uptake, Reliability, and Complementary Factors for Economic Impact. Agence française de développement/The World Bank. Africa Development Forum series. Washington, DC: © World Bank [Online]. Accessed from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/ 10986/31333/9781464813610.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y. Accessed 17 Feb 2021. License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO). http://creative-commons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. Bräutigam, D., and X. Tang. 2011. China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies 49 (1): 27–54. Coega Development Corporation. 2021a. [Online]. Accessed from: http://www. coega.co.za/Default.aspx. Coega Development Corporation. 2021b. Top 10 Reasons to Invest at Coega [Online]. Accessed from: https://www.coega.co.za/files/2020/Top_10-Rea sons_to_Invest_at_Coega.pdf. Corruption Perception Index 2020 by Transparency International is Licensed under CC-BY-ND 4.0. Accessed from: https://www.transparency.org/en/ cpi/2020/index/nzl. Accessed 25 Apr 2021. Doing Business. 2020. Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies. World Bank [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.wor ldbank.org/handle/10986/32436. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. Global Corruption Barometer Africa. 2019. Citizen’s Views and Experiences of Corruption by Transparency International Is Licensed Under CC-BY-ND 4.0. Accessed from: https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/gcb-afr ica-2019. Accessed 25 Apr 2021. Fei, D., and C. Liao. 2020. Chinese Eastern Industrial Zone in Ethiopia: Unpacking the Enclave. Third World Quarterly 41 (4): 623–644. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1694844. Marc, A., N. Verjee, and S. Mogaka. 2015. The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa. Africa Development Forum. Washington, DC: World Bank; and Agence Française de Développement. © World Bank. https://openknowl edge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22033. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. Nizard, R. 2018. Currency Risk in Africa: Easing in 2018, but Reserves Have Melted, Coface Economic Publications [Online]. Accessed from: https:// www.coface.com/News-Publications/Publications/Currency-Risk-in-Africaeasing-in-2018-but-reserves-have-melted. Accessed 26 Apr 2021. Quazi, R., V. Vemuri, and M. Soliman. 2014. Impact of Corruption on Foreign Direct Investment in Africa. International Business Research 7 (4): 1–10. PART IV The African Model of Special Economic Zones CHAPTER 10 Towards Impactful Special Economic Zones in Africa This book has considered Special Economic Zones in China and the lessons that their successes, and sometimes failures, have for African Special Economic Zones; the factors that attract investment in zones by the Chinese and others; the socio-environmental impacts of zones, and the enabling or constraining impact host governments and their policy interventions have had on the success of these Zones. Chinese owned and operated Zones in Africa, and non-Chinese African Zones have been evaluated through a variety of case studies and the sharing of insights from investors garnered during visits to a variety of Zones on the African continent. Special Economic Zones that have been relatively successful and that provide insights into the face of African Special Economic Zones of the future are reflected upon in this chapter—these are the Special Economic Zones in Mauritius and Rwanda. Taking the lessons from the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones and introducing some home-grown lessons from the Mauritian and Rwanda case studies, the Pillars and Protocols are revisited and reflected upon in terms of their propensity to attract Chinese investment to Africa’s Special Economic Zones. Three new Arches are introduced to the model, which is then renamed the African Model of Special Economic Zones. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9_10 293 294 B. ROBINSON 10.1 Rwanda’s Kigali Special Economic Zone Rwanda. What image is the first that comes to mind? Unfortunately, probably the Rwandan genocide. The country has had a turbulent past with Hutu and Tutsi tensions often spilling over into violent ethnic conflict. The Hutus make up the majority of the population, but Tutsi’s historically dominated the political arena, initially through a monarchy, and then through political means. This was the case during the country’s colonial period under the German and Belgian empires and continued after their independence in 1962. Tensions escalated into a full-scale civil war in 1990, quelled by an uneasy ceasefire in 1993. The shooting down of past-President Habyarimana’s plane in 1994 that killed him, changed all that, and sparked one of the worst genocides ever. We will never know how many people were killed during the period of 100 days—estimates vary between 800,000 and 1,000,000 of the 7 million plus population of the time. Most of those that were killed were Tutsis, with the perpetrators principally being Hutus. The Tutsidominated Rwandan Patriotic Front managed to eventually regain power which resulted in a mass exodus of Hutus to neighbouring countries. The period that followed was one of reconciliation and justice, and the country slowly re-built itself. 10.1.1 From Ashes to Rejuvenation While the genocide will forever be a part of the country’s history, the country of 1994 and the 2020’s is vastly different. Visit Rwanda is the country’s official website, and the website declares ‘Rwanda is open for tourism’. The country has not hidden its past, and instead has created opportunities for future generations to learn from past mistakes, while allowing survivors and those affected by the genocide the opportunity to heal—the Kigali Genocide Memorial and others are remembrance memorials to the atrocities of the past. While dark tourism may be an attraction for some visitors, the country has gone out of its way to promote is natural beauty and wildlife. It has re-populated game reserves with the Big 5, it has become a beacon of wildlife preservation through initiatives such as the Kwita Izina Gorilla Naming Ceremony, and it sports world class accommodation along the banks of Lake Kivu. The country promotes tourism through a number of avenues including through the sponsorship of the Arsenal football team. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 295 President Paul Kagame is regarded as a visionary African leader who has spearheaded the revival of Rwanda’s socio-economic development. While not without his detractors, having been accused of political repression, he has focussed on an array of initiatives that have made a huge impact on the country. Tourism is one of the industries that he has focussed on with its ability to absorb labour, but there has been an array of other initiatives, including Special Economic Zones. Cumulatively, these efforts have resulted in phenomenal and stable increases in the GDP of the country (Fig. 10.1), and in 2019 the GDP growth for the country was a healthy 9.46%. As a land-locked country, dependant on overland transport through Uganda and Kenya for trade purposes, a lack of natural resources, and a reputation for instability, the country had and still has many hurdles on the road to achieve its objective of transitioning from a Low Income Fig. 10.1 Rwanda’s GDP from 1960 to 2020 (Word Bank 2021) 296 B. ROBINSON to becoming a Middle Income Country by 2035 and High Income Country by 2050. Rwanda’s 7 Years Government Programme: National Strategy for Transformation (NSTi) 2017–2024 (2021) is a key development policy of the country. The NST1 rests on three ‘Pillars’ of economic transformation, social transformation, and transformational governance. Economic transformation in the NST1 prioritises the creation of 1.5 million jobs; increase sustainable urbanisation from 18.4 to 35%; and modernise and increase the productivity of agriculture and livestock. The wording then gets interesting, and paints a farsighted vision for a modern, technologically advanced, diversified, services oriented, and green economy. The transformation aims to establish Rwanda as a globally competitive knowledge-based economy; promote industrialisation with an export base of high-value goods (air-transport favours high-value for such a landlocked country) and services with the aim of growing exports by 17% per annum; increase domestic savings; position Rwanda as a hub for financial services to promote investment; and promote sustainable management of the environment and natural resources towards being a green economy. 10.1.2 Facilitating Investment Through a Business-Friendly Environment The Rwanda Development Board (RDB) (2021) is the Rwandan government’s key tool to do this. It is under the direct supervision of the Office of the President, signifying the priority attached to its operations. It was established in 2008 and was the result of a merger of eight government institutions, and in so doing, significantly reduced red-tape and bureaucratic hurdles, in a type of one-stop shop. The RDB claims to have been modelled on international best practice. It provides the services of investment promotion, investment deals negotiation, tourism and conservation, skills development, one-stop investors’ services, and export and Special Economic Zone Development. The RDB (2021) website declares a number of reasons for investors to consider Rwanda for investment. These include the economic growth prospects and stability of the economy of the country; the businessfriendly environment of the country; low levels of corruption and government transparency; an educated youthful population with a growing number of tertiary graduates; and a well-connected airline. In addition, it 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 297 has positioned itself as 4IR ready, with the best network readiness in the region and 95% 4G LTE network coverage with over 7000 km of fibre. The country prides itself on an investor friendly environment, ranking 38 on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, and is 2nd in Africa in this regard. It assesses and revises its business environment on an annual basis and introduces investor-friendly reforms where shortcomings are identified. Business registration is free and quick—6 hours to register a business. The one-stop center assists with investment and postinvestment support—a dedicated team will guide the investor throughout the process. Visas and work permits are relatively easy to obtain on arrival, with exclusions allowed for residents of African Union member countries. Incentives are significant. A seven-year tax holiday is provided for investment of more than US$50 Million. Corporate income tax is 15% if 50% of production is exported outside the region or investment is in specific high priority sectors; and 0% tax is payable if the regional headquarters are in Rwanda. Accelerated first-year depreciation rate of 50%. Duty free imports of machinery and inputs within the East African Community. There are specific incentives geared towards priority industries, for instance, ICT firms are allowed VAT exemptions on IT equipment. There are no restrictions on foreign ownership; no restriction on capital flows; and capital gains tax exemptions are provided on the sale or transfer of shares. Chinese investment in the country are clearly discernible: The Kigali City Tower, the tallest building in Kigali, was built by the Chinese as well as numerous public and private buildings; public service facilities; and many roads and other infrastructure are thanks to the Chinese government and Chinese investors. The fact that Kigali has so little in terms of minerals and other extractive resources and their landlocked status that limits exports in any case, supports the view that while China does covet Africa’s abundant resources, this is not the only motivation for their investment. 10.1.3 The Kigali Special Economic Zone Special economic zones are one way the country intends achieving its ambitious objectives. The country introduced Special Economic Zones regulations in 2010 providing the framework for zones, and the Rwandan Development Board proactively marketed the licensing of Zones in the hope of attracting developers and operators of Special Economic Zones. 