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LumumbaCia3

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« Le jeune P.E. Lumumba a commis une erreur fatale: celle de ne pas avoir apprecie, a juste
titre, la delicatesse et la complexite de la mission qui etait devenue sienne depuis son
investiture a la tete du Gouvernement national du Congo »
Les problèmes de Lumumba avec la Belgique commencent-ils seulement après son
investiture comme Premier Ministre comme Miat le dit ?
Qu’en avait-il été de sa rivalité avec Kasavubu ?
Certes, Kasavubu son rival depuis 1958 parlait aussi de l’émancipation. Mais cinq mois avant
l’indépendance alors que tous les deux avaient boycotté les élections de 1959, Kasavubu était invité
à la Table ronde à Bruxelles pendant que Lumumba était emprisonné pour le même fait. A la date de
l’ouverture de la Table Ronde, Patrice Lumumba sera arraché de sa cellule de la prison de Stanleyville,
menottes au poing, pieds et torse nus, battu, et embarqué pour Élisabethville. Il est alors escorté par le
fameux commissaire Segers et qui se retrouvera environ un an plus tard, le 17 janvier 1961, à
Élisabethville parmi les personnes qui assisteront au supplice avant son assassinat.
Malgré tout, sous la pression du parti socialiste belge il sera libéré et rejoindra la Table Ronde où il fit
échouer le plan de la Belgique de faire le Roi Baudouin le Chef de l’Etat du Congo. Pendant toutes ces
discussions Kasavubu était en France pour preparer la secession de sa Republique du Congo Centrale.
Si le discours du 30 Juin était la cause de son assassinat on peut se demander quel est le discours
injurieux que le SG de l’ONU, assassiné lui aussi lors de la crise Congolaise de 1960, avait prononcé
contre le roi des Belges ? Et les nombreux lumumbistes assassines, l’avaient-ils été parce qu’ils avaient
été coauteurs de ce discours?
CI-DESSOUS DEUX DOCUMENTS HISTORIQUES DE LA CIA
DOCUMENT DE LA CIA A PROPOS DE LUMUMBA
4. Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central
Intelligence Agency (Tweedy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
(Satterthwaite)1
Washington, April 18, 1960.
SUBJECT

Political Action Operations in the Belgian Congo
Quoted below as received from Brussels and Leopoldville via [CIA] channels are joint
[State/CIA] statements on the Belgian Congo political situation.
[Page 8]
a. Brussels
We believe that it is unwise to undertake a major political action program in the pre-election
period. The political situation in the Congo is highly fluid. We are new on the Congo political
scene and, with few exceptions, do not have sufficient information on which to base a
judgment on who will win or who merits support. However, we are not opposed to giving
discreet support (provided it is not attributable to the United States Government) to a
limited number of candidates if specific justification is provided in each case. In view of the
delicacy of the situation and paucity of good information, we believe it is essential that the
[CIA] representative consult with the senior [State] representative in Leopoldville on specific
cases.
Our view is that pre-election emphasis should be on establishing access to and infiltration of
various political groups by both normal political officer contact and [less than 1 line not
declassified] key militants. The information obtained from both these activities is a necessary
basis for planning a sound investment in a limited number of key political leaders.
We are opposed to any “stop Lumumba” campaign. He is one of the few, if not only,
Congolese leaders with a Congo-wide appeal and standing. We feel it is almost certain that
he will play an important political role in the Congo for at least the next two years. Thus, an
anti-Lumumba campaign could backfire. Although we consider him unscrupulous and
willing to accept aid from anyone if it would help him, we suggest the possibility of limited
funding to Lumumba along with other selected leaders. This would provide relatively more
help to other leaders but would also keep the door open for future Lumumba contacts and
perhaps avoid alienating him if he learns of our support to other leaders.
[3 names not declassified] seem more attractive than many other leaders because their
newspaper and trade union ties give them some assurance of a continued role in Congo
affairs if they fail as political candidates. Also, [name not declassified] may offer a line to
[name not declassified]. We suggest that consideration also be given to possible assistance to
[1 line not declassified] who is fighting against the communist sympathizers, [1 line not
declassified] approached the Brussels senior [State] representative in Bukavu and made a
good impression. If the [CIA] representative in Leopoldville agrees, this would seem a
particularly good case where a small investment could pay real returns in weakening an
existing communist beachhead in East Congo.
Whether or not it is decided to mount political operations, it is strongly recommended that
Washington tell the Belgian Embassy that we do not intend to intervene in the Congolese
elections. As a matter of [Page 9]interest, the [State] establishment in Brussels
considers2 [less than 1 line not declassified].
b. Leopoldville
Whatever action we might undertake, now or at a later date, in the internal politics of the
Congo, we should exercise extreme caution in dealing with either [less than 1 line not
declassified] has always shown certain suspicions regarding our motives and even recently
cautioned Ngalula, during the latter’s stay in Washington, not to be taken in by the
blandishments of U.S. officials (see [State] despatch [illegible], 23 March).3 In addition,
[name not declassified] has often tried to minimize to [State] the problems in the Congo. For
example, the Belgian Embassy’s statement following the January 1959 riots said that they
were of little significance. Based on our contacts, we likewise do not believe [illegible]
suitable for participation in such negotiations.
