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Literature review on tax havens - Camilla FIORINA

Fiscal Havens: Just a Matter of
Harmful Tax Competition?
A Literature Review
M2 IMPF – 2019/2020
2.1 Definitions and formal lists of Tax Havens
2.3 Determinants of Tax Havens
3.1 Multinational companies and tax avoidance
3.2 Methods of avoidance and evasion by individuals
4.1 Economic growth in tax havens
4.2 The impact of preferential tax regimes in developed countries
4.3 The impact of preferential tax regimes in developing countries
6.1 Main references
6.2 Other empirical evidences
1. Introduction
In recent years tax havens have earned a place of honor at the center of international scandals and
controversies, so much so that they are now very familiar terms even to non-economists.
The growing integration of the financial markets and the development of new technologies that
have made capital mobility faster and more convenient have allowed the proliferation of these
financial realities.
Their huge success, and the disproportionate amount of international capital that is drawn into their
financial systems, have attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers, mainly because of the
concern that the success of tax havens occurs at the expense of non-havens, in particular through
the erosion of the tax base of the latter. Also, thanks to their policy of bank secrecy, they could
potentially be the home to many illegal activities.
The international interest in tax havens becomes a collective reaction in 1998 when the OECD
introduces for the first time what is now known as its Harmful Tax Practices initiative. The objective
was to “develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on
investment and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax bases” (OECD, 1998).
The initiative criticized some of the most important features of tax havens, namely the use of
preferential tax regimes that offer very low tax rates exclusively to non-residents and the limited
availability to exchange financial information with the rest of countries. To discourage countries
from making use of policies which enhance harmful tax competition, the OECD tracked down all the
countries which were considered to be tax havens and created a “black-list” of those which didn’t
agree to commit to exchange information.
This list, which in 2000 included 35 jurisdiction, is updated every time a country agrees to cooperate
and in 2015 it only counted 3 countries: Andorra, Lichtenstein and Monaco (Gravelle, 2015).
Although this may seem to indicate a progress in the fight against tax havens, evidence do not show
a reduction in their activity. On the contrary, they continue to attract huge flows of foreign capital
The aim of this literature review is to provide a general overview, yet quite comprehensive, of the
controversial reality of tax havens.
The work is structured as follows: session 2 serves as an introduction to the general concept of tax
havens. Session 3 provides some insights about how multinational corporations and wealthy
individuals make use of tax havens most of the time to, respectively, avoid and evade taxes. Findings
are supported with empirical evidence. Session 4 reports the different points of view of scholars
about the impact of tax havens on world’s economic growth. Session 5 concludes.
2. Tax havens
2.1 Definitions and formal lists of Tax Havens
International regimes, intended as the set of rules and governance structures established together
by nation states, have always helped to maintain and preserve the delicate balances between
countries, and to manage their conflicts.
With the arise of globalization and spread of multinational enterprises, international tax regimes
have been established, to manage the complex issue of taxation of income produced by
multinational corporations worldwide.
In this context, the Organization for the Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) considers
tax havens as “renegade states”, intended as countries whose “tax practices are salient to the
regime but whose behavior does not comply with the regime’s descriptive norms and practices”,
thus weakening regime effectiveness (Eden & Kurdle (2005)).
In 1998, in its report “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue”, the OECD provided some
practical guidelines for helping the governments to identify tax havens and came up with the key
factors which characterize tax havens:
1. No or only nominal taxes
2. Lack of effective exchange of information
3. Lack of transparency
4. The absence of a requirement that the activity needs to be substantial
As reported by Hines (2010) scholars generally agree on the fact that tax havens are countries and
territories that offer low tax rates and favorable regulatory policies to foreign investors.
On the other hand, the relative importance of the other features strictly depends on the context.
Some authors have tried to include them in their definition of tax havens. For example, Eden &
Kurdle (2005) claim that tax havens can be grouped according to the type of taxation and financial
services offered and according to the type of activities which are privileged.