298 B. ROBINSON The Kigali Special Economic Zone (2020) (Fig. 10.2) was a merger between the previous initiatives of the Kigali Free Trade Zone and the Kigali Industrial Park. Prime Economic Zones Ltd is the promoter, developer and operator of the zone with socio-economic development objectives as the primary goal—job creation and skills transfer; technological transfer; increased tax revenue thanks to an increased tax base; environmental protection; industrial development including sectors requiring specialised infrastructure; import substitution; and export growth and diversification. It has accessed over US$100 million to develop the zone in two phases. The first phase provided for the provision of superior service infrastructure of roads, power, water, as well as fibre optic cables, with a total of 97 plots over 98 hectares. The second phase of about double the size, with one particular plot earmarked as an ICT Park. The Zone has been relatively successful in attracting foreign investors in the following industries: Construction, manufacturing, agro processing and food processing, beverages, textiles clothing and leather, wholesale Fig. 10.2 Kigali Special Economic Zone 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 299 pharmacy services, import and distribution, printing, removal services, transport services, and a university. A number of companies are hightech firms—a particular focus of Rwanda’s economic development policy mentioned before. Many companies target the local market, indicating a focus not solely of export, but import substitution. An interesting resident of the Kigali zone is Carnegie Mellon University Africa (2021). The presence of the university signifies a strong focus towards developing critical skills, in this case engineering skills in the country. The University offers technological programmes, namely the Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering; Master of Science in Information Technology; Master of Science in Engineering Artificial Intelligence; and an option to specialise in a particular area of innovation. Chinese investors began investing in the zone early in its history, and investments include textile factories, paper companies, construction companies and more, including the Beijing Construction Engineering Group and China Star Construction (Fig. 10.3). The Kigali Special Economic Zone is relatively new and continues to evolve, but early indications seem to be that it is attracting investment by the Chinese and global firms, and it is contributing to job creation Fig. 10.3 China Star Construction in the Kigali Special Economic Zone 300 B. ROBINSON Fig. 10.4 Carnegie Mellon University Africa in the Kigali Special Economic Zone and skills transfer, and investments such as the Carnegie Mellon University Africa (Fig. 10.4) is entrenching the zone as an innovation hub for Rwanda, the region, and the continent. So, the question can be posed, what has facilitated the relative success of the Zone? 10.1.4 Critical Success Factors of the Kigali Special Economic Zone—A Reflection of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones To answer the question above, let’s consider the Pillars and Protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zone, but only in terms of what sets the zone and the country context apart from its peers—these are illustrated in Figs. 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, and 10.11. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA Fig. 10.5 Pillar 1 of Leadership support Pillar 1: Leadership support Fig. 10.6 Pillar 3 of supportive government policy • President Paul Kagame has personally driven the economic transformaƟon of Rwanda • Rwanda Development Board under direct supervision of the Presidents Oĸce Pillar 3: Government Policy Fig. 10.7 Protocol 1 of a phased approach Protocol 1: Phased approach Fig. 10.8 Protocol of ease of business Protocol 2: Ease of business Fig. 10.9 Protocol 4 of innovation and learning Protocol 4: InnovaƟon and learning 301 • Closely aligned to socio-economic policy • Clear objec ves and long – term outlook • Willingness to experiment and make mistakes – thus informing future efforts • Modelled on internaƟonal best pracƟces • Annual business environment revision and investor-friendly reforms • Reduced bureaucracy • Significant support for investors • Simplified local government administraƟon • Kigali could be considered a ‘Pilot city of innovaƟon’ • High-tech focus with appropriate ICT infrastructure • InnovaƟon a priority • Carnegie Mellon University Africa – criƟcal skills terƟary educaƟon 302 B. ROBINSON Fig. 10.10 Protocol 7 of environmental consideration Fig. 10.11 Protocol 12 of diversified industries Protocol 7: Environmental consideraƟon Protocol 12: Diversified industries • Environmental issues are an important consideraƟon • SEZ is not exclusively focussed on industrialisa on and export • Factors such as import subs tu on and job crea on also priori sed • SEZ focussed on wide range of related industries 10.2 Mauritius: An Island of a Special Economic Zone Borrowing a reference previously used in the book Kobus Jonker and I authored entitled China’s Impact on the African Renaissance, Nobel Prize laureate VS Naipul referred to Mauritius in 1972 as an overcrowded barracoon (barracks on slave ships) and that the country’s ‘problems defy solution’, while another Nobel prize winning economist James Meade suggested in 1968 that ‘the outlook for peaceful development is weak’. There was good reason for such views of Mauritius at the time. The country had recently acquired independence and the period before independence was marred by racial tensions within the multicultural society. Population growth was a concern, and with a monoculture of sugar production, there was scant hope that the economy could be revitalised significantly to provide hope for the well-being of the population. The selection of Mauritius and Rwanda as the final Chapter’s case studies was deliberate. Both of the countries were in a terrible state after the genocide of Rwanda and the racial tensions of Mauritius. Neither had much of an economy, with Rwanda’s subsistence agricultural sector, and Mauritius’ main industry being limited to the sugar industry. Neither country has much in terms of minerals and energy resources. The populations were mostly unskilled with limited educational facilities. And both were isolated, Rwanda was land locked with poor logistical access to the world’s markets, and Mauritius is an archipelago of islands deep in the 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 303 Indian Ocean. Yet, both countries have defied the odds and become two of Africa’s flagship economies, and both have adopted Special Economic Zones as a key tool in economic development. Mauritius is, however, the benchmark, with undoubtedly the most successful adoption of the Special Economic Zone framework than elsewhere on the continent. 10.2.1 Sailing Ahead in Economic Development The ‘Mauritius Miracle’ is what it is now called—the way the country managed to engender a harmonious multi-cultural environment and achieve phenomenal socio-economic growth. It is now classified as an Upper Middle Income country. How did this happen? Firstly, the ethnic tensions didn’t immediately dissipate. After elections, political tensions were high. The country was initially characterised by violent strikes, protests, political shenanigans, and a state of emergency, but democratic principles and political freedom eventually took its course and the country settled down. It is now regarded as a beacon of hope for multiculturalism, where the various ethnic groups and religions have aligned themselves towards bettering the well-being for all. If one takes a look at the GDP trajectory (Fig. 10.12), it has shown a phenomenal increase since the 1980s. Quite similar in fact to Rwanda’s growth spurt, although GDP growth doesn’t quite match that of Rwanda’s, but varies between a satisfactory 3–5% GDP growth per annum since 2010, with GDP growth rate of 3.015 in 2019. How did the country achieve this commendable growth? From the early days of independence, Mauritius invested heavily in the education of its people. In 2019 it had a 99% gross primary school enrolment and 99% completion rate; 89% lower secondary completion rate; and a relatively high 40% gross tertiary school enrolment (The World Bank 2021). The country has transitioned to a well-skilled labour force which has allowed it to diversify into the services sector, and services now accounts for the bulk of its GDP. And improving peoples’ lives has always been the heart of their social policy as the country embraced a comprehensive social welfare system. If one considers the Human Development Index, Mauritius scored 0.804 in 2020 which is in the ‘very high human development category’, indicative of the success they have achieved in this regard (Human Development Report 2020). 304 B. ROBINSON Fig. 10.12 GDP Mauritius (The World Bank 2021) It has also leveraged the limited natural resources it had. The established sugar industry allowed it to develop its export market and bring in foreign exchange, helped along by preferential trade agreements. The natural beauty of the country lent itself to diversifying into the tourism market, and the islands now support a successful tourism industry. The economy has been well managed through conservative fiscal and monetary policy. Good governance and strong institutions contribute towards it providing an enabling environment for business. If one considers the Corruption Perceptions Index (2020), sub-Saharan Africa achieved a low 32/100, while Mauritius achieved 53/100, and ranked 52 out of 180 countries, much higher than most of its African peers. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 305 The country was proactive in providing incentives for foreign direct investment and encouraged the investment by exporters through duty free imports of supplies and investor friendly labour market regulations. And, it made use of Special Economic Zones. 10.2.2 Export Processing Zones Mauritius was a pioneer of Special Economic Zones in Africa having experimented with them since the 1970s after the Export Processing Zone Act was passed. What was interesting, and quite different from many of the other Special Economic Zones in Africa, is that the zone concept was not restricted to a specific geographical area, but rather, the legislation and benefits applied to the entire country. At this early stage, fiscal incentives were introduced, which included protective import duties on certain supplies and equipment, various rebates on import duties, and long-term concessionary loans. Ease of business was facilitated through a range of initiatives. Tax incentives on manufacturing inputs immediately provided the zone with a competitive edge for export-orientated industries. Complementing the competitive edge was that at that stage, labour rates were quite low, although this changed over time. Government also invested significantly in improving infrastructure to support the zone, as well as provided marketing backing for products manufactured in the zone. Interestingly, the sugar and textile industry provided the capital needed to support and stimulate the zone (Zafar 2011). The initial phase was geared towards manufacturing and contributed significantly to GDP growth due to capital accumulation, and unemployment reduction—employment growth averaged 5.2% and unemployment dropped from 20% in the early 1980s to approximately 2% in the late 1980s. By the end of the 1980’s more people worked in the zone than in the agricultural sector and manufactured goods’ contribution to GDP tripled. Most goods were exported to Europe due to preferential trade agreements for the country, while Asian countries were facing restrictions in their countries through trade barriers such as quotas (Zafar 2011). The 1990s saw growth continue, but mostly as a result of total factor productivity, thanks to economic reforms and human capital improvements, and demand for manufactured goods, especially textiles and clothing goods. While the Zone initially had a focus on some primary industries, such as these industries, this quickly evolved. With having a 306 B. ROBINSON strong export focus, the zone encouraged investment by a range of industries, allowing for much diversification. Early on in its history, the zones began exploring the services sector, and had great success in the banking and financial services sector, as well as the ICT services sector. This is evidenced by the decline of primary sector production from 23% of the economy in 1976 to 6% in 2010; the secondary sector increased from 23 to 28% for the same period; and the tertiary sector saw a boost from 50 to 70% of GDP, again for the same period (Zafar 2011). Today, Mauritius continues to attract investment and grow through a number of incentives and opportunities the country has to offer: It provides global market access through the various preferential tariffs and trading blocs membership such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Southern African Development Community where various exemptions and reductions are provided on corporate tax. There are no duties on exports, and while there is VAT on exports, these are reimbursable on exportation of the end product. Accelerated depreciation allowances are available. No registration duty or land transfer duty is payable on land for high-tech manufacturing. High-tech industries are offered investment tax credits. Tax incentives for Research and Development Rebates are offered on sea- and air-freight expenses. Ease of business includes simple procedures for recruitment of foreign labour with an 8-year work permit allowance. Property purchases by non-residents is allowed (Mauritius Economic Development Board 2021). This trend continues. Mauritius now shares its insights and experiences with other African countries wishing to establish Special Economic Zones, and through its Economic Development Board and the Mauritius Africa Fund, Mauritius is assisting with the Senegal Cargo Villa, the Ivory Coast’s Technology Parks, Ghana’s Technology Park; and Madagascar as it introduces SEZ legislation. 