AVRIL 1960 :
À notre avis, avant les élections, l’accent devrait être mis sur l’établissement d’un accès aux
divers groupes politiques et d’une infiltration de ces groupes, à la fois par les contacts normaux
des responsables politiques et par les principaux militants [moins d’une ligne non déclassifiés].
Les informations obtenues lors de ces deux activités constituent une base nécessaire pour
planifier un investissement judicieux dans un nombre limité de dirigeants politiques clés.
Nous sommes opposés à toute campagne «Stop Lumumba». Il est l’un des rares, si ce n’est
seulement les dirigeants congolais, à avoir un appel et une réputation à l’ensemble du Congo.
Nous pensons qu'il est presque certain qu'il jouera un rôle politique important au Congo
pendant au moins les deux prochaines années. Ainsi, une campagne anti-Lumumba pourrait se
retourner contre nous. Bien que nous le considérions comme peu scrupuleux et disposé à
accepter l'aide de quiconque si cela pouvait l'aider, nous suggérons la possibilité d'un
financement limité pour Lumumba, ainsi que d'autres dirigeants sélectionnés. Cela fournirait
relativement plus d'aide à d'autres dirigeants, mais garderait également la porte ouverte pour
les futurs contacts de Lumumba et éviterait peut-être de l'aliéner s'il apprend que nous
soutenons d'autres dirigeants.
AUGUST 1960
. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1
0731 (In 36351). Ref Dir 44012 (Out 55588):2
Leopoldville, August 11, 1960.
1. Although Congo political situation chaotic and it difficult predict eventual outcome,
Embassy and Station believe Lumumba moving left and Commie influence increasing.
Unless he stopped near future, believe he will become strongman, eliminating moderate
opposition and establishing regime under influence if not fully controlled by Commies. Thus
believe fall Lumumba would assist Western objectives.
2. Lumumba faced by mounting but apparently uncoordinated and disorganized opposition
in parliament and streets. Opposition appears based on tribal jealousies, fear
that Lumumba plans play strongman role eliminating opposition leaders and belief held by
many Congolese that he pro-Communist or under Communist control. However [Page
15]tribal and personal jealousies and lack political acumen opposition leaders preventing
concerted action and organized effort defeat govt in parliament. Per Embtel sent Wash
3593 (anti-Lumumba forces endeavoring embarrass govt and even considering coup d’etat or
assassination. Station counseling [Identity 1] and other contacts adhere legal means
ousting Lumumba. Urging them to coordinate efforts and obtain sufficient votes topple govt
in senate.
Reminding [Identity 1] and others that if they act prematurely it will give Lumumbaopening
to move against opposition, perhaps arresting leaders and or attempting eliminate senate.
Also illegal overthrow would force hand United Nations.
3. Most opposition groups favor some form confederation in place present federal system.
This development appears stem from fear of Lumumba and tribal loyalties. View this
situation we forced go along with confederation approach if wish work against Lumumba.
However, decentralization has many disadvantages such as opening way for Soviets to
penetrate one govt at a time, possibility of paramilitary and subversive ops directed against
other provinces from Lumumba controlled orientale, possibility of increased anarchy (if this
be possible) resulting from division responsibilities which would open way for Communist
penetration. Many problems would merely be transferred from Leop to provincial capitals
where it would be more difficult for KUBARK and ODYOKE to follow them.
4. View situation Station recommends following steps which coordinated with
Ambassador4 be taken shore up Western position Congo:
A. Use all Embassy and KUBARK contacts particularly [Identity 1] to influence senate to act
as balance wheel to Lumumba, Gizenga and other who appear favor bloc. This respect senate
would take position against bloc intervention or other acts inimical Western position.
B. Launch extensive [less than 1 line not declassified] campaign ([less than 1 line not
declassified] meetings) by assisting local political groups with the funds and guidance to take
anti Commie line and oppose Lumumba.
C. Expand political action operations seeking out and recruiting additional political leaders
with view to influencing opposition activities. Would try avoid premature action and
organize efforts to mount a no confidence vote in one or both houses of parliament.
Presently believe senate offers best chance win such vote. Immediate goal would be replace
present govt with more moderate coalition headed by [Identity [Page 16]1]. He appears be
only opposition leader with hope of rallying opposition groups.
D. Attempt infiltrate govt with KUBARK controlled assets such as [name not declassified] to
obtain political intel and try limit influence Commies and incompetent Congolese officials,
many of whom fail realize gravity situation and do not understand steps taken by them
leading Congo to chaos and opening way for future Commie takeover.
E. Bring about call constituent assembly once opposition organized with view writing
constitution acceptable majority on basis desires and Congo mores.
F. Cultivate and attempt recruit members current govt to keep foot in Lumumbacamp.
Although believe would be better oust him, do not want become tied irrevocably to
opposition, if it not able achieve goals. Also would use such assets to try
moderate Lumumba govt and obtain political intel.
5. Recognize above campaign involves large expenditures and offers no guarantee success.
Even if campaign successful our work only beginning as political and economic chaos will
continue forseeable future. Also wish stress Lumumba and company well organized,
opposition disorganized, Station faced with problem finding, developing and recruiting [less
than 1 line not declassified] and political action assets, few if any of opposition appear
understand parliamentary methods needed change govt. However, all Station efforts
concentrated this campaign on crash basis as political pot may boil over any time and action
necessary now.
[Omitted here is further discussion of the proposal.]
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