For example, when low tax rates attract capital which induces changes in the real added value of
the tax haven, they can be categorized as production haven – for example Ireland. On the other
hand, when tax havens specifically design taxes rates to induce firms to incorporate in their
jurisdictions, regardless of the physical location of shareholders, are called headquarters haven – as
Belgium and Singapore. To conclude, sham havens – group which includes most of Caribbean and
Pacific tax havens, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Austria – serve as headquarters havens but offer
also high secrecy and specialize in allowing personal income-tax evasion.
However, boundaries of these categorizations are quite fuzzy and variable over time, especially due
to some efforts by OECD and national governments to fight bank secrecy.
Because of the lack of an agreed-upon definition of tax havens, many different lists have been
formulated by scholars and institutions over time.
The OCED created an initial list of tax havens in 2000 which changed much over the years. However,
the list did not include some low-tax member of the OECD, as Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg.
Moreover, it created a “black-list” of those which didn’t agree to commit to exchange information.
Currently, the OECD divides countries in three lists: a white list of countries implementing an agreedupon standard, a gray list of countries that have committed to such a standard, and a black list of
countries that have not committed. However the lists of the OECD can sometimes be biased by
some political pressure.
The Tax Justice Network proposes a very large list of tax havens, including some specific cities and
areas, as New York, the City of London, Trieste and many others. However, not everyone agrees on
this categorization.
Hines (2010) proposes a quite comprehensive list of 52 jurisdictions which can be recognized as tax
havens, based on their low business tax rates, the self-promotion as financial centers and whether
they were included in the list of other authorities sources, as other scholars, national governments
or international organization as the OECD.
Table 1 – List of Tax Havens
2.3 Determinants of Tax Havens
By looking at the list proposed by Hines (2010), it immediately stands out that the countries and
territories included in the list are not randomly distributed but share some common characteristics.
Dharmapala and Hines (2009) empirically investigate what are the determinants of becoming or not
a tax haven.
From their work it emerges that tax havens are generally small countries (or territories) with the
population not exceeding one million. This happens because small jurisdictions can only be pricetaker when it comes to international tax competition, meaning that any of their tax burden cannot
be shifted to foreign investors, but will be borne by domestic factors of production. For this reason,
domestic residents will benefit from eliminating taxes on foreign capital and directly taxing local
Moreover, they tend to be more affluent than non-havens and have quite open economies, close
to major exporters of capital, also in terms of time-zone. They are less likely to be landlocked and
more likely to be islands; this could be related to the higher ability of islands to attract tourists,
thereby capital. They tend to be common law and English speaking countries, and to have
parliamentary system. Compared to similar non-haven countries, they are in average less endowed
in natural resources, better equipped with infrastructures and have a significant advantage in
quality of governance. Finally, the majority of tax havens are dependent jurisdictions with
autonomous legal and tax systems.
While most of these features were widely recognized by the previous literature, the fundamental
contribution of these authors is to stress the extreme importance of the quality of governance in
determining the tax haven status.
When regressing the probability of being a tax haven against an index of quality of government including measures of voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of
law, and the control of corruption – obtained coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and
results are robust to several checks and control variables. Their well-known result is that, for a small
country with population below 1 million, increasing governance from 0 to 1 – as it would be when
increasing governance quality from the one of Brasil to that of Portugal – the probability of
becoming a tax haven increases from 26% to 61%.
A possible explanation to this phenomenon is that countries need to be credible in their promise to
foreign investors to keep low tax rates, if they want to attract capital. Country with poor governance
will not be able to maintain their credibility and thus will not attract enough foreign investment to
benefit from the lowering of rates.
This could also explain while, in spite of the high growth rates that characterizes the economies of
tax havens, not all countries, especially developing ones, attempt at being recognized as tax havens.
One notable example is Africa which has almost no tax havens and presents, indeed, the lowest
governance indexes of the world on average.