10.2.3 The Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone: Not Living up to Expectations The relationship between China and Mauritius goes back centuries. From the 1700s, Chinese migration to Mauritius occurred on a staggered basis, many entering various trades on the islands and becoming increasingly important to the economy of the country. While not a huge population, the Sino-Mauritian population add to the cultural diversity of the country. The Mauritian Export Processing Zone provided another boost to this 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 307 migration, as more Chinese were attracted to the opportunities that the country had to offer. On an economic and diplomatic level, the relationship between the two countries has also continued to grow in strength, with the investment in Mauritius by the Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, and the Free Trade Agreement that came into being on the 1st of January 2021—the first between China and an African nation. While the Export Processing Zones have been a huge success for Mauritius, historically, Mauritian exporters have struggled to penetrate the Chinese market. There are a number of reasons for this according to Iqbal Khan (2020). One is that Mauritian wages increased more rapidly than even China’s wage rates, which was exacerbated by the introduction of minimum wages in Mauritius. This made input costs for products expensive, thus uncompetitive for the Chinese market. To address this, some Mauritian exporters have begun outsourcing production to countries such as Madagascar—close to Mauritius and with much lower wage rates. Another reason is the scale of production. Chinese importers generally require huge volumes of products, while Mauritius simply isn’t able to produce on such a scale. Finally, China and Mauritius export many similar products, for instance, textiles, so there would be little need to import products from Mauritius as China already produces these goods for export. The Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone had a rocky start for some of the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, and over time has failed to attract the wished-for level of investment. It was launched in 2006 as one of the five Chinese owned and operated zones in Africa. It was regarded as a springboard into Africa and was originally intended to attract light industry exporting to Africa. The global economic crisis in 2008 also played a role, negatively impacting investment. It didn’t live up to expectations in terms of investment and job creation. And it certainly doesn’t compare well with the other Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa evaluated in this book, such as the Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Park, the Chambishi Multi-facility Zone in Zambia, and the Lekki and Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zones of Nigeria. The Mauritian government eventually retracted 80% of the land leased to the zone (Khan 2020) and a strategic re-think was required. One outcome of the Zone has been the Jinfei Smart City, established through a collaboration between China and Mauritius, and completion is expected in 2022. It aims to be a ‘pioneer for innovation and high-end technology 308 B. ROBINSON in Mauritius’. It comprises a residential area (Eden Square) and conference, leisure and tourist area (Noah Wealth Center). It encompasses four primary sectors of culture and tourism; finance and business; logistics and education (Jinfei Smart City 2021). While the Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone may have disappointed both the Chinese and Mauritian government and the earlier investors in the zone, it is important to note that Mauritius, as a countrywide zone, did attract Chinese investors. Mauritius is also a viable entry point for export into Africa, and which Chinese investors are attracted to. Statistics Mauritius (2018) provides some insights in this regard (Figures are in Mauritian Rupees: 0.023 US$ = 1 Mauritian Rupee, 29 July 2021). In 2018, total exports were 80,569 million rupees of which re-exports were 16,648 million rupees. China does not feature in the Top 20 Countries exported to except in terms of re-export where China was the final destination for 614 million rupees worth of goods. Imports from China are significant at 25,162 million rupees, just below the higher value of imports from India at 31,799 million rupees. It is worthwhile reflecting on Mauritian trade regionally, and exports to COMESA are 7914 million rupees and 13,384 to SADC. Dentons (2017) raise the interesting question as to how much of these imports from China are destined for African nations—unfortunately data on this unclear, but it could be significant, highlighting the potential Mauritius has as a springboard for China into Africa. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment remains significant and was only second to France in 2016 at US$70 million (Dentons 2017). Some of the larger Chinese multinationals have set up shop in Mauritius: Huawei established itself in 2002 and has 300 employees with a localisation rate of 50%; China Construction Eight Engineering Division won the bid to expand the Mauritius Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport in 2009; ZTE Corp and Sinohydro Corp have established offices; China State Construction Engineering Corp and China International Telecommunication Construction Corp. have a foothold in the country; and the China Development Bank has a workgroup in Mauritius (CGTN 2018). There is also a Chinese Business Chamber that represents over 300 businesspeople and professionals with Chinese business interests on the Island and aims to be a point of contact for potential investors in the country (Mauritius Finance Network 2021). Chinese investment shows little sign of abating. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 10.2.4 309 Mauritius of the Future Mauritius isn’t resting on its laurels and continues to consider new and innovative ways to attract investment, be competitive, and improve the well-being of the people. While writing this final Chapter, South Africa had just experienced its worst civil unrest since apartheid years, characterised by violence, extensive looting destroying billions of Rands worth of business capital and resulting in mass infrastructural damage, and a killing spree that left hundreds of people dead. An article appears shortly thereafter in an online media report entitled ‘The cost and time it takes South Africans to move to Mauritius’ (Businesstech 2021). Mauritius has for a long time been South Africans preferred holiday, and a favourite honeymoon, destination. It is a short flight from Johannesburg and no visa is required. Mauritius is aggressively marketing their country to South Africans wishing to migrate away from the perceived safety and security issues and the some of the governments transformation policies, but who also wish to be in close enough proximity to South Africa to visit family and friends. It is targeting those with skills, expertise, an entrepreneurial spirit, and … money. To obtain residency requires less that R6 million (US$420,000 at an exchange rate of ZAR1 = $0.07) to buy a luxury property, and in so doing, receive residency for three generations. The tax rate of 15% in Mauritius for individuals is a lot less than the tax scale of 18–45% for South Africans, the 45% rate being for income of over R1,656,601 per annum. There is also no capital gains tax or estate duty. This is just one innovative ploy the Mauritian government is employing to lure money, skills, and foreign direct investment to the country. It continues to evolve its Special Economic Zone model to ensure its relevance and attractiveness in a competitive global environment. It is a benchmark that other African nations aspire towards. 10.2.5 Key Learnings from Mauritius in Terms of the Pillars and Protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones The key learnings from the Mauritius case study in terms of the Pillars and Protocols of the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones are illustrated in Figs. 10.13, 10.14, 10.15, 10.16, 10.17, 10.18, 10.19, and 10.20. 310 B. ROBINSON Fig. 10.13 Pillar 3: Government Policy Pillar 3: Government Policy Fig. 10.14 Pillar 4: Location Pillar 4: LocaƟon Fig. 10.15 Pillar 5: People Pillar 5: People Fig. 10.16 Pillar 6: Integration Pillar 6: IntegraƟon • Closely aligned to socio-economic policy • Adapted to changing economic circumstances • Policy evolved • Willingness to experiment and make mistakes – thus informing future eīorts • Springboard into Africa • Provides investors an opportunity to take advantage of preferenƟal trade policies with countries and regions of the world • A strong focus on educaƟon • Resultant high-level of skills • Supported high-tech and services industries • Limited labour market regulaƟons • The approach of the zones was integrated • The Zone was not geographically delimited, but applied to the enƟre country. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA Fig. 10.17 Protocol 1: Phased approach Protocol 1: Phased approach Fig. 10.18 Ease of business Protocol 2: Ease of business Fig. 10.19 Protocol 12: Diversified industries Protocol 12: Diversified industries Fig. 10.20 Protocol 10: Social System Protocol 10: Social System 10.3 311 • Phased approach developed as lessons were learnt and mistakes made • Adapted to economic change internally and externally • Ease of business prioriƟsed in the early versions of the Zone • SEZs were not exclusively focussed on industrialisaƟon • Not exclusively focussed on exports • Supported a wide range of industries • The social system was key consideraƟon by government • Zone were integral to inclusive development objecƟves The Lessons and Investments from China for Africa This final section of the book attempts to bring together the various issues that have been evaluated and discussed throughout. It does this from the African perspective of the lessons learned from the Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones and the critical issues for Chinese investors in Africa. From this evaluation, some wisdom is drawn of how the model 312 B. ROBINSON can be contextualised to the African context to contribute to more effective Special Economic Zones on the continent—these are represented as Arches that complement the Chinese Special Economic Zone model, encapsulated as the African Model of Special Economic Zones. 10.3.1 Pillar 1: Leadership Support ‘Shenzhen Speed’—originally ascribed to the erection of the Guomao high-rise building in the city and which is now synonymous with the phenomenal success of this Chinese Special Economic Zone—has its Chinese leaders to thank for the accomplishment of the building and the zone. Xi Jinping, and the visionary leaders before him such as Deng Xiaoping, provide the top governmental support to ensure success. Chinese investors in Special Economic Zones in Africa were bolstered with confidence when they perceived both their and their African counterparts’ leadership, were supporting the zones. Such support often resulted in funding opportunities, business opportunities, good marketing, and reduced the risk of operating businesses in foreign African countries. While a critical issue for Chinese investors, this leadership support in Africa was not always evident—leadership sometimes changed as did leadership understanding and support of the zones; and political leaders occasionally reneged on their initial commitments. Leadership was sometimes conflicted between political aspirations and socio-economic objectives, such as instances in South Africa, where labour policies were influenced by the political might of unions within political alliances. Yet if we consider Rwanda with President Kagame at the helm, we note a country with clear leadership vision. Personal attention and support for the development institutions that house the Special Economic Zones provided an enabling environment for the zone to thrive. Rwanda, therefore, serves as an example of how Special Economic Zones can and should be supported to ensure their ability to contribute to a country’s sustainable development objectives. 10.3.2 Pillar 2: Government Support Government support is obviously closely related to leadership, but it is more than just one person that can make a difference to the effectiveness of Special Economic Zones in Africa, the entire government has to act in unison in their support in zones. And this applies to national, 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 313 regional and local government structures, where unfortunately in Africa, there sometimes seems to be a dichotomous approach to policy towards zones. From the case studies, it appears as though some countries provided exceptional support for special economic zones, providing the necessary fiscal incentives, good infrastructure, and introduced interventions minimising red tape and bureaucratic hurdles, while others did not. These were all critical issues for Chinese investors in their investment decision. Needless to say, government should not be an impediment to special economic zones. Corrupt and incompetent government officials in Africa were found to compromise infrastructural support—the broken promises of infrastructural provision—while corruption increased costs doing business. The Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone was severely impacted by such problems which would likely limit future investment in the zone and may even result in disinvestment by existing investors. Political stability in the country and within regional and national political structures is a critical condition for investment. It can be assumed that the relative stable government and peaceful situation in Mauritius and Rwanda contributed to Chinese willingness to invest in these countries. This aspect warrants a new support structure in the African Model of Special Economic Zones, namely African Arch 1 of Peace, safety and security (Fig. 10.21). Fig. 10.21 African Arch 1: Peace, safety and security 314 B. ROBINSON 10.3.3 Pillar 3: Government Policy Government policy towards Special Economic Zones in China was integrated into its general socio-economic objectives. It was also organic in nature. It constantly evolved over time as lessons were learnt and circumstances changed, while maintaining a long-term perspective that contributed to stability. Policy makers were not afraid of making mistakes, these mistakes informed future policy. That is why this particular Pillar is represented as cyclical in nature. Policy was sometime clear in Africa, sometimes ambiguous, and at times policy makers lacked understanding or insight into the role of Special Economic Zones in their development objectives. This policy uncertainty was a significant deterrent to investment by Chinese investors! This makes sense. If an investment is made in a Zone based on fiscal incentives that it promises, investors want to be assured that these incentives remain in place during the duration of their long-term investment. Failure to do so could have serious consequences on the projected returns on the investment. Conflicting policy or poorly considered policy was also a problem. Take for instance the export orientation of Ethiopia’s Special Economic Zones. Instead of considering the value of import substitution and benefits of job creation, export conditions on zones were stifling investment. They also made little sense as certain industries were simply not able to compete internationally for a number of reasons, such as the cost of transport due to Ethiopia’s landlocked position and the distance to the port. Countries such as Rwanda and Mauritius have followed some of the examples set by China and introduced Special Economic Zone policy that is in harmony with clear socio-economic objectives that the country has set. Both have also allowed for a regular process of evaluation, thus learning from successes and failures of their policy, and allowed for flexibility in adapting to a rapidly changing global world. 10.3.4 Pillar 4: Location Location is of paramount importance, and China selected locations based on the criteria of access to domestic, regional and international markets. Shenzhen was earmarked due to its proximity to Hong Kong, which allowed for relatively easy distribution of goods produced to the global 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 315 market, but also facilitated Foreign Direct Investment from Hong Kong to Mainland China. Location was mostly well chosen by African Special Economic Zones. Location to the domestic market was an important consideration for some investors who wanted to sell goods on the domestic market, although this was not always possible due to the export orientated policy of the country. Regional access was also a consideration for investors, such as Mauritius being regarded as a springboard into Africa. Unfortunately, trade with neighbouring countries was often constrained by trade barriers or poor infrastructure. Adoption, and more importantly, implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) holds much promise to free up regional trade. Such a trading bloc could negotiate preferential agreements with other trading blocs. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could complement AfCFTA and facilitate significant trade between African nations and the rest of the world. The importance of unrestrained trade warrants the inclusion of the second African arch, namely African Arch 2: Inter and Intra-African continental trade (Fig. 10.22). While access to markets was one consideration, some zones were selected for other, justifiable, reasons: Being close to industrial hubs facilitates an efficient supply chain and provides a market for goods; raw materials availability in the area; for mining companies, zones would need to be in the heart of the mining activity where mineral resources are found. Labour supply in the area was important, both from the perspective of investors requiring human resources, but also from the Fig. 10.22 African Arch 2: Inter and Intra-African continental trade 316 B. ROBINSON host country perspective, where zones could contribute to the alleviation of unemployment and hold promise of skills transfer. Safety of the area is also a critical consideration, and often Chinese zone operators had to employ their own ‘army’ of security personnel to ensure the safety of investors and their employees—this is reflected in the first African arch mentioned earlier. 10.3.5 Pillar 5: People An entire prior Chapter has been dedicated to people. Two aspects were considered, namely the importance these zones had in reducing unemployment and improving the well-being of people—the social upliftment and well-being of a ‘harmonious’ society has always been pivotal in China’s zones—and the value placed on labour by Chinese investors. To summarise, relatively cheaper labour in many African countries attracted investment as wages in China increased when development took hold. The problem was that while labour supply may be in surplus, labour may not have the literacy, skills or education needed by companies—this stifled productivity. If there were a lack of skills, Chinese companies that would consider investing would be labour-intensive in nature where skills were not too critical—hence the number of assembly-type operations in Special Economic Zones. Chinese investors, contrary to public opinion, do not want to employ Chinese labour as wages are higher, and the costs of flights, visas and accommodation can be cost prohibitive even with their skills and resultant productivity being higher. Chinese investors did invest time and effort into upskilling workers, and this naturally led to an increase in wages, as Chinese firms tried to retain employees they had trained. This saw a natural outcome of wages been higher in the zone than outside the zone. In the case of South Africa, some zone operators negotiated wage levels in the zone than were higher than minimum wages in the country. The justification for doing so was that it reduced volatility and community resistance, but the question was raised as to whether the higher wage made the zone less competitive than other zones globally in attracting Chinese investment. Localising labour with critical skills were a problem in countries with a compromised education system, or where the skills provided by educational institutions were inappropriate to the needs of companies. It would 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 317 be difficult for Chinese companies to ‘upskill’ when essential basic education is lacking. This resulted in the situation where Chinese companies were sometimes left with no choice but to employ Chinese labour, this was especially true for engineering type professions. Some Chinese companies sent local African employees to China for training programmes in an attempt to address the shortage of critical skills and may even provide Chinese language lessons while there to reduce language barriers. There was also the move by some Special Economic Zones to invest in specialised training facilities and facilitate higher education in innovation related fields—such as the apprenticeship training offered at the Coega Special Economic Zone in South Africa and the Carnegie Mellon University Africa in Rwanda. Investment by Chinese operators in African zones, and Chinese investments within these zones contributed to job creation, as well as other benefits. It supports local enterprise development with most Chinese companies wishing to access supplies and raw material from local businesses. It supported SMME development by locals, the example was given of the rise of guest houses and restaurants near the Ethiopian Eastern Industrial park to cater for businesspeople visiting the area. The infrastructural investment contributed to better access to services and facilities for local communities—roads built for accessing the zone would contribute to ease of transport for locals. There were also negative impacts, with some conflict with local communities being noted. 10.3.6 Pillar 6: Integration The zones in China are so integrated with cities that they are cities themselves. Shenzhen is one giant Special Economic Zone. This was less evident in African Special Economic Zones, except of course for Mauritius, where the Export Processing Zone was countrywide and wellintegrated throughout the economy, and integral to its socio-economic objectives. Many of the other Special Economic Zones in Africa were not well integrated. They tended to be on the outskirts of the cities, and while there may be some integration with industrial areas, they were generally not well integrated with the cities themselves. Sometimes cities would be competition with the zones rather than complementing each other activities. 318 B. ROBINSON There was at times a lack of integration with transport logistics that severely compromised the ease of zone investors to trade. Poor road infrastructure was a huge problem in Nigeria, while countries such as South Africa were struggling with deteriorating rail infrastructure. 