3. Who are the users of Tax Havens?
Tax havens process very large volume of foreign capital transactions. There are three main
categories of cross-border transactions: direct investment, portfolio securities, and other assets.
A direct investment is an investment made by an individual or a corporation which acquires at least
10% of ownership of a foreign company, thus gaining some control interests in the company. A
portfolio investment, on the other hand, is when the investor owns less than 10%. Other assets
include mainly loans and deposits.
The proportion of portfolio investment which is directed toward tax havens is astonishing: in 2007
the Cayman islands reported an inbound portfolio investment of 1.827.291 million dollars – the 6th
largest in the world – with a GDP 2.415 millions. Without going overseas, in 2007 Luxembourg had
a greater inbound portfolio investment than japan, which has 250 times the population of
Luxembourg (Hines (2010)).
Tax havens receive also large proportion of FDI: in 2004 American firms located 27% of their foreign
gross assets in tax havens and declared that 42% of their foreign income were earned in tax havens
(Hines (2010)).
This pattern reflects the desirability of locating capital and income-earning activities in low tax
jurisdictions: tax havens are very attractive locations for purely pass-through financial entities.
Indeed many corporations do not establish productive activities in tax havens, which explains the
incredible disproportion between capital inflow and GDP.
Even though FDI are almost entirely undertaken by multinational companies, capital injected into
tax haven comes from both wealthy individual investors and corporation, mainly with the purpose
of avoiding, or even evading, taxes.
3.1 Multinational companies and tax avoidance
Over the past decades, the activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has increased relentlessly.
As reported by Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), from 1990 to 2004, FDI by MNEs grew at an average
annual rate of 12,4%, which is more than double than the 5% growth rate of economy.
Those companies, whose importance in global economy is growing decade after decade, own a
quite large number of affiliates in tax havens. However, to what extent and how they make use of
these affiliates largely depends on corporate tax rates across countries and on how their home
countries tax foreign income.
The shared concern in the international community is that MNEs exploit differences in tax rates
across countries and use their affiliates in tax havens for avoiding taxes, namely by shifting income
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.
Gravelle (2015) describes some of the most common techniques used by corporations for avoiding
taxes. In particular, the two most used are debt shifting and transfer pricing.
The technique of debt shifting consists in borrowing more in affiliates located in high-tax
jurisdictions, where interest on debt is tax deductible, and establishing all equity financed affiliates
in low-tax jurisdictions.
Another well-established technique is that of manipulating the transfer pricing, that is the prices at
which the subsidiaries of a given group buy their own products from each other. Companies can
shift income by artificially lowering the price of goods and services sold by parents and affiliates of
the same company in high-tax jurisdictions and increasing the price of purchases. In this way profits
appear in tax havens and losses in non-havens.
In the attempt to limit the scope for this practice, regulatory agencies tried to impose the so called
“arm-length principle”: intra-group transactions should be carried out at the market price of the
goods and services traded, as if the subsidiaries were not linked. However, controlling that
companies are respecting this principle is a complex task, in particular for the transfers of rights,
intellectual properties and intangible. Indeed, companies operating with this kind of products are
particularly active in tax havens.
Other techniques include contract manufacturing and tax deferral techniques as cross crediting and
check-the-box provisions. Deferral techniques are particularly used by US corporations. The US
government, unlike the biggest part of major capital exporter’s governments, taxes income earned
inside the national territory as well as income earned abroad. The latter, however, is not taxed until
is repatriated: the behavioral consequence for US multinational corporations is that they are more
incentivized to use tax havens to delay repatriation of income, which is known as deferral.
Desai et al. (2006) empirically identify the characteristics of the US MNEs that make the most
extensive use of tax havens and which are the determinants for tax havens operations. To do so,
they perform a Logit regression where the dependent is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the
parent company owns at least an affiliate in a tax haven, and a Tobit regression where the
dependent is the fraction of a firm’s foreign affiliates located in tax havens. The explanatory variable
are the quantity of non-haven sales, the quantity of parent sales, the average industry non-haven
tax rate, the industry share of sales to related parties abroad and the parent R&D to sales ratio. The
analysis is performed for years 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999.