10.3.7 Pillar 7: Infrastructure China perfected infrastructure. The government ensured that the countries Special Economic Zones were equipped with everything needed— power, water, roads, ports, etc. Infrastructure supporting Special Economic Zones in Africa varied considerably. Rwanda and South Africa invested in outstanding internal and external infrastructure for their zones, but in other countries, this was not the case. Chinese zone operators in Africa have been let down on occasion by host country governments who promised infrastructure, such as roads to connect the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone to ports, but reneged on these undertakings. The Zone operators were left with the situation that they either had to invest significantly in such external infrastructure or just manage with what was in place. Internal infrastructure was either provided for by the host government, or as is the case in Chinese owned zones in Africa, the operators invested heavily in internal infrastructure. And it wasn’t just investing in roads. The lack of services and utilities in many countries resulted in these zones having to invest in power plants, water treatment plants, boreholes etc. As a result, these zones often found themselves to have gained a competitive edge in terms of infrastructure that they could offer investors—an uninterrupted power supply for a ceramic factory in Nigeria was a critical condition for the investment. ICT infrastructure provided in Rwanda’s zone, and the move towards ‘Smart cities’ in Mauritius, signifies a move by these countries and their zones to become leaders in the high-tech and services industry, and ensure their competitiveness as the fourth industrial revolution takes place. 10.3.8 Protocol 1: Phased Approach Twelve protocols featured in the Chinese Model—these are the necessary interventions to ensure that Special Economic Zones are effective in achieving their desired development outcomes. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 319 The first protocol is that of Special Economic Zones having a phased approach, and this phased approached is continuous in nature. It requires that Special Economic Zones continually evaluate their activities and learn from their past successes and failures as they re-craft the zone going forward. It also requires that zones constantly benchmark themselves against other zones and change and adapt based on what they have learned from others. Rwanda has modelled their Special Economic Zone on international best-practices, and annually conduct revisions and investor-friendly reforms—this will stand them in good stead as the zone evolves. Some African zones have not adequately acknowledged nor addressed their weaknesses. There also seems to be a lack of experimentation. These are both important if such zones are to evolve as they develop and adapt to a world of economic shocks. What is interesting about China and Mauritius, is that both countries have actively gone out and shared their experiences on Special Economic Zones with other countries and zones. African countries struggling with their own zones or considering such zones, would be well advised to take advantage of such assistance to improve their zones’ performance and potential of success. 10.3.9 Protocol 2: Ease of Business Bureaucracy stifles entrepreneurship. China in the early years of their Special Economic Zones dispensation recognised that the bureaucracy necessitated by a planned economic system, was its very own downfall. As the country introduced market reforms it actively sought to simultaneously reduce the red tape of doing business and simplify local government administration. Investors are attracted to countries that facilitate and encourage efficient business practices. Whether this be in the opening of a business, acquiring licences, and trading, the ease of business contributes to business success. Many zones in Africa have recognised this, and with the support of government, in-house one-stop shops and customs offices have been introduced. Apart from easing bureaucracy, they often serve to guide investors, and in Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa, having access to Chinese-speaking staff goes a long way in cementing an investment commitment. 320 B. ROBINSON In general, though, most Chinese investors reflected on the difficulty they often faced in doing business in Africa. Something as simple as installing a land-line telephone could be complex, time-consuming and frustrating. Incompetent government administration, service delivery inefficiency, and corruption were regular complaints described by Chinese investors. 10.3.10 Protocol 3: Preferential Policies Preferential policies contribute to the competitiveness of Zones—and it is a very competitive environment with hundreds of Zones throughout the world vying for investors. If one considers Chapter 6 which listed the various preferential policies and incentives, it becomes clear how different they are, and how complex they can be. Preferential policies, such as fiscal and other incentives, obviously need to be contextualised to the objectives of such zones, but often they almost appear to be restrictive, rather than encouraging investment. An investor would also struggle to make sense of many of the policies that are publicly available, and a number of zones do not have publicly accessible information. In the day and age of digital information, it seems that many zones in Africa are not promoting themselves as they should. It would be interesting to know whether potential investors have been consulted in the development of many of these policies to determine the optimal balance of policies to attract investment and achieve the socio-economic objectives of the zone. 10.3.11 Protocol 4: Innovation and Learning Special Economic Zones should be ‘pilots of innovation’ as was the case on China, where the zones evolved quite quickly from heavy industry to high-tech. Strategic industries were incubated and eventually, so-called ‘smart-cities’ emerged. Most African zones lag behind other zones in developing countries in terms of innovation and learning, the exception being zones such as the Kigali Special Economic Zone. It has made innovation a priority and partnered with the Carnegie Mellon African University to support specialised skills development in this regard, while having a high-tech focus, and providing appropriate ICT infrastructure. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 10.3.12 321 Protocol 5: Favourable Investment Climate A favourable investment climate refers to providing the correct balance of incentives, services, infrastructure and market access; and encouraging domestic and foreign investment through public, private and public–private partnerships. Many investors are specifically attracted to the large and emerging markets that African countries offer. Making these accessible to Chinese and other investors will contribute to investment, job creation and import-substitution. A favourable investment climate also refers to the ease in which profits and capital invested in host countries can be repatriated—some countries provide assurances in this regard. Legislation requiring localised ownership and associated requirements are a significant disincentive, with investors resistant to relinquishing a share of their ownership and control. Political and social volatility similarly make investors wary due to the associated risks to their investments. It also refers to making foreign expatriates feel welcome, what China referred to as giving foreigners ‘national treatment’. Many Chinese owned and operated Special Economic Zones in Africa went out of their way to provide a homely environment for Chinese workers in the zones— kitchens and restaurants serving Chinese cuisine; hostels with entertainment and sports facilities for Chinese workers where they can socialise. The Chambishi Multi Facility Economic Zone was a prime example of how this can be done. Host countries can also contribute in this regard by making the transition to a different country and new culture as seamless of possible and encourage the re-settlement of foreigners—as evidenced by Mauritius in their efforts to attract the wealthier investor and resident. 10.3.13 Protocol 6: Modern Service Industry A modern service industry can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, in terms of basic services, these should be available, reliable, efficient and costeffective. Creating a culture of innovation in Special Economic Zones requires more than this just basic services. It requires an efficient banking and financial services sector; it requires cutting edge ICT services. This is lacking in many of the zones in Africa and this limits their Special Economic Zones’ ability to move the economy from heavy industry dependence towards more advanced technologies and a diversified economy. 322 B. ROBINSON 10.3.14 Protocol 7: Environmental Consideration Development and environmental protection are paradoxical. Kuznets’s curve describes how development correlates with environmental degradation until a point is reached where factors such as responsible consumer and business behaviour, and increased environmental standards and policing, reduce damage to the environment. China can attest to this. As China improves its own internal standards, coupled to the shift of production facilities to lesser developed economies due to cheaper factors of production and other reasons, there is a real risk that polluting industries will be shifted to Africa. Some African nations may not have the legislation, policing or political will to ensure environmental protection, and there is no doubt that unscrupulous businesses would take advantage of this, and not adhere to global environmental standards or live up to their own responsibilities in this regard. This concern was raised in the case of the Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia. While China is attempting to rein in those guilty of environmental damage in China and elsewhere, it is critically important that Africa takes ownership of the issue. As African countries, regional bodies, and as a continent, Africa needs to be proactive and be accountable for its own future, whether that be environmental, social or economic. This brings us to the third African arch, namely African accountability (Fig. 10.23). Environmental issues were an important consideration for Chinese Special Economic Zones as they evolved, and a similar approach can and should be taken with African Special Economic Zones. China has been at Fig. 10.23 African Arch 3: African accountability 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 323 the forefront of renewable energy technology and reducing harmful emissions, and readily shares this knowledge with Africa. African governments should also be giving the environment precedence in the establishment of Special Economic Zones, and China can contribute knowledge and expertise in this regard. 10.3.15 Protocol 8: International Cooperation China, from being inward focussed, rapidly changed as their Special Economic Zones were gaining traction to an outward focus. This entailed developing international cooperation and goodwill. This is fortunate for Africa as it benefits from greater attention from China, and through interventions such as the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the BRICS association, and emerging nations playing a greater role in the United Nations and other global bodies, Africa is well positioned to take its rightful place in the global arena. 10.3.16 Protocol 9: Address Shortcomings There are a number of Pillars and Protocols that allude to the necessity for Special Economic Zones to learn from their mistakes and address shortcomings—the necessity to have phased approach, for government policy to evolve, and to be experimental and innovative. China has numerous shortcomings and still does, but it does try to address these shortcomings. Pollution was mentioned earlier, but similarly, corruption has been a significant problem which the country is tackling. With such a large population, urbanisation and resultant congestion is a problem. Special Economic Zones in China have been leveraged to address some of the negative externalities that development creates, for instance, governance controls were integrated in the zones to reduce corruption; and spatial planning and improved services assisted with ensuring better urban efficiencies. African Special Economic Zones should reflect on their weaknesses and evolve over time to address them, and government can facilitate this process. Akin to China, many African cities suffer from an urbanisation problem, with congested, crowded, and polluted cities. The Lekki Free Trade Zone in Nigeria was found to be contributing to a new industrial hub outside of Lagos, and people were moving out of the city to be closer 324 B. ROBINSON to this area of growth and for job opportunities, thus contributing to some alleviation of the problems associated with an overcrowded Lagos. 10.3.17 Protocol 10: Social System The Social System protocol relates well with the Pillar of integration. As an objective of Special Economic Zones is to improve the lot for society, it makes sense that there is a strong correlation between the two. As China’s Special Economic Zones developed, the Chinese government was able to gradually introduce and improve social welfare interventions. This doesn’t seem to be as well integrated in African Special Economic Zones, apart from the obvious job creation outcome. Initiatives by Zone operators and investors to social initiatives were limited. Clinics may be one example that was found at most Chinese operated zones in Africa, and the Chambishi Multi Facility Zone in Zambia has a hospital for its staff, but also provided health services for the wider community. There didn’t seem to be much in the way of corporate social investment by investors in the zones. There are exceptions though. The Coega Special Economic Zone in South Africa has a strong societal focus, and was very involved in job creation, support of SMMEs, skills development and other corporate social investment efforts directed towards the surrounding townships. The zone recognised that it was interrelated with these communities and had a role to play in their upliftment. The second example would be Mauritius. The socio-economic development of the country was strongly associated with the establishment of the Export Processing Zone, which in turn was closely related to the welfare improvements the country could offer its people. There was also a reciprocal relationship. As the welfare system grew in substance, it had the benefit of improving education levels in the country, which in turn supported the evolving services industry and innovative high-tech industries. 10.3.18 Protocol 11 and 12: Export Orientation and Diversifies Industries The export orientation of China’s Special Economic Zones was the stimulus that it needed as it opened to the global market, but that evolved over time, and investors gradually entered China and serviced the domestic market, and there was also a strong focus on diversification. 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 325 Some countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, have adopted a strong export orientation at the expense of diversification into related industries of those already established, or that provided import-substitution effects. This has been motivated by currency problems and severe balance of payment deficits been experienced by the host country, rather than having a good rationale for doing so. This constrains investment into industries that could effectively cater to this market, create employment, and compete against imports. It also constrains diversification. Diversification also seems to be limited in Africa due to a dominance of heavy industry, or to traditional low-skilled labour-intensive industries. This is mostly due to the lack of specialised skills, but also an indication of inappropriate policy interventions by host governments. Special Economic Zones can serve as a catalyst to change this and bring in innovative technologies as is the case in Rwanda. Providing the necessary ICT infrastructure and providing access to tertiary education in innovative sectors can provide the impetus for change. 10.4 The African Model of Special Economic Zones The Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones that has been described and applied throughout this book provides numerous insights and lesson for Special Economic Zones in Africa. While the African country context is critical to consider in determining an appropriate Special Economic Zone intervention, these Pillars and Protocols will always be relevant. Three additional African Arches have been added to the model and refer to important attributes that need to be provided in the African context to ensure African Special Economic Zones’ global competitiveness, without which, will severely curtail their ability to attract Chinese and other investors, and thus limit their contribution to sustainable development. These are peace, safety and security; reduced trade barriers and promotion of inter and intra-continental trade; and African accountability. These are presented in Fig. 10.24—The African Model of Special Economic Zones. Protocol 2: Protocol 3: Protocol 4: Ease of PreferenƟal InnovaƟon policies business & learning Protocol 5: Favourable Investment Climate Protocol 6: Phased approach Fig. 10.24 The African Model of Special Economic Zones Protocol 1: Phased approach Protocol 7: Protocol 8: Protocol 9: Modern InternaƟonal Addressing shortservice cooperaƟon comings delivery Sustainable development Protocol 10: Protocol 11: Protocol 12: Social Export Diversified system orientaƟon industries 326 B. ROBINSON 10 TOWARDS IMPACTFUL SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA 327 References 7 Years Government Programme: National Strategy for Transformation (NSTi) 2017–2024. 2021. Accessed from https://www.nirda.gov.rw/uploads/tx_ dce/National_Strategy_For_Trsansformation_-NST1-min.pdf. Businesstech. 2021. The Cost and Time it Takes South Africans to Move to Mauritius, July 24. [Online]. Accessed from https://businesstech.co.za/ news/trending/508294/the-cost-and-time-it-takes-south-africans-to-moveto-mauritius/. 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License: Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0 IGO) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/). Index A absolute advantage, 137 accessibility, 156 advanced technologies, 68, 138, 321 Africa’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, 228 African accountability, 322, 325 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 24, 89, 109, 158, 168, 315 African Development Bank, 16, 21, 170 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 112, 168, 306 African Model of Special Economic Zones, 293, 312, 325 African Passport, 24 African Renaissance, 10, 23 African Tree of Organic Growth, 10, 28 African Union (AU), 16, 22, 89, 91, 105, 131, 227, 228, 297 Agenda 2063, 16, 22 agribusiness, 109 agricultural bank, 170 agricultural modernization, 87 agriculture, 21, 30, 37, 41, 93, 106, 107, 182, 247, 249, 263, 305 agro-processing, 123, 209, 211, 215, 298 aid, 16 AIDS, 92 Algeria, 9, 18, 98, 127–129, 228 America, 21 Angola, 9, 26, 78, 90, 95, 98, 99, 118, 124, 168, 176, 178–180 Angola-mode, 17, 98, 241 Armenia, 169 arts and culture, 22 Asia, 21, 77, 111, 242 Asian, 305 assembly, 287, 316 assembly industries, 122 assembly plants, 162 assets, 11 attracting investment, 3 Australia, 169 automobile, 129 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 B. Robinson, African Special Economic Zones, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8105-9 329 330 INDEX automotive, 27, 121, 209, 211, 212, 285 aviation, 109 B balance of payment, 18, 325 Bangladesh, 113, 114 Beautiful China, 239, 241 Beijing, 102 Beijing Action Plan 2018, 100 2019–2021, 89, 90, 92, 100, 226 Belarus, 169 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 71, 77, 92, 103, 104, 107, 108, 315 beneficiation, 209, 211 of mineral and natural resources, 201 Benin, 118, 168, 176, 178–180 bilateral, 89, 129, 233, 262 bilateral financial cooperation, 77 bilateral relations, 108, 169, 287 bilateral trade, 88 Blue/Ocean Economy, 23 blue economy, 107 Botswana, 15, 26, 130, 168, 176, 179–181 bottlenecks of infrastructure, 98 Brain-Drain, 196 Brazil, 102, 103 bribery, 143 BRICS bank, 19 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), 19, 88, 323 BRICS Plus, 102, 103 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE), 163, 196 broken promises, 313 bureaucracy, 20, 49, 154, 219, 252, 263, 283, 296, 313, 319 bureaucratic red tape, 148 Burkina Faso, 17, 168, 176, 178–180 Burundi, 78, 113, 168, 176, 178–180 business climate, 70 business confidence, 191 business environment, 216 business-friendly, 296 business services, 27 C Cabo Verde, 176, 179, 180 Cambodia, 127 Cameroon, 113, 118, 141, 143, 150–152, 155, 166, 168, 176, 178–180 Canada, 169 capacity building, 18, 106 capacity development, 237 Cape Verde, 113, 168 capital, 11, 13 capital equipment, 163 capital flows, 297 capital formation, 66 capital gains tax, 140 capital gains tax exemptions, 297 capital markets, 15, 16 Central Africa, 14, 160 Central African Republic, 168, 176, 178, 179 certificates of origin, 129 Chad, 168, 176, 178–180 chemicals, 27 children, 90 China, 4 China-Africa Developmental Financing Forum, 107 China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), 104, 125, 126 China-Africa Financial Cooperation Consortium, 107 China-Africa Fund for Industrial Cooperation, 104 INDEX China-Africa Green Development Plan, 243 China Development Bank, 126, 170 China’s economic policy in Africa, 102 China’s Model of Special Economic Zones, 80 China’s policy, 139 Chinese developers, 128 Chinese diaspora in Africa, 232 Chinese expatriates, 167, 266 Chinese investment, 293 Chinese labour, 149, 189 Chinese Liberation Army, 38 Chinese loans, 99 Chinese market, 307 Chinese migration, 232 Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 95, 126 Chinese Model of Special Economic Zones, 61, 311, 325 Chinese owned and managed Special Economic Zones, 152 Chinese owned and operated, 293 Chinese policy, 111 Chinese policy towards Africa, 169 clean energy, 20 climate action, 28 climate change, 28, 93, 236–238, 242, 243, 247, 248 colonialization, 226 commercial financial institutions, 146 common development, 104, 227, 238 common prosperity, 104 Communist Party, 35, 169 community, 228, 229, 231, 265, 316, 317 community development, 99 community problems, 157 community unrest, 205 Comoros, 168, 176, 178, 179 comparative advantage, 29, 137 331 competitive, 137, 287, 305, 307, 316 competitive advantage, 160, 280 competitive edge, 318 competitiveness, 318, 320 concessional loans, 100, 227, 305 conditionality, 17 conflict, 4, 226, 231, 265, 294, 317 Confucius Institute, 91, 227, 233 Congo, 124, 168 construction, 97, 118, 298 consumer goods, 94 consumer products, 27 consumption, 69 cooperation, 131 cooperation programmes, 108 Coronavirus, 14 corporate governance, 16 corporate income tax, 297 corporate social investment, 324 corporate tax, 140, 306 corrupt, 283, 313 corruption, 14, 53, 78, 98, 143, 202, 204, 262, 269, 284, 288, 296, 304, 320, 323 cost of doing business, 143 cost of labour, 216 Côte d’Ivoire, 17, 21, 26, 118, 176, 178, 180 COVID-19, 14, 38, 92, 130, 196, 226 creating employment, 181 crime, 106, 196 critical services, 219 critical skills, 162, 196, 216, 299, 316 cross-border investment, 77 cross border trade, 283 Cuba, 123 cultural exchange, 77, 86 Cultural Revolution, 37 cultural wealth, 13 culture, 23, 25, 31, 87, 93, 108, 235, 242, 321 332 INDEX of doing business, 152 cultures and traditions, 233 culture shock, 165, 233 currency, 139, 164, 263 currency exchange, 165 currency fluctuations, 268 currency problems, 325 customs, 198, 202, 288 customs controlled area, 145, 198 customs duties, 139, 140 customs duties for export, 143 customs inspection, 155 customs office, 149, 252, 283, 319 customs procedures, 107 customs requirements, 140 cyber security, 25, 91 D dams, 241 debt burden, 15, 78 debt distress, 15 debt forgiveness, 99 debt reduction, 21 debt-traps, 99 decolonisation, 23 defence, 41 deforestation, 239 demand-side reforms, 69 democracy, 23, 109, 303 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 9, 14, 17, 90, 99, 118, 124, 168, 176, 178, 180, 269 Deng, Xiaoping, 38, 41, 312 depreciation allowances, 140 desertification, 93, 239, 243, 244 develop finance, 21 developing countries, 104, 109, 236 developing nations, 105 development assistance, 108 development finance, 13, 16, 20, 107, 109 development finance institutions, 16, 146, 169 development institutions, 312 development policy, 261 digital economy, 70, 109 diplomacy, 242 Disease Control and Prevention, 92 diversification, 14, 24, 62, 93, 97, 100, 101, 264, 285, 296, 298, 304, 306, 324 diversified economy, 104, 321 diversity, 3, 29 Djibouti, 18, 26, 78, 