Their findings support the concern that multinational firms carry out operation in tax havens as a
part of their international tax avoidance strategies.
They discover that larger firms are more likely to have foreign affiliates, as well as those with an
higher fraction of foreign operations. This holds particularly for corporations with a high fraction of
intrafirm sales and high R&D/sales ratio, whose products are often intangible technology assets or
intangible properties as patents. This seem to support the fact that multinational companies makes
extensive use of transfer pricing to avoid some tax payments.
Moreover, results from the regression indicate that multinational corporations operating in
industries with low foreign tax rates are more likely to operate in tax havens, confirm that US firms
with low foreign tax rates benefit from making use of tax havens to defer US taxation of their foreign
To provide further evidence they distinguish between large tax havens - Hong Kong, Ireland,
Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland, which they call “Big 7 Havens – and all other
havens, which they call “dots”. Results show that high foreign tax rates in non-haven countries are
associate with greater operations in the “Big 7” where corporations can establish real operations,
which is a further evidence of firms relocating taxable income using, for example, profit shifting.
To conclude their analysis, they perform a new regression where the dependent variable is the ratio
of tax payments to sales for affiliates located outside of tax haven countries. They add more
explanatory variable and it emerges that while the ownership of regional tax havens affiliates –
intended as geographic proximity – is associated with a significant reduction in tax payments.
More recent empirical work present similar results for European countries. Gumpert, Hines and
Schnitzer (2016) reports evidence of tax avoidance behavior of German MNEs. However, the relative
small number of companies owning tax havens affiliates (roughly 20% with respect to the 59% of
US companies) indicate that most of the time available tax savings can be lower than the costs to
establish tax haven affiliates, due to firm-specific marginal costs of income reallocation.
3.2 Methods of avoidance and evasion by individuals
Financial services offered by tax havens are not addressed exclusively to corporations.
While most of the time, corporations do not expose their selves to huge scandals by illegally evading
taxes, but mainly exploit tax system loopholes to “legally” avoid taxes, wealthy individuals make a
quite different use of tax havens.
Gravelle (2015) explains that offshore evasion of individuals can take different forms. For example,
they could invest in foreign stock and bonds, which usually takes the form of a portfolio investment.
Else, they can put money in a bank account located in tax havens, which usually offers very high
protection of their clients’ privacy and high levels of banking secrecy.
Finally, individual can make use of trusts or create shell and sham companies to disguise their wealth
offshore, and not pay taxes on that income.
Gravelle (2105) reports an example, made by Guttenberg and Avi-Yonah, of how individuals typically
evade US taxes through a Cayman Island operation. An individual, using the Internet, can open a
bank account in the name of a Cayman corporation (or equivalently use a trust ore set a shell
company). Money can be electronically transferred without any reporting to tax authorities, and
investments can easily be made in the United States or abroad, since usually investments by nonresidents in interest bearing assets and most capital gains are not subject to a withholding tax. In
most of the cases, this operation is entirely protected by strict banking secrecy rules.
Some countries have engaged in the fight against overseas tax evasion, mainly by improving
exchange of financial information among countries and trying to put a brake on banking secrecy.
In 2010, the American congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which impose
foreign financial institutions to choose between reporting information on asset holders or be
subject to a 30% withholding rate.
Following the same wave, the European Union Saving Directive forced the EU member to choose
between information reporting or a withholding tax: only 3 countries – Austria, Belgium and
Luxembourg – chose not to report information, while the United States decided to not participate
to the agreement.
Although the measures taken by the various countries are incomplete and not very effective,
something is changing globally on banking secrecy, limiting the future of tax havens on this front.
To date, in fact, 105 countries around the world have signed up the “multilateral competent
authority agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information” formulated by the
OECD in its attempt to increase and facilitate multilateral and bilateral exchange of information.