113, 118, 124, 130, 141, 152, 155, 156, 158, 161, 164, 166, 168, 267 domestic and regional market, 156 domestic capacity, 31 domestic consumption, 66 domestic demand, 15 domestic economy, 65 domestic market, 156, 159, 315 domestic restructuring, 125 Dominican Republic, 113–115 duties and levies, 144 duty free, 144, 169, 268, 271, 297, 305 duty free imports, 139, 140, 143 E ease of doing business, 30, 62, 139, 148, 262, 281, 284, 297, 301, 305, 306, 319 East Africa, 14 East African Community, 168 Ebola, 14, 92, 226 e-commerce, 109 economic base reform, 51 Economic Community of West African States, 168 economic conditions, 191 economic cooperation, 20, 77, 86, 88, 103, 104, 106, 107, 242 INDEX economic development, 225, 303 economic growth, 10, 14, 17, 27, 37, 97, 182, 201, 209, 216, 235, 250, 269 economic growth and diversification, 13 economic participation, 13 Economic Partnership Agreements (2021), 168 economic performance, 3 economic policy, 191, 197 economic reforms, 305 economic slowdown, 80 economic transformation, 105 education, 21, 27, 28, 70, 87, 91, 162, 177, 186–188, 193, 196, 226, 227, 296, 302, 303, 316, 324 education and skills, 12 Egypt, 9, 14, 15, 88, 102, 117, 126–129, 270, 271 electricity, 153 electricity supply, 202 Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), 108 Emerging Market Economies (EME), 108 emerging market investors, 27 emerging markets, 109 employability, 13, 90 employment, 18, 99, 115, 175, 204, 216, 227, 251, 305, 325 employment regulations, 283 enabling environment, 263 energy, 27, 97, 101, 106, 108, 109, 212 enforcement of regulations, 255 enterprise development, 99, 229, 317 entrepreneurs, 261, 281, 309 entrepreneurship, 13, 16, 30, 70 333 environment, 74, 78, 90, 92, 101, 108, 148, 199, 227, 235, 237, 242, 296, 302, 322 environmental agency, 247 environmental compliance, 246 environmental consideration, 62 environmental controls, 255 environmental degradation, 225, 235 environmental impact, 241, 247, 255 environmental impact assessments, 246 environmental negligence, 66 environmental policy, 250 environmental protection, 242, 244, 250, 298 environmental regulation, 255 environmental security, 241 environmental standards, 322 environmental support, 242 environmental sustainability, 10, 13, 23 Equatorial Guinea, 113, 176, 178, 179 equipment, 161 Eritrea, 90, 113, 118, 176, 178, 180, 282 Eswatini, 88, 100, 102, 168, 176, 179, 180 Ethiopia, 9, 10, 15, 17, 22, 26, 90, 102, 127–130, 154, 156, 158, 168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 184, 186, 189, 228, 230, 247, 248, 250, 251, 262, 264, 267, 270, 271, 276, 282, 283, 325 ethnic, 303 Europe, 21, 77 European Union, 168, 169 European Union’s Coutanou Agreement, 94 exchange programmes, 227, 233 exchange rates, 268 excise duty, 146 334 INDEX excise tax, 144 EXIM bank, 98 expatriate labour, 149, 181 experiment, 73, 323 experimental approach, 65 experimentation, 319 expertise, 186 export diversification, 99 export growth, 241, 298 Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank), 88, 146, 169 export market, 160, 304 export orientated growth, 209 export orientated policy, 315 export orientation, 62, 144, 156, 264, 266, 324 export-oriented, 263, 305 Export-processing Zones (EPZs), 39, 43 export(s), 66, 88, 93, 107, 113, 125, 137, 167, 169, 201, 268, 272, 296, 297, 299, 307, 308, 314 extractive industry, 97 F facilities, 230 factor markets, 70 fair competition, 109 favourable investment climate, 62 fertility rates, 4 finance, 97, 103, 109, 247, 281 financial assistance, 237 financial constraints, 16 financial incentives, 139 financial industry, 52 financial inflows, 27 financial initiatives, 139 financial institutions, 87, 263 financial integration, 77 financial security, 151 financial services, 27, 109, 296 financing models, 107, 241 fiscal, 304 fiscal deficit, 15 fiscal incentives, 305, 313, 314 fiscal policy, 15 Five Pillars, 86 flying geese syndrome, 241 FOCAC Beijing Action Plan of 2019–2021, 89, 103 food scarcity, 226 food security, 101, 106, 237 foreign currency, 267 foreign currency accounts, 165 foreign currency bank accounts, 167 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 11, 18, 26, 27, 50, 65, 66, 72, 95, 97, 113, 117, 161, 198, 270, 283, 305, 308, 309, 315 foreign exchange, 126, 268, 304 foreign expatriates, 321 Foreign Investors, 52 foreign labour, 208, 306 foreign ownership, 164, 297 foreign ownership limitations, 139 foreign reserve, 267 foreign strategies, 86 foreign technologies, 71 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Action Plan (2019–2021), 242 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 88, 102, 226, 287, 323 Four Modernisations, 41 Fourth Industrial Revolution, 73, 92, 318 fragile economies, 4, 99 fragile states, 4 France, 308 Free Movement of People, 24 free trade agreement, 87, 168 Free Trade Zones (FTZs), 43 INDEX G G20, 105 Gabon, 26, 98, 113, 118, 124, 141, 144, 146, 147, 150, 151, 155, 162, 166, 168, 176, 178, 179 Gambia, 113, 118, 168, 176, 178, 180 GDP, 287 GDP growth, 4, 14, 38, 66, 67, 182, 197, 295, 303, 305 gender, 23, 194 gender equality, 27 Generalized System of Preferences of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2021), 169 General Resources Account, 18 geo-political, 132 geo-political competition, 11 geopolitical partnerships, 108 Germany, 4, 177 Ghana, 14, 113, 114, 116, 118, 141, 144, 147, 149–152, 155, 158, 161, 164, 166, 168, 176, 179, 180 Gini coefficient, 4 Global Competitiveness Report, 208 global economic slowdown, 66 global economy, 71 global environment, 89 global environmental standards, 255 global investment, 26 globalisation, 86, 139, 198 global market, 267 global stability, 18 global trade routes, 158 global warming, 11, 248 going global, 117 going out, 77, 117, 130 Going out to the Outside World, 52 governance, 13, 28, 199, 202, 203, 219, 237, 241, 288, 304 335 governance and regulatory, 12 governance risks, 78 government, 261 governmental support, 73 government borrowing, 19 government intervention, 213 government ownership, 199 government policy, 4, 29, 62, 213, 266, 301, 314 government reforms, 71 government regulation, 208 government support, 62, 213, 312 government transparency, 296 Grand Inga Dam, 24 Great Leap Forward, 37 Green city, 74 green development, 87, 92, 104, 240, 244 green economy, 296 green energy, 243 greenhouse gas emissions, 236 Guinea, 130, 168, 176, 178, 179 Guinea-Bissau, 168, 176, 178, 179 H Hainan, 40 Harmonious Society, 53 harmonious world, 104 health, 21, 27, 87, 90, 226, 227 health care, 92, 104 higher education, 193 Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative, 21 high-skill, 181, 192 high-speed telecommunications, 155 high-speed train, 24 high-tech, 50, 56, 188, 299, 306, 318, 320, 324 high-value goods, 296 hijacking, 266 Honduras, 115 336 INDEX Hong Kong, 42, 54, 314 human capital, 70 Human Development index, 9 humanitarian, 108 humanitarian efforts, 226 humanitarian support, 90 human resources, 161 human rights, 23, 101, 226 I Iceland, 169 ICT, 321 ICT infrastructure, 318, 320, 325 ICT Park, 298 ICT services, 306 import duties, 305 import restrictions, 268 import(s), 66, 88, 93, 107, 137, 267, 268, 272, 308 import-substitution, 161, 267, 298, 299, 314, 321, 325 import tariffs, 129 import taxes, 144 incentives, 125, 140, 145, 199, 214, 241, 263, 266, 269, 288, 297, 305, 306, 321 inclusive, 53, 109, 225 inclusive economic growth, 20 inclusive growth, 10, 22, 23, 29, 106 inclusive international trade, 109 income opportunities, 4 income tax reforms, 15 independence, 89 India, 102, 103 Indonesia, 127 industrial capacity, 87, 104, 107 industrial clusters, 38, 42 industrial development, 197, 209, 249, 298 Industrial Development Zones, 39, 43 industrial growth, 229 industrial hubs, 156, 315 industrialisation, 50, 87, 103–105, 197, 200, 202, 203, 229, 237, 239, 241, 263, 296 industrial nodes, 214 industrial parks, 39, 105 industrial policy, 69, 70, 197, 266 industrial waste, 239 industry, 27, 37, 41, 122 inequality, 4, 14, 27, 28, 163, 191, 197, 203, 226, 235 infectious diseases, 108 inflation, 14, 15, 164 informal employment, 182 informal sector, 15 information, 151 infrastructural bottlenecks, 15 infrastructural projects, 99 infrastructure, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 23, 26–28, 30, 53, 57, 62, 77, 80, 87, 97, 99, 103, 104, 106, 109, 129, 139, 151, 156, 198, 199, 201, 202, 214, 219, 229, 251, 262, 264, 271, 274, 275, 284, 287, 288, 297, 298, 305, 309, 313, 315, 317, 318, 321 infrastructure development, 242, 246 in-house customs office, 154 innovation, 13, 27, 28, 52, 65, 68, 70, 74, 109, 202, 299, 301, 307, 321 innovation and learning, 62, 320 innovative, 80, 309, 323–325 innovative cultures, 65 institutional autonomy, 65 institutional development, 202 institutions, 28, 304 integrated approach, 62 integration, 23, 216, 317 intellectual property rights, 70 Inter and Intra-African continental trade, 315, 325 INDEX interest free concession, 18 interest-free loans, 227 interest rate, 15 internal reserves, 19 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 17 international best-practices, 319 international cooperation, 62, 238, 323 International Development Association (IDA), 17 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 16, 18, 100, 105, 108 international trade, 11, 18 investment, 95, 103, 105, 109, 113, 175, 261, 262, 264, 271, 280, 285, 293, 296, 306, 307, 313, 314, 319 investment climate, 321 investment decision, 139 investment-friendly, 109 investment incentives, 65 investment promotion, 296 investor confidence, 66 investor friendly, 305 investor-friendly reforms, 319 investors, 298 Ivory Coast, 168 J Japan, 169 job creation, 160, 161, 175, 190, 197, 208, 209, 228, 229, 267, 285, 287, 298, 299, 307, 314, 317, 321, 324 job market, 196 justice, 28 K Kazakhstan, 169 337 Kenya, 17, 26, 78, 113, 114, 116, 118, 124, 141, 146, 148, 150–152, 155, 158, 168, 176, 179, 180, 226, 295 knowledge-based economy, 296 Korea, 36 Kuznets’s curve, 235, 322 L labour, 68, 94, 98, 241 labour cost, 161 labour disputes, 162 labour-employer relations, 208 labour environment, 214 labour force growth, 66 labour intensive, 42, 111, 137, 186, 187, 316, 325 labour legislation, 161, 175, 189, 208, 216 labour market, 181, 209, 213, 215, 305 labour market policies, 208 labour market reform, 209 labour office, 187 labour productivity, 161 labour regulations, 149 labour supply, 315 land, 68 land claims, 157 land reforms, 65 land utilisation, 53 language, 235 language barriers, 162, 317 Latin America, 111, 242 law and order, 13 law enforcement, 90 leadership, 264 leadership support, 62, 213, 301, 312 learning, 65, 66 Lesotho, 18, 26, 115, 168, 176, 179–181, 246 338 INDEX lesser-developed countries, 169 Liberia, 90, 111, 113, 168, 176, 178, 179 Libya, 14, 91 licenses, 143, 148, 319 life expectancy, 4 lifestyle, 139, 165, 288 literacy, 177 living conditions, 19, 90 living standards, 196, 225, 226 loadshedding, 220, 276 local government administration, 319 localisation, 188 localisation quotas, 149 localised ownership, 321 localising labour, 316 local labour, 189 local work force, 157 location, 62, 156, 209, 214, 281, 314 location advantages, 65 location of the zone, 139 logistical infrastructure, 153 logistical support, 263 logistics, 218 low-carbon, 87 low-income countries, 18 low-skill, 192, 325 low-skilled industries, 216 M Macao, 42 Macau, 54 macroeconomic environment, 18 macroeconomic stability, 29 Madagascar, 113, 119, 141, 144, 146, 147, 168, 176, 178–180 Malaria, 92 Malawi, 113, 119, 141, 144, 146, 147, 150, 152, 158, 164, 166, 168, 176, 179 Mali, 17, 90, 113, 168, 176, 178–180 management, 139 management positions, 188 managerial staff, 186 manufacturers, 184 manufacturing, 14, 97, 104, 109, 120, 182, 211, 263, 285, 305 manufacturing industries, 198 manufacturing sector, 42, 201 Mao, Tse-tung, 35 maritime, 107 market, 12, 241, 251, 253, 267, 287, 314, 315 market access, 169, 321 market competition, 69, 70 market failures, 16, 69, 70 market opportunities, 139, 156 market-oriented economic reforms, 65 market reform, 38, 319 market restrictions, 70 market system, 51 masked diplomacy, 228 Mauritania, 14, 113, 168, 176, 178–180 Mauritius, 9, 26, 111, 113, 119, 126–130, 141, 144, 147, 155, 158, 161, 164, 166, 168, 176, 179–181, 270, 271, 282, 293, 302, 306, 309, 314, 317–319, 324 Mauritius Miracle, 303 metals, 97 Mexico, 128 migration, 108, 156, 194, 229, 265, 307, 309 military cooperation, 90 minerals, 97 minerals beneficiation, 120 minimum wage, 187, 307 mining, 123, 241, 315 mining industries, 97 mining sector, 188, 228 INDEX Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM), 125 moderately prosperous society, 85, 226 modern agriculture, 23 modern economies, 30 modern service delivery, 62 modern service industry, 321 MOFCOM Trade and Economic Cooperation Development Fund, 126 monetary policy, 14, 15, 18, 77, 164, 304 Mozambique, 17, 90, 113, 119, 124, 141, 152, 168, 176, 178–180, 228 multilateralism, 89, 108 multilateral policy, 169 multilateral trading system, 109 multiplier effect, 11 mutually beneficial cooperation, 86 N Namibia, 15, 26, 90, 113, 120, 142, 144, 146, 147, 155, 158, 166, 168, 176, 179–181 natural resources, 97, 101, 106, 241, 280, 295, 296, 304 New Development Bank (NDB), 16, 19 New Zealand, 169 Niger, 17, 168, 176, 178–180 Nigeria, 9, 10, 15, 95, 113, 114, 116, 120, 124, 126–130, 142, 144, 147, 148, 151, 152, 154, 156, 160–162, 164–166, 168–170, 175, 176, 178, 179, 181, 186, 188, 229, 231, 233, 235, 261, 264, 266–270, 274, 276, 282–284, 318 Nigeria Trust Fund, 21 non-intervention policy, 100 339 North Africa, 14 Norway, 169 numeracy, 183 O ocean economy, 242 offshore banking facilities, 166 oil & gas, 118, 120 oil & gas, 97 oil exports, 14 One Belt One Road Policy, 169, 261 One-China, 100 One-Stop Investor Services, 288 one-stop shops, 148, 219, 296, 319 1-stop service, 252, 283 Open-Door Policy, 40 opening-up, 35, 40, 44, 47, 69, 77, 90, 169 open markets, 109 organic growth, 10, 226 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 16, 19 outsourcing pollution, 241 owned, 285 ownership, 264 ownership and management of zones, 151 ownership quota restrictions, 163 ownership structure, 113 P Pakistan, 123, 127 Paris Agreement of 2015, 236 patriotism, 261 peace, 22, 28, 313, 325 peace and security, 87, 104, 242 peaceful, 265, 313 peacekeeping, 108 peacekeeping efforts, 90 peace security and stability, 23 340 INDEX people, 62 people-to-people, 104 people-to-people exchanges, 93 performance standards, 200 permits, 283 permits and licenses, 148, 149 personal income taxes, 140 phased approach, 62, 318 piracy, 91 policy, 28, 106, 129, 132, 246, 247, 256, 261, 293, 313, 325 policy coherence, 202 policy coordination, 77 policy environment, 199 policy framework, 199 policy support, 68 policy uncertainty, 140, 268 political equality, 86 political leadership, 262 political stability, 251, 262, 265, 313 political support, 130 political will, 213, 322 political willpower, 22, 264 polluting industries, 225, 241, 322 pollution, 74, 92, 235, 239, 240, 249, 250, 323 pollution control, 243 poor regulation and/or enforcement, 255 population, 265, 267, 323 population growth, 4, 159, 302 port efficiency, 284 port facilities, 153, 158 port handling charges, 143, 144 port infrastructure, 284 poverty, 4, 14, 17, 18, 27, 39, 41, 87, 89, 163, 191, 196, 203, 225–227, 237 poverty reduction, 4 Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), 18 power, 129, 274, 276, 278, 280, 318 power and utilities, 27 power plants, 153 power relations, 108 power supply, 220 practical skills, 187, 196 preferential financing, 139, 146 preferential interest rates, 146 preferential policies, 62, 320 preferential rates and duties, 94 preferential trade agreements, 304, 305 preferential trade arrangements, 167 price and margin controls, 144 private investment, 49 private investors, 117 private sector, 21, 199, 200 private security, 153 production, 287, 307 production capacity, 13, 103, 105 production frontier, 68 productive capacity, 137 productivity, 13, 29, 30, 66, 70, 162, 175, 182–184, 186, 187, 189, 191, 196, 216, 296, 305, 316 professionals, 195 promises broken, 271, 274 property tax, 140, 263 prosperity, 85, 106 protectionist measures, 109 protests, 231, 265, 303 public finances, 18 public financial management, 29 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), 30, 66, 117, 263, 321 public resources, 4 public service, 227 public utilities, 21 Q qualification mismatch, 194 quality of material, 163 INDEX quota-free, 169 quota restrictions, 143 R radical economic transformation, 203 rail infrastructure, 318 railroad, 284 railway, 153, 271, 274 raw materials, 24, 37, 97, 129, 139, 144, 146, 156, 161, 163, 229, 267, 268, 315, 317 Real Estate, Hospitality and Construction (RHD), 27 red tape, 150, 219, 281, 296, 313, 319 reform, 86 refugees, 226 regional access, 315 regional development, 71 regional integration, 31 regional markets, 129 regional organizations, 87 register, 297 registering businesses, 148, 283 regulatory, 246, 281, 282 regulatory intervention, 225, 235 renewable energy, 106, 211, 242, 323 rental rates, 139, 145 repatriate profits, 139, 164, 267 Republic of Congo, 18, 176, 178, 180 Republic of Korea, 127 research, 90, 106, 243, 306 residence permits, 152 residency, 309 resource curse, 99 resource exploitation, 4 resource mobilization, 15 resources, 11, 68 retail, 14, 27 return on investment, 151 341 revolution, 38 rights and duties, 13 risk, 284, 312, 321 risk assessment, 151 road and rail infrastructure, 129 road infrastructure, 274, 318 road network, 271 roads, 153, 288, 297, 317 road transport, 274, 284 rural, 4, 90, 182 rural areas, 52 rural communities, 227 rural development, 16 Russia, 102, 128 Russian Federation, 103, 169 Rwanda, 9, 10, 26, 78, 90, 113, 121, 144, 146, 147, 150, 151, 168, 176, 179, 180, 282, 293, 294, 297, 302, 312, 314, 318, 325 S safety, 157, 265, 313, 316, 325 safety and security, 230, 309 São Tomé and Príncipe, 100, 168, 176, 179, 180 savings, 13 scarce skills, 13 school enrolment, 10 science and technology, 41, 162 science, technology and innovation, 23 secondary, 103 security, 86, 106, 153, 251, 265, 266, 313, 316, 325 security and safety, 262 semi-skilled, 162, 184, 186 Senegal, 111, 113, 121, 137, 142, 144, 147, 150, 168, 176, 178–180 service delivery, 206, 262, 264, 275, 284, 320 342 INDEX service industry, 121, 318, 324 services, 230, 321 services oriented, 296 services sector, 306 Seychelles, 18, 26, 113, 168, 179, 180 Shanghai, 40 Shantou, 40, 57 Shenzhen, 40, 43, 314, 317 Shenzhen Speed, 47, 312 shift production, 186, 255 shortcomings, 62 Sierra Leone, 26, 90, 121, 130, 142, 144, 147, 168, 176, 179, 180 Silencing the Guns, 24 skilled, 162, 186 skilled labour, 138 skills, 13, 30, 90, 162, 169, 183, 186, 191, 201, 316 skills development, 28, 109, 288, 296, 320, 324 skills levels, 177 skills shortage, 188, 190 skills training, 162, 227 skills transfer, 13, 99, 175, 177, 188, 209, 227, 267, 298, 300, 316 smart cities, 106, 243, 307, 318, 320 SMEs, 16, 71, 104 SMME, 99, 163, 317, 324 social and cultural, 12 social and political enviro, 157 social challenges, 3 social development, 10, 90, 242 social impact, 28 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and the Chinese Dream, 85 socialist, 51 social networks, 66 social policy, 17 social progress, 21 social security, 51, 69 social stability and harmony, 51 social system, 62, 324 social wealth, 226 societal benefits, 228 societal development, 225 socio-economic, 101, 132, 161, 191, 285, 314 socio-economic development, 3, 169, 213, 295, 298, 324 socio-economic growth, 202, 303 socio-economic indicators, 3 socio-economic objectives, 312, 317, 320 socio-environmental, 293 Somalia, 26, 89, 176, 226, 270, 282 Somaliland, 3 South Africa, 4, 9, 14, 20, 26, 88, 89, 102, 113, 121, 124, 130, 142, 145–147, 150, 151, 154, 155, 158, 160, 162, 163, 168, 175–177, 179–181, 190, 205, 232, 271, 275, 276, 282, 284, 309, 312, 318, 324 South African Development Community (SADC), 212 Southern Africa, 14 Southern African Development Community, 168, 306 South Sudan, 9, 10, 14, 78, 168, 176, 178, 179, 270 Sovereign-Guaranteed Loans, 21 sovereignty, 89 Soviet Union, 36 specialist skills, 181, 187 stability, 296, 314 stable political systems, 265 stamp duty, 145, 146 standard of living, 23 State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), 14, 47, 49, 69 state security, 153 strategic industries, 320 strike action, 204 INDEX strike activity, 129 strikes, 189, 205, 208, 303 structural adjustment loans, 21 structural challenges, 66 structural change, 183 structural reforms, 29, 68, 109 structural transformation, 31 subsidies, 139 subsidizes utilities, 139, 145 subsistence agricultural sector, 302 subsistence agriculture, 182 subsistence farming, 4 substitution effect, 185 Sudan, 15, 18, 21, 90, 98, 113, 122, 124, 142, 143, 145, 147, 155, 158, 164, 166, 176, 178, 180, 181 supply chain, 77, 156, 248, 315 supply-side reforms, 69 sustainable development, 22, 23, 26, 27, 65, 80, 87, 100, 104, 109, 237, 243, 312 sustainable economic development, 16, 21 sustainable economic growth, 18, 241 sustainable growth, 3 Swaziland, 181 Switzerland, 169 T Taiwan, 36, 42, 88, 100, 102 Tanzania, 26, 113, 114, 116, 122, 124, 142, 145–147, 155, 161, 164, 167, 168, 176, 178–181 taxation, 107 tax exemptions, 139, 263 tax-free dividends, 140 tax holiday, 129, 139, 297 tax holidays and allowances, 140 tax incentives, 139, 140, 268, 306 tax rates, 140 343 tax rebates, 126 tax revenue, 298 TB, 92 technical, 109, 186 technical skills, 188 technicians, 195 technological capacity, 43 technological exchanges, 106 technological industries, 188 technological transfer, 298 technology, 13, 65, 68, 73, 92, 104, 201, 225, 239, 242, 296 technology hub, 74 technology parks, 124 technology sector, 162 technology transfer, 104, 106, 201, 236, 237 telecommunications, 21, 27 10 Concepts of Shenzhen, 53 Ten Cooperation Programs with Africa, 86 Ten Systems, 50 terrorism, 91, 106 terrorist, 280 tertiary, 103 textile industry, 94, 160, 251 textile(s), 101, 122, 253, 267, 298, 299, 305, 307 Thailand, 127 The Miracle of China, 46 Think Tanks, 93 Tianjin New Area, 40 Tibet, 36 Togo, 113, 122, 142, 148, 150, 167, 168, 176, 179, 180 tourism, 14, 107, 121, 122, 294, 296, 304 tourist, 54, 308 trade, 93, 103, 107, 109, 283, 295 trade balance, 93 trade barriers, 268, 305, 315 trade deficit, 101, 108 344 INDEX trade facilitation, 104 trade hub, 158 trade policy, 66, 202 trade surplus, 137 trade tensions, 66 trade union activity, 162 trade unions, 203, 208, 214, 216 trade volumes, 94 trade war, 137 training, 162 training institute, 188 transport, 21, 299 transport and logistics, 27, 202 transportation, 107 transport costs, 24, 160 transport facilities, 229 transport infrastructure, 20, 78, 284 transporting, 267 transport investment, 271 transport logistics, 37, 318 Trump, Donald, 131, 137, 227 Turkey, 169 20+20 Cooperation Plan, 91 U Uganda, 26, 78, 113, 122, 142, 145, 148, 150, 155, 158, 167, 168, 176, 178, 179, 295 unemployment, 181, 191, 195, 196, 203, 208, 212, 226, 305, 316 unionisation, 189 unions, 312 United Kingdom, 169, 177, 181 United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals, 27 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015), 236 United Nations (UN), 89, 90, 105, 108, 323 United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 94 United States (US), 4, 66, 123, 130, 169, 177, 181, 228, 241 UN peacekeeping, 91 unskilled, 162, 184, 186, 302 unskilled labour, 181 urban, 52, 182, 274 urban development, 20 urbanisation, 182, 229, 237, 239, 249, 296, 323 US markets, 168 utility, 149 utility services, 148 V value chain, 30, 66, 109, 125 value proposition, 199 VAT, 140, 198, 306 VAT exemptions, 139, 140, 143, 297 Venezuela, 128 Vietnam, 113, 114, 127 violent protests, 207 visa, 297, 309, 316 visa restriction, 149 W wage levels, 94, 175, 216, 316 wage rates, 181, 186, 307 wages, 184, 185, 316 water, 129, 153, 274, 318 water pollution, 239 water resource, 20 water scarcity, 239, 250 water treatment, 276 well-being, 11, 19, 23, 27, 28, 57, 90, 203, 226, 227, 237, 302, 309, 316 West Africa, 14, 228, 265 Western Africa, 160 Western Europe, 27, 241 Western Sahara, 3 wildlife protection, 93 INDEX Win-Win, 103 win-win cooperation, 89 women, 23, 90, 227 working conditions, 228 work permit, 149, 297, 306 work stoppages, 207 work visa, 152 World Bank, 16, 100, 105, 108 World Bank Group, 17 World class infrastructure, 155, 284 World Health Organisation, 228 World Trade Organisation, 43, 108 X Xiamen, 40 Xi, Jinping, 73, 77, 85, 108, 239, 312 Xiong’an New Area, 73 345 Y young, 216 youth, 23, 108, 194, 195, 265, 296 youth employment, 162 Z Zambia, 26, 78, 95, 113, 123, 124, 127–130, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 158, 162, 164, 167, 168, 170, 175, 176, 179, 180, 186, 188, 230, 235, 246, 247, 263, 264, 268–270, 274, 276, 280, 282 Zhuhai, 40, 54 Zimbabwe, 14, 15, 89, 90, 95, 113, 123, 150, 164, 176, 177, 179, 180, 212 zone infrastructure, 153