In 2016, some of the most important financial centers, including Switzerland, Luxembourg and Hong
Kong, accepted to disclose bilateral information about the amount of bank deposits owned by
foreigners in their banks. Moreover, various scandals and leaking of information took place in last
years, involving some of the most important financial institutions located in tax havens – see for
example the well-known case of Panama Papers.
Scholars have been taken advantage of these events to try to estimate the amount of household
financial wealth which is held offshore. Zucman (2013), exploiting anomalies in global investment
statistics, estimated that 8% of households’ financial wealth is held in tax havens; this amount is
equivalent to 10% of the world GDP. Alstadsæter et al. (2018) confirmed his results by taking
advantage of the bilateral release of information, and find that this amount is heterogeneously
distributed among countries, and cannot be explained by differences in tax rates.
They found that countries with the greater stock of offshore assets are often autocracies – Russia
and some Latin American countries hold the equivalent of the 60% of their GDP offshore – together
with countries with a long tradition of democracy – as United Kingdom and France, which old around
15% of their GDP oversees. At the same time, some of the countries with the lowest amount of
wealth held offshore are Korea – a typical low-tax economy – and Scandinavian countries – some of
the world’s highest tax countries. Geography also showed to be an important determinant:
proximity to Switzerland explains a great fraction of the foreign wealth held in their bank accounts.
However, due to the illegal nature of tax evasion, it is also important to consider a possible
important margin of error in these kind of estimations. In particular, last decade’s boom of the use
of shell and sham companies poses several difficulties in the measurement of offshore households’
financial wealth.
4. Tax Havens and economic growth
Tax havens are often considered as “parasites” that erode the tax base of high-tax countries and
divert economic activities that would have otherwise taken place in non-havens.
The concern is so strong in the international community that in 2013, with the support of the leaders
of major developed countries, the OECD publish its report “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting”, where it declares that profit-shifting strategies by MNEs raise serious issues of fairness
and compliance and that “what is at stake is the integrity of the corporate income tax”.
Nevertheless, the numerous initiatives undertaken by national governments and international
organizations in the last decades to limit tax avoidance behavior of MNEs have never yielded the
desired results, and the amount of foreign capital injected in tax havens has continued to grow
While the phenomenon of tax evasion by wealthy individuals is not so easy to curb, tax avoidance
by MNEs most of the time consists in legally exploiting the loopholes of tax systems. In its report,
the OECD acknowledges that “the current international tax system, characterized by inter-state tax
competition, rather than by co-operation, has not kept pace with developments in the business
environment, providing MNCs with plenty of opportunities to exploit legal loopholes and enjoy
double non-taxation of income”.
This leads to the question of whether it is only a matter of a delay by the international community
to adapt to these changes or if there is someone else, besides tax havens, who benefits from their
4.1 Economic growth in tax havens
While it could seem obvious that tax havens benefit from being active financial centers, the
questions is much more complex.
As Hines (2005) underline, since foreign capital that enters into tax havens almost immediately flows
out to industrialized economies, this could easily not translate into real economic growth of tax
havens. Moreover, by imposing such low tax rates on foreign capital, they renounce to a large flow
of tax revenue which could have been devoted to the funding of their welfare systems.
Nevertheless, Hines (2005) empirically demonstrates that tax havens “flourish” in terms of
economic growth, displaying economic growth rates consistently higher than the economies of
higher-tax countries: haven countries as a group exhibited 3,3% annual per capita GDP growth from
1982 to 1999, whereas the world averaged just 1,4%. Also, he shows that the public sector is not
particularly affected by the extremely low tax rates, with similar ratio of government expenditures
to GDP as comparable non-haven countries. Indeed, even very low tax rates produce significant
revenues when the tax base is very large, as it is the case for tax havens which attract huge flows of
Blanco and Rogers (2012) confirm these results also when addressing endogeneity of tax haven
status, and on a more recent sample of countries. As seen in Dharmpala and Hines (2009) the tax
havens status around countries is not random, but has some very precise determinants that could
explain part of the related economic growth. For this reason, they run a 2SLS regression using land
area as an instrument instead than a tax haven status dummy, which still confirms the higher
economic growth of tax havens.
4.2 The impact of preferential tax regimes in developed countries
While most scholars agree on the fact that corporation are shifting profits to tax havens to avoid
taxes, the debate is still really ongoing on the effects that this behavior has on the business activity
and economy of high tax countries.
Basically, the tradeoff is the following: profit shifting to tax havens erodes the tax base of high-tax
countries thus reducing tax revenues. On the other hand, profit shifting effectively decreases the
investment cost of corporations and this could promote investment and economic activity.
The first point of view is supported by the well know work of Slemrod and Willson (2009), in which
they define tax havens as “parasites” which are responsible for pushing excessive tax competition.
They develop a model in which tax havens, by offering extremely low taxes, in turn oblige nonhavens to adopt tax rates lower than their optimum, thereby reducing their available budget for
public expenditures.
In contrast, in the same period Desai, Folei and Hines (2006) consider the effect of tax havens on
investments in high-tax countries through what they defines as the complementary effect, meaning
that if “foreign investment makes the use of tax havens more attractive, it follows that the use of
tax havens makes foreign investment more attractive”. More precisely, by giving corporations some
arbitrage on tax payments, the possibility of making use of tax havens reduce actual investment
costs of corporations, thereby stimulating their activity, particularly in the neighborhood of tax
Ten years later, scholars are far from finding an agreement. Most of the debate about profits shifting
focuses on tax revenues: as an example, Clausing (2016) estimates that profit shifting is likely to cost
the US government between 77 billion USD and 111 billion USD by 2012. In a very different paper,
however, Suarez (2018) studies the effects of the repeal of Section 936 of the US internal revenue
code, which excluded the income of Puerto Rican affiliates from corporate taxes. This rose tax rate
of exposed multinational corporations by 4.65-6 percentage points relative to non-exposed firm,
which lead to a reduction of their global investment by 10%, increased their share of investment
abroad by 12% and reduced their US employment by 6.7%. He also found that the slowdown of
employment growth persisted for 15 years after the repeal of 936. Using spatial variation, he found
that in more exposed industrial areas, the slowdown of employment growth persisted for 15 years
after the repeal of 936. These areas also experienced relative decrease in income, wages, and home
values, becoming more reliant on government transfers.
His results strongly support the theory that profit shifting not only distorts tax revenues, but has a
real effect on foreign and domestic investment and other economic indicators, as unemployment.
What is the prevailing effect, however, is still far from being clear.
4.3 The impact of preferential tax regimes in developing countries
Developing countries face the same trade off dealt with in session 4.2. However, when trying to
assess the impact of tax haven’s activity on the economy of developing countries, it is important to
consider the deep structural and institutional differences existing between developed and
developing countries.
Developing countries often have to deal with poverty and a big informal sector. For this reason, they
tend to depend more on corporate tax as a share of total tax revenue than developed economies,
and consequently could be more affected by the erosion of the corporate tax base. Also, they rely
heavily on flows of foreign capital to sustain their economies. As a consequence, they may risk to
engage into a very harmful tax competition in an attempt to attract as many foreign capital flows as
possible. Some interesting evidences support this concern: the UK International Development
Committee estimated that in 2012 tax revenues in developing economies represented the 13% of
their GDP, while developed economies collected the equivalent of the 35% of their GDP. In 2011,
the government of India indicated that losses due to tax incentives could be estimated at more than
5% of their GDP.
Crivelli, Keen, and de Mooij (2015) empirically demonstrate how profit shifting problems are likely
to be especially pressing in less developed countries. By conducting a panel data analysis on a
sample of 173 countries (OECD and non-OECD members) they conclude that base spillovers –
meaning the impact of countries’ tax policy on the tax base of other countries – is noticeably
stronger for non-OECD countries than for OECD countries, and statistically more significant.
Blanco and Rogers (2014) suggests that there might be a positive neighborhood effect for
developing country due to the proximity to tax havens. They observe, for example, that El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua benefit in terms of FDI by being in close proximity to
Belize. However they find that, while increased FDI is generally associated with economic growth,
the proximity to tax haven may have a different impact on welfare measure, suggesting that harmful
tax competition might be stronger than positive spillover effects.
5. Conclusions
Relying on a small part of the existing body of literature about tax havens, this literature review has
tried to offer a quite comprehensive insight to the reality of tax havens and the important
consequences that these small countries have on the world’s economy.
To date, the international community is divided between those who argue that tax havens are
completely harmful to non-haven economies and those who argue that under the right
circumstances, tax havens can stimulate international production and investment.
But while the debate is still ongoing, a fact clearly emerges: the ever increasing integration of the
production process and financial markets is making tax havens increasingly determinant actors in
the global scenario.
Individual countries and international organizations will have to confront each other and improve
their cooperation, especially in terms of exchanging information, in order to limit the damage
caused by tax havens activity, and seize the opportunities to benefit from it. On this front, the
international community has already made great strides in the fight against banking secrecy, but
much more can be done in terms of tax coordination and adaptation of laws to the new business
6. References
6.1 Main references
6.2 Other empirical evidences
Alstadsæter, A. & Johannesen, N. & Zucman, G. 2018.
"Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence
and implications for global inequality". Journal of
Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 89-100.
Suárez Serrato, J. C. 2018. "Unintended
Consequences of Eliminating Tax Havens". NBER
Working Papers 24850, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Blanco, L. R. & Rogers C. L. 2012. "Do Tax Havens Really
Flourish?". Global Economy Journal (GEJ), World
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 1-23,
Clausing K. A. 2016. "The Effect of Profit Shifting on
the Corporate Tax Base in the United States and
Beyond" National Tax Journal, National Tax
Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 69(4), pages
905-934, December.
Blanco, L. R. & Rogers C. L. 2014. "Are Tax Havens Good
Neighbours? FDI Spillovers and Developing
Countries". Journal of Development Studies, Taylor &
Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 530-540, April.
Crivelli, E. & de Mooij, R. A. & Keen, M. 2015. "Base
Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries" IMF
Working Papers 15/118, International Monetary Fund.
Dharmapala, D. & Hines J., 2009. "Which countries
become tax havens?". Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1058-1068, October.
Desai, M. A. & Foley, C. F. & Hines, J. R, 2006a. "The
demand for tax haven operations". Journal of Public
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 513-531,
Desai, M. A. & Foley, C. F. & Hines, J. R. 2006a. “Do Tax
Havens Divert Economic Activity?”. Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 219-224, February.
Eden, L. & Kudrle, R. T. 2005. “Tax havens: Renegade
states in the international tax regime?”. Law and
Policy, 27(1), 100-127.
Dharmapala, D. & Riedel, N. 2013. "Earnings shocks
and tax-motivated income-shifting: Evidence from
European multinationals". Journal of Public
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 95-107.
Gumpert A. & Hines, J. R. & Schnitzer M. 2016.
"Multinational Firms and Tax Havens". The Review
of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4),
pages 713-727, October.
Hines, J. R. 2010. "Treasure Islands". Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 24 (4): 103-26.
Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation. 1998. “Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue”.
OECD. 2019. Signatories of the multilateral
competent authority agreement onn automatic
exchange of financial account information and
intended first information exchange date.
Gravelle, J. 2015. “Tax Havens: International Tax
Avoidance and Evasion”. Congressional Research
Services. Extended version of: Gravelle, J. 2009. Tax
Evasion. National Tax Journal, 62(4), 727-753.
Hines, J. R. 2005. "Do Tax Havens Flourish?" NBER
Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 19,
pages 65-100, National Bureau of Economic Research,
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